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Air Traffic Evaluations (7010.1) | ATE | Effective: | 07-15-99 | Updated: | 06-01-99 |
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Subject: | INFORMATION: Full-Facility Evaluation, | Date: |
Anytown ATCT (XYZ), Your State; | ||
June 21-25, 1999 | ||
From: | Manager, Air Traffic Evaluations and | Reply to |
Investigations Staff, AAT-20 | Attn. of: | |
To: | Manager, Air Traffic Division, AXX-500 |
Members of the Air Traffic Evaluations and Investigations Staff, AAT-20, conducted a full-facility evaluation (FFE) at XYZ on June 21-25, 1999. A specialist from the (Name) Region's QA Staff, AXX-505; an OS from XYZ; and a CPC who served as the NATCA representative assisted the team. The evaluation was conducted through observation, position monitoring, interviews, data review, and a review of in-flight evaluation reports. Operational positions were monitored for ## hours. The team conducted ## interviews (## internal and ## external) and reviewed ## in-flight evaluation reports. A total of ### items were assessed during the evaluation. The ATM and staff were briefed on June 25, 1999, regarding the evaluation team's findings. The hub manager attended the outbriefing.
XYZ, an ATC Grade 10 facility within the Central Your State Hub, had a traffic count for CY 199X of ###,### compared to ###,### for CY 199X, a # percent increase/decrease.
XYZ experienced ## OE's and ## OD's during the 12-month period prior to the evaluation.
1. OPERATIONS. A total of ## items was assessed. Of these, ## items were rated satisfactory. Other items were rated as follows:
a. Action. Two items were identified.
1. (99-T-XYZ-01A) OE/D CAUSAL FACTOR: RADAR DISPLAY. Specialists routinely dropped data blocks while aircraft were still within their areas of responsibility (7110.65, par. 5-3-8).
2. (99-T-XYZ-02A) OE/D CAUSAL FACTOR: POSITION-RELIEF BRIEFING. Specialists did not use position-relief checklists nor accomplish comprehensive verbal briefings (7110.65, par. 2-1-23 and app. D).
b. Management Effectiveness. One item was identified.
(99-T-XYZ-03M) POINT-OUT PROCEDURES. Specialists did not utilize proper interphone message format when initiating and receiving point-outs; e.g., specialists failed to restate aircraft call signs and/or beacon codes when receiving point-outs. In addition, the coordination was not completed with an exchange of operating initials (7110.65, pars. 2-4-13 and 5-4-3).
NOTE-
Point-out Procedures was identified as a problem during the previous FFE conducted in May 1997.
c. Problem. Two items were identified.
1. (99-T-XYZ-04P) STRIP-MARKING PROCEDURES. A review of flight progress strips revealed that the ATIS code was either not placed in the appropriate location or not entered on the strip. Additionally, strip-marking errors were obliterated rather than lined-through (7110.65, par. 2-3-1 and XYZ 7110.2C, par. 8-6).
2. (99-T-XYZ-05P) PIREP's. Specialists did not solicit PIREP's hourly when weather conditions warranted. In addition, specialists did not relay PIREP information to subsequent aircraft (7110.65, par. 2-6-3).
NOTE-
PIREP's was identified as a problem during the previous FFE conducted in May 1997.
d. Region. One item was identified.
(99-T-XYZ-06R) LETTER OF AGREEMENT (LOA). The mandatory LOA between XYZ and the airport authority pertaining to movement and non movement areas had been negotiated and submitted for the airport manager's signature over 2 years ago. At the time of the FFE, there was no indication that a signed document would be forthcoming in the near future. Documentation substantiated that the ATM and the hub manager had exhausted all avenues for resolution at the local level with the airport authority (7210.3, pars. 4-3-1 through 4-3-3).
e. Informational. One item was identified.
MVA CHART/VIDEO MAP. The MVA chart was properly validated; however, the new video map did not depict the MVA in the area that was outside XYZ's delegated airspace yet within XYZ's ASR range. Discussions with the SM and an SP indicated that action had been initiated to obtain a corrected MVA video map.
2. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. A total of ## items was assessed. Of these, ## items were rated satisfactory. Other items were rated as follows:
a. Commendable. One item was identified.
TRAINING TEAM RESPONSIBILITIES. XYZ personnel were commended for their demonstrated commitment to excellence in conducting and administering the OJT program. Eight developmentals were assigned to XYZ at the time of the FFE. Training course material was detailed, organized, and current. Training reports prepared by the OJTI's and skill checks documented by OS's were consistently and sufficiently detailed to support management's decisions. Training teams met regularly to review each developmental's progress. All recommended skill enhancement training was individualized and designed specifically to improve the developmental's performance. Adherence to the train-to-succeed philosophy resulted in training outcomes that reflected unique dedication by all personnel.
b. Management Effectiveness. One item was identified.
(99-T-XYZ-07M) PREPARATION OF FAA FORM 7230-4. An "E" was not placed in the left margin on FAA Form 7230-4 to denote equipment returned to service. The tower cab's watch checklist did not contain all equipment that was required to be checked during each shift; e.g., MSAW/CA. Remarks did not include that AF had accomplished DVRS checks. In addition, FAA Form 7230-4 was retained beyond 6 months (1350.15, par. 7230; 7210.3, pars. 4-6-3, 4-6-5 and 11-2-7; and XYZ 7110.1, app. 1).
NOTE-
Preparation of FAA Form 7230-4 was identified as deficient during the previous FFE conducted in May 1997 and a problem during the FUE conducted in June 1998.
c. Problem. One item was identified.
(99-T-XYZ-08P) ADMINISTRATIVE REFERENCE FILES. Reference binders in staff offices contained outdated material. In addition, the master library contained numerous canceled directives (1320.1, par. 1103; 7210.3, par. 2-1-4).
NOTE-
Administrative Reference Files was identified as deficient during the previous FUE conducted in June 1998.
d. Deficient. Two items were identified.
3. (99-T-XYZ-09D) TECHNICAL TRAINING RESPONSIBILITIES. The ATM had not ensured that technical training objectives and technical performance trends were developed (7210.56, par. 3-1-2).
4. (99-T-XYZ-10D) DUTY FAMILIARIZATION DIRECTIVE. A facility directive did not specify the positions that required duty familiarization and the minimum information to be read/discussed as part of duty familiarization (7210.3, par. 2-2-3).
e. Informational. One item was identified.
COLLEGE TRAINING INITIATIVE (CTI) DEVELOPMENTALS. Interviews revealed that XYZ anticipated eight CTI developmentals before the end of FY-99. Three of these developmentals had reported at the time of the evaluation. Training course materials had been updated and the facility was preparing for qualification training. It was significant that the three developmentals who were on board had reported without completing initial qualification training; e.g., tower visibility, BRITE, and control tower operator (CTO) examinations.
Consequently, the sole SP at XYZ would be required to administer this unanticipated classroom training.
NOTE-
This item was off-checklist.
3. SPECIAL EMPHASIS ITEMS (SEI).
a. National SEI's. No item was applicable.
b. Regional SEI's. One item was applicable.
VFR-ON-TOP. Observations and interviews revealed that facility personnel were knowledgeable of procedures for VFR-on-top clearances.
(Manager's Signature)
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