The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 1997
The Purple Suit concept, reflected in the color of this publication’s cover, represents an important metaphor of joint and combined planning. Service members involved in joint and combined operations dissociate themselves from the inherent biases of parochial concerns to work together for the common good. The color purple symbolizes the intermingling of all the whites, blues, greens, tans, reds, gold, and silver found in Service uniforms and insignia. Purple is joint and combined: the Purple Suiter is an officer who embodies the motto on the Armed Forces Staff College Seal: “That All May Labor as One.”
The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 1997
AFSC Pub 1

The mission of the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) is to prepare mid-career and senior officers for joint and combined duty. AFSC Pub 1 is an even more important document now that joint professional military education is a shared responsibility, with Phase I taught at the Service schools and Phase II taught at AFSC. AFSC Pub 1 is the basic textbook at the college and the single most important document we use to carry out our mission. Several other colleges and institutions have adopted Pub 1 for their curricula, and it has become a prominent reference book for operators and planners throughout the joint community. AFSC Pub 1 is also available in the Joint Electronic Library, accessible through desktop computers.

Pub 1 is a unique document. It offers a perspective on joint planning and execution that is not found elsewhere. It presents the “big picture” of the players, the process, and the procedures, synthesizing elements from a wide range of sources, presenting them in a systematic manner. No other single publication so completely treats the subject of “jointness.”

Because Pub 1 is derived from many sources, official and unofficial, AFSC has no monopoly on its contents. The process of joint planning is dynamic, so Pub 1 must be dynamic. This edition reflects the adaptive planning concepts evolving as our new National Military Strategy adjusts to the post-cold-war environment and the inherent uncertainties and instabilities of a rapidly changing world. To keep it useful and current, however, we depend on input from the users of this book, who labor every day to solve the problems of joint planning in the “real world.” Therefore, we solicit not only official comments from your commands, but also unofficial comments from you, the reader/user.

AFSC’s motto “That all may labor as one” is probably more relevant today than at any other time in our recent history. The challenges that face our nation during current budget realities, force reductions, and stringent review of our basic Service roles and missions require military leaders who understand fully the complexities of joint warfare. Our goal is to support the needs of the combatant commanders and their staffs during these very challenging times.

William R. Looney III
Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force
Commandant

EDUCATING STRATEGIC LEADERS FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW
The National Defense University (NDU) was established by the Department of Defense on 16 January 1976. The four institutions of NDU, the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Information Resources Management College (colocated at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.), and the Armed Forces Staff College (Norfolk, Virginia), along with the Institutes for National Strategic Studies and Higher Defense Studies, ensure excellence in professional military education and research for national security. The university was created in response to recommendations made by the DOD Committee on Excellence in Education, and is the senior joint educational institution operating under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since two senior Service colleges were located on the same post, the committee realized that close affiliation of the two institutions would reduce administrative costs, streamline duplicated functions, permit better use of people and resources, and promote constructive dialogue benefiting both colleges. This affiliation enabled students from each college to enroll in elective courses taught at both schools, and to share in other educational opportunities not possible in the past. It also permitted use of faculty expertise in both colleges for the benefit of all university students. On 12 August 1981, the Armed Forces Staff College was also brought under NDU with the same objectives in mind.

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

The National War College (NWC), one major component of the National Defense University, is a unique military education institution. The National War College conducts a senior-level course of study in national security strategy to prepare selected military officers and federal officials for high-level policy, command, and staff responsibilities. The National War College focuses on national security policy and strategy and emphasizes a joint and interagency perspective. Reflecting this emphasis, the student body is composed of equal representation from the land, sea (including Marine and Coast Guard), and air Services, with the remaining quarter of the class drawn from the various civilian federal departments and agencies.
The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) is a major component of the National Defense University. It is the only senior Service college dedicated to the study of management of resources for national security. The ICAF mission is to prepare selected military officers and civilians for senior leadership and staff positions by conducting postgraduate, executive-level courses of study and associated research dealing with the resource component of national power, with special emphasis on materiel acquisition, and its integration into national security strategy for peace and war. ICAF furnishes the senior course for the acquisition work force.

The Information Resources Management College (IRMC) is the capstone institution for Defense IRM education. As such, it offers graduate-level courses in information resources management. The college prepares senior Department of Defense officials for joint management of the information resource component of national power and its integration with, and support to, national strategy.

The Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) was established on 13 August 1946 as a joint educational institution operating under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The college is composed of three schools, the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School (JCSOS), Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS), and the Joint Command, Control, and Information Warfare School (JCIWS). The JCSOS and JCWS offer PJE Phase II education for Joint Specialty Officer nominees. The JCSOS and JCWS focus on joint and combined operations planning (integration of air, land, and naval forces) with emphasis on strategic deployment, joint employment, sustainment, and the synchronization of forces. The curriculum is designed to promote a spirit of cooperation and understanding that is critical to joint and combined warfighting. The JCIWS deals with facets of command and control communications, operations, and countermeasures, and with information warfare.
History

In the 1930s few officers were qualified to engage in joint or combined operations. The demands of World War II highlighted the shortfall of not having trained officers who could easily plan for joint and combined actions by ground, sea, and air forces. To overcome this shortfall and to alleviate the friction and misunderstanding resulting from lack of joint experience, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established an Army-Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) in 1943. ANSCOL conducted four-month courses to train officers for joint command and staff duties.

In the mid-1940s a joint military committee prepared a directive for a new school. This directive was approved on 28 June 1946 and established the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) as the primary military institution to train officers assigned to joint and combined duty. Responsibility for the operation and maintenance of its facilities was charged to the Chief of Naval Operations. Following a temporary residence in Washington, D.C., AFSC was established in Norfolk, Virginia, on 13 August 1946 on the site of a former U.S. Naval Receiving Station. The faculty was composed of officers with joint experience in all theaters of World War II. There were 150 students in the first class, which began on 3 February 1947. AFSC conducted two classes of about six months' duration each year.

AFSC began a period of growth in size and prominence. Classes were expanded to include civilian students from DOD agencies and officers from allied nations to further promote the joint and combined experience. With the construction of Normandy Hall in 1962, the college completed its transition from a temporary to a permanent institution. AFSC became part of the National Defense University on 12 August 1981.

In 1978 AFSC assumed responsibility for teaching the Joint Command, Control, and Communications Staff and Operations Course, and the formation of two schools within the college began. The Joint and Combined Staff Officer School (JCSOS) accommodated the original charter of the college, while the Joint Command, Control, and Electronic Warfare School (JCEWS) accepted responsibility for this additional course plus two more: the Joint Electronic Warfare Staff Officer Course in 1982 and the Joint Command, Control, and Communications Countermesures Staff Officer Course in 1989.
Until 1990 the AFSC JCSOS continued to graduate two classes of about six months’ duration each year. In July 1990 the school adjusted its program to comply with congressional requirements for joint professional military education and began a two-level curriculum to furnish Phase II joint education for Joint Specialty Officer nominees. Intermediate-level officers completed a nine-week course and interacted with those in an associated five-week course for senior-level officers. In the summer of 1991 the 9-week intermediate program was expanded to 12 weeks, and decoupled from the 5-week senior program. In 1994, the senior program expanded from 5 to 12 weeks.

Mission

The Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) is a selectively manned, joint professional military educational institution that educates staff officers and other leaders in joint operational planning and warfighting in order to instill a primary commitment to joint and combined teamwork, attitudes, and perspective.

Insignia

The red of the shield symbolizes the Army, the silver the Air Force, and the blue the Navy. The nebuly lines link the three military departments into an inseparable whole. The torch is a symbol of leadership showing the way; the book is a symbol of scholastic work; the wreath represents achievement. The scarlet circle bearing the name of the college is symbolic of a sword belt, indicating that only officer personnel attend the college.
AFSC Pub 1 is the primary AFSC textbook. Pub 1 brings together official procedures and adds necessary details in explaining the complex process of joint planning. It serves as a compendium of guidance from many sources, including Joint Publications, Service publications, technical reports, and person-to-person reports received from staff officers working in the field. To further assist the reader, Pub 1 cites authoritative sources as needed.

There are many changes in this revision of Pub 1. Procedures, terminology, and even the organization of the Joint Planning and Execution Community continue to change, so we must keep pace to remain effective staff officers and planners. It is impossible to keep the material in this publication current without information from those of you who read and use it. Please mail suggestions for improvements, changes, or corrections to

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
Joint and Combined Staff Officer School
ATTN: Pub 1 Coordinating Editor
7800 Hampton Boulevard
Norfolk, Virginia 23511-1702

REQUESTS FOR COPIES Pub 1 is distributed to resident students of the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School, the JPME Phase II Senior Course, and the Joint Command, Control, and Information Warfare School; attendees at the Joint Planning Orientation Course; the Joint Staff; the military Service headquarters; the unified commands and their Service component commands; the specified commands; the subordinate unified commands; and the National Defense University. Many commands and agencies have elected to attach their needs to the initial AFSC contract. Other commands, agencies, schools, and individuals may purchase copies of Pub 1 through the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
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All have my sincere thanks.

CHARLES L. CORNWALL, Colonel, USAF
AFSC Pub 1 Editor
“Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort.”

_Dwight D. Eisenhower_
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The Joint Staff Officer  

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The Joint Staff Officer

100. PURPOSE AND PERSPECTIVE

a. The purpose of The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, AFSC Pub 1, is to be a single, useful volume to help you understand joint operation planning. It does not stand alone; it is a textbook to supplement the instruction of the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School at the Armed Forces Staff College. It is a textbook and not official doctrine for operations. Joint and Service Doctrine should be referred to for official guidance. While no single volume can fully cover the entire subject, our purpose here is to give you many of the fundamental principles of the joint planning system. Pub 1 is also a compendium of the many references used by the staff officer. References listed in each chapter should be consulted for the most current and accurate procedures and policies. Its organization and content were selected to offer

- the “big picture” of the complex system of joint operation planning used by the U.S. military;
- an introduction to joint and combined organizations and their command relationships;
- a description of the tools and responsibilities of action officers on a joint staff; and
- references and detailed guides that give the joint staff officer a place to turn for additional material.

b. We have found that our readers’ perspectives vary widely. Professionally, the readers may be staff officers well versed in military planning, or they may be new to this complex and challenging work. Operationally, their organization may be employment oriented, or they may work at a level concerned with strategic matters. Each point along the spectrum has different expectations and places different demands on the joint planning process.

c. Pub 1 offers a view of all the players in the planning community that helps you to better understand the entire process and, thus, your role in it. We will outline the processes and cite references so that the serious student can go to the source for an in-depth discussion of an issue. To assist you in developing skill in military planning, we will place Service planning procedures in the context of the overall concept of the joint planning process.
d. Your view of the overall process may also improve if you study military-hi
tory, strategy, tactics, logistics, and the principles of war. Joint Publication 5-0 and the
5-series joint pubs should also be studied. That helps to compensate for a lack of previ
ous work in the field of planning and gives you a broad perspective not limited to your
work experience. Such study will give you a broader and deeper understanding of the
factors that influence military operations and will also illuminate past mistakes.

101. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

a. As you develop your professional base of experience in joint planning, you will
have to filter from the ocean of information some key lessons learned or certain guiding
principles that have universal application. In our profession, the principles of war repr
sent some of those fundamental truths that have stood the test of time. Students who
have reviewed and researched warfare over the years still have not reached consensus on
a single list of principles of war; but they all will attest that such principles are a good
starting point for evaluating military strategy and tactics, and form the foundation for
operation planning.

b. Indepth discussions of our current principles of war can be found in joint and
Service publications. Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces* discusses
the principles of war and their application in joint warfare. Army Field Manual No.
100-1, *The Army*, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 *Naval Warfare*, Air Force Manual 1-1,
*Basic Doctrine of the U.S. Air Force* and Fleet Marine Force Manual FMFM 6-4,
*Marine Rifle Company/Platoon* all contain extensive discussions of the principles of
war. Excellent articles about the principles of war can be found in *Military Review*
(May 1955 and September 1981) and *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (November
1986). Figure 1-1 summarizes these joint and Service publications and references. As
you can see, the principles of war differ from country to country.

102. PROFESSIONAL READING LIST As a framework for expanding your
professional knowledge in this area, the following professional reading list on classic
military thought is recommended. For a more complete list, see the bibliographies listed
in many of the following publications and in professional military journals. For a list of
professional readings recommended by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see
Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces* For the study of military classic
literature, see the historical bibliography #8 compiled by Dr. Robert H. Berlin of the
Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6800. For the study of the
“Great Captains,” see special bibliography #279 compiled by Air University Bibliogra
phy Branch, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
**PRINCIPLES OF WAR**

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Adapted from JT Pub 1, FM 100-1, AFM 1-1, and FMFM 6-4
*Military Review, May 1955, and Soviet Battlefield Development Plan*

**Figure 1-1**


Joint Electronic Library (JEL)


103. ORIGINS OF AMERICAN MILITARY STAFF PRACTICE
a. **European origin** The staff practice and philosophy of the Armed Forces of the United States are almost completely of European origin. The modern general staff was developed in Prussia during the nineteenth century. Distinctive features of this staff system included

- the staff’s semi-independent position within the Prussian War Ministry,
- the staff’s special concern with military theory and doctrine as well as with the higher military education of senior officers, and
- the exchange of officers of the general staff corps between positions on the general staff and duties with field units.

The general staff improved commanders’ ability to control the field operations of mass armies. These advantages eventually brought about the adoption of a staff system by all major Western powers.

b. **The United States and the general staff concept** Major General Friedrich von Steuben, the first Inspector General of the Continental Army of the United States, introduced the staff practices of Frederick the Great into Washington’s army during the American Revolution. His well-drawn estimates of the military situation were of significant value to the American cause. Although American military leaders failed to develop the staff concept further during the years following the Revolution, the military staff saw rapid development in Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century.

c. The American Civil War exposed many of the conceptual weaknesses of our military staff. Why General George G. Meade failed to follow up his advantage at Gettysburg and pursue Lee in his retreat has been the subject of endless debate. Only a few historians have noted that Meade really lacked a staff with the training and resources to prepare and disseminate plans and orders quickly for such a complex operation. On the evening of 3 July 1863, a well-trained staff with adequate resources might have changed the course of history had it presented Meade with a well-conceived and ready-to-execute plan for pursuing Lee. The brilliant campaigning of Lee and Jackson was performed without detailed, exhaustive formal planning. It was more in keeping with the American style of the time, and it caught the imagination of militaries around the world. War, however, was becoming too complex, too industrialized to be fought without extensive use of the staff system. Isolated from Europe and concerned mainly with internal affairs during the nineteenth century, the United States did not adopt the military staff system for the Armed Forces until the beginning of the twentieth century.

104. **STAFF DEVELOPMENT IN THE INDIVIDUAL MILITARY SERVICES** Today, a number of functions common to all the Services have developed from the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments, and most recently from the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Figure 1-2 describes these common functions. The following pages discuss the evolution of military staffs within each
of the Services and the specifics related to their current functions. These functions are, by law, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and the authority of the combatant commander as specified in Chapter 6, Title 10, U.S. Code. The accompanying illustrations describe some of the major functions of the individual Services as discussed in DOD Directive 5100.1. Additional information is in CM-44-89 “Report on Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces,” and CM 1584-93 “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States,” 10 February 1993.

**COMMON FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS**

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<td>• maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment in emergency;</td>
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<td>• recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to unified and specified combatant commands;</td>
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<td>• prepare and submit budgets for their respective departments;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations and administrative and logistic support for all forces and bases; and</td>
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<td>• assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective functions.</td>
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Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1 Figure 1-2

a. The U.S. Army

(1) **Origin.** From its birth in 1775 until the early 1800s, young America’s army staff patterned itself after the British system: control of the small Regular Army was split between the Commanding General, who was responsible for military discipline and control of field forces, and the Secretary of War, who guided administration and support with a staff bureau system. This bureau system divided authority between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army and lacked the mechanism to develop coordinated, long-range plans. Though suited to the efficient administration of a small peacetime force, the bureau system was incapable of coping with the demands placed on the twentieth-century Army, a situation that became clear in the Spanish-American War (1898).

(2) **Development in the twentieth century**
(a) In 1899, a civilian lawyer, Elihu Root, was appointed Secretary of War. At the time, he expanded the Army’s missions to include pacification and administration of the island territories recently acquired from Spain; in addition, he responded to public criticism of the logistical and operational confusion that had plagued Army performance in the Spanish-American War. He undertook reform of the Army command and staff system patterned on the British system. In 1903 Congress passed legislation creating a modern U.S. Army General Staff. The War Department General Staff corps of 44 officers, who were relieved of all other duties, was functionally organized to prepare plans for the national defense and mobilization of troops. The legislation also replaced the ranking military position, Commanding General of the Army, with a War Department Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff (COS) supervised all Army forces and the staff departments that had been responsible to the Secretary of War. It was not until 1918, though, that it was clearly resolved that the Chief of Staff was the ranking member of the Army when General Pershing, then Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, was made subordinate to the COS. The Root reforms were the beginning that gave the Army the basis for a unified command and staff system.

(b) Today the Army Staff is an executive component of the Department of the Army. It exists to assist the Secretary of the Army in his/her responsibilities, and includes the following:

- Chief of Staff
- Vice Chief of Staff
- Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Plans, and Logistics
- Assistant Chiefs of Staff (positions authorized by law, but not used)
  - Special Staff: Chief of Engineers; Surgeon General; Judge Advocate General; Chief of Chaplains; Chief of National Guard Bureau; and Chief of Army Reserves
The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war. The Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and any organic aviation and water transport assigned.

**SOME OF THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMY ARE TO**

- organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land—specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations;
- develop airborne doctrine, procedures, and equipment that are common to the Army and Marine Corps;
- organize, equip, and provide Army forces for joint amphibious, airborne, and space operations and train such forces, in accordance with joint doctrines;
- organize, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations;
- organize, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of psychological operations;
- furnish forces for the occupation of territories abroad;
- perform functions relating to the management and operation of the Panama Canal; and
- conduct the authorized civil works program, including projects for improvement of navigation, flood control, beach erosion control, and other water resource developments in the United States.

_A collateral function of the Army is to train forces to interdict enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on or from land._
b. The U.S. Navy

(1) **Origin.** The Department of the Navy was established in 1798. The early department was entirely in the hands of civilian appointees, while naval officers served at sea. Growth in size and complexity of Navy business in the first quarter of the 1800s led to creation of a Board of Naval Commissioners to give professional advice to the civilian appointees on constructing, repairing, and equipping ships and superintendent shipyards. It was a bilinear arrangement, since employment of forces and discipline of troops was retained by the Secretary of the Navy. By 1842 the Navy Department had shifted from a predominantly personnel service, like its Army counterpart, to a predominantly materiel service deeply involved in complex and expanding technical problems. Five individual bureaus under the Secretary of the Navy were created for yards and docks; construction, equipment, and repairs; provisions and clothing; ordnance and hydrography; and medicine and surgery. The creation of additional bureaus specifically for navigation and equipment and for recruiting (enlisted personnel matters) was the response to weaknesses of the bureau system that were discovered during the Civil War. When necessary, special boards were formed to consider specific technical problems, such as strategy, inventions, and new vessels. By the close of the nineteenth century, the size and complexity of the Service, as well as the pressing need to ensure adequate preparation for war, became too much for control by a single manager. This, compounded by the intra-Service as well as the inter-Service experiences in the Spanish-American War, furnished motivation for Congressional and administrative change in the early 1900s.

(2) **Development in the twentieth century**

(a) In 1909 a General Board of the Navy was established to serve as an advisory body to the Secretary on matters of personnel, operations, materiel, and inspections. Legislation in 1915 created the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) that was charged with the operation of the fleet and preparation and readiness of war plans. In the 1920s the responsibilities for operation of the fleet were assigned to the newly created position of Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet. In March 1942 the positions of Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet and CNO were consolidated; once again the total direction and support of the U.S. Navy operating forces were under a single person. By the 1960s the CNO as military chief had complete responsibility for operations as well as supporting logistics and administration.

(b) Today the **Office of the Chief of Naval Operations** within the Department of the Navy assists the Secretary of the Navy in executing his or her responsibilities. This office includes the following:
FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

The Department of the Navy is responsible for the preparation of the Navy and Marine Corps forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war and, under the integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime component of the Navy and Marine Corps to meet the needs of war. Within the Department of the Navy, the Navy includes naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic.

SOME OF THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ARE TO

- organize, train, equip and furnish Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and land-based naval air components--specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to establish and maintain local superiority in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land, air, and space operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign;

- organize, equip, and furnish naval forces, including naval close air support and space forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious operations;

- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic nuclear warfare to support strategic deterrence;

- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, protection of shipping, aerial refueling and minelaying, and controlled minefield operations; furnish the afloat forces for strategic sealift;

- furnish air support essential for naval operations;

- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including forces required for the strategic defense of the United States, under joint doctrines;

- organize, train, equip, and furnish forces to operate sea lines of communication;

- organize, train, equip, and furnish forces for the support and conduct of special operations; and

- coordinate with the Department of Transportation for the peacetime maintenance of the Coast

Some collateral functions of the Navy and Marine Corps are to

- interdict enemy land power, air power, and communications through operations at sea;

- furnish close air and naval support for land operations;

- prepare to participate in the overall air and space effort; and

- establish military government pending transfer of this responsibility.

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1 Figure 1-4
Chief of Naval Operations
Vice Chief of Naval Operations
Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations
Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel (N1); Policy, Strategy, and Plans (N3/5); Logistics (N4); and Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments (N8)
Directors: Director of Naval Intelligence (N2); Director, Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Requirements (N6); Director, Training and Doctrine (N7); Chief of Naval Reserve; Surgeon General; Chief of Chaplains; and Oceanographer of the Navy

c. The U.S. Marine Corps

(1) **Origin.** The Marine Corps staff had its origin in 1798 in the Act for the Establishment and Organization of the Marine Corps. For a time the Commandant was a one-man staff; his chief duty was recruiting Marines for service with the fleet. As the number of recruits began to increase, however, the Commandant expanded the staff to include an adjutant to assist with musters and training, a quartermaster to procure supplies, and a paymaster to pay the troops. An administrative staff of three to five officers carried the Marine Corps through the nineteenth century.

(2) **Staff growth in the twentieth century.** The emergence of the United States as a world power after the Spanish-American War greatly expanded Marine Corps employment. As additional staff officers were assigned to aid the adjutant, quartermaster, and paymaster, their offices became known as departments. Change first occurred outside the staff departments in what came to be called the “Immediate Office of the Commandant.” The initial step was taken in 1902, when an officer was assigned to headquarters as aide-de-camp to the Commandant. He formed the nucleus for staff expansion in the Office of the Commandant. The position of Chief of Staff was added in 1911 to assist the Commandant with matters of training, education, equipping the troops, and organization, distribution, and assembly at embarkation for expeditionary duty.

(3) Between World War I and the 1970s, the Marine Corps headquarters staff evolved into the staff that is seen today. In the early years of the twentieth century, there was the strong influence of the American Expeditionary Force and the development of the Army staff. Through World War II, the headquarters staff retained a line planning staff and functionally organized staff divisions for administrative, technical, supply, and operations functions. In the 1950s the staff was reorganized along general staff divisions, G-1 through G-4, and several technical staff divisions. The position of Chief of Staff was defined in 1957 to assist the Commandant in his responsibilities to supervise and coordinate the headquarters staff. Even through the early 1970s, there was a composite staff.
Specific responsibilities of the Department of the Navy toward the Marine Corps include the maintenance of not less than three combat divisions and three air wings and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.

**SOME OF THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE MARINE CORPS ARE TO**

organize, train, and equip Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign;

furnish security detachments and organizations for service on naval vessels of the Navy;

furnish security detachments for protection of naval property at naval stations and bases;

perform other duties as the President may direct; and

develop landing force doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment that are of common interest to the Army and Marine Corps.

Arrangement with a distinction in line and staff functions. In 1973 headquarters was reorganized along functional lines with four Deputy Chiefs of Staff: Manpower, Installations and Logistics, Requirements and Programs, and Plans and Operations. These new directorates replaced the general staff sections. Marine Corps field units continued to use a combination of a functionally organized general and executive staff and a staff of technical experts.

(4) The **Headquarters, Marine Corps** is in the executive part of the Department of the Navy. Its functions are to furnish professional assistance to the Secretary of the Navy, accomplish all military department support duties that deal with the Marine Corps, coordinate the action of Marine Corps organizations, prepare instructions for the execution of approved plans, and investigate and report efficiency of the Marine Corps in support of combatant commands. Its current organization includes the following:

Commandant of the Marine Corps
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps  
Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Aviation; Installation and Logistics; Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Plans, Policies and Operations; and Requirements and Programs  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)

d. The U.S. Air Force

(1) **Origin.** The earliest staff organization in the Air Force reflected the general staff organization in the Army in the years before World War II. Before 1935 the War Department General Staff was responsible for planning, coordinating, and controlling the Air Corps. In 1935 the General Headquarters Air Force was formed and operated under the Army Chief of Staff and the War Department. By June 1941 the Army Air Forces had a recognized Office of the Chief of the Air Force. Reorganization throughout the war years resulted in experiments with a variety of staff organizational arrangements: the Army-style general staff organization; a double-deputy staff that produced a two-prong functional general staff identified as operations and administration; and a tridirectorate staff that recognized personnel and administration, materiel and logistics, and plans and operations.

(2) **Growth since 1947** With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the U.S. Air Force was created as a coequal partner in the National Military Establishment. At first, the U.S. Air Force retained the multiple directorate organization used when it was the Army Air Corps. Stuart Symington, the first Secretary of the Air Force, was sworn in on 18 September 1947. The Secretary, along with the first several Chiefs of Staff, developed what was to become the foundation of today’s headquarters staff. The current organization is a multiple directorate staff: the traditional personal and specialist staff subdivisions plus a coordinating staff of personnel, comptroller, operations, and materiel.

(3) Since its inception, the U.S. Air Force has been organized along functional rather than area lines. The Chief of Staff is the military head of the Air Force. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff may speak for the Chief of Staff at any time on any subject within their functional areas, according to the authority delegated by the Chief of Staff. Each deputy in turn presides over a family of directorates, and each directorate is functionally oriented. In the Air Staff, decisions are made at the lowest level that has access to sufficient information and the requisite delegated authority.
The Department of the Air Force is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war and, under integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime component of the Air Force to meet the needs of war. Within the Department of the Air Force, the Air Force includes combat and service aviation forces.

**SOME OF THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE AIR FORCE ARE TO**

- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air—specifically, forces to defend the United States against air attack, gain and maintain general air supremacy, defeat enemy air forces, conduct space operations, control vital air areas, and establish local air superiority;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including forces for the strategic defense of the United States, in accordance with joint doctrines;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic air and missile warfare; organize, equip, and provide forces for joint amphibious, space, and airborne operations;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for close air support and air logistic support to the Army and other forces, including airlift, air support, resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical air reconnaissance, and air interdiction of enemy land forces and communications;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for air transport for the Armed Forces;
- develop doctrines, procedures, and equipment for air defense from land areas;
- furnish launch and space support for the Department of Defense;
- organize, train, equip, and furnish land-based tanker forces for the in-flight refueling support of strategic operations and deployments of aircraft of the Armed Forces and Air Force tactical operations;
- organize, train, equip, and furnish forces to operate air lines of communications; and
- organize, train, equip, and furnish forces for the support and conduct of special operations.

**Collateral functions of the Air Force include**

- surface sea surveillance and antisurface ship warfare through air operations,
- antisubmarine warfare and antiair warfare operations to protect sea lines of communications,
- aerial minelaying operations, and
- air-to-air refueling in support of naval campaigns.

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1
(4) The Air Staff is an executive part of the Department of the Air Force. It serves to assist the Secretary of the Air Force in carrying out his responsibilities and is organized as follows:

- Chief of Staff of the Air Force
- Vice Chief of Staff
- Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Logistics, Plans and Operations, and Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
- Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
- Special Staff: Surgeon General; Judge Advocate General; Chief of Chaplains; Chief of National Guard Bureau; Chief of Safety; Director of Manpower and Organization; Chief, Security Police; Director of Programs and Evaluation; Director of Test and Evaluation; Civil Engineer; Chief of Air Force Reserve; Director of Morale, Welfare, Recreation and Services; Air Force Historian

e. The U.S. Coast Guard

(1) Origin. The Coast Guard, the nation’s oldest continuing seagoing Service, was established in 1790 as “a system of cutters” in the Treasury Department. First called the Revenue Marine and later the Revenue Cutter Service, the Coast Guard was primarily a law enforcement agency responsible for collecting customs duties from ships entering U.S. waters, enforcing embargoes, hunting pirates, and enforcing quarantines. However, by 1797 the strength of the Treasury Department’s cutters had been increased to “defend the sea coast and repel any hostility to vessels and commerce”; Congressional authorization established the role of the Coast Guard in national defense.

(2) Expansion of responsibility. In 1915 the U.S. Lifesaving Service, an organization of local stations scattered along U.S. coasts, merged with the Revenue Cutter Service to form the U.S. Coast Guard, and with that was born its traditional image, the “lifesavers.” During World War I responsibilities were added for port safety and security, commercial vessel safety, icebreaking, and marine environment protection. Joined in 1939 by the Lighthouse Service, the Service assumed responsibility for establishing and maintaining aids to navigation. In 1967 the Coast Guard became part of the newly formed Department of Transportation. A comprehensive review of wartime missions was performed in 1981 by the Navy and Coast Guard Board. In a 1984 Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretaries of Navy and Transportation, Coast Guard area commanders were assigned as commanders of the newly formed U.S. Maritime Defense Zones (MDZ). These commanders are responsible to the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commanders for planning and coordinating U.S. coastal defense, preparing operational plans, conducting exercises, and training reserve forces. MDZs will be activated as a deterrent option to ensure port safety and the initial safety of seaborne deployments.
The Coast Guard is a military Service and a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times. It is a Service in the Department of Transportation except when operating as part of the Navy on declaration of war or when the President directs.

SOME OF THE MAJOR PEACETIME FUNCTIONS OF THE COAST GUARD ARE TO

- enforce or assist in enforcement of the law with power to arrest, search, and seize persons and property suspected of violations of Federal law, including drug interdiction;
- administer laws and enforce regulations for the promotion of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction;
- coordinate marine environmental protection response;
- enforce port safety and security;
- enforce commercial vessel safety standards and regulations;
- regulate and control ship movement and anchorage;
- acquire, maintain, and repair short-range aids to navigation;
- establish, operate, and maintain radio navigation;
- develop, establish, maintain, and operate polar and U.S. icebreaking facilities;
- organize, equip, and furnish forces for maritime search and rescue;
- engage in oceanographic research; and
- maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized Service in the Navy.

SOME OF THE MAJOR WARTIME FUNCTIONS OF THE COAST GUARD ARE TO

- continue peacetime missions;
- plan and coordinate U.S. coastal defense for the Fleet Commanders through assignment as commanders of U.S. Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic and Pacific; and
- perform naval wartime missions of inshore undersea warfare, mine countermeasures, harbor defense, ocean escort, etc., occurring in the U.S. littoral sea.

Adapted from Titles 10 and 14 U.S. Code and Navy and Coast Guard Board Review of Coast Guard Wartime Tasking dated 19 March 1981
(3) **Organization.** The command and control structure of the Coast Guard is based on nine autonomous districts and two Maintenance and Logistics Commands (MLCs) that report to the Atlantic and Pacific area commanders. The Commandant of the Coast Guard reports directly to the Secretary of Transportation in peacetime. On declaration of war, or when directed by the President, the Coast Guard becomes a Service within the Navy with the Commandant reporting to the Secretary of the Navy; he or she reports to the CNO for military functions concerning organization, training, and readiness of operation forces assigned to the Navy.

(4) The **Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard** under the Commandant reports in peacetime to the Secretary of Transportation. The Commandant is assisted in the direction of policy, legislation, and administration by a functional organization headed by Chiefs of Offices:

Chiefs of Offices:
- Acquisition; Chief Counsel; Civil Rights; Command, Control, and Communications; Resource Director/Comptroller; Engineering; Health Services; Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection; Navigation; Operations; Personnel; and Readiness and Reserves

105. **THE JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER (JSO)**

a. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the Secretary of Defense to establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers of the military Services who are particularly educated, trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters. “Joint matters” are defined in the law as “the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces,” and this includes national military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified command. There are no restrictions on the number of officers who may hold the joint specialty; however, sufficient numbers must be designated to meet Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) requirements. Approximately 9,000 billets are currently designated as JDAs.

b. The Secretary of Defense designates as JSOs officers who are educated in and experienced in the employment, deployment, and support of unified and combined forces to achieve national security objectives. To qualify as a JSO, an officer must complete an approved program of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and a full JDA. JSO designation boards are convened by the secretaries of the military departments to consider officers for recommendation to the Secretary of Defense for designation as JSOs. The Secretary of Defense can waive some of the JSO requirements on a case-by-case basis.

c. Both Service PME and JPME contribute essential qualities to the educational development of a JSO nominee. The military departments are responsible for designating
officers as JSO nominees. Officers may be designated as JSO nominees when they have successfully completed a program of Joint Professional Military Education or have a Critical Occupational Specialty. Designation of an officer as a JSO nominee identifies the officer as a potential candidate for JSO, but does not, in itself, constitute recommendation for award of the Joint Specialty.

d. A JDA is a designated position in a multi-Service or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three military departments. Such involvement includes matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified command. At least 800 JDAs are designated as critical. Current law requires that critical billets be filled with JSOs unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approves an exception.

e. For further information on the JSO program, see JCS Admin Pub 1. (Joint Officer Management) and the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (CJCSI 1800.01, 1 March 1996) (CM-344-90, 1 May 1990).

106. SERVICE SCHOOLS

a. Major organizational changes in the late 1800s and early 1900s laid the foundation for a modern staff system in the U.S. Armed Forces. The continuing professional education of military officers was an important element and included Service staff and war colleges. European experience had shown that, without a sound and vital school system, the staffs themselves could not function properly. The Naval War College was established in 1884 and the Army War College in 1901. The Air War College was established in 1946.

b. World War I led to the creation of a widespread system of field staffs in the Army and a growth of staff consciousness in the other Services. Soon after the war, the U.S. military Services began to evolve the functional staff patterns that remain in use today. The Service colleges reached officers destined for Service leadership, educating them in the fundamentals of staff practice and enlarging on the body of knowledge that was to become Service doctrine.

c. By the 1920s the U.S. Armed Forces had a distinctively American staff system that had been drawn from elements of Prussian, British, and French military organizations. For example, contrary to some European practices, the United States did not adopt the concept of a permanent staff corps. Rather, officers constituting U.S. staffs are members of their own Service and are assigned to staff duty only periodically throughout their careers.
d. After World War II command and staff education for field-grade officers was further developed. While command and staff courses for company and field-grade officers in the Army (1901), Marine Corps (1920), and Navy (1923) had long been in existence, the schools now emphasized education in staff subjects and field application. Attendance at the Services’ schools rose to a level not possible during the war. The Air Command and Staff College began at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in 1946.

107. JOINT AND COMBINED SCHOOLS The school system that accompanied the early twentieth-century military reforms was reconstituted and enlarged to meet post-World War II requirements. Shortly after the war, three joint Service colleges were established: the Army Industrial College, redesignated the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) in April 1946, and the National War College (NWC) in August 1946, both at Ft. McNair in Washington; and the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) in August 1946 in Norfolk, Virginia. All colleges have now been incorporated under the National Defense University (NDU), NWC and ICAF in 1976, and AFSC in August 1981. Today NDU also includes the Information Resources Management College (IRMC), the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), and the Institute of Higher Defense Studies (IHDS). NDU is assigned the task of preparing selected military officers and civilian officials for command, management, and staff responsibilities. The senior colleges emphasize national security formulation, military strategy development, mobilization, management of resources for national security, and planning for joint and combined operations. Effective July 1990, the Armed Forces Staff College became the single point for completion of Joint Professional Military Education for prospective Joint Specialty Officer nominees. This was mandated by Congress. The Service intermediate and senior schools teach the first phase of a joint track. The Armed Forces Staff College teaches the follow-on phase at the application level with a curriculum and environment specifically designed to nurture a joint perspective. For further information on JPME, see Appendix VI, Joint Admin Pub 1.2 (Joint Officer Management) and JCS Memo SM-73-89, Implementation of the JCS Program for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).

108. THE AFSC PERSPECTIVE

a. Planning for joint forces is a team effort, and that team must be carefully balanced. The staff comes from the represented Services and brings not only Service doctrine but also the technical expertise from a range of functional areas within the Services.

b. The ultimate purpose of staff officers is to make sound recommendations to a commander and then clearly communicate the commander’s decision to the chain of command. This publication has been developed to help members of a joint staff work more effectively as action officers, understand the joint planning process, and interpret and prepare products of the planning process.
c. AFSC Pub 1 has evolved over the years from many sources. Wherever possible, joint publications have been used. When these do not cover the particular subject, we have adapted material from applicable Service manuals. AFSC Pub 1 traces its roots to the following publications:

(1) Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF)

(2) Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*

(3) Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

(4) Joint Pub 1-03 Series, *Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions*

(5) Joint Pub 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*

(6) Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*

(7) Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*

(8) Joint Pub 4-01, *Mobility System Policies, Procedures and Considerations*

(9) Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*

(10) Joint Pub 5-03 Series, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*

(11) Joint Pub 6-0, *Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations*

(12) CJCS MOP 7, “The Joint Strategic Planning System”

(13) JCS MOP 136, “JCS, CINC, and OJCS Involvement in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System”

(14) *Unified Command Plan* (UCP)

(15) *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP)

(16) U.S. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 1, *Naval Operational Planning*

(17) U.S. Marine Corps Manual FMFM 3-1, *Command and Staff Action*

(19) JCS Action Officer Orientation

(20) American Forces Information Service, DOD *The Armed Forces Officer*

(21) U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5 *Staff Organization and Operations*

(22) Joint Admin Pub 1.2 *Joint Officer Management*

(23) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.0 *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*

(24) Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, Title IV, Joint Officer Management


d. The chart at the end of the chapter illustrates the rank insignia of the military Services, the “joint team.”
### Officers Insignia of the United States Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Coast Guard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>Lieutenant Junior Grade</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-2</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>Lieutenant Commander</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>Major General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Rear Admiral (O-7 &amp; O-8)</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-6</td>
<td>Commodore</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-7</td>
<td>Rear Admiral</td>
<td>Vice Admiral</td>
<td>General</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>O-8</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>Fleet Admiral</td>
<td>General</td>
<td></td>
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<td>O-9</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>General</td>
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<tr>
<td>O-10</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>General of the Army</td>
<td>General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coast Guard officers use the same rank insignia as Navy officers. Coast Guard enlisted rating badges are the same as the Navy’s for grades E-1 through E-9’s have silver specialty marks, eagles and stars, and gold chevrons. The badge of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard has a gold chevron and specialty mark, a silver eagle and gold stars. For all ranks, the gold Coast Guard shield on the uniform sleeve replaces the Navy star.

**Figure 1-8**

AFSC PUB 1
### Enlisted Insignia of the United States Armed Forces

**Navy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranks</th>
<th>Insignia</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>E-1</td>
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<td>Seaman Apprentice</td>
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<tr>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>Seaman</td>
</tr>
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<td>E-4</td>
<td>Petty Officer Third Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>Petty Officer Second Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>Petty Officer First Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>Chief Petty Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-8</td>
<td>Senior Chief Petty Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-9</td>
<td>Master Chief Petty Officer</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Marines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranks</th>
<th>Insignia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private First Class</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lance Corporal</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corporal</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
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<td>Gunnery Sergeant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First Sergeant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sergeant Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Master Gunnery Sergeant</td>
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**Army**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranks</th>
<th>Insignia</th>
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<td>(no insignia)</td>
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<td>Corporal</td>
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<td>Sergeant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gunnery Sergeant</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First Sergeant</td>
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<td>Command Sergeant Major</td>
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<td>Sergeant Major</td>
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**Air Force**

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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Airman First Class</td>
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<td>Technical Sergeant</td>
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<td>Master Sergeant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Master Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Master Sergeant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1-9*
## Joint Organization and Staff Functions

**Chapter 2**

- **Introduction** 2-2
- **Organization for National Security** 2-2
- **Origins of the Joint Concept** 2-7
- **Origins of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** 2-8
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Joint Organization and Staff Functions

200. INTRODUCTION Numerous governmental organizations are involved in the implementation of U.S. national security policy. This chapter focuses primarily on the organizations and agencies responsible for the planning and execution of military operations, their organizational structure, and their command relationships.

201. ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY Knowledge of relationships between elements of the national security structure is essential to understanding the role of joint staff organizations. Figure 2-1 illustrates the principal officials and organizations that make and execute national security decisions.

a. National Command Authorities (NCA)

(1) Constitutionally, the ultimate authority and responsibility for the national defense rests with the President.

(2) Since passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the President has used his Secretary of Defense as his principal assistant in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. The Secretary is responsible for the effective, efficient, and economical operation of the Department of Defense, and he has statutory authority, direction, and control over the military departments.

(3) The National Command Authorities (NCA) are the President and Secretary of Defense or persons acting lawfully in their stead. The term NCA is used to signify constitutional authority to direct the Armed Forces in their execution of military action. Both movement of troops and execution of military action must be directed by the NCA; by law, no one else in the chain of command has the authority to take such action except in self-defense.

b. National Security Council (NSC). The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 as the principal forum to consider national security issues that require Presidential decision. Its membership now includes only four statutory members: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Director of Central Intelligence serve as statutory advisers to the NSC. The history of the NSC and its organization are discussed in Chapter 5.
c. **Department of Defense (DOD)**

(1) **History.** The Joint Board of the Army and Navy was established in 1903 as the first attempt to use a regularly constituted agency to coordinate the actions of the Army and the Navy. Since the beginning of the nation, the single focus for coordination between the War Department and Navy Department has been the President. During the 1920s and 1930s, Congress made several fiscally motivated studies intended to reorganize the administrative branch of government. In fact, one such report of a joint Congressional committee in June 1924 recommended that a single Department of Defense be formed under one cabinet officer; no action was taken on the report. Interestingly, the most significant support for a single executive department responsible for national defense came from Congressional desires to limit the size of the executive departments during the Depression. In 1932 the House considered a bill that would have permitted the President to establish a Department of National Defense and, as the President saw fit, subject to approval of Congress, transfer and consolidate functions of executive departments. The establishment of a single defense department was rejected by the House, and the sweeping reorganization recommendations made by President Hoover were eventually rejected by a lame-duck Congress. During the period, opposition among the military appears to have been strong. The Joint Board of the Army and Navy accepted a staff report dated May 1933 and said,
“The Joint Board is unable to recommend an organization for a Department of National Defense that would be more efficient or more economical than the present separate departmental organizations. In the opinion of the Board, amalgamation of the two Departments would be a grave error.”

(2) The creation of a single executive department responsible for national defense was marked by indecision and, from some circles, open hostility. But World War II and its aftermath furnished the necessary impetus for unification of the military departments under a single cabinet-level secretary. Anticipating the needs of a peacetime military organization, an indepth review by Congressional, executive, and military groups began even before the end of the war. Overwhelmingly, the studies were influenced by parochial Service interests reflecting the opinions of experienced wartime military and civilian leaders with vastly different views of the postwar era. Issues that dominated the search for a consensus included retention of air power in the Navy, maintenance of a separate Marine Corps, and the form and substance of the new military department of the Air Force.

(3) National Security Act of 1947 The National Security Act of 1947 was monumental legislation. After almost 50 years that included wartime lessons beginning with the Spanish-American War, a modern military organization had come into existence: unified action of the Services was law, the powers of the Secretary of National Defense were identified but subject to broad interpretation, and the roles and missions of the military Services were defined by Executive Order, but would not be Congressionally stated until 1958. The act created the National Military Establishment (NME) under the leadership of a civilian secretary who was co-equal with the cabinet-level secretaries of the Army, Navy, and new Air Force.

(4) In 1949 the National Security Act was amended to change the name of the NME to Department of Defense and recognize it as an executive department. Further, it changed the alignment of the Services to military departments within DOD. The Reorganization Act of 1958 asserted the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense over the executive department and clarified the operational chain of command that runs from the President and Secretary of Defense to the combatant forces.

(5) DOD functions today are outlined in DOD Directive 5100.1 and illustrated in Figure 2-2. The Department of Defense is composed of the
Office of the Secretary,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
Joint Staff,  
defense agencies (16),  
Department of Defense field activities (9),  
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and  
unified (9) combatant commands.

Functions of the Department of Defense

As prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the Department of Defense maintains and employs the Armed Forces to

- support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;
- ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest; and
- uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

Reference: DOD Directive 5100.1 

(6) The role of the Secretary of Defense has changed since the position was established in 1947. Originally, the secretary had only general authority shared with the civilian secretaries of the military departments. In 1949 his position was strengthened with his appointment as head of an executive department, reduction of the role of military department secretaries, and his assumption of budgeting responsibilities. Today he is the principal assistant to the President for all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Moreover, the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 makes clear his position in the operational chain of command. Figure 2-3 illustrates the organization that reports to the Secretary of Defense.
**DOD Organization (July 1995)**

**Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff**
1. Dep. Secretary of Defense
2. Under Secretaries
3. Assistant Secretaries
4. Deputy Under Secretaries
5. Principal Deputy Under Secretaries
6. Directors
7. Other Officials

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**Combatant Commands**
(9)

**Military Departments**
- Army
- Navy
- Air Force

**Combat Support Agencies (16)**
- Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
- Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)
- Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
- Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)*
- Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)*
- Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA)
- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)*
- National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)*
- Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)
- National Security Agency*/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS)
- Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)
- Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BDMO)
- Central Imagery Office (CIO)*
- Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA)
- Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)
- On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)

**DOD Field Activities (9)**
- Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS)
- Washington Headquarters Services (WHS)
- Defense Medical Programs Activity (DMPA)
- Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA)
- Dept. of Defense Education Activity (DODEA)
- American Forces Information Service (AFIS)
- Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA)
- Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office (DPMO)
- Department of Defense Civilian Personnel Management Service (CPMS)

* Combat Support Agencies are required to report periodically to CJCS and SecDef on their responsiveness and readiness

Figure 23
d. **Military departments**

(1) The **military departments** are separately organized, each under a civilian secretary who supervises the Service chief (or chiefs) in matters of a Service nature. Basically, their functions are as follows:

- recruit
- supply
- train
- mobilize
- administer
- construct, outfit, and repair equipment
- construct, maintain, and repair buildings
- organize
- equip
- service
- demobilize
- maintain

(2) The history of the military departments has been significantly altered by executive order and legislation since the National Security Act of 1947. Examples are the **Key West Agreement of March 1948**, which broadly clarified the roles and missions of the Services, and the **Reorganization Act of 1958**, which removed the military departments from the chain of command and clarified their support and administrative responsibilities.

202. **ORIGINS OF THE JOINT CONCEPT**

a. **History before 1900**  American history reflects the importance of joint operations. MacDonough’s operations on Lake Champlain were a vital factor in the ground campaigns of the War of 1812; the teamwork displayed by General Grant and Admiral Porter in the Vicksburg Campaign of 1863 stands as a fine early example of joint military planning and execution. However, instances of confusion and lack of coordinated, joint military action received public criticism in the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War (1898). By the turn of the century, advances in technology and the growing international involvement of the United States required greater cooperation between the military departments and the development of joint planning.

b. **History through World War I**  As a result of the performance of the U.S. military establishment in the Spanish-American War, a joint board composed of the professional heads of the Army and the Navy and the chief planner of each Service was established in 1903. The Joint Army and Navy Board was to be a continuing body that could plan for joint operations and resolve problems of common concern to the two Services. Unfortunately, the Joint Board accomplished little, because it could not originate ideas or enforce decisions, being limited to commenting on problems submitted to it by the secretaries of the two military departments. It was described as “a planning and deliberative body rather than a center of executive authority.” As a result, it had little or no impact on the conduct of the first World War. Even as late as World War I, questions of seniority
and command relationships between the Chief of Staff of the Army and American Expeditionary Forces in Europe were just being resolved.

c. History through World War II After World War I, the two Service secretaries agreed to reestablish and revitalize the Joint Board. Membership was expanded to six: the chiefs of the two Services, their deputies, and the Chief of War Plans Division for the Army and Director of Plans Division for the Navy. More important, a working staff (named the Joint Planning Committee) made up of members of the plans divisions of both Service staffs was authorized. The new Joint Board could initiate recommendations on its own. Unfortunately, the 1919 board was given no more legal authority or responsibility than its 1903 predecessor; and, although its 1935 publication Joint Action Board of the Army and Navy gave some guidance for the unified operations of World War II, the board itself was not influential in the war. The board was officially disbanded in 1947.

203. ORIGINS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

a. Soon after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, at the Arcadia Conference in Washington, established the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the supreme military body for strategic direction of the Anglo-American effort. But the United States in 1941 had no established agency to furnish U.S. input to such a committee. The British Chiefs of Staff Committee, on the other hand, had long been giving effective administrative coordination, tactical coordination, and strategic direction to British forces. The British committee had planning and intelligence staffs to coordinate the ongoing war effort as well as serve as a “corporate” body for giving military advice to the War Cabinet and the Prime Minister. The collective responsibility of the British committee was set by the Prime Minister in 1924 and given to each new member as a directive:

   In addition to the functions of the Chiefs of Staff as advisers on questions of sea, land or air . . . each of the three Chiefs of Staff will have an individual and collective responsibility for advising on defense policy as a whole, the three constituting, as it were, a Super-Chief of a War Staff in Commission.

b. In response to the need for coordinated staff work, the concept described by Admiral Leahy as a “unified high command” was adopted by the United States in 1942; that group came to be known as the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This first Joint Chiefs of Staff worked throughout the war without legislative sanction or even formal Presidential definition, a role that President Roosevelt believed preserved the flexibility required to meet the needs of the war. The first members of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff were the “opposite numbers” to the British Chiefs of Army, Navy, and Royal Air Force (an autonomous and co-equal military organization): Admiral William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt’s special military adviser, with a title of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy; General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief of the U.S.
Fleet; and General Henry H. Arnold, Deputy Army Chief of Staff for Air and Chief of the Army Air Corps. Each was promoted in December 1944 when the grades of General of the Army and Fleet Admiral of the United States Navy were established.

c. The Arcadia Conference also gave formal definition to the terms **JOINT**, “involving two or more Services of the same nation,” and **COMBINED**, “applying to organizations, plans, and operations of two or more nations.”

d. Under President Roosevelt’s leadership, this new U.S. military body steadily grew in influence and became the primary agent in coordinating and giving strategic direction to the Army and Navy. In combination with the British Chiefs of Staff, it mapped and executed a broad strategic direction for both nations.

e. At the end of World War II, the continued need for a formal structure of joint command was apparent; the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff offered a workable example. The first legislative step was the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. That legislation formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff and laid the foundation for the series of legislative and executive changes that produced today’s defense organization. However, the road to a formal unified command organization was controversial. The debate over the most recent Congressional action, the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act, illustrates that controversy is alive even today. As seen in Figure 2-4, significant legislative changes and executive decisions have altered and refined the influence and position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1947.
**LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO THE JCS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGISLATION</th>
<th>PROVISIONS</th>
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| **1947 National Security Act** | - Designated Secretary of National Defense to exercise **general** authority, direction, and control  
|                     | - Created the **National Military Establishment**  
|                     | - Established U.S. Air Force  
|                     | - Established CIA and NSC  
|                     | - Established JCS as permanent agency  
|                     | - JCS became **principal military adviser** to President and Secretary of Defense  
|                     | - Established a legal basis for unified and specified commands  |
| **1948 Key West Agreement** | - Confirmed JCS members’ function as **executive agents** for unified commands  
|                     | - Service roles defined  |
| **1949 Amendment** | - Military department heads lost cabinet rank and were removed from NSC  
|                     | - Renamed NME the Department of Defense  
|                     | - Created office of **Chairman**  |
| **1952 Amendment** | - Gave **Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)** co-equal status on JCS on Marine Corps issues  |
| **1953 Amendment** | - **Removed JCS from executive agent status**, i.e., handling day-to-day communications and supervision over unified commands  
|                     | - Established **military departments as executive agents** for unified commands  |
| **1958 Amendment** | - Gave Chairman a vote  
|                     | - **Removed military department as executive agent**  
|                     | - Joint Staff has no executive authority, but assists the Secretary of Defense in exercising direction over unified commands  |
| **1978 Amendment** | - Made CMC a full member of JCS  |
| **1986 Amendment** | - Designated Chairman **principal military adviser**  
|                     | - Transferred duties of corporate JCS to Chairman  
|                     | - Created position of Vice Chairman  
|                     | - Specified chain of command to run from President to Secretary of Defense to unified and specified combatant commanders  |

References:  
National Security Act of 1947, as amended;  
*Reorganization of the National Security Organization*,  
Report of the CNO Select Panel, dated March 1985
204. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TODAY

References: Title 10 United States Code (as amended)  
DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components”  
DOD Directive 5158.1, “Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Relationships with the Office of the Secretary of Defense”  
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Action Officer Orientation Handbook

a. Composition The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) consist of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The collective body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is headed by the Chairman (or the Vice Chairman in the Chairman’s absence), who sets the agenda and presides over JCS meetings. Responsibilities as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take precedence over duties as the chiefs of military Services.

b. Executive authority The executive authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been changed as different organizational approaches have been implemented.

(1) In World War II, the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff were executive agents for theater and area commanders. The original National Security Act of 1947 saw the Joint Chiefs of Staff as planners and advisers, not as commanders of combatant commands. Nevertheless, the 1948 Key West Agreement confirmed the then-current practice under which the Joint Chiefs of Staff served as executive agents for unified commands. This authority was reversed by Congress by a 1953 amendment to the National Security Act.

(2) Today, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no executive authority to command combatant forces. The issue of executive authority was clearly resolved by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986: “The Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands. The ‘chain of command’ runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

c. Military advice. Today, by law, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Members of the JCS may submit to the Chairman advice on an opinion in disagreement with or in addition to the advice presented by the Chairman. However, all JCS members are also, by law, military advisers, and they may respond with advice or opinions on a particular matter when the President, NSC, or Secretary of Defense requests such advice.
d. **Immediate military staff** DOD Directive 5100.1 assigns the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Joint Staff, as the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense. This designation is not found in “title 10, United States Code” but the Directive is a clear statement that the Secretary of Defense will turn to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for staff support on military matters.

e. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)**

   (1) The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 identified the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior ranking member of the Armed Forces. By law, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is now the **principal** military adviser to the President. As he considers appropriate, he may seek the advice of and consult with the other JCS members and combatant commanders. When he presents his advice, he shall present the advice or opinions of other JCS members and, as he considers appropriate, the range of military advice and opinions he has received.

   (2) The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 also transferred to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the functions and responsibilities previously assigned to the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The broad functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are set forth in 10 USC 153 and detailed in DOD Directive 5100.1. They are summarized in Figure 2-5.

   (3) 10 USC 162 requires the secretaries of the military departments to assign all forces under their jurisdiction to the combatant commands or the U.S. Element, NORAD, except those forces assigned to carry out the statutory functions of a secretary of a military department, or forces assigned to multinational peacekeeping organizations. Military department functions include recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, maintaining, constructing, outfitting, and repairing. The chain of command to these combatant commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense directly to the commander of the combatant command. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff **functions within the chain of command by transmitting communications** to the commanders of the combatant commands from the President and Secretary of Defense.” That position is now clearly stated in DOD Directive 5100.1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff **does not exercise military command** over any combatant forces; that issue was clarified in the 1953 amendment to the National Security Act of 1947.
Functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is responsible for the principal functions listed below:

- **STRATEGIC DIRECTION**
  assist the NCA to provide strategic direction of the Armed Forces

- **STRATEGIC PLANNING**
  prepare strategic plans
  prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans
  perform net assessments of the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces, and its allies as compared to potential allies

- **CONTINGENCY PLANNING**
  provide for preparation and review of contingency plans
  advise on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities

- **REQUIREMENTS, PROGRAMS, AND BUDGET**
  advise on the priorities of requirements
  advise on program recommendations and budget proposals
  assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs

- **DOCTRINE, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION**
  develop doctrine for joint employment
  formulate policies for joint training
  formulate policies for coordinating military education and training

- **OTHER MATTERS**
  exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff
  as directed by the President, attend and participate in meetings of the NSC
  advise and assist the NCA on establishing combatant commands
  transmit communications between the NCA and combatant commands
  review plans and programs to determine adequacy and feasibility
  as the Chairman considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders
  provide U.S. representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations

References: DOD Reorganization Act of 1986
DOD Directive 5100.1

Figure 2-5
f. **Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 created the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who performs such duties as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may prescribe. By law, he is the second ranking member of the armed forces and replaces the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his absence or disability. Though he was not originally included as a member of the JCS, Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993 vested the Vice Chairman as a full voting member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

g. **Military Service chiefs.** The military Service chiefs are often said to “wear two hats.” As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they offer advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, and NSC. As the chiefs of the military Services, they are responsible to the secretary of the military department for management of the Services. By custom, the vice chiefs of the Services are delegated authority to act for their chiefs in most matters having to do with day-to-day operation of the Services. The duties of the Service chiefs as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take precedence over all their other duties.

205. **ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**References:** Joint Admin Pub 1.1, *Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff*
Title 10 United States Code (as amended)
DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components”

a. **Joint Admin Pub 1.1** *Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff* outlines the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Staff; joint boards, commissions, and committees; National Defense University; defense agencies; and other supporting organizations.

b. **Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).** The composition and function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were discussed in section 204. There are two groups that are not part of the Joint Staff that greatly assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the execution of their role.

1. In the joint arena, a body of senior flag or general officers assists in resolving matters that do not require JCS corporate-body attention. Each Service chief appoints an operations deputy who works with the Director of the Joint Staff to form the subsidiary body known as the **Operations Deputies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** or the OPSDEPs. The OPSDEPs are generally the three-star chiefs of operations for the Services: Army Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) for Operations and Plans; Navy Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Plans, Policy, and Operations; Air Force DCOS for Plans and Operations; and Marine Corps DCOS for Plans, Policy, and Operations. They meet in sessions chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff to consider issues of lesser importance on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to screen major issues before they reach the Joint...
Chiefs of Staff. With the exception of the Director, this body is not considered part of the Joint Staff.

(2) Similarly, there is a subsidiary body known as the Deputy Operations Deputies, JCS (DEPOPSDEPs), composed of a chairman, who is the Vice Director of the Joint Staff, and a two-star flag or general officer appointed by each Service chief. The DEPOPSDEPs are currently the Service directors of plans: Army Assistant Deputy COS (ADCOS) for Operations and Plans for Joint Affairs; Navy ADCNO for Plans, Policy, and Operations; Air Force Director of Plans; and Marine Corps Director of Plans. Issues come before the DEPOPSDEPs to be either settled at their level or forwarded to the OPSDEPs. Except for the Vice Director of the Joint Staff, the DEPOPSDEPs are not considered part of the Joint Staff.

(3) Matters come before these bodies under policies prescribed in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5711.01. The Director of the Joint Staff is authorized to review and approve issues when there is no dispute between the Services, when the issue does not warrant JCS attention, when the proposed action is in conformance with CJCS policy, or when the issue has not been requested by a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. **Joint Staff**

(1) The term “Joint Staff” was not specifically defined in the Reorganization Act of 1986, but the Act did restrict the staff’s size to 1,627 military and civilian personnel. The restriction on size was repealed in the 1991 DOD Authorization Act. The staff includes personnel assigned or detailed to permanent duty on the Joint Staff, but does not include those assigned or detailed to the military departments. The staff is composed of approximately even numbers of officers from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force. In practice, the Marines make up about 20 percent of the number allocated to the Navy.

(2) Each amendment to the NSA of 1947 stated that the Joint Staff is not to operate or be organized to be an overall Armed Forces General Staff; therefore, it has no executive authority.

(3) The Joint Staff assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with strategic direction of the combatant forces and operation of the combatant commands; and integration into an efficient team of joint staff forces. Subject to the Chairman’s authority, direction, and control, the Joint Staff assists other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities.
(4) **Figure 2-6** illustrates the history of the Joint Staff as the directorates, agencies, and staff members have varied with administrative and statutory demands. Organization of the Joint Staff is illustrated in **Figure 2-7**.

(5) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consultation with other JCS members and with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, selects the Director, Joint Staff to assist in managing the Joint Staff. By law, the direction of the Joint Staff rests exclusively with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Staff also assists the other JCS members and the Vice Chairman in carrying out their responsibilities.

(6) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manages the Joint Staff and the Director of the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff performs such duties as the Chairman prescribes.

d. **Agencies of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

(1) **Organizations reporting to CJCS.** The diversity of offices within the Joint Staff and other organizations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff illustrates a wide range of functions and responsibilities. Among organizations reporting to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the CJCS representatives to international negotiations, e.g., Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and activities involved with politico-military affairs and defense in the Western Hemisphere, e.g., U.S. representation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee and the Military Committee of NATO. Other activities include the National Defense University, the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocations Board, and the Joint Transportation Board. **Figure 2-8** illustrates the organizations that report to CJCS.

(2) **Organizations reporting to the Secretary of Defense through CJCS.** The combatant commanders have been directed by the Unified Command Plan and DOD Directive 5100.1 to communicate to the Secretary of Defense and President through the CJCS. Several defense agencies that report to the Secretary of Defense also support CJCS. CJCS has operational responsibilities for the Defense Information Systems Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency; and CJCS gives policy guidance and direction to other supporting organizations, including the Joint Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Agency, the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center, the Military Communications-Electronics Board, and the Joint Warfighting Center. **Figure 2-9** illustrates the organizations that report to the Secretary of Defense through CJCS and those that, like the combat support agencies and activities, have functional relationships to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through CJCS.
## EVOLUTION OF THE JOINT STAFF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGISLATION OR DIRECTIVE</th>
<th>CHANGES</th>
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</table>
| **1947 National Security Act** | • Limited size of Joint Staff to 100 officers  
• Organized Joint Staff into Strategic Plans, Intelligence, Logistic Plans  
Joint Secretariat was not part of the Joint Staff |
| **1949 Amendment** | • Created office of Chairman  
• Limited size of Joint Staff to 100 officers |
| **1953 Amendment** | • Assigned responsibility for managing Joint Staff to Chairman |
| **1957 Amendment** | • Reorganized Joint Staff into Strategic Plans, Intelligence, Logistic Plans, Communications-Electronics, Subsidiary Activities, and Military Assistance Affairs |
| **1958 Amendment** | • Limited Joint Staff to 400 officers  
• Reorganized Joint Staff to take planning and operational responsibilities; divided staff into Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Plans and Policy, Communications-Electronics  
• Chairman selects Director, Joint Staff, in consultation with JCS  
• Chairman manages Joint Staff on behalf of JCS |
| **1963 Internal Reorganization** | • Formalized position of Operations Deputies  
• Established position of Director, Joint Staff  
• Established NMCC outside Joint Staff  
• Disestablished Intelligence Directorate; transferred responsibilities to DIA |
| **1964 Internal Reorganization** | • Established Administrative Services Directorate  
• Term OJCS came into use to include Joint Staff and all agencies under the Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| **1976 Internal Reorganization** | • Disestablished J-1 and J-6, incorporating functions into J-5 and J-3 |
| **1979 Internal Reorganization** | • Established Command, Control, and Communications Directorate |
| **1981 Internal Reorganization** | • Reestablished J-1 as Manpower and Personnel Directorate |
| **1984 DOD Authorization Act** | • Established Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency (SPRAA) |
| **1986 Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act** | • Created position of Vice Chairman  
• Resulted in the creation of J-7 and J-8 directorates  
• Limited Joint Staff to 1,627 military and civilian personnel |
| **1991 Authorization Act** | • Numerical limit on Joint Staff repealed |
| **1993 Authorization Act** | • Vice Chairman became full member of JCS |

References: National Security Act of 1947, Title 10, U.S. Code, as amended; Joint Admin Pub 1.1 Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff
The Joint Staff

Chairman of the JCS
Vice Chairman of the JCS*

Chairman of the JCS
Vice Chairman of the JCS
Chief of Staff, Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, Air Force
Commandant, Marine Corps

Director, Joint Staff
Operations Deputies

Vice Director, Joint Staff
Deputy Operations Deputies

Inspector
General

J-1
Directorate for Manpower & Personnel

J-2
Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate

J-3
Directorate for Operations

J-4
Directorate for Logistics

J-5
Directorate for Strategic Plans & Policy

J-6
Directorate for Command, Control, Communications, & Computer Systems

J-7
Directorate for Operational Plans & Interoperability

J-8
Directorate for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment

Reference: Joint Admin Pub 1.1 Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff Figure 2-7
Organizations Reporting to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Staff

U.S. Delegation, U.N. Military Staff Committee

U.S. Representative to the NATO Military Committee

CJCS Representatives for Negotiations (OSCE, CD)

National Defense University

Joint Material Priorities and Allocations Board

Joint Transportation Board

U.S. Representative, Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group

Military Communications and Electronics Board

Adviser for Mapping, Charting and Geodesy

U.S. Delegation, Inter-American Defense Board

U.S. Section, Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission

U.S. Military Representative, Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-U.S.

U.S. Section Canada-U.S Military Cooperation Committee

Reference: Joint Admin Pub 1.1 Figure 2-8
206. COMBATANT COMMANDS

a. History

Reference: Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, October 16, 1985, U.S. GPO, Washington, 1985

(1) The history of the current combatant command arrangement begins with the lessons learned in the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War. Between 1903 and 1942, the Joint Army and Navy Board sought cooperation between the Army and Navy, but accomplished little in the way of improving joint command. In effect, decisions on joint matters in dispute between the Services went to the level of the commander in chief. The President was the single “commander” who had a view of the entire military theater...
and authority over both the Army and Navy on-site commanders. Interestingly, one product of the Joint Board, an agreement on “mutual cooperation” in joint operations, was in effect at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Early in World War II, General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, realized that a unified command arrangement, not mutual cooperation, had been made necessary because of the complexity of modern warfare.

(2) The experiences of World War II fully supported the theory and practice of unified command. Then, quite unlike today, the unified commanders reported to their executive agents on the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The executive agents have alternately been the military chiefs of Services (World War II and 1948) and the civilian secretaries of the military departments (1953-1958). Confusion rose from the understanding that the suppliers of the support and administration, the military departments, should also share in the direction of the forces in combat.

(3) As discussed earlier, the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 was the first definitive legislative statement “to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.” The act went on to say that it was the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to “establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security,” and the President would establish unified and specified combatant commands to perform military missions. The military departments would assign forces to the combatant commands; the responsibility for their support and administration would be assigned by the Secretary of Defense to a military department. Forces not assigned would remain under the authority of the military department. Now, it was thought, the nation could make more effective use of its military resources.

b. Definitions. Unified and specified combatant commands were first described in the NSA of 1947. The statutory definition of the combatant commands has not changed since then.

Unified Combatant Command A military command which has abroad, continuing missions under a single commander and which is composed of forces from two or more military departments

Specified Combatant Command A military which has broad, continuing missions and which is normally composed of forces from one military department.

By law, the term combatant command means a unified or specified command. The commander of a combatant command is designated commander in chief (CINC).
c. **Chain of command.** Congress intended in the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 to clarify the command line to the combatant commanders and to preserve civilian control of the military. Goldwater-Nichols stated that the operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. The act permitted the President to direct that communications between the President and the Secretary of Defense be transmitted through the CJCS. Under 10 USC 163, the Unified Command Plan directs that communications between the NCA and the combatant commander be transmitted through the CJCS. Further, by statute, the Secretary of Defense is permitted wide latitude to assign oversight responsibilities to CJCS in the Secretary’s control and coordination of the combatant commanders. This authority has been exercised in DOD Directive 5100.1 and other directives.

(1) The commanders of combatant commands exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of assigned forces and are directly responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. Combatant commanders prescribe the chain of command within their commands and designate the appropriate level of command authority to be exercised by subordinate commanders.

(2) The military departments operate under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense. This branch of the chain includes all military forces within the respective Service not specifically assigned to commanders of combatant commands, and is separate and distinct from the branch of the chain of command that exists within a combatant command.

d. **Command Authority**

References: Title 10, United States Code (as amended)
DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components”
Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

(1) The effective use of the nation’s armed forces requires a unity of effort in the operation of diverse military resources. It also requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, nongovernmental organizations, and among nations in any alliance or coalition. The President, as advised by the National Security Council, is responsible for the national strategic unity of effort. The Secretary of Defense, supported by the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of the military departments, the Chiefs of Staff of the Services and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is responsible to the President for the national military unity of effort for creating, supporting, and employing military capabilities.
(2) The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 made the combatant commanders accountable to the NCA for performing their assigned missions. With this accountability came the assignment of all authority, direction, and control that Congress considered necessary to execute the responsibilities of the combatant commanders. The act defined the command authority of the combatant commander as the authority to

- give authoritative direction to subordinate commands including all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics;
- prescribe the chain of command within the command;
- organize commands and forces to carry out assigned missions;
- employ forces necessary to carry out assigned missions;
- assign command functions to subordinate commanders;
- coordinate and approve administration, support, and discipline;
- exercise authority to select subordinate commanders and combatant command staff.

(3) This authority is termed “combatant command and, subject to the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, resides only in the combatant commander. Combatant command (COCOM) is the command authority over assigned forces vested in the CINCs by 10 USC 164 and is not transferable. It is defined in Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF):

“COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by title 10, US Code, Section 164, or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and cannot be delegated or transferred. COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organization. Normally, this authority is exercised through component commanders. COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.”

(4) COCOM is a concept that is not shared with other echelons of command. Combatant commanders exercise COCOM through component commanders, subordinate unified commanders, commanders of joint task forces, and other subordinate commanders.
(5) In the past, **directive authority for logistics** has been an issue for contention. Much of this may have been resolved by the more definitive statement on the subject in the February 1995 edition of UNAAF:

- Directive authority for logistics supports the combatant commander’s responsibility to effectively **execute operational plans**, maintain effectiveness and economy of operation, and **prevent or eliminate unnecessary duplication** of facilities and overlapping functions among Service component commands.

- Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commander, military departments are still responsible for logistics and administrative support of forces assigned or attached to the combatant commands.

- In **peacetime**, the CINC has responsibilities that are consistent with legislation, DOD policy and regulations, budgetary considerations, and local conditions. Disputes are referred to the military department for consideration; failure to receive timely resolution there allows the CINC to forward the matter through CJCS to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

- During **crisis or war**, the CINCs’ authority and responsibility are expanded to include use of facilities and supplies of all forces under their command as necessary for accomplishing their missions. Joint logistics doctrine developed by CJCS establishes wartime logistics policy.

- The CINCs have approval authority over Service logistics programs that affect operational capability or sustainability within their theaters, e.g., base adjustments and force beddowns that will have significant effects on operational capability or sustainability. Disputes in this area may be settled by the Secretary of Defense through CJCS.

(6) **Operational control** (OPCON) is another level of authority used frequently in the execution of joint military operations. OPCON is authority **delegated** to echelons below the combatant commander. Normally, this is authority **exercised through** component commanders and the commanders of established subordinate commands. Limitations on OPCON as well as additional authority not normally included in OPCON can be specified by a delegating commander. OPCON is defined in UNAAF:

“OPCON is the command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and can be delegated or transferred. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON i
cludes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. It should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. These elements of COCOM must be specifically delegated by the combatant commander. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and geographic joint operations areas of subordinate joint force commanders.”

(7) The term tactical control (TACON) is used in execution of operations. TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TACON is inherent in OPCON.

(8) Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commands when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. This includes the NCA designating a support relationship between combatant commanders as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs who are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior commander) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the degree of authority the supported commander is granted.

e. Other authorities Other authorities outside the command relations delineated above are described below.

(1) Administrative control (ADCON) is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, and discipline and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10 USC. This is the authority necessary to fulfill military d
partment statutory responsibilities for administration and support. ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service forces assigned to a combatant commander at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command. ADCON is subject to the command authority of combatant commanders.

(2) **Coordinating Authority** Coordinating authority may be exercised by commanders or individuals at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more military departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement. The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which command may be exercised. It is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Coordinating authority is not in any way tied to force assignment. Assignment of coordinating authority is based on the missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.

(3) **Direct Liaison Authorized** DIRLAUTH is authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting DIRLAUTH informed. DIRLAUTH is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

   f. **Role of CJCS** The role of CJCS in the chain of command of the combatant commands is threefold.

   (1) As stated, communications between the NCA and the combatant commanders pass through CJCS. The DOD Reorganization Act permits the President to establish this communications chain of command; DOD Directive 5100.1 of 25 September 1987 directs it. With this communications responsibility come the myriad duties associated with assisting the President and Secretary of Defense in the direction and control of the combatant commanders: strategic direction, strategic planning, and contingency planning and preparedness.

   (2) **Oversight** of the activities of combatant commands in matters dealing with the statutory responsibility of the Secretary of Defense falls to CJCS. This includes recommending changes in assignment of functions, roles, and missions to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces.
(3) CJCS is the spokesman for the combatant commanders, including comments on the summary and analysis of requirements, programs, and budget.

g. **Assignment and Transfer of Forces** All Service forces (except as noted 10 USC 162) are assigned to combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense. A force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.

(1) Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.

(2) The combatant commander exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over forces assigned or reassigned by the NCA. Subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) will exercise OPCON over assigned or reassigned forces. Forces are assigned or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the broadest level of command and control is required or desired. OPCON of assigned forces is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated within the combatant command by the commander in chief of the combatant command (CINC) or between combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense.

(3) The combatant commander normally exercises OPCON over forces attached by the NCA. Forces are attached when the transfer of forces will be temporary. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces will normally direct the delegation of OPCON over forces attached to those subordinate commands.

(4) In accordance with the “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum and the Unified Command Plan, all forces operating within the geographic areas assigned to a combatant command will be assigned or attached to and under the command of the commander of that command, except as otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Forces assigned to perform the mission of the military department, i.e. recruit, supply, equip, maintain, etc., are not required to be assigned to a combatant command, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. Forces directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense may conduct operations from or within any geographic areas as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the commanders concerned or as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Transient forces do not come under the chain of command of the area commander solely by their movement across area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operations area (JOA) boundaries.

h. **Organization Relationships**
References: *Unified Command Plan*

(1) The unified command structure is flexible, and changes as required to accommodate evolving U.S. national security needs. The *Unified Command Plan* (UCP) is the document that establishes the combatant commands. It is approved by the President, published by the CJCS, and addressed to the commanders of combatant commands. The UCP identifies geographic areas of responsibility, assigns primary tasks, defines authority of the commanders, establishes command relationships, and gives guidance on the exercise of combatant command. Figure 2-10 illustrates the current unified combatant command relationships.

(2) Five combatant commanders have geographic area responsibilities. These combatant commanders are each assigned an area of responsibility (AOR) by the *Unified Command Plan* (UCP) and are responsible for all operations within their designated areas: U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command.


(4) General responsibilities of the CINC's are spelled out in the UCP.

(5) Charts of the command relationships of the combatant commands and selected multinational commands are shown on the following pages. The combatant command charts show major subordinate organizations and, where applicable, indicate formal associations with multinational or binational commands, because some commanders serve in more than one capacity. All CINC positions are nominative (i.e., they can be held by an officer from any Service), although most are typically affiliated with one or two Services.

i. **Summary charts.** Figures 2-11 and 2-12 summarize the basic differences found in UNAAF between combatant commands and their subordinates.
Unified Command Organization

Reference: adapted from UCP

Figure 2-10
## SUMMARY OF JOINT ORGANIZATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishing Authority</th>
<th>Unified Combatant Command</th>
<th>Subordinate Unified Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President through the Secretary of Defense with advice &amp; assistance of CJCS</td>
<td>Unified commander, when authorized by CJCS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Mission Criteria

- Any combination of the following, with significant forces of two or more military departments involved:
  - A large-scale operation requiring positive control of tactical execution by a large and complex force
  - A large geographic or functional area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations therein
  - Common utilization of limited logistic means

### Commander's Responsibilities

- Plan and conduct military operations in response to crises, including the security of the command and protection of the United States, its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion
- Maintain the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command
- Carry out assigned missions, tasks, responsibilities
- Assign tasks to, and direct coordination among, the subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the assigned missions
- Communicate directly with the Chiefs of the Services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and subordinate elements
- Keep the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly advised of significant events and incidents that occur in the functional or geographic area of responsibility, particularly incidents that could create national or international repercussions

### Forces

- Significant forces of two or more military departments
- Significant assigned or attached forces of two or more Services

### Authority of the Commander

- Combatant command (command authority), i.e.,
  - Authoritative direction for logistics/joint training
  - Prescribe chain of command; select commanders & staff
  - Organize commands/forces; employ forces
  - Assign command functions
  - Coordinate/approve admin & support
  - In the event of a major emergency in the AOR requiring the use of all available forces, may assume temporary OPCON of all forces in the assigned AOR
  - In an unusual situation, may exercise COCOM directly of subordinate elements

### Notes

- Combatant command (command authority) through components, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, attaching elements of one force to another, and directly to specific operational forces
- Commander's staff: key staff positions represented by Services assigned, balanced by composition of forces & character of operations

- Exercises Operational Control through
  - components
  - joint task forces
  - attaching elements of one force to another
  - directly to specific operational forces

Reference: JOINT Pub 0-2, UNAAF

Figure 2-11
## SUMMARY OF JOINT ORGANIZATIONS (cont’d.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishing Authority</th>
<th>Combatant Commander’s Service Component Command</th>
<th>Functional Component Command</th>
<th>Joint Task Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|                        | Combatant commander, and commanders of subunified commands and JTFs | • Secretary of Defense  
• Combatant commander  
• Subordinate unified command  
• Existing JTF |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Criteria</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|                  | • Specific limited objective  
• Does not require centralized control of logistics  
• Requires close integration of effort  
• Requires coordination of local defense of subordinate area |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander’s Responsibilities</th>
<th>Commanders of Component Command</th>
<th>Functional Components</th>
<th>Joint Task Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Recommend proper employment of forces  
• Accomplish operational missions  
• Select units for assignment to subordinate forces  
• Conduct joint training  
• Inform CINC of proposed changes in logistics support  
• Under crisis action or wartime, implement CINC’s logistics directives  
• Develop program and budget requests that comply with CINC’s guidance  
• Inform CINC of program and budget decisions that affect planning  
• General functions: internal administration and discipline, training, logistics functions, intelligence  
• Furnish force data to support assigned missions | • Recommend proper employment of forces  
• Accomplish assigned operational missions  
• Conduct joint training | • Recommend proper employment of assigned forces  
• Accomplish assigned operational missions  
• Jointly train assigned forces |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Functional Components</th>
<th>Joint Task Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • All Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organization, and installations under the command assigned to the unified command | • Normally, but not necessarily, forces of two or more military departments | • Assigned forces of two or more military departments on a significant scale  
• Assigned by establishing authority |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority of the Commander</th>
<th>Functional Components</th>
<th>Joint Task Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Internal administration and discipline  
• Training of Service forces  
• Logistics, except as otherwise directed by the CINC  
• Service intelligence matters | • As determined by the designating commander | • Exercises OPCON over assigned & normally over attached forces |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notes</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Commander is senior officer of Service assigned to a combatant command and qualified for command  
• Performs operational missions of long or short duration  
• Commander designated by establishing authority may be Service component commander with concurrence of JFC | • JTF is dissolved when purpose has been achieved  
• Commander may be a component commander selected with concurrence of CINC | |

Reference: JOINT Pub 0-2, UNAAF  
Figure 2-12
**Command Relationships:**
U.S. Atlantic Command

USACOM - NATO Command Relationships:

**Command**

USCINCACOM  Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SAACLANT)
LANTFLT  CINC, Western Atlantic Command (CINCWESTLANT)

**Also serves as:**

USCINCACOM  (Unified Command)

NOTE 1: See Figure 2-22 (NATO Organization)

Figure 2-13
Command Relationships: U.S. European Command

USEUCOM - NATO Command Relationships:

Command | Also serves as:
--- | ---
USEUCOM | Allied Command Europe (ACE)
USNAVEUR | Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH)
USAFE | Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AIRCENT)
USAREUR | Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT)

NOTE 1: See Figure 2-22 (NATO Organization)
NOTE 2: Rotational billet among US, GE, NL

Figure 2-15
Command Relationships:
U.S. Pacific Command

NOTE 1: USFK also performs duties as CINC, United Nations Command and CINC, Combined Forces Command
(See also Figure 2-23 (UNC and CFC Org.)

Figure 2-16
Command Relationships:
U.S. Southern Command

Figure 2-17
Command Relationships:  
U.S. Space Command

NOTE 1: CINCSpace, if USAF, is dual-hatted as AFSPC. CINCSpace also performs duties as CINCNORAD (see also Figure 2-24) and heads the DOD Manned Spaceflight Support Office.

NOTE 2: J-1, J-2, J-4 and J-6 staff directorates are shared between USSPACECOM and NORAD. Each command has its own J-3 and J-5. (See also Figure 2-24)
Command Relationships:
U.S. Special Operations Command

Figure 2-19
Command Relationships:
U.S. Strategic Command

Figure 2-20
Command Relationships: NATO

Military Committee (MC) International Military Staff (IMS)

Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) (US)
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) (US)

Commander in-Chief Western Atlantic Command (WESTLANT) (US)
Commander in-Chief Eastern Atlantic Command (EASTLANT) (US)
Commander in-Chief Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT) (POR)
Commander Allied Forces North West Europe (AFNORTHWEST) (UK)
Commander Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) (GE)
Commander Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) (US)

Commander Submarines Allied Command Atlantic (SUBACLANT) (US)
Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic Command (STRIKFLTLANT) (US)

Commander Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) (US)

Allied Air Forces North West Europe (AFNORTHWEST) (UK)
Allied Naval Forces North West Europe (NAVNORTHWEST) (UK)
Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT) (US/LNL/GE)
Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AIRCENT) (US)
Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP) (DA)
Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (LANDSOUTH)
Allied Land Forces South Eastern Europe (LANDSOUTHEAST)
Allied Land Forces South Central Europe (LANDSOUTHCENT)
Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH)
Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (NAVSOUL)
Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (STRIKFORLANT)

NATO International Military Staff

Director IMS

Public Information

Finance

Intelligence Division
Plans & Policy Division
Operations Division
Logistics & Resources Division
Comms & Info Systems Division
Armaments & Standardization Division

Situation Center

Figure 2-22
Command Relationships:
United Nations Command (UNC) and
ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC)

NOTE 1: Also commands USFK (See Figure 2-16)

Figure 2-23
Command Relationships:
NORAD

CINCNORAD is also USCINCSPACE.

NOTE 2: J-1, J-2, J-4 and J-6 staff directorates are shared between NORAD and USSPACECOM. Each command has its own J-3 and J-5. (See also Figure 2-18)

Figure 2-24
207. A JOINT STAFF

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

a. Introduction. As shown in the summary of Service functions and staff history in Chapter 1, each of the military Services has developed a different concept of how its staff should be organized. However, the fundamental staff concept is consistent among all Services: the commander has a staff, a group of assistants, that is not in the operational chain of command. Joint commanders choose a staff system that satisfies their needs, one that can be used effectively by officers from the different Services who make up their staffs. The concept of the joint staff is seen throughout the combatant commands. The basic organization is seen in combatant commands, joint task forces, component commands, and joint agencies.

b. Definition. A joint staff is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as the staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), which includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force.


(1) Members of the joint staff are responsible to the joint force commander.

(2) The joint force commander should ensure that the recommendation of any member of the staff receives consideration.

(3) Authority to act in the name of the commander is specifically prescribed.

(4) Orders and directives to subordinate units are issued in the name of the commander and, generally, to the next subordinate command, rather than directly to elements of that subordinate command.

(5) Authorization is generally given to communicate directly between appropriate staff officers of other commands to expedite execution of orders and directives and to promote teamwork between commands.

(6) Each staff division must coordinate its action and planning with the other staff divisions.
(7) The joint force commander is authorized to organize the staff and assign responsibilities to ensure unity of effort and accomplishment of assigned missions.

d. **Staffing.** The establishing authority of a joint activity provides for the furnishing of necessary staff personnel. As on any staff, the number of people should be kept to the minimum and matched to the assigned task. Staff members should be detailed for sufficiently long periods to gain and use the required experience. The officers on the joint staff must be competent to advise the commander in areas concerning their respective Services.

e. **Organization** Figure 2-25 illustrates the broad functional subdivisions of a typical joint staff organization that are outlined in Joint Pub 1-02. The commander’s staff is broadly categorized into personal staff, special staff, and general or joint staff divisions.

(1) The **personal staff group** is directly responsible to the commander. Includes any assistants needed to handle matters requiring close personal control by the commander. The commander’s aide or aide-de-camp, legal advisor, public affairs adviser, inspector general, and political affairs adviser (or international affairs adviser) are generally on the commander’s personal staff.

(2) The chief of staff (COS) is the **principal staff officer** who coordinates and directs the work of the staff divisions. For internal administrative matters, the COS may be assisted by a secretary of the joint staff. In addition, some staffs have deputy chiefs of staff to assist the COS.

(3) The **special staff group** assists the commander and the joint staff with technical, administrative, or tactical matters, e.g., comptroller, facility engineering, medical, weather, quartermaster, and transportation affairs. The special staff is usually small, with experts found on the component command staffs or within the joint staff divisions.

(4) The principal functional divisions or directorates of the commander’s staff are known as general or joint staff. The function of the joint staff is to execute the responsibilities of the commander, e.g., developing policy, preparing and coordinating plans, and overseeing all functions assigned to the commander. Depending on the staff, the staff subdivision may be headed by an assistant chief of staff or director. The joint staff may also be known as coordinating staff group, executive staff group, or supervisory staff group. The CINC or joint force commander has the authority and latitude to establish the staff organization required to fulfill the command’s responsibilities.
• **Manpower and personnel division (J-1)** This division manages personnel and administration, develops personnel policies, administers military and civilian personnel within the command, and administers prisoners of war.

• **Intelligence division (J-2).** The J-2 division’s function is to ensure that the joint command has sound intelligence on the area of operations and the location, activities, and capabilities of the enemy. J-2 emphasis is on the enemy. Activities may include HUMINT and counterintelligence, target identification and selection, and electronic intelligence gathering and analysis.

• **Operations division (J-3).** The operations division directs and controls current operations. Its work begins with the initial planning and extends through the integration and coordination of joint operations. The division may be charged with the conduct of
special operations, including PSYOP and special warfare, joint training, and coordination of joint exercises.

- **Logistics division (J-4)** The division develops logistics plans and coordinates and supervises supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, construction, and related logistics activities. Responsibilities may include weapons surety, civil engineering support, transportation management, etc. Because logistics support is a Service responsibility, the primary thrust of joint logistics operations may be to coordinate Service programs and integrate them with the joint commander’s concept of support. Knowledge of Service policies and doctrine is essential.

- **Plans and policy division (J-5).** This division does the long-range planning. The division prepares campaign, concept, and operation plans and the associated Commander’s Estimate of the Situation. Often, the J-5 is responsible for special weapons planning. In commands without a separate J-5 division, the function is performed by the operations division.

- **Command, control, communications, and computer systems division (J-6).** This division may be found with a variety of names and designators: Command, Control, Communications Systems; Communications-Electronics and Automated Systems Division; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Division; etc. They use organizational codes such as J-6, C3, C4, C4I, C3S, etc. The functions of the division include handling command responsibilities for communications and frequency control, tactical communications planning and execution, and management and development of electronics and automatic information systems.

A more detailed description of the basic functions of the principal joint staff divisions is shown in Figure 2-26

Nontraditional divisions are also found in many commands.

- **Security assistance division.** The mission of supporting military and economic aid to countries within a joint commander’s area of operations is complex and vital to U.S. foreign policy. This function may be found in a separate division or as a part of the logistics division.

- **Interoperability division** The responsibility for joint planning, plans evaluation and analysis, development of joint doctrine, coordinating joint education and training, and the conduct of joint training exercises may be separate from the other divisions.
# FUNCTIONS OF JOINT STAFF DIVISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECTORATE OR DIVISION</th>
<th>RESPONSIBILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manpower and Personnel</strong> <em>(J-1)</em></td>
<td>• Manage manpower  &lt;br&gt; • Formulate personnel policies  &lt;br&gt; • Supervise administration of personnel, including civilians and prisoners of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence</strong> <em>(J-2)</em></td>
<td>• Ensure availability of sound intelligence on area and enemy locations, activities, and capabilities  &lt;br&gt; • Direct intelligence efforts on proper enemy items of interest  &lt;br&gt; • Ensure adequate intelligence coverage and response  &lt;br&gt; • Disclose enemy capabilities and intentions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operations</strong> <em>(J-3)</em></td>
<td>• Assist in direction and control of operations  &lt;br&gt; • Plan, coordinate, and integrate operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logistics</strong> <em>(J-4)</em></td>
<td>• Formulate logistics plans  &lt;br&gt; • Coordinate and supervise supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, construction, and related logistics matters  &lt;br&gt; • Ensure effective logistics support for all forces in the command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plans and Policy</strong> <em>(J-5)</em></td>
<td>• Assist commander in long-range or future planning  &lt;br&gt; • Prepare campaign and operation plans  &lt;br&gt; • Prepare estimates of the situation  &lt;br&gt; • Functions may be included in operations directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command, Control, Communications, and Computers or Communications-Electronics and Automated Systems</strong> <em>(J-6)</em></td>
<td>• Assist commander with responsibilities for communications-electronics and automated data systems  &lt;br&gt; • Prepare communications and data systems plans to support operational and strategic concepts  &lt;br&gt; • Furnish communications to exercise command in mission execution  &lt;br&gt; • Functions may be included in operations directorate or in the special staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Staff</strong></td>
<td>• Give technical, administrative, and tactical advice  &lt;br&gt; • Prepare parts of plans, estimates, and orders  &lt;br&gt; • Coordinate and supervise staff activities  &lt;br&gt; • Special staff may be included as branches of directorates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Staff</strong></td>
<td>• Responsible directly to the commander  &lt;br&gt; • Special matters over which the commander chooses to exercise close personal control  &lt;br&gt; • Usually includes the political adviser</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF  
Figure 2-26
• **Force structure, resources, and assessment division** The Reorganization Act of 1986 brought added responsibility to combatant commanders for critical involvement in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The specialized nature of this work and the coordination required with component commands has created a need for dedicated staff support.

f. **Variations in joint staff divisions** The commander may organize the staff as necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities. Many combatant commands have taken advantage of this flexibility as illustrated in the internal staff diagrams Figures 2-13 through 2-24. For example, EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM have consolidated the security assistance function with J-4; TRANSCOM and STRATCOM have consolidated the J-3 and J-4 functions.

g. **Terminology.** Joint Pub 1-02, *The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, uses the term “general staff” to describe the divisions explained above. While there is consistency in the functional subdivisions of a staff into personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, planning, etc., the staff designations vary between Services and with the size of organization supported. The Army and Marine Corps may use G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 to identify personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics staff divisions; the Navy may use N-1, N-2, N-3, etc.; and the Air Force uses letter designations. Figure 2-27 illustrates just some of the possible staff designations.

h. **History.** Joint staffs are organized on the conventional staff model. The advent of extensive joint operations during World War II and the institution of the unified command structure after the war posed the question of which type of staff organization would be best suited to such commands. For a variety of reasons, the general staff organization adapted by General Pershing from the French in World War I and developed by the Army and Marine Corps evolved as the model for the U.S. joint staff. This is reasonable, because joint operations nearly always include ground forces, and a majority of the joint staff will be familiar with the concept. The term *joint staff* or conventional staff is used in lieu of *general staff* to avoid confusion with the General Staff, a unique organizational concept. The General Staff is a senior, professional military staff with command authority used in some foreign military organizations. Such an arrangement was expressly forbidden in the creation of the U.S. military establishment in 1947 and has been excluded in every legislative change since.
## U.S. STAFF DESIGNATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY COMPONENT HQ</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
<th>INTELLIGENCE</th>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
<th>PLANNING</th>
<th>COMMUNICATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCS Personnel</td>
<td>DCS Intelligence</td>
<td>DCS Operations and Plans</td>
<td>DCS Logistics</td>
<td>DCS Engineer Resource Management</td>
<td>DCS Communications-Electronics</td>
<td>DCS Systems Automation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY DIVISION HQ</th>
<th>ACOS Personnel (G1)</th>
<th>ACOS Intelligence (G2)</th>
<th>ACOS Operations (G3)</th>
<th>ACOS Logistics (G4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCS Personnel (DP)</td>
<td>DCS Intelligence (IN)</td>
<td>DCS Operations (DO)</td>
<td>DCS Logistics (LG)</td>
<td>DCS Plans (XP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCS Communications Systems (SC)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIR FORCE COMPONENT HQ</th>
<th>DCS Personnel</th>
<th>ACOS Intelligence</th>
<th>DCS Operations</th>
<th>DCS Logistics</th>
<th>DCS Plans</th>
<th>Communications Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>DO</td>
<td>LG</td>
<td>XP</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>(CG) or included in SPTGP as CS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY COMPONENT HQ</td>
<td>ACOS Administration (N1)</td>
<td>ACOS Intelligence (N2)</td>
<td>ACOS Operations (N3)</td>
<td>ACOS Logistics (N4)</td>
<td>ACOS Plans (N5)</td>
<td>ACOS Communications (N6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ABBREVIATIONS:
- **DCS**: DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
- **ACOS**: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF

## References:
- ARMY FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations
- AIR FORCE Publication 53-21, USAF Staff Organization Chartbook
- NAVY NWP 11, Naval Operational Planning

### 208. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN JOINT STAFFS

#### a. Intrastaff relationships
Each joint staff division coordinates its actions and planning with the other divisions. Information on progress and problems is shared regularly throughout the staff. As issues or problems come to the attention of a commander, a single joint staff division is assigned primary responsibility for the action. That division assumes responsibility for coordinating the work among the other divisions and agencies within the headquarters.

#### b. Interstaff relationships
A commander may authorize staff officers to communicate directly with the staff officers of subordinate commands for coordination. When formal orders and directives are issued, however, they are issued in the name of the commander to the commander of the subordinate command—not directly to elements of that command. There are restrictions on the command authority of a combatant...
mander that affect the relationship of the joint staff with the subordinate commanders. The combatant commander is primarily concerned with broad operational matters and, in general, leaves problems associated with administration and support mainly to the component commands. On the other hand, with COCOM, the combatant commander has directive authority to accomplish the mission. By law, directive authority covers all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics. UNAAF contains definitive guidance on logistics, since the Services are assigned by law the primary responsibility for that support.

c. A joint staff assists the commander in the exercise of command. The functions that relate to joint operations will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.

209. COMBINED COMMANDS

a. A combined command is a force under a single commander that is composed of sizable assigned or attached elements of two or more allied nations.

b. The organizational principles already discussed have equal validity when applied to combined commands. The concepts of command authority and the responsibilities of combatant commanders are generally applicable to combined commanders. However, since combined commands are binational or multinational, their missions and responsibilities (including command responsibilities) must be established and assigned to conform to binational or multinational agreements. Organizational questions about combined commands are often more difficult to answer than national organizational questions. The primary source of difficulty is the lack of precedent and an absence of combined doctrine. Normally, a combined command operates under the terms of a treaty, alliance, or bilateral agreement between or among the nations concerned. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Combined Forces Command Korea (CFC), and Allied Command Europe (ACE) are examples of multinational commands.

210. NATURE OF COMBINED STAFF DUTY The normal types of staff problems are magnified on a combined staff. There are psychological and sociological problems created by differences in customs, religions, and standards of living. These factors point to the need for a different mental approach to combined staff duty. Just after the Allied Forces Southern Europe had been formally established in August 1951, Admiral Carney as CINC SOUTH wrote the following memorandum to his staff:
“To those of you who have only worked in the framework of your own particular Service, and thus have not been exposed to the necessary give and take of unification, much that you see will appear to be lacking in order and logic; to those of you who have not had previous experience in inter-Allied dealings, the modus operandi may appear even more obscure. Working within the framework of one’s own Service is a simple matter because the Service procedures have been long established and all of one’s colleagues speak the same language and are guided by the same indoctrination. Joint efforts, be they on the staff or in the field, invariably require mutual adjustments; these adjustments may be radical but with people of good will and good spirit the Services can truly work as a team.

When inter-Allied factors are superimposed, the effects are frequently unpredictable. Politics are politics the world over and many times we encounter difficulties and objections which are illogical from the military standpoint but which stem from political factors that are very real to the officeholders, the voters, and the taxpayers of the countries concerned. It is to be expected that we will frequently encounter problems of obscure and puzzling origin, and an awareness of the possibility should help to foster the patience and flexibility necessary.”

This memorandum, written more than four decades ago, demonstrates the timelessness of certain principles relating to the human element of organizations. The advice is as good today as it was then.
The nature of joint and combined staff duty gives rise to some obligations that should be observed. Lieutenant General D.M. Schlatter, USAF, former Commandant of the Armed Forces Staff College (July 1954 to July 1957), and an experienced officer in joint and combined commands, used to advise future joint and combined staff officers as follows:

The first obligation I’m going to give you sounds like a cliché. It isn’t when you really examine it. Be objective, avoid bias and prejudice. None of us can avoid bias and prejudice one hundred percent. We can’t possibly do it, no matter how hard we try. Each of us has a varying background of knowledge, education, beliefs; and there’s a certain inherent bias we can never get rid of completely; but we must keep on trying, even though we realize that we can’t get rid of it entirely.

Second, avoid emotion. Emotion tends to clog up the thinking processes.

Third, stick to facts whenever possible. This is not always possible. In many cases you must rely on opinion or judgment and a vague thing called common sense. In these cases, you should listen to other competent judges. You should avoid extremes. Above all, don’t express your opinion unless you know what you are talking about.

Fourth, stick to the subject at hand. This is a very hard thing to do in a group discussion. Sometimes, of course, it’s downright dull and it suggests that old anecdote about never letting facts interfere with a good story. But if you want to reach a decision, you should stick to the subject at hand.

Fifth, avoid personalities. Like emotion, personalities clog up the thinking apparatus. If you can’t be complimentary, at least don’t say too much. You can always damn a man, you know, by faint praise. Someone has said the best treatment for a man with a chip on his shoulder is to pat him on the back until the chip falls off.

Sixth, and probably the most important obligation of a staff officer, be honest and accurate. There is an essential requirement for rugged honesty, particularly in combat effectiveness reporting. To shade the truth in any way in this vital subject is, to my mind, the cardinal military sin. There are two kinds of enthusiasm. A commander with enthusiasm will fire a military unit up to the point it can do more than it ever thought was possible. This is very necessary, but it is a different kind of an enthusiasm from the second kind. This second kind is usually a detriment, for it can induce unjustified optimism. You can get so enthusiastic and proud of your Service or your unit that you will brag that it can do many things it can’t possibly do. Above all, here is another good place to be quiet unless you are sure of your facts. In staff work, to recommend a course of action and tell all the pros of the matter and express none of the things against it is to do yourself and your commander an injustice.

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Staff Work: Methods and Applications  

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Staff Work: Methods and Applications

300. STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Every military organization has a commander who alone must accept responsibility for what the unit does or fails to do. The commander must authorize all plans, policies, and basic decisions before they are put into effect. All orders from a higher command to a subordinate unit are issued by or for the commander of the parent unit and are given to the subordinate commanders. By this means, authority and responsibility are fixed and the channels of command are established.

b. It should be apparent, however, that the day-to-day operation of any organization involves hundreds of details. As the size of the organization increases, the number and variety of the details increase. The commander cannot devote personal attention to all of them. A staff is an aid to command. It serves to ease the commander’s workload by furnishing basic information and technical advice by which he or she may arrive at decisions.

c. A properly functioning staff extends the eyes, ears, and will of a commander by

- learning the commander’s policies and working within them;
- keeping the commander informed of pertinent information;
- developing basic decisions into adequate plans;
- anticipating future needs and drafting tentative plans to meet them;
- translating plans into orders and transmitting them to subordinate commands;
- ensuring compliance with these orders through constructive inspection and observation; and
- supplementing the commander’s efforts to ensure unity of effort throughout the command.
301. **PROBLEM SOLVING**

a. The responsibilities of the commander it serves determine the exact nature of the work done by a military staff. The staff of a joint task force commander assigned to assault an enemy beach faces problems significantly different from those of the staff of a unified commander charged with the peacetime military security of a broad area and protection of U.S. interests from attack.

b. No matter how significantly joint staffs vary, there are, nevertheless, common features we can identify. A military commander continually faces problems that involve uncertainties and alternative possibilities in their solution. Since the purpose of a staff is to assist the commander in the exercise of command, the work of the staff, as well, revolves around the solution of problems.

c. Problem solving, in any field of endeavor, can be reduced to five logical steps:

- **recognize** the problem
- **collect** necessary information
- **develop** possible solutions
- **analyze and compare** possible solutions
- **select** the best solution

d. Over the years, military staffs have developed a number of logical and orderly processes to assist them in problem solving. As shown later in this book, the joint planning process uses a variation of the basic problem-solving method as an approach to finding military solutions to situations that threaten U.S. national security interests.

302. **THE ROLE OF THE STAFF ACTION OFFICER**

a. A staff action officer is designated at the Joint Staff, a combatant command, a Service headquarters, or a command to work on a particular action or series of related actions requiring decision or consideration. It is the responsibility of the action officer (AO) to develop, coordinate, and complete the required analysis; formulate recommendations; present the action for decision; and, ultimately, prepare a message or other correspondence implementing the recommendations. The responsibility continues during the internal routing of the implementing document and ends only when that document has been dispatched or when competent authority decides that further action is not required.
b. Pride of authorship is a curse. While the AO is responsible for “working the problem,” the final solution is derived from the knowledge, experience, study, and foresight of the entire staff. The AO should coordinate and consult by the quickest and most informal method available, using discussions, personal visits, and telephone calls as much as possible. When practicable, such actions should be taken during draft stages to avoid revision of final copy.

c. A good staff officer will stand up and be counted—on issues, not on trivial matters. There is no room in briefings or staff action papers for emotion or personal views.

d. Good solutions to the wrong problem get an AO nowhere. Even when the problem has been carefully identified at the outset, the AO must be ever alert to changes and modifications as time passes.

e. A good staff action officer continually cultivates close, informal contacts with a wide range of officers with similar or related areas of interest interdepartmentally and internationally. An AO solicits ideas from everywhere.

f. The AO’s Responsibilities in the Coordination Process

(1) Coordination gives interested and affected organizations an opportunity to contribute to and comment on joint actions. Early involvement of all concerned organizations is crucial.

(2) Preliminary coordination is normally sought at the AO level to gather input that strengthens the action and identifies issues. After preliminary coordination, the AO staffs the action again.

(3) Organizations that do not agree with an action as written may recommend changes to the text. The AO must indicate whether the changes were incorporated.

(4) Final coordination is a request for formal Service and agency concurrence or nonconcurrence in a proposed joint action. Requests for final coordination are sent to the planner level in the Services and to the division chief level in other organizations. Planners and division chiefs are the focal points for securing their organization’s approval at whatever level is appropriate, depending on the nature of the action. Thus, during final coordination, the concurrence, nonconcurrence, or comments received on an action are considered to be the final views of the head of the organization.

(5) Coordinating organizations are expected to concur or nonconcur in a timely manner during final coordination. Nonconcurrence should be accompanied by specific objectives and supporting rationales. Suggested changes to an action that do not form the basis for concurrence or nonconcurrence may be submitted; however, these recommendations should be clearly distinguished from issues on which nonconcurrence is based.
g. Concurrence and Nonconcurrence

(1) Staff, agency, subordinate, or component concurrence or nonconcurrence is critical to the decision-making process. The AO must coordinate with those concerned all actions relevant to more than one organization. AOs with correspondence requiring concurrence or nonconcurrence should send it to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR).

(2) Nonconcurrence requires the lead organization to evaluate the data and make a recommendation in consideration of the nonconcurrence.

303. MILITARY BRIEFINGS

a. Truly effective performance in any of the military Services requires communication skills that are most exacting. The need for accuracy and thoroughness on one hand and brevity and quick response on the other has given rise to a highly specialized and stylized type of speech. This type of speech has been designated the “military briefing.” It requires specific techniques with respect to the role of the briefer, the purpose the briefing serves, and the nature of the required response.

b. At all levels, commanders and staff officers communicate and exercise control using the military briefing. The military briefing is used so extensively that it has become an accepted staff procedure. The primary reasons for its frequent use are to save time for the senior officer, to enable that officer to question the briefer and clarify points, and to facilitate a rapid, coordinated response, all of which serve to reduce reaction time.

c. The principles and techniques of effective speaking apply to the military briefing just as to any other type of speech. However, the military briefing is more concise, usually limited to bare, unglossed facts—the minimum needed for comprehension. There are no “attention-getters”; the essentials are delivered in a purely objective manner. The military briefing often is a one-time-only presentation of facts, with reference to enough familiar material to establish a basis for understanding by the listeners. Briefers often will be required to discuss a very broad subject in a very limited time. Some briefing officers find themselves giving daily or weekly briefings, but AOs most often find their briefings situational—oriented to a specific listener or audience and dealing with a specific subject in which they have expertise.
304. TYPES OF BRIEFINGS

a. The term “briefing” has been applied loosely to almost every form of oral communication in which a military person is involved or in which a military subject is discussed. There are four recognizable types of military briefings: information briefing, decision briefing, staff briefing, and mission briefing. Although there are elements common to all, each type is distinct, and the briefer must understand precisely what is required in each situation.

b. Each type of briefing is designed to accomplish a specific purpose: to impart information, to obtain a decision, to exchange information, or to review important details. The objective common to every briefing is to facilitate a rapid, coordinated response.

(1) The information briefing. The purpose is to present facts to the listeners--to keep them abreast of the current situation or to supply specific requested information. It does not require a decision; the desired response is comprehension.

(2) The decision briefing. This briefing contains the elements of the information briefing, but it is usually more comprehensive in scope, and it is presented for an entirely different purpose. The specific response to the decision briefing is an answer to a question or a decision about possible courses of action to be taken.

(3) The staff briefing. The staff briefing is, perhaps, the most widely used form of military briefing. It is designed for the rapid oral exchange of information within a group of people and is, in this sense, similar to the information briefing. It is also similar to the decision briefing whenever it leads to a command decision. It is known and used at every military echelon to keep a commander and staff mutually informed of the current situation. The anticipated response is a coordinated effort.

(4) The mission briefing. This briefing is designed especially for combat operations. It is also used to brief training missions that simulate combat conditions. Its purpose can be a combination of any or all of the following: to impart last-minute information, to give specific instructions, or to instill an appreciation of the overall mission. The desired response is a thorough and up-to-date understanding of operational conditions that could affect the successful execution of the mission. It, too, is closely related to the information briefing.

c. An AO must remember a couple of things while briefing.

(1) Be prepared psychologically and mentally to cope with any audience reaction, which can range from passive acceptance to strong objection and heated discussion. The AO must remain objective, answer questions without emotion, and promise a quick response if additional information must be gathered.
(2) Be prepared to do your best on every briefing occasion. Successful briefing ability comes from mastery of fundamental speaking skills and briefing techniques, from practice and study, from good judgment, and from being aware of the audience’s feedback.

305. STAFF ACTION PAPERS: THE TOOLS OF THE TRADE

a. If AOs are the eyes and ears of a commander or senior staff officer, the obvious question is, “How do they perform these duties?” Biologically, AOs have their own eyes and ears to perform the job, but, realistically, their principal tools are pen, paper, and telephone. To be more formal, action officers create staff action papers.

b. If your organization were fairly small and the turnover of people relatively light, you could probably operate by merely sending handwritten notes back and forth. In short, you could “wing it.” But an organization the size of the DOD can’t operate this way. This is especially true when working in the joint arena. The joint environment, whether it is at a combatant command or the Joint Staff, demands consistency and uniformity to be efficient.

c. There are, of course, some differences between commands’ forms, and peculiarities of each; they reflect the unit’s mission and that of the parent organization of the combatant commander, and the combatant commander’s preference. In general, you will not find major differences among the commands’ forms, nor will you find major differences between your own Service’s forms and the joint forms. It is essential that you master the use of whatever forms your command uses. Each form represents a preferred method that the organization uses to operate in the staff environment and is the vehicle by which most of the communication travels. Typical examples are shown in the following paragraphs.

306. INFORMATION PAPERS These papers normally are used to pass information to the boss (combatant commander, deputy combatant commander, and chief of staff of a combatant command), to pass information between staff offices when no reply is expected, and to issue directives from the boss to directors and chiefs of special staff offices.

a. Fact Sheets convey information to an informed principal. They are used to update the combatant commander returning from trips, to furnish material for a Congressional hearing, to submit material for briefing books for a trip, or to answer a query. There is no established format; the only mandatory information is writer’s name, rank, division, directorate, phone number, and date of presentation. They should be limited to one page and normally are used to give a rapid updating on a specific topic with which the user is familiar. Brevity is the keynote in preparation.
b. **Memorandums for Record** are used to record an event or action taken that would not otherwise be recorded, and are normally limited to one page. For example, they may be used to record the minutes of a meeting, a telephone conversation, or information from a one-time source.

c. **Memorandums** normally are limited to one page. When necessary, enclosures such as itineraries and schedules may be attached. Memorandums are often informal notes to individual staff members in the daily conduct of routine business.

### 307. DISCUSSION OR POSITION PAPERS

The purpose of these papers is to give the user a short outline guide for discussions during consultations, meetings, and command visits. They may contain substantiation of the command position, opposition to other command views, questions, or any other material that would be useful in discussions.

a. On the **Joint Staff**, three types of papers are used. The **Position Paper** is used to summarize an issue, including its status and any recommendations. The paper is written in simple narrative style using direct, active sentences and is no more than two pages in length. Level of detail is determined by knowledge level of the intended user. **Talking Paper** is prepared in “bullet” format and is intended to be used in oral discussions for an audience that is intimately familiar with the subject. **Information Papers** are used to convey information in preparation for a meeting or briefing. Facts should be presented in clear, concise wording using “tick” and “bullet” format. Additional guidance is found in the Joint Staff Joint Administrative Instruction 5711.06M, *Action Processing*.

b. **Point Papers** are often used to guide the user in discussions outside the command. They should not exceed two pages. An abbreviated sentence structure is desirable, but clarity must be maintained. Point papers are often compiled into books for use during trips, command visits, discussion with visitors, and conferences. Typical point paper format is shown below:

```
Outline

! background - essential events or actions
! discussion - be brief, consider reader’s position, be specific
! important points - one page, may include enclosures, respond on time
! staff comment - you are the expert, be positive in tone, state critic’s position
```

c. **Position Papers** present the command position on unresolved issues, with necessary background information to substantiate that position and to oppose contrary views. They may include a talking paper as an enclosure, if a discussion is anticipated and it would assist the user in covering the subject.
Outline:

- purpose - reason for the paper, e.g., paper was requested by . . ., paper required for a meeting, etc.
- discussion - tailor to level of reader’s knowledge, identify key points, avoid telegraphic messages and technical or military jargon, etc.
- recommendation - logical recommendation that flows from purpose and discussion

D. Discussion Papers are often prepared for subjects on which discussion could be initiated, to obtain views or decisions, extend a commendation, emphasize a command position, or other appropriate reasons. A good discussion summary advises the CINC about the discussion objectives, subjects to avoid, and the recommended position to take.

e. Background Papers give chronological background data, the current status, and actions to be accomplished for a particular problem or subject. Frequently they are used as backup and background material for members of the command group and staff at meetings and conferences and during visits. If practical, they should be limited to one page. A condensed outline style, rather than complete sentences and paragraphs, should be used to achieve brevity and clarity. Additional details may be in enclosures or tabs to the basic paper.

308. COORDINATION PAPERS These are used to coordinate routine actions within the staff.

a. Summary Sheets are informal means of communicating with the various elements of the Joint Staff. Their format is self-explanatory. The Joint Staff uses Form 136, a specialized summary sheet indicating the level of staff and Service coordination that has taken place on the accompanying action paper.

b. Staff Summary Routing Sheets are standard multipurpose forms to serve as referral slips, memorandums, summaries of action, and permanent records of the internal coordination on an action. Action papers are often forwarded under such sheets, as are copies of routine correspondence submitted for information.

309. DECISION PAPERS These are papers used to present staff recommendations for decision and/or formal approval.

a. Summary Sheets (generic) must include the substantive points necessary to reach a logical decision without excessive recourse to enclosures or the study they must
b. **Action Summaries** are memorandums, preferably no more than one single-spaced page, that accompany correspondence or messages to be signed or released. Summaries contain the problem, facts, discussion, and conclusions. A recommendation drawn from the attached correspondence or message is clearly stated as the last element of a summary.

### 310. THE STAFF STUDY

a. The staff study is one of the more flexible problem-solving procedures available to a staff. Mainly used for administrative and managerial problems where operational considerations are not immediately involved, the staff study lists conclusions and recommendations on a specific, clearly stated problem. Many organizations use staff studies—some more than others. Their broad outline is illustrated [Figure 3-1](#), where it is compared with the rational steps of the problem-solving process.

**A Comparison:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Study</th>
<th>Action Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>! Problem</td>
<td>! Recognize the problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>! Assumptions</td>
<td>! Collect necessary information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>! Facts bearing on the problem</td>
<td>! Develop possible solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>! Discussion</td>
<td>! Analyze and compare possible solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>! Conclusions</td>
<td>! Select the best solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>! Recommendations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The staff study is a formal paper that follows a prescribed format. It is flexible in content and can be applied to a variety of problems. Although mainly confined to use within the staff, the staff study is not merely a dressed-up staff memorandum.

c. We can best understand the staff study by discussing its (or six) main paragraph headings.
(1) **The problem.** Stating the problem concisely and accurately is one of the more difficult tasks in any problem-solving process. A correct statement is the foundation for all that follows. The problem may be stated as a question, a statement of need, or an infinitive phrase.

(2) **Assumptions**

(a) Assumptions are important, but they can be dangerous in military staff work. They constitute the reasonable suppositions that must be made to work out a problem logically. In effect, they are artificial devices to fill gaps in actual knowledge. You should be sure that the assumptions are valid and necessary. The validity of a staff study is tied directly to the validity of the assumptions.

(b) Do not make assumptions that are essentially self-evident.

(3) **Facts bearing on the problem**

(a) A list of every fact related to the study is, in most cases, too lengthy and involved. Select those that need to be highlighted and list them in logical sequence (preferably the order in which they will be used in the discussion to follow).

(b) Facts also may be introduced in the discussion paragraph itself. Whether they are singled out for listing in this paragraph or introduced in the course of the discussion, they must be authenticated. Practice varies in this detail. The annexes are the appropriate place to expand on facts, if detailed explanations are necessary.

(4) **Discussion**

(a) The discussion is the heart of the staff study; it is where the problem is analyzed and the options are considered. One method is to describe the advantages and disadvantages of possible solutions, introducing facts and reasoning sequences as necessary. Another technique is to list criteria and test each possible solution against each criterion.

(b) If a full discussion requires more than two or three typed pages, include it as an annex. However, an annex should not be used merely to avoid the labor of making the discussion concise and logical. The purpose of a staff study is to save the commander’s time by doing a careful job of writing; referring to a long, rambling discussion annex is not doing the job properly.

(5) **Conclusions**
This paragraph is where the best solution to the problem is selected. The conclusions must follow logically from the discussion and should contain a brief statement of the superior solution.

(b) The writer must be careful not to include new material or new viewpoints in the conclusion paragraph.

(6) Recommendations. This paragraph explains how the conclusions can be implemented. If a letter, memorandum, or message is needed to implement the conclusions, it is customarily attached as enclosure “A.” All that should remain for the commander to do is to approve and, if necessary, sign the enclosure.

d. The basic question that must be answered is, “If the commander buys the recommendation, will the problem be solved?”

311. LETTERS. Frequently, a letter is the recommended action and is attached to a decision paper for approval, signature, and dispatch. Commands are free to choose the style of letter for their use.

312. MESSAGES

Reference: MIL STD 6040, U.S. Message Text Formatting Program

a. Some actions may recommend dispatching a message. Messages may be transmitted electronically, or they may be sent by mail or courier, depending on requirements for speed of delivery and security. Precedence categories indicate the relative order in which a message is processed in the telecommunications system and the speed with which it must be handled during internal headquarters processing. The time objective established as a general guide is as follows:
Precedence    Code    Time Objective

Flash         ZZ       As fast as possible (less than 10 minutes)
Immediate     OO       30 minutes
Priority      PP       3 hours
Routine       RR       6 hours

b. Whenever a message is prepared that includes the word “not”--where the accidental omission of the “not” would produce the opposite or other action than that desired--add the words, “repeat not,” e.g., “Execution will not repeat not be made pending receipt of further orders.”

c. References should be listed in messages. All references should be briefly summarized in the first part of the message so that the message stands alone and can be completely understood without reading the other documents. Avoid the use of Not To All (NOTAL) references whenever possible.

313. ESTIMATES

References: Joint Pub 1-03.8, Joint Reporting Structure, Situation Monitoring FM 101-5, AFM 28-3, FMFM 3-1, NWP 11

a. Most discussion of the staff study imply that for every problem, there is a neat and tidy solution. Experienced action officers will suggest that, in reality, that is simply not the case. The best staff studies may have to conclude that there is no feasible solution to the stated problem and that, at least for the time being, the best “course of action” is to do nothing. Normally, however, operational military situations do not permit doing nothing. Although the commander often is faced with so many uncertainties and so wide a variety of alternative courses of action that the overall problem seems unsolvable, postponing decisions or deferring action until the situation clears is usually impossible. For better or for worse, the operational commander must have the best available estimate of how to proceed--and often must have it in a short time.

b. A device that has evolved over years of military experience is estimate of the situation. This is the operational counterpart to the staff study and, although it has several forms, we can identify two distinct categories:

(1) the Commander’s Estimate (of the Situation)

(2) the staff estimate
Staff estimates are discussed with deliberate planning, Chapter 6; Commander’s Estimates are discussed in both deliberate planning and crisis action planning, Chapters 6 and 7 of this book.

314. NONQUANTIFIABLE FACTORS IN STAFF WORK

a. Staff officers must remain objective in their work. It’s easy to conduct a study to find the best solution when the “right answer” is known even before the study begins. Unfortunately, people are usually blind to their own prejudices and parochialisms, so the obvious solution may be a poor one, indeed.

b. If experience is the best teacher, then experience must be considered an important resource that can be used to help solve problems. Experience is far more than just knowing facts and figures. It includes that all-important human factor: a “feel for the problem.” Even though science cannot explain how the human-experience factor works, a planner should appreciate its value, actively seek out a source of experience, and consider (but not blindly follow) advice based on experience.

c. “Gut feeling” is not a formally recognized part of the problem-solving method, but it, too, can be helpful in staff work. Even when action officers have done their work according to the book, quantified the process, and come up with the optimal solution, an inside alarm can go off and say, “Wait a minute, something’s not quite right yet.” If that happens, the planner should review all the data one more time, see if all important factors have been identified and considered, and determine whether the recommended solution really makes sense. This “gut feeling” can be especially helpful if the planner has a tempted to use a purely analytical method. Automated systems, used carefully and correctly, can be helpful in analyzing data, but they must not be allowed to make decisions. Human beings are responsible for their decisions; a computer is not.

d. Staff officers must look beyond all the traditional factors that may favor a particular course of action, and call the attention of the commander to several other considerations that cannot be quantified. This is true because, when the time comes for commanders to make final decisions on a piece of completed staff work, they must wrestle with these issues that are not easily measured or defined. They must consider the questions of law, morals, ethics, aesthetics, politics, culture, and history, any or all of which may play an important role in this final decision.
315. YOUR EFFECTIVENESS AS AN AO

a. Your ability to express your thoughts clearly, both orally and in writing, will most often determine your effectiveness as a staff officer. Many commanders have said during AFSC interviews that their action officers need to learn how to communicate more effectively. There are many fine Service publications, as well as civilian sources, available to assist you in improving in these areas. For instance, there is Army Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders or Guide to Effective Military Writing by William A. McIntosh (Stackpole Books). Air Force Pamphlet 4-19 Tongue and Quill or Revising Business Prose by Richard Lanham (Scribner’s) among many others. Use them! Figure 3-2 summarizes some key rules from the Army reference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STYLE RULES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Put the recommendation, conclusion, or reason for writing in the first or second sentence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use the active voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use short sentences (15 words or less)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use short words (three syllables or fewer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write paragraphs no more than 1 inch deep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use correct spelling, grammar, and punctuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use “I,” “you,” and “we” as subjects of sentences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reference: Department of Army Pamphlet 600-67  

b. Effective speaking or writing does not mean using long, infrequently used words that require listeners or readers to break out their dictionaries; on the contrary, the most effective communication contains the everyday words that best express your meaning.

c. Your role as an effective action officer is to give senior officers accurate and adequate information to make a decision and to implement a plan or program. In effect, your job is to do the “leg work” so that the senior officer can merely approve or “sign off” on the project.
Joint Publications

Chapter 4

- Introduction 4-2
- Joint Publication System (JPS), Joint Doctrine, and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) Development Program 4-4
- Selected Joint Publications 4-7
- Joint Pub 1-03, Joint Reporting Structure 4-11
400. INTRODUCTION

a. It is not easy to attain the level of military professionalism required of an active duty staff officer. A broad background of education and military experience is helpful; knowledge of certain documents and reporting systems is fundamental. This chapter highlights some of the documents, reports, and joint publications that are frequently used by joint staff officers. It also describes the development and documentation of joint doctrine in the Joint Publication System (JPS) and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) program.

b. Joint Pub 5-03.1 (Note: To be published as CJCSI 3122.01), Annex Q, (JOPES Volume I, 4 August 1993) lists references used by military staffs in joint operation planning. The list is keyed to specific functional areas within the joint staff organization. It serves as a catalog from which staff officers can select a working library of relevant publications to better understand their jobs.

c. Memorandums used to implement CJCS decisions and policy are described in Joint Administrative Instruction 5711.06M, Action Processing. That document also includes an extensive list of references on Joint Staff action processing.

(1) **Chairman’s Memorandum (CM)** CMs are memorandums issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out his responsibilities. They document such things as CJCS policy actions, guidance and instructions to the CINCs of combatant commands, and other things that require CJCS action. CMs are prepared for the signature of the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) **Memorandum issued in the name of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (MCM)** MCMs are memorandums issued in the name of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and contain policy instructions or comments based on existing CJCS policy. They cover such things as OPLAN reviews and JSPS actions, and may be signed by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director or Vice Director of the Joint Staff, or the Secretary of the Joint Staff if the MCM concerns administrative matters only.

(3) **Director, Joint Staff, Memorandum (DJSM)** DJSMs deal with staff-to-staff actions such as requesting information for review or furnishing information. They can state a Joint Staff position or give Joint Staff coordination on Service or Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) actions. DJSMs are prepared for the signature of the Director or Vice Director of the Joint Staff.
(4) CJCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) MOPs are numbered statements of policy issued in the name of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and sent to the Services, combatant commands, Joint Staff, and Defense agencies on matters involving strategic planning; contingency planning; military requirements; programs and budgets; manpower; joint doctrine, training, and education; and policies and procedures that support fulfillment of the other statutory and directed responsibilities of the CJCS. MOPs are reviewed annually and reissued, revised, or canceled when they become five years old. MOP 1 contains both numerical and subject indexes for all MOPS.

d. MOP 60, “Release Procedures for Joint Staff and Joint Papers and Information,” establishes policy and procedures for release of Joint Staff and joint papers and information. Joint Staff information and papers are those originated by the Joint Staff; there is an extensive list of documents in MOP 60 that fall under its control for purposes of release.

e. Under SM-98-93 dated 15 April 1993, existing MOPs, Joint Administrative Instructions (JAs), and directives to the combatant commands that are due for updating or revision are to be converted to the appropriate document described below:

   (1) CJCS Instruction CJCS Instructions replace all types of correspondence containing CJCS policy and guidance that does not involve the employment of forces. They are of indefinite duration and are applicable to external agencies or both the Joint Staff and external agencies. CJCS Instructions remain in place until superseded, rescinded, or otherwise canceled. They do not contain joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures as defined in Joint Pub 1-02.

   (2) CJCS Notice CJCS Notices replace all types of correspondence containing CJCS policy, guidance, and information of a one-time or brief nature applicable to external agencies or both the Joint Staff and external agencies. They contain a self-canceling provision and will not remain in effect longer than one year.

   (3) Joint Staff Instruction Joint Staff Instructions replace Joint Administrative Instructions and all other types of correspondence containing policy and guidance of indefinite duration applicable only to the Joint Staff.

   (4) Joint Staff Notice Joint Staff Notices replace all types of correspondence containing policy guidance, or information of a one-time or brief nature applicable only to the Joint Staff. They contain a self-canceling provision and will not remain in effect longer than one year.

   (5) J Instruction J Instructions contain policy and guidance of indefinite duration applicable only to the issuing Joint Staff J directorate.
(6) **J Notice.** J Notices contain policy, guidance, or information of a one-time or brief nature applicable only to the issuing Joint Staff J directorate. They contain a self-canceling provision and will not remain in effect longer than one year.


### 401. JOINT PUBLICATION SYSTEM (JPS), JOINT DOCTRINE, AND JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (JTTP) DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

**Reference:** Joint Pub 1-01, 25 April 1995

a. The purpose of the JPS is to enhance the combat effectiveness of U.S. forces. The JSPS furnishes the principles, guidelines, and conceptual framework for initiating, validating, developing, coordinating, evaluating, approving, and maintaining joint doctrine; joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP); and joint technical publications for the Armed Forces. The Director, J-7, the Joint Staff, manages the joint doctrine and JTTP program for CJCS.

b. The joint publication hierarchy furnishes a framework for organizing joint doctrine and JTTP publications into the functional series illustrated Figure 4-1. The organizational structure generally follows traditional joint staff lines of responsibility. Each series, except the 0 and 1 series, includes a keystone manual as the first publication in the series. Each keystone publication is the doctrinal foundation of its series. The functional structure is organized as follows.

1. **Joint Pub 0 Series, Capstone Joint Warfare Doctrine** Publications in the Joint Pub 0 Series link joint doctrine to national strategy and the contributions of other government agencies and alliances. The UNAATF, Joint Pub 0-2, continues to furnish the basic organization and command and control relationships required for effective joint operations. This series also includes Joint Pub *Joint Warfare for the U.S. Armed Forces*.

2. **Joint Pub 1 Series, Joint Reference Publications** The Joint Pub 1 Series includes a joint publication guide and index and general reference publications.
(3) **Joint Pub 2 Series, Doctrine for Intelligence Support of Joint Operations.** Publications in the Joint Pub 2 Series establish joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for intelligence support of joint operations, including direction, planning, collection, processing, production, and dissemination.

(4) **Joint Pub 3 Series, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations.** Publications in this series establish joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for directing, planning, and executing joint military operations.

(5) **Joint Pub 4 Series, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations.** Publications in this series establish joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for directing, planning, and carrying out logistics support of joint operations.
(6) **Joint Pub 5 Series, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations**. Publications in this series establish the joint planning processes relating to the conduct of joint military operations, such as deliberate and crisis action planning.


c. Joint publications are publications of joint interest prepared under the cognizance of Joint Staff directorates and applicable to the military departments, combatant commands, and other authorized agencies. They are approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, authenticated by the Director of the Joint Staff, and distributed through Service channels. Only publications approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be referred to as “joint publications.” Publications involving two or more Services that have not been reviewed and approved by the CJCS are referred to as “multi-Service” and will identify the participating Services.

d. Joint publications are identified by publication number. The Director, J-7, signs publication numbers to ensure subject matter continuity. Joint publication numbers comprise three numerical groups.

1. The first group identifies the functional field numerical series as described above.

2. The second numerical group, preceded by a hyphen, places the publication within a functional field. A zero-digit designator is used to indicate the keystone manual for the series of a functional field. (For example, Joint Pub 6-0 would be the number for the keystone manual in the C4 Systems series.)

3. The third numerical group, preceded by a period, designates the publications that furnish supporting or expanded doctrine or JTTP for sequenced manuals within a functional field. For example, Joint Pub 3-09.1 would be the number of the publication on Joint Lasers Designation Procedures, which supports Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*, which falls under the Joint Pub 3-0 Series of publications.

e. Additional joint publications, unnumbered and not doctrine, have been issued under separate cover. These various pamphlets and handbooks will aid in joint and combined operations and planning. Some of the most valuable are listed in the following sections.

**402. SELECTED JOINT PUBLICATIONS**

**AFSC PUB 1**
a. Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), is a valuable reference that sets forth principles and doctrine governing the activities of the Armed Forces of the United States when Services of two or more military departments are operating together. It includes guidance governing exercise of command by the combatant CINCs and joint force commanders, explains the functions of the CJCS and military departments in support of joint operations, furnishes guidance for the military departments and subordinate commands in the preparation of their respective detailed plans, and describes the command functions of joint commands.

b. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States guides the joint action of U.S. Armed Forces, presenting concepts that mold those Armed Forces into the most effective fighting force. The concepts are broadly stated, and require a leader’s judgment in application. This publication guides U.S. multinational endeavors as well.

c. Joint Pub 1-01, Joint Publication System (Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program) contains guidance and procedures on the nomination, development, coordination, and approval of joint doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) publications. It includes an index of all existing and planned publications and identifies the responsible lead agency for each publication.

d. Joint Pub 1-01.1, Compendium of Joint Publications, furnishes a readily available list of all joint publications, with a brief synopsis of each, to joint force commanders, their staffs, and components. The publication specifically gives an overview of joint doctrine development, all published joint publications, all joint publications currently under development, and all validated joint doctrine projects.

e. Joint Pub 1-01.2, Joint Electronic Library User’s Guide, is a hands-on guide to using the Joint Electronic Library (JEL). The JEL furnishes a high-speed, full-text search and retrieval capability accessible through desktop computers via modem. Information contained on the JEL CD-ROM is listed in Appendix J.

f. Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, contains definitions of commonly used military terms. The standardization of military terminology is a major step toward effective communication and common understanding within the Department of Defense, between the United States and its allies, and within the civilian-military community.

g. Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer is a pamphlet that covers the breadth of authoritative guidance for the employment of our Armed Forces. It contains
executive summaries of capstone, keystone, and other key joint doctrine publications that are important to combatant commanders.

h. **Joint Pub 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support of Joint Operations**, describes doctrine for intelligence support to joint or multinational operations.

i. **Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations**, outlines the translation of national strategy into assigned missions and military objectives, capabilities, and concepts of employment of component forces in joint operations, and the principles of command organization for all aspects of joint force operations. Concepts covered include developing the Commander’s Estimate, discharging warfighting responsibilities, and planning and executing campaigns employing joint forces.

j. **Joint Pub 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities**, is currently under development as an overarching publication that will describe the capabilities the individual components furnish the joint force commander. It will also summarize the component’s key responsibilities in supporting the joint force commander’s operation or campaign.

k. **Joint Pub 3-01.2, Theater Counterair Operations**, furnishes fundamental principles and guidance for all aspects of counterair operations, including command and control of offensive and defensive air defense operations and Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) operations involving all military Services.

l. **Joint Pub 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations**, establishes doctrine for planning and employing joint forces in amphibious operations.

m. **Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations** establishes fundamental principles of joint employment of Special Operations Forces (SOF). It includes a definition of special operations and describes SOF organizations, missions, capabilities and limitations; joint SOF organizations and operational concepts; and the functional relationships between SOF and conventional forces at all levels of war.

n. **Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations other than War** contains guidance on preparing for and conducting selected military operations other than war. These selected military operations other than war include support for insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, counterterrorism, peace operations, recovery operations, counterdrug operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, domestic support operations, and logistics support.

o. **Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations** is designed for senior commanders designated as JTF Commander of a peace operation. It is meant to be a resource tool for the commander and his senior staff, and is most useful when supplemented by the Peace Operations Database maintained as part of the Joint Electronic
Library. Though consistent with joint and Service doctrine, it is not a doctrinal publication.

p. **Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations** will describe the strategic context for coordination between government agencies. It will identify the fundamental principles that a joint force commander may employ in gaining agency cooperation to accomplish a mission.

q. **Joint Pub 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations** will consolidate multinational planning and operations guidance and principles already contained in various joint doctrine publications. It will capture lessons learned from recent multinational operations and exercises that are applicable at the doctrinal rather than joint tactics, techniques, and procedures level.

r. **Joint Pub 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone** contains broad doctrinal guidance for joint forces involved in the use of airspace over the combat zone.

s. **Joint Pub 3-56, Command and Control for Joint Operations** describes overarching command and control guidelines, describes typical joint force command and staff functions and agencies, and incorporates joint command and control doctrine for use by commanders and staffs at combatant commands, subunified commands, JTFs, and subordinate component commands. It contains guidance and procedures to consider while organizing, planning, coordinating, and conducting joint force operations and training.

t. **Joint Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations** contains doctrine covering the entire spectrum of logistics. It includes the architectural framework for logistics support to joint operations, guidance for joint logistics planning, and the relationship between logistics and combat power.

u. **Joint Pub 4-01, Mobility System Policies, Procedures, and Considerations** furnishes joint transportation procedures for submission of common-user movement requirements. It compiles mobility-related policies, procedures, and data derived from various Government, DOD, and Service directives for use as a planning guide.

v. **Joint Pub 4-05, Mobilization** covers the major planning and execution aspects of the mobilization process, including the identification of general responsibilities and concepts for coordination of mobilization planning, and responsibilities for planning by organizations outside the Department of Defense. It describes the systems and procedures used in the mobilization planning process.

w. **Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations** contains keystone doctrine that establishes requirements, responsibilities, and guidelines for planning joint
operations. It details core guidance for the planning of joint operations in all mission areas, including mobilization, deployment, sustainment, employment, and mission analysis. It identifies and defines the interdependent relationships between threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, course of action development, and execution planning, and explains the interrelationships required between personnel, intelligence, logistics, C3 systems, and other staff agencies to maximize combat effectiveness through coordinated joint planning and execution.

x. **Joint Pub 5-00.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Campaign Planning** will guide the planning and execution of joint campaigns at theater and subordinate command levels. It will describe the relationship between theater and subordinate campaign plans at the strategic and operational levels. It will also examine the relationship between campaign plans and JOPES in the development of theater and subordinate campaign plans.

y. **Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures** furnishes planning guidance and procedures for forming, staffing, and deploying a joint task force (JTF). It includes an overview of the purpose of a JTF; responsibilities and authorities of the appointing authority, JTF commander, and JTF component, supporting, and supported commanders; and other command and control considerations related to the JTF. It relates JTF operations to the steps of Crisis Action Planning (CAP).

z. **Joint Pub 5-03 Series, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)**. This series of publications covers deliberate and crisis action planning procedures; OPLAN, CONPLAN, and Concept Summary development; and associated ADP support. See Chapters 6 and 7 of this publication for additional information.

aa. **User’s Guide for Joint Operation Planning** an unnumbered guide and reference companion to Joint Pub 5-0, offers joint planners a sound understanding of the substance and form of joint operation planning, particularly the deliberate planning process and the types of plans developed under that process.

bb. **User’s Guide for JOPES**, also unnumbered, contains a general overview of JOPES. This document is intended to be used as a companion piece to the User’s Guide for Joint Operation Planning.

c. **Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations** is broad in scope, discussing the entire spectrum of C4 systems supporting commanders. It is a plicable to joint operations at all levels of conflict.
403. JOINT PUB 1-03, JOINT REPORTING STRUCTURE (JRS) GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

a. The Joint Reporting Structure is outlined in Joint Pub 1-03, and is directed for use throughout the military community. It is designed to furnish

- military information to the NCA;

- a central catalog of recurring reports to support command decisions military operations so as to minimize duplication;

- standardization in reporting systems of the Joint Staff, Services, and combat support agencies; and

- central management and standard rules for the application of message text formatting to reporting systems.

b. The JRS creates reports and reporting systems that have wide application in command and control, operation and support planning, plan execution, and analysis. It portrays essential data on personnel, matériel, and equipment status; operational and logistics planning; and the overall military situation. It establishes

- procedures for preparing reports,

- the framework for reporting systems for transferring data between participating commands and agencies, and

- the standards for automatic data processing within the structure.

c. Joint Pub 1-03 Series includes numerous publications, each concerned with a particular functional area. Several of them are listed below.

1-03.3 Joint Reporting Structure Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)

1-03.6 Event or Incident Reports

1-03.7 Nuclear Weapons Reports

1-03.8 Situation Monitoring

1-03.9 Reconnaissance
d. **Intelligence reports** In Joint Pub 1-03.15, the JRS outlines four intelligence reports.

   (1) **Department of Defense Intelligence Digest (DODID)** The purpose of the DODID is to give the CJCS, the combatant commands, and selected U.S. Government agencies timely, finished intelligence about developments that could have a significant effect on current and future planning and operations. DIA prepares this narrative report, and it normally covers a single activity, event, or situation. The primary objective of the DODID is to report on key developments, explain their occurrence, and assess their impact on the United States and its interests.

   (2) **Spot Intelligence Report (SPIREP)** The purpose of the SPIREP is to give the CJCS, the National Military Intelligence Center (DIA), the combatant commands, the military Services, and selected U.S. Government agencies timely intelligence information on developments that could have an immediate and significant effect on current planning and operations. This narrative report is submitted to the national level by combatant commands, military Services, and military organizations of divisional level whenever critical developments appear imminent or are of potentially high interest to U.S. national-level decision-makers. Its content includes the nature of the event, where and when the event occurred, the source of the information, and remarks. SPIREPs are transmitted to the national level not later than one hour after receiving the critical information. Initial SPIREPs are not delayed to verify the information or to get more details; rather, amplifying or clarifying information is forwarded in followup SPIREPs.

   (3) **The Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM)** DISUMs give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Military Intelligence Center (DIA), the military Services, and selected U.S. Government agencies daily analysis of an actual or simulated (training exercise) crisis and a summary of relevant intelligence information produced during the preceding 24-hour period. The minimum required information includes subject,
general hostile situation, hostile operations during the period, other intelligence factors, and the counterintelligence situation. DISUMs are submitted to the national level by combatant commands.

(4) DIA Intelligence Situation Summary (INTELSITSUM). The INTELSITSUM furnishes timely, periodic intelligence summaries about an actual or simulated (training exercise) foreign crisis that could have an immediate effect (actual or simulated) on U.S. planning and operations, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, the military Services, U.S. military commanders worldwide, and selected U.S. Government agencies. The summary contains the subject, summary and highlights, military activity, political issues, collection posture, and outlook.

e. Situation Monitoring. Joint Pub 1-03.8, JRS, Situation Monitoring contains the instructions for the Commander’s Situation Report (SITREP) and Commander’s Operational Reports (OPREP-1, -2, -4, and -5).

(1) SITREPs keep the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, Services, and agencies of the Government advised of critical national and international situations; existing political, military, and operational situations and plans; the readiness of combatant commanders to meet the requirements of CJCS-approved plans; the progress of ongoing large-scale military exercises; and any significant intelligence event. SITREPS are narrative reports that include the following kinds of data:

- Own situation, disposition, or status of forces: summary update of changes to force locations, mission readiness deteriorations, proposed deployments, changes of operational control, and projected additional force requirements

- Situation overview: brief overall assessment of the situation, including conditions that increase or detract from capability and readiness of forces

- Operations: description and results of offensive or defensive operations, information on the operation of allied forces, summary of planned operations for the next 24 hours, and deviations from previously reported plans

- Intelligence and reconnaissance: brief overview of the situation, order of battle, capabilities, and threat changes, reference to significant SPIREPs submitted during the previous 24 hours

- Logistics: brief overview of logistics sustainability by class of supply, highlighting significant deficiencies affecting planned operations and problems beyond the commander’s capability to overcome.
Communications and connectivity: significant outages, incompatibilities, quantitative equipment deficiencies, and their impact

Personnel: factors affecting readiness of forces or units, daily battle casualties, and the effect on command mission of casualties sustained

Significant political, military, and diplomatic events not reported by OPREP-3 PINNACLE but that may result in public reaction, results of government decisions made by key allies, civil unrest, etc.

Commander’s Estimate, or CINC’s or Service chief’s assessment summary of key points from preceding paragraphs highlighting areas requiring CJCS or NCA action or decision, intentions on execution, etc.

(2) SITREPs are submitted daily effective 2400Z to ensure receipt in Washington no later than 0400Z the following day. Duplicate reporting between SITREPs, OPREPs, and other JRS reports is discouraged. Information required to be submitted via another JRS report is not included in SITREPs; instead, reference is made to the appropriate JRS report.

(3) OPREPs are usually narrative reports, used to advise the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, Services, and U.S. Government agencies of events or incidents that could attract national or international attention; current operations and recommended operation plans describing the deployment or employment of military units; and the results of activities associated with military operations. The system is designed to satisfy all echelons of command with a single reporting system. OPREPs-1, -2, -4, and -5 are covered in Joint Pub 1-03.8 Situation Monitoring

• OPREP-1, Operation Planning Report is used to describe planned operations for current situations.

• OPREP-2, Operation Start Report is used to advise that an operation has started or to direct execution of a plan or part of a plan.

• OPREP-4, Operation Stop Report is used to report the completion of an operation or a phase of an operation.

• OPREP-5, Operation Summary Report is used to give a statistical summary.

f. Incident Reporting Joint Pub 1-03.6, JRS Event/Incident Reports furnishes instructions for reporting significant events or incidents with specific report content and format guidance for 11 different categories of events, and instructions for report submi
The **OPREP-3, Event/Incident Report**s used to notify the National Military Command Center (NMCC) immediately of any event or incident that may attract national attention.

g. **Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)**

**Reference: Joint Pub 1-03.3**

(1) **Introduction** GSORTS is the single automated report within the Department of Defense used to furnish the NCA, CJCS, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with authoritative identification, location, and resource information on units and organizations of the U.S. Armed Forces. GSORTS describes each registered unit in terms of personnel, equipment, and supplies on hand; equipment condition; and training in terms of unit training levels C-1 through C-6. These levels reflect the status of each unit’s resources and training as measured against the resources and training standards required to undertake the wartime mission for which the unit is organized or designed. Combat, combat support, and combat service support units of the operating forces of each Service, including Active, National Guard, and Reserve units, assigned tasks in either the SIOP or an OPLAN residing in JOPES, report their status of resources and training through GSORTS at the unit levels specified in Joint Pub 1-03.3. Status of selected foreign forces is also reported in GSORTS for identification as required by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) GSORTS is a primary source of data on force availability to meet planning requirements for current operations. It is an automated Global Command and Control System (GCCS) data file that contains the identity of worldwide organization resources keyed to each unit’s individual Unit Identification Code (UIC). These data support operation planning, and command and control functions, within the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the Services, Service major commands, component commands, and combat support agencies. The perishability of status information requires that reports be prepared when the status changes and forwarded without delay. GSORTS data are useful in support of planning only when unit information is timely and accurate. Joint Pub 1-03.3 describes report submission time and frequency requirements.

(3) Within GSORTS, organization and unit identity and status information is cumulated, refined, updated, and filed for rapid recall. GSORTS information is submitted by subordinate units and compiled at higher echelons of command. GSORTS inputs originated by Service major commands and component commands are routed to the appropriate combatant command where they are entered into the GCCS. GSORTS information is forwarded simultaneously to the Joint Staff, combatant commanders, and Service headquarters.

(4) Computer processing demands precise formatting and strict adherence to administrative guidelines. Reporting format, data element definitions, and rules for their use are contained in Joint Pub 1-03 series. GSORTS reports contain basic identity, status,
personnel strength, combat readiness, equipment and crew status, and other elements that present a picture of the unit and its daily readiness and capabilities. As GSORTS input is received, the status data are processed, entered into, and update the GSORTS File. The Director for Operations, J-3, the Joint Staff, maintains the master GSORTS File.

(5) **Relationships between GSORTS and other systems** GSORTS interfaces with the Specified Geolocation Code File (GEOFILE), the Type Unit Data File (TUCHA), and the Major Equipment Code File (MEQPT), a GSORTS equipment status file. GSORTS supports JOPES through GCCS by updating the JOPES database.

h. **JOPES Reporting System (JOPESREP)**

References:  
Joint Pub 1-03.21, *JRS, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Reporting Structure (JOPESREP)*
Joint Pub 5-03 Series, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*

(1) JOPESREP is an information reporting system structured to support deliberate and crisis action planning. It describes standard procedures for reporting the information required to develop the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) database and the Summary Reference File (SRF) used to plan and flow force and sustainment in support of contingency plans. JOPESREP defines standard element descriptions, criteria for editing, and report procedures; specifies formats; and defines information to solve planning problems.

(2) JOPESREP is used by the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) to develop, review, coordinate, revise, and approve operation plans; identify movement constraints that result from lack of resources, port reception or throughput capabilities, and POL storage limitations; identify shortfalls in resources to meet plan requirements; and improve the accuracy of planning data.
Defense Department Systems and Processes

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Defense Department Systems and Processes

500. OVERVIEW

a. **Introduction** At both national and departmental levels, various processes and systems have been developed to handle the complex problems of setting strategic direction, determining national military policy, requesting resources to execute that policy, and translating the funded military capability into military operations. The joint planning process is one link in a long and complex chain. This chapter describes many of the systems that influence joint staff officers in their role as joint operation planners.

b. **Background** Before focusing on the processes or systems used by DOD for joint planning and operations, we need to set the stage. Since our primary goal is to be able to relate the systems to the joint arena, the background of our study is a basic understanding of the joint purpose these systems serve. The purpose of joint operation planning is to use the military element of national power effectively to protect U.S. interests, and U.S. national security strategy is the starting point for joint planning. Joint planning is a process, a systematic series of actions or procedures, used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks. The following systems affect joint planning and operations:

- National Security Council (NSC) System
- Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
- Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
- DOD Acquisition System
- Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems
- National Communications System
- Defense Communications System
- Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)
- C4I for the Warrior (C4IFTW)
- Global Command and Control System (GCCS)
501. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM

References: National Security Act of 1947, as amended  
January 1982  
January 1993  
Joint Staff Manual 5715.01, National Security Council Affairs,  
dated 1 December 1994

a. **Function.** The National Security Council (NSC) was established by the National Security Act of 1947 as the principal forum to consider national security issues that require Presidential decision. Congress envisioned that the NSC would allow the military and the civilian government departments and agencies to work more effectively together on national security matters. The NSC functions, by statute, are to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security to enable the military and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively; to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power; and to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security for the purpose of making recommendations to the President. Although the statutory functions of the NSC has remained essentially unchanged since the mid-1950s, its composition, influence, and schedule of meetings have varied considerably with each President, the personality of his key advisers, and his view of the organization. Currently, through PDD-2/NSC, the NSC is tasked to give advice on integrating all aspects of national security policy affecting the United States, including domestic, foreign, military and economic policy (in conjunction with the National Economic Council).

b. **Organization**

(1) In 1949 the NSC was placed in the Executive Office of the President. It includes only four statutory members: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Director of Central Intelligence are specified as statutory advisers. Additional members, specified in PDD-2/NSC, are the Secretary of the Treasury, the Representative to the United Nations, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the “National Security Adviser”), the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Chief of Staff to the President, and, when appropriate, the United States Attorney General. The National Security Adviser is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the council and the interagency coordination. Statutory members and advisers, and other members of the NSC specified by PDD-2/NSC attend all meetings of the Council. Other senior officials not included as members may be invited to attend meetings, depending on the topics being discussed. Subordinate elements of the NSC include the following:
(a) The National Security Council Principals Committee (NSC/PC), a cabinet-level senior interagency forum for consideration of national security policy issues and resolution of issues not requiring the President’s participation. The Chairman, or in his absence, the Vice Chairman attends these meetings.

(b) The National Security Council Deputies Committee (NSC/DC), the senior sub-Cabinet level interagency forum for national security policy issues. The NSC/DC reviews and monitors the work of the NSC interagency process (including the Interagency Working Groups (IWGs)), and focuses much of its attention on policy implementation. The Vice Chairman attends these meetings.

(c) The NSC/DC Crisis Management (NSC/DC/CM), responsible for day-to-day crisis management and crisis prevention, including contingency planning for major areas of concern. The Vice Chairman attends these meetings.

(d) The NSC Interagency Working Groups (NSC/IWGs) which convene on a regular basis as determined by the Deputies Committee, review and coordinate implementation of Presidential decisions in their policy areas. The Assistant to the Chairman or the J-directors or their deputies attend these meetings.

(e) The Interagency Working Groups/Subgroups (IWG Subgroups) meet under the sponsorship of the IWG to develop background material, review working papers, and discuss and develop policy options on national security issues, including those arising from the implementation of NSC decisions. The Joint Staff division chief or action officer (AO) with functional responsibility for these issues would represent the Chairman at these meetings.

(2) NSC Documents. NSC documents are established to inform U.S. Government departments and agencies of Presidential actions:

(a) Presidential Decision Directive (PDD/NSC) The PDD series is used to publish Presidential decisions on national security matters. All PDDs in this series are individually identified by number and signed by the President.

(b) Presidential Review Directive (PRD/NSC) This series of directives is the mechanism for directing the reviews and analysis of an assigned topic to be undertaken by the departments and agencies. All PRDs in this series are identified by number and signed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Upon completion of staffing, a PRD often becomes a PDD.

502. DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT--A JOINT PERSPECTIVE
References: CJCSI 3100.01 (Draft), “Joint Strategic Planning System,” dated June 1995

a. Introduction

(1) The purpose of the Department of Defense (DOD) Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is to produce a plan, a program, and a two-year budget for the DOD with the ultimate objective of furnishing the combatant commanders with the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the formal means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, discharges his responsibility to give strategic plans and direction to the Armed Forces of the United States and to interact with the other DOD systems. The JSPS establishes the formal process for review of the national security environment and U.S. national security objectives; threat evaluation; assessment of current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets; and proposal of military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to achieve national security objectives. See Figure 5-1.

(2) Taken together, the JSPS and the PPBS have the combined purpose of furnishing the best possible mix of missions, forces, equipment, and support to the combatant commanders. The joint perspective requires that the systems be looked at as one system, beginning and ending with the combatant commanders’ warfighting requirements and capabilities. Viewed in this manner (see Figure 5-2), the entire process is interrelated. It is important to note that the planning sequence allows continuous assessment, giving it the flexibility needed to accommodate today’s rapidly changing global environment.

(3) The following paragraphs discuss JSPS and PPBS according to the processes they cover: planning, programming, and budgeting. The documents and subprocesses included in the three processes are discussed, identifying with each document or subprocess the system it supports.

b. Planning

(1) Joint Strategy Review (JSR)--JSPS The Joint Strategy Review (JSR) assesses the strategic environment for issues and factors that affect the national military strategy in the near and long term. The JSR is the JSPS process for continuously gathering information and examining current, emerging, and future issues, threats, technologies,
organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions. Throughout the process current strategy, forces, and national policy objectives are reviewed and assessed. **The JSR facilitates the integration of strategy, operation planning, and program assessment** When significant changes in the strategic environment are identified, JSR Issue Papers are prepared. These papers are initial discussions of proposed changes to the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Planning Document (JPD), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

(a) **JSR Working Groups** JSR working groups, consisting of representatives from the Joint Staff, the Services, and the combatant commands, continuously review the international and domestic environment for trends and changes that should be incorporated into the strategic thinking of the United States in the long, mid, and near term. The intent is to include officers from the Services and combatant commands in the working groups to expand participation in the strategy development process.
Interacting with the JSPS

UNCLASSIFIED Joint Staff Working Paper

1. National Security Strategy
   Addresses political, economic, and military security issues. Provides broad direction for defense planning and establishes the framework for defense planning to proceed.

2. Joint Planning Document
   Series of volumes providing concise priorities, requirements or programming advice to SecDef for mid-term planning. Contains 7 Volumes.

3. Defense Planning Guidance
   SecDef's planning guidance and fiscal constraints to Services for POM development. Provides link between planning and programming phases of PBS.

4. Long-Range Vision Paper
   Describes future joint operational concepts, recommends defense missions and national security needs for the long term.

5. Joint Strategy Review
   Continuous process that assesses the strategic environment for issues and factors that may affect the NMS in the near term or long-range. (J-5)

   Based on the NSS. Provides CJCS advice on national military objectives, force structure, and support requirements to the NCA. (J-5)

7. Program Objective Memorandums
   Recommendations of the Service Secretaries, USCINCSOC, and heads of DOD agencies to SecDef on allocation of resources.

8. Chairman's Program Recommendation
   CJCS programmatic recommendations to create/enhance joint warfighting capabilities. Establishes CJCS's measures of effectiveness for assessing Service program efficiency. (J-8)

9. Integrated Priority List
   A list of CINC's highest priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that may adversely affect CINC's mission.

10. Integrated Priority List (IPLs)
    CINC's Integrated Priority List

11. Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA)
    Expands the role of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) through the establishment of JWCA Teams. Teams assess joint warfighting aspects of their respective areas by analyzing Service POMs and CINC IPLs and recommending areas for divestiture and recapitalization to the JROC.

12. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
    Provides strategic guidance to CINCs, Service Chiefs and Agencies and apportionment of forces for near-term planning. Includes 14 Supplemental Instructions.

13. Contingency Planning Guidance
    Fulfills SecDef's statutory duty to provide annual written policy guidance for contingency planning for the Chairman.

14. Budget Estimate Submission (BES)
    Submitted to OASD/C by Military Departments based on approved Program Decision Memorandums.

15. Joint Strategy Review (JSR)
    JSR Report
    Asesses Service POMs and recommends adjustments. Assis SecDef POM decisions.

16. Chairman's Program Assessment
    Conducts Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) which feeds readiness assessments into the JWCA. Prepares readiness baseline for monthly presentation to the DepSecDef at the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). (J-3)

    Series of volumes providing concise priorities, requirements or programming advice to SecDef for mid-term planning. Contains 7 Volumes.
(b) **JSR Issue Papers** JSR Issue Papers report, and, when appropriate, publish changes in the strategic environment significant enough to warrant senior leadership review. When a significant change in the strategic environment is identified, a JSR Issue Paper is sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, and the combatant commanders. Continual assessment of the strategic environment gathers information needed to determine whether revisions to other JSPS documents are needed.

(c) **JSR Annual Report** The JSR Annual Report summarizes issues studied over the previous year and recommends any changes to the National Military Strategy as a result of those issues. The JSR Annual Report is published by 1 August annually.

(d) **Long-Range Vision Paper** The Long-Range Vision Paper is published when needed and examines plausible future environments 14 years beyond the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) period. Its purpose is to help determine future national security needs for the long term, offering a means to study the implications of those future environments on the NMS, joint doctrine, force structure and requirements.

(e) **JSR Support Responsibilities** The following assigned responsibilities support the Joint Strategy Review Process.

- The Director, DIA, prepares baseline intelligence assessments, strategic planning advice, and an analysis of force structure to support the JSPS as well as the development of the NMS, JPD, JSCP, CPA and other strategic planning or assessment documents. The Joint Staff, combatant commanders, Services, and defense agencies use these biennial threat assessments, focused on specific time periods, as a baseline for intelligence planning. The threat assessment is prepared in three parts, limited to the length necessary to summarize security interests as they relate to the NMS.
  - Parts One and Two support development of strategic plans, assessments, and environments beyond the FYDP, including the long-term acquisition policy of DOD and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
  - Part Three supports development of such documents as the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA). In consonance with the priorities listed in PDD-35, “The Enduring Challenges Document,” the JSR broadly assesses regional and global issues, including military forces and capabilities; proliferation, particularly of weapons of mass destruction; science and technology; defense economics and associated industrial infrastructure; military-political-sociological conditions; regional instability; terrorism; narcotics; command, control, communications, and computers; humanitarian concerns; and foreign intelligence and security service activities and collection activities by nongovernment organizations. Preparers of Part Three
use regularly produced intelligence reports such as the National Intelligence Estimates, and Defense Intelligence Reports and Appraisals.

- The Joint Staff J-5 is responsible for the JSR process, including preparing administrative guidance, managing, and organizing the JSR. The J-5 prepares the Long-Range Vision Paper, JSR Issue Papers, and the JSR Annual Report.

- The Joint Staff J-8 prepares, in collaboration with the combatant commanders, Services, and other Joint Staff directorates as appropriate, estimated force structure with alternatives that broadly support proposed changes to the NMS. These documents include appropriate strategic, nonstrategic, and defensive force structures; alternatives; and recommendations for use in the development of military plans to effectively support the NMS. Force apportionment guidance to be used in other JSPS documents (e.g., the JSCP) is included. Comparative analyses of force structure effectiveness, capabilities, and alternatives are furnished as constrained strategies and military options assessed.

(2) National Military Strategy (NMS)--JSPS The NMS furnishes to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, as to the recommended national military strategy and fiscally constrained force structure required to support attainment of national security objectives. The NMS assists the Secretary of Defense in preparing the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and guiding the development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The NMS is forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for his review and then to the President. It may be used to determine the CJCS position on matters of strategic importance regarding NCA-directed actions. The NMS also furnishes supporting documentation to the Secretary of Defense for consideration during preparation of the DPG, and to the Services for consideration during development of the Program Objective Memorandums (POMs). In 1992 the NMS was published in an unclassified format for the first time. The intent now is to publish the NMS “as needed” based on NSS changes when changes in the strategic environment dictate a need to modify the national strategy. The NMS includes

- a contextual setting, summarized from the JSR, that includes an appraisal of U.S. defense policy, as stated in the current DPG, and recommendations for change;

- an updated intelligence appraisal, extracted from the JSR, that describes the range of threats to U.S. national security;

- a description of ways to achieve U.S. national security objectives, including discussion of the threats to U.S. security interests;
• a description of the strategic landscape; and

• recommended fiscally constrained force levels, developed in collaboration with the Services and combatant commanders, that are required in order to achieve the strategic objectives with acceptable risk.

(3) *Joint Planning Document (JPD)--JSPS.* The *Joint Planning Document* (JPD) supports the National Military Strategy by furnishing concise programming priorities, requirements, or advice to the Secretary of Defense for consideration during preparation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The JPD is a stand-alone document published in a series of volumes covering specific functional areas. The JPD supports the strategy and force structure for the defense planning period and gives concise military tasks, priorities, requirements, or guidance in functional areas. It is intended to furnish insight on CJCS priorities in development of the defense program for the affected FYDP.

(a) **Volume 1, Intelligence (J-2 lead),** establishes CJCS intelligence policy guidance and associated goals and objectives in support of the NMS and develops prioritized intelligence capabilities required by the CINCs to support the NMS during the FYDP. It also serves as supporting documentation for the core intelligence capabilities identified in the DPG.

(b) **Volume 2, Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological (J-5 lead),** outlines the capabilities required by the combatant commanders to support the strategy for the planning period. The CINC's inputs for this volume constitute their formal input to the Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study (NWRS) process.

(c) **Volume 3, C4 Systems (J-6 lead),** summarizes major command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems capability objectives and programming priorities needed to support the NMS and its force structure in addition to future joint military operations.

(d) **Volume 4, Future Capabilities (J-8 lead),** discusses present and future operational capability deficiencies and potential technology exploitation opportunities that require major science and technology (S&T) or systems acquisition (research and development) efforts in the mid- and long-range timeframes, and establishes a prioritized set of major R&D and S&T objectives to correct those deficiencies.

(e) **Volume 5, Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) (NIMA lead),** discusses major MC&G resource requirements and shortfalls to support the NMS, states shortfalls and appraises the inherent risks in programmed MC&G resources, and recommends prioritized actions to resolve those shortfalls.
Volume 6, Manpower and Personnel (J-1 lead), identifies and examines broad issues and programs common to all Services that relate to meeting current and programmed forces, and states the CJCS position regarding military and civilian personnel management programs and policies needed to support manpower requirements.

Volume 7, Logistics (J-4 lead), describes the joint logistics policies and programs that affect the capability of programmed forces to meet their present and future requirements, and states joint logistics policy in support of the NMS for use of the Secretary of Defense in developing the DPG.

Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)--PPBS The DPG issues guidance from the Secretary of Defense to the military departments for development of the military departments’ Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) for the defense planning period. The DPG includes major planning issues and decisions, strategy and policy, strategic elements, the Secretary’s program planning objectives, the Defense Planning Estimate, the Illustrative Planning Scenarios, and a series of studies The DPG is the major link between the JSPS and the PPBS.

(a) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) takes the lead in drafting the DPG, considering the previous year’s DPG, Program Decision Memorandums (PDMs), and the budget, along with the NMS. The DPG Steering Group, chaired by the Deputy USD(P), helps develop and coordinate the DPG. DPG development relies on extensive dialogue between OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, and the Services.

(b) As chapters of the DPG are drafted, they are circulated to the military departments and others for review and comment. The Services use the draft DPG as guidance to begin development of their programs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, and the Defense Resources Board (DRB) review the draft DPG until the final version is issued. The DRB was established as an oversight organization to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the PPBS process. The DRB ensures that fiscal and other guidance are followed at all levels. This powerful group is actively involved in every step of the PPBS process. The board, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, also serves as the major arbiter of fiscal issues leading to development of the DOD budget.

c. Programming In January, the President approves Fiscal Forecasts and Guidance (FFG) developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and sends it to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services. The FFG furnishes fiscal guidance concerning the value of the dollar and forecast availability that the Services need to develop realistic programs within fiscal constraints.

(1) Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) The military departments and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) send POMs to the Secretary of Defense in
the spring of even-numbered years. These identify major issues that must be resolved during the year of submission. Supporting information for the POMs is published per the annual POM preparation instructions.

(a) The combatant commanders submit their requirements to the Services through their components during POM development. The CINCs also send their highest priority needs to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs). The Services are required to include special annexes that show how their POMs respond to the needs of the CINCs, in particular the CINCs’ individual IPLs, and the CINCs have the opportunity to review all POMs to ensure that the Services have considered their needs.

(b) POMs are based on the strategic concepts and guidance stated in the DPG and include an assessment of the risks associated with current and proposed force and support programs. POMs express total program requirements for the years covered in the DPG. They also describe the rationale for proposed changes to the force approved by the Secretary of Defense as reflected in the Future-Years Defense Program (FYDP). The FYDP is the official database of all military establishment programs approved by the Secretary of Defense, structured as depicted in Figure 5-3. The FYDP is updated formally three times during the cycle shown in Figure 5-4.

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**Future-Years Defense Program Structure**

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<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Operations &amp; Maintenance</th>
<th>Research &amp; Development</th>
<th>Procurement</th>
<th>Military Construction</th>
<th>Appropriations</th>
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Figure 5-3
(c) At the behest of Congress, the Secretary of Defense began submitting two-year budgets, starting in FY89 with the FY89-90 budget. Congress, however, has not changed its traditional practice of working out the budget annually. To remain synchronized with Congress, DOD complies with the original annual budget timetables, but, in keeping with the spirit of the two-year budget, doesn’t introduce new items in the “off-year” budget of each cycle. Instead, DOD refines the figures submitted the year before. See Figure 5-5.

(2) Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA)--JSPSThe Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) is the CJCS’s assessment of the composite POM. It summarizes the views of the CJCS on the balance and capabilities of the POM force and support levels required to attain U.S. national security objectives. In addition, the CPA assists the Chairman in fulfilling his statutory duty to do the following:

- advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other components of the Department of Defense conform to the priorities established in strategic plans and support the priorities established for the requirements of the combatant commanders
- submit to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within projected resource levels and guidance furnished by the Secretary, to achieve greater conformance with established priorities
• advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the major power programs and policies of the Armed Forces conform to strategic plans

(a) The CPA assesses how well strategic guidance and the POMs submitted by the military departments, USSOCOM, and defense agencies conform to national military defense priorities and strategic guidance. When appropriate, it may contain alternative recommendations and proposals to improve conformance with strategic guidance or the CINC’s priorities.

(b) CPA development is an iterative process that begins before the POMs are published and ends when critical issues are identified for inclusion in the CPA. Services, CINCs, agencies, and the Joint Staff are involved throughout the process. This coordination is essential to identify and properly develop specific issues appropriate for CJCS to bring before the Secretary of Defense formally. Documents considered in CPA development include POM preparation instructions, OSD Fiscal Guidance, the DPG, the POMs themselves, the NMS, the JPD, the JWCA, the JMRR, the JMNA, the CINCs’ IPLs, the Combat Support Agency Responsiveness and Readiness Report, etc.

(3) Issues--PPBS. The OSD staff prepares a set of potential issues, i.e., alternatives to some of the programs included in the POMs. The CINCs and OMB prepare other potential issues. The Program Review Group (PRG) examines all potential issues, resolving many issues at the PRG level, and agrees on a set of issues to be considered by the Defense Resources Board (DRB). The DRB makes the final selection from the list of candidates; those selected as a formal briefing to the DRB or as issue books, sometimes

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**Biennial PPBS Continuum**

- **Past FYs**
  - Oct-Nov: In Execution
  - Dec-Jan: Planning
  - Feb-Mar: Off-Year Review (Ongoing assessment of PBDs)
  - Apr-May: Congressional Budget Action
  - Jun-Jul: BES Build

- **Current Year (FY0)**
  - Aug-Sep: In Execution

- **Budget Year (FY1)**
  - Sep-Oct: Service Build
  - Oct-Nov: Budget Build
  - Dec-Jan: Federal Budget

- **Program Year (FY2-Even)**
  - Jan-Feb: Guidance Development
  - Feb-Mar: DPG
  - Mar-Apr: POM Build
  - Apr-May: POMs
  - May-Jun: POM Review
  - Jun-Jul: POMs
  - Jul-Aug: BESs

- **Program Year (FY2-Odd)**
  - Aug-Sep: Off-Year Review (Ongoing assessment of PBDs)

- **Planning Year (FY3)**

- **Planning Year (FY4+)**

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*Figure 5-5*
called program review books, are prepared, staffed through the CINCs and Services for comment, and forwarded to the DRB for a decision. The Services formulate the issue papers, and the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs also supply inputs. Each issue paper consists of a discussion section followed by alternatives. The individual issues are combined into issue books (IBs), sometimes called main issues or program review books. Issue books are circulated to other OSD staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and the Services for review and comment. The DRB, the DOD’s “board of directors,” considers the books, with comments to facilitate the decision process.

(4) **Program Decision Memorandums (PDMs)**--PPBS The DRB has many meetings over a two-to-three-week period to consider the Issue Books and resolve the issues. The CINCs are invited to the meetings that consider their issues. The Service Chiefs and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may attend DRB meetings. Each Issue Book is the subject of one two-to-three-hour meeting, after which the Deputy Secretary of Defense reaches a tentative decision. After all the Issue Books have been individually reviewed, a wrap-up meeting is held to evaluate the total effect of the tentative decisions on the program. Open issues are resolved and final decisions are reached and recorded in PDMs during early August.

d. **Budgeting**

(1) **Budget Estimates Submission (BES)**--PPBS Each of the military departments and defense agencies forwards its Budget Estimates Submission (BES) to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (ASD(C)). The BES is traditionally due in September. It includes data for the prior year, current year, budget year, and budget year plus one (more for authorized programs) per the Budget Guidance Manual and supplementary memorandums. Budget Estimates are prepared and submitted based on the approved program as well as current economic assumptions contained either in the PDMs or in detailed budget guidance issued each year. On receipt of the submission, the comptroller’s program and budget office begins the joint OSD and OMB hearings to review the submission. Appropriate members of the Joint Staff and OSD staffs attend these hearings, jointly conducted by OSD and OMB representatives. The military departments make presentations concerning their submissions and respond to questions. The DRB meets when appropriate.

(2) **Program Budget Decisions (PBDs)**--PPBS Budget submission hearings are held to obtain additional information needed to draft Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). The entire budget is reviewed to ensure that the requests are properly priced, program schedules are appropriate, and estimates are consistent with the objectives of the Secretary of Defense. PBDs document approval of the estimates for inclusion in the President’s Budget. These decisions evaluate, adjust, and approve all resources in the budget request. Although the responsible budget analyst has the lead in developing the
PBD, other OSD staff personnel furnish appropriate recommendations and support. When each individual PBD is written, it is coordinated with OMB and the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of Defense. Each PBD consists of a discussion of the area, issues, and a series of alternatives. PBDs are sent with a covering memorandum that identifies any unresolved issues to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who then chooses one of the alternatives or directs a new one, and the signed PBD goes to the appropriate military department and CINCs.

(a) If a military department appeals a PBD, the reclama is processed through the same channels as was the PBD, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense makes the final decision. The military department secretaries and Service chiefs have an opportunity as near the end of the review cycle as possible to discuss with the Secretary of Defense the major budget issues that merit his personal review. During this phase of PPBS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs assess the impact of PBDs on warfighting capabilities of the combatant commands. They present their concerns to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who discusses them with the Secretary of Defense as appropriate. While the formal PPBS process has not changed, the CINCs and the Joint Staff are becoming increasingly influential in the program and budgeting choices.

(b) Since the mid-1980s, the role of the CINCs in resource management has increased significantly, as shown by Figure 5-6. PPBS has become much more responsive to the needs of the CINCs. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, is the only combatant commander who actually submits a budget.

(3) Defense Budget--PPBS If, at the end of the PPBS process, OMB or DOD feels that unresolved differences remain, the Secretary of Defense and Director, OMB, raise these issues when they meet with the President. Once the final budget decisions are made, the DOD budget becomes a part of the President’s budget that is submitted to the Congress in January. Once the President signs the Congressional appropriations act into law, OMB can begin apportioning funds to the federal departments. The Services execute the budget and procure new forces and capabilities, and the CINCs develop, maintain, and prepare to execute their contingency plans (See Figure 5-7).

e. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)--JSPS The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) contains guidance to the CINCs and Service Chiefs for accomplishing military tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. These assignments take into account the capabilities of available forces, intelligence information, and guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense. The JSCP directs the development of contingency plans to support national security objectives by assigning planning tasks and apportioning major combat forces and strategic lift capability to the combatant commanders. As a capabilities planning document, it represents the last phase of resource management. It apportions the resources provided by the PPBS to develop operation plans.
The JSCP constructs a coherent framework for giving capabilities-based military advice to the NCA.

1. The JSCP is designed to be a “living document” that is reviewed biennially. As a result of such reviews, the Joint Staff J-5 initiates appropriate changes resulting from force structure modification and changes to the strategic environment, or, if there is no need to revise the JSCP, publishes a directive requiring CINC revalidation of operation plan requirements.

2. The JSCP is the principal vehicle that assigns tasks to the combatant commanders to develop operation plans, Concept Plans with or without Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD), and functional plans using deliberate planning procedures described in detail in Chapter 6 following. The JSCP gives strategic planning guidance and direction for plans to be developed following its distribution with a time-frame for completion being between 12 and 18 months. It consists of a single volume that covers planning guidance, objectives, tasks, and major force apportionment for planning. Major combat forces expected to be available during the planning period include both...
Active and Reserve forces under various conditions of mobilization. The JSCP supplemental guidance, published separately as 14 CJCS Instructions, furnishes planning guidance, capabilities, and amplification of tasks assigned for planning in specified functional areas:

- **CJCSI 3110.02** Intelligence
- **CJCSI 3110.03** Logistics
- **CJCSI 3110.04** Nuclear
- **CJCSI 3110.05** Psychological Ops
- **CJCSI 3110.06** Special Ops
- **CJCSI 3110.07** Chemical Warfare; Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense; Riot Control Agents and Herbicides
- **CJCSI 3110.08** Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
- **CJCSI 3110.09** Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
- **CJCSI 3110.10** Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C4 Systems)
- **CJCSI 3110.11** Mobility
- **CJCSI 3110.12** Civil Affairs
- **CJCSI 3110.13** Mobilization
- **CJCSI 3110.14** Military Operations Other Than War
- **CJCSI 3110.15** Special Technical Operations
f. **JSPS-Related Assessments and Other Key Documents** The following assessment list contains critical JSPS-related information.

1. The **Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA)** (J-8) is prepared by the CJCS in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs. It is submitted annually to the Secretary of Defense for his approval and submission to Congress with the defense budget. The JMNA fulfills the statutory duty of the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress an annual comprehensive net assessment of the defense capabilities and programs of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies compared with those of potential adversaries.

2. The **Current Readiness System (CRS)** (J-3). The CRS, depicted in Figure 5-8 and detailed in CJCSI 3401.01, looks at current strategy and assesses areas judged important to joint warfare. When deficiencies exist, they are looked at in more detail in concert with the unified commands and Services. Service programs are reviewed for adequacy to satisfy the current warfighting deficiency. This system reviews and assesses current strategy, forces, and critical joint enablers.

3. The **Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR)** (J-3) The JMRR, the central component of the CRS, examines both current readiness and readiness to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS). It is a subjective assessment with a macro-level focus by the senior leadership of the Services and combatant commands. The JMRR

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**Current Readiness System**

![Current Readiness System Diagram](image-url)
contains the CJCS Service assessments of unit readiness by the Service Operations Dep-
ties and CINC assessments of joint readiness and is briefed by the J-3. During the JMRR, the Services report unit readiness, assessing people, equipment, training, and critical e-
ablers. The CINCs report joint readiness, assessing their ability to integrate and synchr
nize ready forces to execute their assigned missions. A quarterly feedback JMRR, chaired
by the CJCS or VCJCS, is conducted to brief the CINCs’ identified deficiencies and
courses of action to correct them. The solutions are developed as a collaborative effort
between the Joint Staff, the Services, and unified command staffs. The focus is on near-
term (within two years) operational, planning, policy, and programmatic corrections for
key warfighting deficiencies.

(4) The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) (J-8) The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process is the CJCS vehicle for obtaining a systematic view of future joint warfighting capabilities. Assessments, sponsored by Joint Staff Dire-
torates, are conducted by teams of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, unified commands, Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, federally funded research and development centers, and others as necessary. Assessments examine key r
relationships and interactions between joint warfighting capabilities, and identify opportuni-
ties for improving warfighting effectiveness. The continuous assessment process gives
insight into issues involving requirements, readiness, and plans for recapitalizing joint
military capabilities. Findings are presented to the CJCS, the JROC, and the CINCs. The
final assessment products are used to influence programming and budget guidance and to
develop joint requirements resource recommendations. The JWCA is the major source for
developing the Chairman’s Program Recommendations (CPR).

(5) Chairman’s Program Recommendations (CPR) (J-8) The CPR contains
the CJCS’s recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for future programs. These recom-
mendations represent the Chairman’s view of programs important for creating or e-
hancing joint warfighting capabilities. The recommendations are intended for considera-
tion while developing the Defense Planning Guidance. Services, unified commands, and
the Joint Staff are involved throughout the process. CINC inputs are solicited to make the
CPR a better tool during DPG development.

(6) The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)

(a) The DPG issues policy, articulates strategic objectives, and reflects the
national military strategy; it includes the Secretary of Defense’s force and resource POM
guidance to the military departments, other combat support agencies, and the unified
commands. The DPG is a statutorily required (reference) indispensable source document
for both planning and programming. It is essential that CJCS advice be furnished during
development of the DPG.
(b) The DPG also includes the Secretary’s program planning objectives, the Defense Planning Estimate, the Illustrative Planning Scenarios, and a series of studies. The DPG is a major link between the JSPS and the PPBS.

(7) **Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)** fulfills the statutory duty of the Secretary of Defense to furnish written policy guidance annually to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for contingency planning. The Secretary issues this guidance with the approval of the President after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CPG focuses the guidance given in the NSS and DPG, and is the principal source document for the JSCP.

### 503. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER (C4) SYSTEMS

Historically, great military victories are often attributed to superior mobility, firepower, intelligence, or logistics. Superior command and control (C2) systems have enabled commanders to maintain the unity of effort to apply these capabilities at the critical time and place to win. Today improved technology in mobility, weapons, sensors, and C4 systems, and increased and increasingly sustained operation tempo, generate voluminous amounts of information. Information overload, if not managed, can adversely affect the outcome of a conflict. Properly employed, C4 systems can be the key to successful information management and military operations.

#### a. Basic Doctrine

(1) An unbroken chain of communications must extend from the NCA, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the combatant commanders, component commanders, and commanders of subordinate and supporting commands.

(2) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the combatant commands, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the Services, ensures that commanders at each echelon have the communications necessary to accomplish their assigned missions. The required communications capability may come from the Defense Communications System (DCS), the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), other National Communications System (NCS) operating agencies’ systems, organic force communications systems, or commercial communications systems. This multiplicity of C4 systems ensures communications support during all phases of military operations.

(3) Effective C4 systems are critical to planning and executing successful joint or combined operations.

(4) Joint force commanders (JFCs) must develop operational procedures that provide an interoperable, compatible communications network. Annex K to any OPLAN furnishes the plan for employment of communications and C4 systems in that OPLAN.
b. **Definitions**

(1) **Command and control** denotes the process that commanders use to plan, direct, coordinate, and control forces to ensure mission accomplishment.

(2) **C2 Systems, C4 Systems, and C4** are the supporting systems that include both the C2 systems and the communications and computer systems required to implement the C2 process.

c. **C4 Systems Principles** Experience has demonstrated that the C4 planner should be brought in at the beginning of the planning process and involved throughout the planning evolution. To achieve operational objectives, C4 principles should be applied during all phases of the operation. Joint Pub 6-0 identifies principles common to Service, joint, and combined C4 activities. Some of the key principles deal with system discipline, interoperability, flexibility, reliability, security, and survivability.

d. **Peacetime Systems** Deterrence, the fundamental U.S. military strategy, relies on peacetime readiness of forces. Therefore, peacetime C4 systems support three basic requirements of daily operations, attack warning, and transition to war.

e. **Conventional War Systems** Wartime C4 systems support joint force commanders’ requirements for C2, including intelligence, logistics, combat service support, and special operations. Additional communications links are usually brought on line, including targeting and strike mission planning. Essential C4 systems are composed of many systems and nodes connecting the combatant commander with U.S. components, supporting combatant commanders, and any allied or coalition forces. The C4 system of a combatant command includes the C4 systems of subordinate commands and joint task forces (JTFs) when such organizations are established.

f. **Communications Support--JTFs** Communications support may be available to a joint force commander from the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) or other CJCS-controlled communications resources. CJCSM 6231-series discusses CJCS communications capabilities.

504. **NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS)** The National Communications System (NCS) is an interagency group that coordinates the telecommunications assets of 23 Federal departments and agencies to ensure compatibility and interoperability during emergencies without compromising day-to-day operations.

a. The purpose of the NCS is to assist the President, National Security Council Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Office of Management and Budget to
• exercise their wartime and nonwartime emergency functions and their planning and oversight responsibilities, and

• coordinate the planning for national security and emergency preparedness communications for the Government under all circumstances.

b. The Secretary of Defense is the Executive Agent for the NCS. The principal adviser for NCS matters is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I). The Director, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), is the Manager, NCS.

505. DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (DCS) The Defense Communications System (DCS) is a composite of certain DOD communications systems and networks under the management control and direction of DISA. It administers the C2 requirements of DOD and civil agencies directly concerned with national security or other critical emergency requirements. The objective is to organize the complex of DOD communications networks, equipment, control centers, and resources to furnish an effective, responsive, survivable worldwide communications system.

506. THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES). The system used by the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) to conduct joint planning during peace and crisis is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Joint operation planning is a process coordinated through all levels of the national structure for joint planning and execution, including the NCA and the JPEC. The focus of the joint operation planning process is at the combatant commanders, who use it, assisted by and coordinated through JOPES, to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and direct the actions necessary to accomplish the mission. In normal peacetime conditions the process--called deliberate planning--produces operation plans, either OPLANs or CONPLANs, and functional plans. In crises the process--called Crisis Action Planning (CAP)--produces operation orders (OPORDs). JOPES is designed to facilitate rapid building and timely maintenance of plans in deliberate planning, rapid development of effective options and OPORDs through adaptation of approved operation plans or in no-plan situations in CAP, and effective management of operations in execution across the spectrum of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment when operations are conducted.

a. **Overview of JOPES** JOPES is the integrated joint conventional command and control system used to support military operation monitoring, planning, and execution (including theater-level nuclear and chemical plans) activities. JOPES incorporates policies, procedures, personnel, and facilities by interfacing with automated data processing (ADP) systems available on the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), reporting
systems, and support to senior-level decision-makers and their staffs at the NCA level and throughout the JPEC.

b. **JOPES Procedural Principles** JOPES was developed and continues to evolve based on several principles described below.

1. JOPES includes administrative policies and procedures that govern all conventional military operation planning and execution. This system standardizes vocabulary, procedures, and joint ADP support (available on GCCS) for all participants in all aspects of joint military planning and execution, and facilitates the transition from training, to planning, to executing effective, successful military operations.

2. JOPES planning is based on both requirements and capabilities. Military planners use forces and resources identified in the JSCP, CJCS orders, Service documents, and approved operation plans or OPORDs. They identify forces and resources required to accomplish the mission and compare them to actual forces and resources available. Supporting commands and agencies and the Services confirm force and resource availability, including combat, combat service, and combat service support forces, and sustainment and transportation resources. Rapid, accurate exchange of information via GCCS is fundamental to the intense coordination required throughout the JPEC to support timely decisions during planning and adjust operations to the developing situation during execution.

3. JOPES contains specific procedures for the supported command to identify shortfalls between planned requirements and identified capabilities throughout the planning process. If shortfalls cannot be resolved, planners conduct a risk analysis, and adjust the CINC’s concept of operations if the risk is considered too great.

4. Within JOPES, completed and approved plans are maintained and updated as changes occur. New plans are required when the threat, tasks, forces assigned, resources available, and/or concept of operations change to the extent that the supported CINC and the CJCS conclude that development of a new plan is necessary. Otherwise, commanders and their staffs concentrate on keeping existing plans and orders up to date and executable through use of all appropriate methods, including plan maintenance conferences and teleconferences.

c. **Guidelines** JOPES authoritative documentation is published in the CJCSM 3122 series of manuals as follows:

1. Joint Pub 5-03.1 (CJCSM 3122.01), Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I *Planning Policies and Procedures*, unclassified, describes the policies and procedures governing the joint conventional deliberate and crisis action planning processes under JOPES.
(2) CJCSM 3122.02, Manual for Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) Development and Deployment Execution, describes building, refining and maintaining force deployment databases for deliberate and crisis action plans.

(3) CJCSM 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II (Planning Formats and Guidance), unclassified, describes operation plan formats and gives guidance for joint conventional planning and execution under JOPES. Specific guidance concerning OPLAN and CONPLAN formats and examples of them are included, along with detailed administrative procedures concerning plan data management, classification, and security guidance.

(4) CJCSM 3122.04, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II (Planning and Execution Format and Guidance, Secret Supplement) describes formats for classified portions of operation plans.

g. **The Scope of JOPES** JOPES is the integrated, conventional command and control system designed to satisfy the information needs of senior decision-makers in conducting joint planning and operations. Figure 5-9 depicts the scope of JOPES, spanning the gamut of deliberate and crisis action planning and execution, integrating all seven JOPES functions in all phases of military operations (mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment), from the NCA through all levels of the JPEC.

h. **History of JOPES** Development of support for standardized joint operation planning began in the 1960s. Originally, computer types, software programs, planning procedures, and documentation varied between commands, and the support proved ineffective. For instance, planning data stored in one command’s computer system were easily available only to an organization using that system. Information transfer between similar computer systems was mechanically difficult, frustrating, and time consuming. Moreover, the combatant commands had, over time, developed different formats for storing data to support their individual plans. Plans submitted by the combatant commanders were therefore difficult to analyze, review, approve, or relate to each other.

(1) In 1966 the Secretary of Defense, recognizing the seriousness of these problems, directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop procedures and a standardized ADP system that could be used with the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) to support the new Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS). JOPS was to accomplish several things, including the following:
foster common understanding by using standard procedures throughout the planning community

give standard formats for operation plans that contain only the information necessary to understand and use the plans

incorporate standard data files and common application programs in a system compatible with all users to allow the rapid flow of information

permit the identification of shortfalls early in the planning process

include a mechanism for plan refinement and review

allow rapid conversion of operation plans into an operation order during a crisis

(2) Work began on the development of JOPS in 1967; initial design of JOPS received formal JCS approval in 1970. By 1973 new Honeywell 6000 computers were installed to furnish ADP support for the standardized planning procedures in JOPS. To prevent combatant commands from losing (during transition to the new standardized computer system) the plan development ADP support they were already using, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed rapid development of interim computer programs until new software could be introduced. The Force Requirements Generator (FRG), Movement Requir
ments Generator (MRG), Transportation Feasibility Estimator (TFE), and utility programs that allowed them to interact were developed as temporary programs and proved so successful that they were adopted as the standard ADP systems for JOPS.

(3) JOPS procedures were continually updated through the years as the standardized system for developing and documenting operation plans in deliberate planning and operation orders in Crisis Action Procedures (CAP), as Crisis Action Planning was called under JOPS. However, the data generated in JOPS ADP were not readily accessible for rapid adaptation to crisis action situations under CAP, and JOPS ADP gave no capability to monitor execution of an OPORD. To help remedy this condition, the Joint Deployment System (JDS) was developed to furnish the ADP support for increasingly time-constrained crisis action planning. Primarily intended to support crisis action planning, the JDS database included TPFDD and narrative data from all approved plans. JDS bridged the gap between deliberate and crisis planning by making the extensive efforts of deliberate planning resident in the JDS database immediately available for use in crisis action planning.

(4) While JDS was an improvement over JOPS, the disadvantage of having to move back and forth between the two systems hampered its effectiveness. DISA implemented a strategy of bringing improved JOPS and JDS functions together into a single, user-friendly system--JOPES, which resided on WWMCCS.

(5) JOPES procedures continue to be used for deliberate planning and crisis action. JOPES ADP, which supports force planning, support planning, and transportation planning has migrated to the GCCS and is further discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

507. JOINT CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED (JCLL) The Joint Center for Lessons Learned operates a computerized search and retrieval system to extract relevant lessons from a large database of existing knowledge acquired during previous operations and exercises. The database has been built mostly from after-action reports and is continuously updated. The search capabilities are extremely sophisticated and capable of supporting short- or no-notice crisis planning. The JCLL is managed by the Joint Staff J-7 Evaluation and Analysis Division (ESD) and includes three subsystems.

a. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) a PC-based software package designed to create, modify, and display observations from command post exercises, field training exercises, and actual operations. After-action reports and lessons learned are consolidated and forwarded to the Joint Staff J-7 (ESD). These observations are transcribed into the JULLS database (Secret) and made available to the entire JPEC. MCM 86-90 furnishes details on administration of the system.

b. Joint After-Action Reporting System (JAARS) CJCS MOP 53 requires submission of after-action reports (AARs) following operations and exercises. The AAR is the vehicle by which most lessons learned are generated for the JULLS database. Joint
Pub 1-03.30 contains formats and procedures for preparing and submitting AAR documents.

c. Remedial Action Projects (RAP) Program tracks significant shortfalls or deficiencies identified during exercises and operations to favorable resolution. RAP furnishes a written description of deficiencies and shortfalls that must be corrected by specific actions in order to improve joint warfighting capabilities. MCM 234-90 gives guidance concerning compliance with and administration of the RAP program.

508. C4I FOR THE WARRIOR. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) for the Warrior is a concept that sets forth a roadmap for achieving joint interoperable C4I on a global basis that

- allows successful mission execution--anytime, anywhere;
- is responsive, reliable, and secure; and
- is affordable.

a. C4I for the Warrior encompasses the concept of a global C4I system that directly links and supports the combatant commanders who engage in military operations in a rapidly changing world. C4I for the Warrior furnishes accurate and complete pictures of the battlespace, timely and detailed mission objectives, and the clearest view of targeting.

b. A unifying C4I concept is essential to achieving the objectives required to meet the needs of the combatant commanders. Through a revolutionary approach of an open architecture that makes C4I data available as needed by the user, and in an evolutionary manner, C4I for the Warrior attempts to resolve joint force C4I interoperability issues. Its aim is to improve the joint warfighter’s ability to manage and execute crisis and contingency operations and furnish the means for unifying the many Service C4I programs currently being pursued.

c. The C4I for the Warrior concept builds on lessons learned from previous conflicts, operational requirements, the effects and opportunities presented by rapidly changing technologies, and the implications of evolving U.S. national security strategy.
GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (GCCS) is the mid-term phase of the Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and Intelligence for the Warrior (C4IFTW) concept. C4IFTW fulfills the requirement for a capability to move a U.S. fighting force on the globe at any time and to give it the information and direction to complete its mission. The C4I objective is to give the warrior a fused, real-time, accurate picture of the battlespace and the ability to order, respond, and coordinate horizontally and vertically to fulfill a mission in that battlespace (Figure 5-10). GCCS is the single C4I system that satisfies the C4IFTW concept. It is a user-focused program under the oversight of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff that will furnish C4I systems to support strategic, theater, and tactical requirements and a common thread that extends from the foxhole to the commander in chief. The C4IFTW is indeed a revolutionary approach to resolving the joint force interoperability issues and evolving heterogeneous Service C4I programs into a unified system.

a. **Overview.** GCCS evolved from a baseline legacy of integrated C2 components and serves as the cornerstone for the rapid integration of additional legacy systems until all functional requirements are satisfied. As legacy components are fielded, they will be reengineered or replaced. GCCS common functional, physical, and operational characteristics are based on a Common Operating Environment (COE). All future GCCS development must be compatible with this COE. The result will be a fully integrated GCCS, with a common look and feel and the flexibility to interface with external systems.

b. **Initial Capabilities.** The initial task of GCCS was to be a functional replacement for the older WWMCCS ADP system. This required movement of JOPES ADP and other mission-essential applications such as SORTS from the WWMCCS mainframe environment into the GCCS distributed architecture network. However, GCCS also offers much more than just a platform for those applications. As the single C4I system to underlie evolution of the C4IFTW concept, GCCS establishes a foundation to support further growth. That foundation comprises a robust network to give global connectivity, a flexible and reliable system architecture, and a comprehensive training system to ensure personnel capable of operating and maintaining the system. This basic infrastructure, enabled by the adaptability of modern computing technology, will permit GCCS to continue to develop in order to support warfighters, however their needs may change. The structure will include the following:

- a network with robust connectivity
- sufficient system architecture to support a redundant system not vulnerable to a single point of failure
- integration of JOPES and other WWMCCS mission-essential applications
- a sufficient number of trained personnel
Global Command and Control System

Linked communications network, same picture from NMCC through CINCs to JTF

- sufficient funding to operate and maintain the system
- the ability to exchange data with Service- and CINC-unique systems

c. GCCS Mission Applications GCCS performs command and control mission functions better and more reliably than WWMCCS applications, especially in the JOPES functions migrating from WWMCCS to GCCS that are briefly discussed below. JOPES functions that aid in force, support, and transportation planning are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

(1) JOPES ADP resident on GCCS includes software used to construct time-phased force deployment data and analysis including the following:

- Requirements Development and Analysis system (RDA) for force planning
– Logistics Sustainabilty and Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE) for support planning

– Joint Engineering Planning and Execution System (JEPES) for engineering support planning

– Medical Planning and Execution System (MEPES) for medical support planning

– Force Augmentation Planning and Execution System (FAPES) prototype, a decision support tool that furnishes the capability to support mobilization planning, monitoring, and execution requirements

– Joint Feasibility Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) for transportation planning

– Theater Analysis and Replanning Graphical Execution Toolkit (TARGET) for concept and course of action development

(2) **Common Operational Picture** is the basic GCCS fused battlespace picture. This capability can display land, sea, and air tracks on a near-real-time basis, overlaid on a chart battleground. To produce the Common Operational Picture, GCCS interfaces with other systems, such as Service battlespace display systems, data link (TADIL) inputs, and other data feeder systems, such as JDISS (discussed later). Through its core software, GCCS produces the geographic display, correlates contacts, and furnishes track database capability.

(3) **Global Transportation Network (GTN)** is an operational prototype that furnishes the automated command and control support needed for USTRANSCOM to carry out its mission of global transportation management for DOD. GTN also supports USTRANSCOM in accomplishing its task to integrate deployment-related ADP systems and to furnish centralized traffic management in peace and war.

(a) GTN accesses current transportation information from diverse sources, integrates that information, and gives it to users in a useful form. Information is integrated into a central database to cross-reference supply, cargo, forces, passenger, and patient requirements and movements with airlift, air refueling, aeromedical, and sealift schedules and movement. Success will be directly related to the quality of the data, response time to a query, number of users able to access the database at one time, and ability to keep the database operational under all conditions.

(b) **DESERT SHIELD/STORM** highlighted the need for integrated transportation information. One of the key problems experienced was inaccurate movement requirements. JOPES gave a general forecast of requirements to schedule lift against, but
some units took more or less equipment than the JOPES database held for them, or they weren’t ready to embark lift assets at times indicated in the JOPES database. This sometimes resulted in scheduling the wrong lift assets for the wrong loads at the wrong times. Another problem was lack of in-transit visibility; once passengers and cargo were loaded on a lift asset, they could not be tracked until accounted for at the receiving end. The customers in the field did not know where critical items were in the pipeline, so duplicate and triplicate requisitions were sometimes submitted, and lift that could have been used more efficiently for something else was used to move the extra items. Containers remained in ports because nobody knew what they contained or where to send them. In-transit visibility, a primary benefit of GTN, solves or ameliorates such deficiencies.

(c) GTN gives users the ability to do the following things, as depicted in Figure 5-11:

- locate items in transit
- forecast port workload
- assess unit deployment status
- determine onward movement requirements
- confirm requisition movement
- determine container and pallet contents
- obtain current aircraft and ship schedules

(4) Scheduling and Movement (S&M) is the focus within JOPES for command and control information on deployment activity and status. It functions as a vehicle to report and track movement of TPFDD requirements. S&M allows the user to review, update, schedule, and create manifests of both Transportation Component Command (TCC) carrier and organic movement data, before and during deployment. It offers the capability to review and analyze an extensive variety of sources requirements. TCC air carrier information is supplied by the Global Transportation Network (GTN). Multiple reports concerning transportation analysis are available. Major new functions in S&M include the following:

- maintaining both allocation (planned) and manifested (actual) movement data
- permitting “shuttles” through same geographic location
- furnishing carrier support for more than one OPLAN

(5) GCCS Reconnaissance System (GRIS). The Joint Reconnaissance Information System (JRIS), the Pacific Command Reconnaissance Mission Information System (PARMIS), and the European Reconnaissance Information System (ERIS) collectively furnish the functionality required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Reconnaissance Center (JCS/JRC) and theater commands. These applications and their databases are...
rently migrating to GCCS to form GRIS, which will be made available to the Joint Staff, each theater command, and selected organizations. GRIS produces

- a monthly theater consolidated reconnaissance sortie schedule,
- ability to monitor ongoing scheduling and real-time execution from theater reconnaissance unit messages,
- end-of-the-month reconnaissance sortie execution report, and
- reconnaissance sortie reports and schedules for selected timeframes and theater.

(6) **Evacuation System (EVAC)** The Joint Staff, combat support agencies, and the Services had a requirement for a command and control system to assist in planning for and building evacuation plans. U.S. embassies and consulates throughout the world collect and forward to the Joint Staff detailed information about U.S. citizens in their areas. The EVAC application makes this information readily available to planners and operates on GCCS with a primary and backup database server. EVAC receives formatted “F77” reports from the automated message handlers and automatically updates the primary and backup databases. The principal users of EVAC are the Joint Staff and the CINCs. The EVAC application does the following:
• furnishes a method for storing, retrieving and deleting “F77” files
• allows functional managers and maintenance users to add and delete EVAC users
• allows functional managers and maintenance users to change the EVAC database manually and add, delete, and update records
• allows users to display multiple EVAC records by country and all districts within a country
• allows users to print detailed information for any country selected or for several countries

(7) Fuel Resource Accounting System (FRAS) gives fuel planners an automated capability for determining the supportability of a deliberate or crisis action plan and for generating the time-phased bulk petroleum required to support an OPLAN. FRAS facilitates the review of the fuel requirements of a proposed, new, or revised OPLAN and assesses the adequacy of available resources to support crisis action planning. Two or more OPLANS can be combined into a single OPLAN for analysis. The requirements generated can be varied through the use of intensity tables and consumption data extracted from the Logistics Factors File (LFF) or with Service-supplied data. Principal users are the Joint Staff, CINCs, the Services, and the Defense Fuel Supply Center.

(8) Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) furnishes an intelligence window to national, theater, and tactical intelligence sources through the joint architecture for intelligence. It offers connectivity and interoperability with intelligence systems required to support forces in peacetime, crisis, and war. Using an integrated set of commercial off-the-shelf software applications, JDISS supports the following functions:

• accessing theater, Service, and national intelligence databases
• transmitting and receiving specific requests for intelligence
• maintaining a local database capability to store, retrieve, and display intelligence data, including map graphics features
• supporting digitized imagery exchange and imagery analysis
• accessing automated record message processing systems, I&W systems, and collection management systems
• entering intelligence data into a variety of operations and intelligence systems

(9) Theater Analysis and Replanning Graphical Execution Toolkit (TARGET) is a toolkit containing planning tools designed to support the operation planner during crisis action procedures. The tools allow planners and operators to accomplish tasks through rapid access to required documents, information sources, analysis tools, multimedia, and teleconferencing tools.
(10) **Global Status of Resources and Training (GSORTS)** is an output application furnishing information on the status of units with respect to personnel, equipment, and training. The location of specific units can be plotted on digitized maps produced by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). GSORTS uses data entered by the Services, CINCs, and combat support agencies. The GSORTS database includes all defined joint data elements. GSORTS query and display capabilities include the following:

- categories of units (ships, fighter aircraft, ground forces)
- specific types of units (frigates, Marine infantry battalions, F-18 squadrons)
- by OPLAN
- by specific unit (detailed status information)

(11) **Air Tasking Order (ATO)** offers the capability to view and print selected parts of air tasking orders. A query function allows the user to tailor requested information contained in a specific order for viewing. The query function also supports display of color-coded ground tracks for selected parts of the order. ATO interfaces with the Contingency Tactical Air Planning System (CTAPS).

d. **Joint Electronic Library (JEL)** furnishes a high-speed, full-text search and retrieval capability immediately accessible through desktop computers. Action officers, planners, warfighters, educators, students, and doctrine developers can have immediate access to the most complete and current library of joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures available through the JEL. It will eventually have several hundred joint, Service, and multinational doctrine publications. JEL is maintained and operated by the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), Fort Monroe, Virginia, and has two main parts: (1) JEL CD-ROM version which is distributed worldwide by JWFC and updated periodically as determined by the Joint Staff (J-7); and (2) World Wide Web Internet access at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. Questions about JEL can be directed to JWFC, Doctrine Division.
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Deliberate Planning

600. INTRODUCTION

References: Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF)
Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*
Joint Pub 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
   Volume I, *Planning Policies and Procedures*. Note: To be published as CJCSM 3122.01
CJCSM 3122.02, Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment
   Data Development and Deployment Execution
CJCSM 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
   Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance
CJCSM 3122.04, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
   Volume II, Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance
   (classified)

a. Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines the joint operation planning process as follows:

“A coordinated joint staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission.”

The particular procedures we use in joint planning depend on the time available to accomplish them. When time is not a critical factor, we use a process called peacetime or deliberate planning. When the time available for planning is short and the near-term result is expected to be an actual deployment and/or employment of military forces, the planner uses crisis action planning (CAP) procedures. The overall procedures are the same for both deliberate and crisis action planning:

- receive and analyze the task to be accomplished
- review the enemy situation and begin to collect necessary intelligence
- develop and compare alternative courses of action
- select the best alternative
- develop and get approval for its concept
- prepare a plan, and
- document the plan
b. The next section of this chapter introduces the entire process of joint operation planning to give perspective to the planning problem. The remaining sections describe deliberate planning procedures. Deliberate planning is discussed from the receipt of the assigned task to the development of a detailed transportation schedule of personnel, matériel, and resupply into the theater of military operations. The chapter also describes the procedures for maintaining the accuracy of plan data. We present the phases and steps of the planning process as sequential and orderly, though in actual practice procedures may vary considerably. Some of the steps may overlap, some may be undertaken simultaneously, and some are iterative.

601. THE PROCESS OF JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

a. The staff of a combatant command must consider many factors in its planning in order to select the best means of performing a military mission. Understandably, this means that the planning process will be complex; out of necessity the process must be orderly and thorough. The joint operation planning process must be flexible, as well. In peacetime, it may require 12 months or more to completely prepare and fully coordinate a plan; on the other hand, a crisis may demand a product in just a few hours or days.

b. The amount of time available significantly influences the planning process. Two different methods of planning are described in the JCS-published Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), depicted graphically Figure 6-1.

(1) DELIBERATE or PEACETIME PLANNING is the process used when time permits the total participation of the commanders and staffs of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). Development of the plan, coordination among supporting commanders and agencies and the Services, reviews by the Joint Staff, and conferences of JPEC members can take many months, possibly the entire two-year planning cycle, to develop a large plan, though continued JOPES Automated Data Processing (ADP) improvements should reduce the time required.

(2) TIME-SENSITIVE or CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) is conducted in response to crises where U.S. interests are threatened and a military response is being considered. While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future hypothetical contingencies where prudence drives a planning requirement, CAP is carried out in response to specific situations as they occur and that often develop very rapidly. Thus, in CAP, the time available for planning is reduced to as little as a few days. The overall process of CAP parallels that of deliberate planning, but is much more flexible to accommodate requirements to respond to changing events and NCA requirements. CAP procedures promote the logical, rapid flow of information, timely preparation of executable courses of action (COAs), and communication of reports and recommendations.
(3) Both deliberate and crisis action planning are conducted within JOPES. Procedures for both are described in Joint Pub 5-03.1, to be republished as CJCSM 3122.01 (JOPES Volume I) and CJCSI 3122.02. CJCSM 3122.03 JOPES Volume II, and CJCSM 3122.04 describe detailed administrative and format requirements for documenting the annexes, appendixes, etc. of OPLANs, CONPLANs, and functional plans, the products of deliberate planning. The purpose of JOPES is to bring both deliberate and crisis action planning into a single system architecture to reduce the time required to do either, make the refined results of deliberate planning more readily accessible to planners in CAP, and more effectively manage any plan during execution.

c. The view of resources is another method of describing joint operation planning.

(1) Requirements planning focuses on the combatant commander’s analysis of the enemy threat and assigned task. The planned response determines the level of forces and the support needed to overcome that threat. These required forces and supplies may be more than the level of available resources.

(2) On the other hand, capabilities planning attempts to meet the threat based on the forces and support that have been funded by Congress in the current budget cycle.

AFSC PUB 1
This level of forces, equipment, and supplies is available now or expected to be available in the planning cycle.

(3) Military solutions may be constrained; a course of action may be limited by available resources or political and diplomatic considerations. Continuing an established trend, the JPEC is moving ever more toward capabilities planning in the post-cold-war era of less explicitly defined and more diverse threats. A regional rather than global focus for deliberate planning allows increased flexibility in apportionment of available combat forces. Anticipation of multiple regional contingencies within the framework of adaptive planning allows effective apportionment of some combat forces to more than one CINC for contingency planning, depending on national priorities and the sequence in which regional contingencies develop. Apportioning supplies is more difficult, but progress continues toward developing capabilities in JOPES to create contingency plans that account for anticipated sustainment availability.

d. Still another way to define planning focuses on command perspective.

(1) Strategic, global planning is done primarily at the JCS/NCA level. Decision-makers look at the entire world situation as it affects, or is affected by, the use of U.S. military forces.

(2) In regional planning, combatant commanders focus on their specific geographic regions as defined in the Unified Command Plan.

(3) Functional planning is conducted by combatant commanders with functional responsibilities, i.e., USSPACECOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM, and USTRANSCOM, and their component commanders. They view their planning problem as not being limited by geography.

(4) The perspective of the command greatly influences both the choice of course of action and the resources made available for planning. Strategic planning for possible sequential or concurrent execution of more than one operation outweighs the regional perspective of any single commander. Likewise, functional planning is subordinate to each supported CINC’s concept for the particular theater of operations in order to support that concept.

e. Finally, joint operation planning can be described in terms of its contribution to a larger purpose.

(1) Campaign planning takes a comprehensive view of the combatant commander’s theater of operations and defines the framework in which an OPLAN fits. Campaign planning offers purpose and a common objective to a series of OPLANS.
Designing campaigns represents the art of linking major operations, battles, and engagements in an operational design to accomplish theater strategic objectives. Theater campaigns are conducted in theaters of war and subordinate campaigns in theaters of operations; they are based on the Commander’s Estimate and theater strategic estimate and resulting theater strategies. “Campaigns of the US Armed Forces are joint; they serve as the unifying focus for our conduct of warfare. Modern warfighting requires a common frame of reference within which operations on land and sea, undersea, and in the air and space are integrated and harmonized; that frame of reference is the joint campaign. As such, the joint campaign is a powerful concept that requires the fullest understanding by leaders of the US Armed Forces.” (Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces”)

Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concept through the development of theater campaign plans. The campaign plan embodies the combatant commander’s strategic vision of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives. Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes (see Figure 6-2). If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes. Campaign planning is done in crisis or conflict, but the basis and framework for successful campaigns is laid by peacetime analysis, planning, and exercises (Joint Pub 5-0). To the extent possible, plans should incorporate the following concepts of joint operation (campaign) planning doctrine:

- Combatant commander’s strategic intent and operational focus
- Orientation on the strategic and operational centers of gravity of the threat
- Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity
- Phasing of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive battle and stabilization, follow-through, and post-hostilities/redeployment), including the commander’s intent for each phase

(2) A successful contingency plan involves a wide spectrum of operation. Each element within the spectrum requires special consideration:
Mobilization planning details the activation of Reserve forces as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel to bring all or part of the Armed Forces to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency;

deployment planning encompasses all activities involved in moving forces and materiel from origin or home station to destination, including intra-CONUS, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, and movement through staging areas and holding areas;

employment planning describes the theater use of combat forces; and

sustainment planning involves the logistics support of combat forces.

(3) This guide outlines the entire environment of joint operations and focuses on deployment, with emphasis on the strategic mobility problem. Deployment planning has been the focus of real-world planning efforts in the past and remains so. As JOPES evolves, new ADP applications will be integrated to make possible much more refined mobilization, employment, and sustainment planning.
602. DELIBERATE PLANNING

a. To draw from the many categories we have identified, this chapter describes the planning procedures for

• developing a plan of military action in a hostile environment

• prepared by a CINC with a regional perspective

• by a staff in peacetime conditions when combat action is not imminent

• using currently available U.S. capabilities measured in armed forces, transportation, and supplies and

• emphasizing the strategic deployment of those forces, equipment, and supplies based on the CINC’s concept of operations.

b. This chapter discusses the deliberate planning procedures to build a contingency plan for military action. The plan is based on predicted conditions that will be countered with resources available during the planning cycle. The product is called an operation plan that can be either an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan, depending on the level of detail that is included.

c. Automated Data Processing (ADP) support is essential to the process of creating and maintaining a database of the many available types of combat and support units, describing the units in terms of numbers of passengers and weight and volume of cargo, calculating the vast quantities of specific sustaining supplies needed in each of the various phases of an operation, and simulating the movement of troops and support from their starting location to the point of employment in the theater of military operations.

603. SUMMARY OF THE PLANNING CYCLE

a. The process of joint deliberate planning is cyclic and continuous. It begins when a task is assigned and is almost identical whether the resulting operation plan is a fully developed OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan. Operation plans remain in effect until canceled or superseded by another approved plan. While in effect they are continuously maintained and updated.

b. Task assignment The CJCS is responsible for preparing strategic plans and providing for the preparation of joint contingency plans. Strategic planning was discussed in Chapter 5; the contingency planning responsibility of the CJCS is performed through the commanders in chief of combatant commands (CINCs). The task-assigning directive
performs several functions: it apportions major combat forces available for planning, and specifies the product document, i.e., an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan, and the review and approval authority for the plan. With this the CINC has the scope of the plan, its format, and the amount of detail that must go into its preparation.

c. Developing the concept In response to the task assignment, the supported CINC first determines a mission statement and then develops a fully staffed concept of envisioned operations documented in the CINC’s Strategic Concept. The CINC’s Strategic Concept is submitted to the CJCS for review and, when approved, becomes the concept of operations on which further plan development is based. The concept is also sent to subordinate and supporting commanders, who can then begin the detailed planning associated with plan development.

d. Developing the detailed plan Subordinate commanders use the CINC’s concept and the apportioned major combat forces as the basis to determine the necessary support, including forces and sustaining supplies for the operation. The CINC consolidates the subordinates’ recommended phasing of forces and support and performs a transportation analysis of their movement to destination to ensure that the entire plan can feasibly be executed as envisioned. Next, the Services identify real-world units to take part in the plan, and the sustainment to meet requirements is identified as much as possible. US TRANSCOM, a supporting command, analyzes strategic sea and air transportation. Figure 6-3 illustrates the overall process of this phase: determine the forces and cargo required; describe them in logistic terms of numbers of personnel, volume, and weight; simulate the move using the capabilities of apportioned lift resources; and, finally, confirm that the OPLAN is transportation feasible with the available resources and transportation schedules. This planning phase is over when documentation is prepared for final review.

e. Review of the plan The review process is more than a single phase in deliberate planning. The Joint Staff has reviewed and approved the CINC’s concept before detailed plan development. Now the completed plan goes to the CJCS for review and approval. If all is in order, the plan will be approved (effective for execution, when directed).

f. Preparation of the supporting plans The emphasis here shifts to the subordinate and supporting commanders, who respond to the tasks identified in the approved operation plan by preparing supporting plans that outline the actions of assigned and augmenting forces.
604. BASIS FOR MILITARY PLANNING

a. The process of planning a joint operation produces a contingency plan for military action. It begins with a national strategy stated by the President, supported with the funding of resources by Congress, and is defined by the task assignments published by the CJCS. The systems that support the translation of national interests into contingency plans are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

b. Players in the planning process are illustrated Figure 6-4. They include the NCA, their advisers, supporting executive-level agencies, and a group collectively called the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The JPEC is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as the commands and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, support, and sustainment of forces in a theater of operations. Examples of those organizations are listed in the definition and include those shown on the lower part of Figure 6-4, i.e., CJCS, supported commanders, etc.

(1) Civilian leadership tops the pyramid Figure 6-4. The ultimate decision on national policy, detailed development of resource levels, and overall strategic direction of the U.S. Armed Forces is given by the President and Secretary of Defense, referred to as the National Command Authorities (NCA). The NCA are supported by the executive departments, e.g., Departments of Defense and State, and organizations within the Office
of the President, such as the National Security Council. The illustration also includes combat support agencies, e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency. All these executive-level organizations have a role to play in the preliminary direction of contingency operations and approval of the final plans.

(2) The CJCS and the Joint Staff, who publish the task-assigning documents, review the products and approve the final version of peacetime plans. The supported command, i.e., the combatant command, and its subordinates are the commands primarily responsible for developing the deliberate plan and, ultimately, executing it. The Services and their logistics agencies play key support roles within the community. By law, it is the responsibility of the Services to recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, and maintain forces for the combatant commands. The U.S. Transportation Command is shown separately as a supporting player in the JPEC because of its strategic mobility responsibilities and its critical role in assisting the CINCs to develop transportationally feasible plans.
The last entry on the figure is titled “Supporting Commands”; it represents all the commands and agencies that supply resources to the supported command.

c. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) details an established, orderly way of translating the contingency planning task assignments into an operation plan or Functional Plan in deliberate planning, or an operation order in crisis action planning. JOPES is directed by DOD to be used as the process for joint planning. JOPES is comprehensive enough to thoroughly prepare a concept of military operations and automated enough to handle the enormous quantities of data involved in military operation planning. The modern computer tools it employs afford reasonable assurance that the plan will work as expected on execution or can be modified during execution to adapt to changing circumstances. The overall system is complex and is best understood through examination of both the process and procedures that make it up.

(1) The process is a particular method of planning for joint operations that involves a number of steps or operations. It is the planning activity from receipt of the task to the preparation of supporting plans by subordinate and supporting commanders. The joint planning process for both deliberate and crisis action planning is described in the references identified at the beginning of this chapter and paragraph 601.a(3).

(2) The procedures are the individual, often interrelated, steps, actions, or methods performed to produce the plan. Each level of command responsible for writing plans may have developed its own procedures to expand or augment JOPES direction. These procedures may vary in certain respects from command to command, so newly assigned staff officers need to adjust to the specifics of their own organizations.

(3) Staff officers should keep the difference between process--the method of planning--and procedures--the steps required to use the process--clearly in mind as they become immersed in joint planning. An abundance of detailed procedures accompanies the actual planning process, yet most of the published guidance seems very general in nature. This publication tries to amplify JOPES guidance.

d. Service Planning Systems

(1) The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the efficiency of the Services and their preparedness for military operations. Given strategic guidance in CJCS documents and program and budget guidance sent through department channels, the military Service chiefs have developed a series of documents that support, direct, and guide component commanders.

(2) The following documents describe the Service-unique planning systems and have specific application in the development of joint OPLANs:
(3) The component commanders receive direction and guidance from both the operational chain of command and a Service or functional support chain of command; they are the common link between the two chains. The component commanders support the operational needs of the CINCs to the extent that they are supported through their Service and functional chains of command. The components negotiate the proper balance between requirements planning and capabilities planning.

e. **Adaptive Planning** Adaptive planning is a concept for joint operation planning in the context of the post-cold-war world. It is the framework within which the deliberate planning process produces operation plans useful to high-level decision-makers if crises develop. It recognizes that with the more diversified threats to U.S. interests since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, fixed assumptions for warning times and political decisions (force movements, reserve callup, mobilization, etc.) used in deliberate planning will likely be less accurate if the contingency that planners anticipate actually occurs. In short, without a single, well-understood, primary foe with global aspirations and capabilities to plan against, the world is a less predictable place. Adaptive planning also recognizes that key decision-makers are more likely to exploit available response time to deter further crisis development if a menu of response options, gauged to a range of crisis conditions, is available for them to implement rather than an all-or-nothing choice. The “all” would likely be too much and the “nothing” not enough to deter escalation of a crisis early in its development. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) requires the CINCs to
use adaptive planning principles to develop a menu of options along the spectrum from “all” to “nothing” in their operation plans for regional contingencies, including flexible deterrent options, deploy-decisive-force options, and counterattack options. JSCP force apportionment facilitates development of this range of options by apportioning some forces to more than one CINC for deliberate planning. This policy is often referred to as “multi-apportionment.” In anticipation of the need to respond to multiple, sequentially developing regional contingencies, the JSCP also furnishes planning guidance that prioritizes and deconflicts planned employment of forces that are apportioned to more than one CINC.

1) Regional focus Regional contingencies are the focus of U.S. conventional planning. Anticipated regional contingencies for which deliberate planning is conducted are classified as either Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) or Lesser Regional Contingencies (LRCs). An MRC is a regionally centered crisis based on a significant threat to U.S. vital interests in a region that warrants the deployment of significant forces (i.e., greater than division-wing combinations). An LRC is a regionally centered crisis based on a less compelling threat than in an MRC. LRC missions range from conflict to the lower end of the combat spectrum. Through the JSCP, combatant commanders are assigned tasks of developing operation plans or Functional Plans for specific MRCs and LRCs anticipated as future possibilities in their geographic areas of responsibility (AORs).

2) Range of options The adaptive planning concept calls for development of a range of options during deliberate planning that can be adapted to a crisis as it develops. Where the crisis builds slowly enough to allow it, appropriate responses made in a timely fashion can deter further escalation or even defuse the situation to avoid or limit conflict. Where such options fail to deter or there is not time enough to execute them, a stronger response may be required to protect vital U.S. interests. The eventuality of attack without prior warning must also be considered. Figure 6-5 amplifies the options discussed.

(a) Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) FDOs underscore the importance of early response to a crisis. They are deterrence-oriented and carefully tailored to avoid the response dilemma of too much too soon or too little too late. Military FDOs are intended to be used in concert with diplomatic, economic, and informational options to give the NCA a wide array of deterrent options integrating all elements of national power. All regional operation plans have FDOs, and CINCs plan requests for appropriate diplomatic, economic, and informational options as they develop their plans. Examples of FDOs from all four elements of national power are listed in Figures 6-6 through 6-9. In general, plans for FDOs use Active Component, in-place forces of approximately brigade,
squadron, or battle group size, intratheater lift assets, and predominantly Active Component support forces.

(b) **Deploy decisive force** If decision-makers elect not to make a response to crisis indications, or an adversary is not deterred by FDOs that are executed, CINCs must plan for later actions (less timely from a deterrence perspective) to respond to ambiguous warning. Unambiguous warning occurs when the President decides, based on intelligence he receives, that a hostile government has decided to initiate hostilities. Deploy-decisive-force options involve early deployment of sufficient supportable combat forces, possibly including some Reserve forces, to the crisis region to defend U.S. interests, followed by decisive force to quickly end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. Deploy-decisive-force options are the focus of deliberate planning. They are the options for which detailed force and resource planning is conducted and for which transportation-feasible TPFDDs are developed for OPLANS. Though crises for which deploy-decisive-force options are appropriate may still be deterrable, planners assume that deterrence will fail and that conflict will erupt.

(c) **Counterattack** There exists the possibility that crises could begin with no-warning attacks against U.S. forces or vital interests, or without prior deterrent moves having been made. U.S. force deployments would not begin until after conflict.
Examples of Requested Diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options

- Alert and introduce special teams
  - Public diplomacy
  - MTT
  - Communications
- Reduce international diplomatic ties
- Increase cultural group pressure
- Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures
- Promote democratic elections
- Identify clearly the steps to peaceful resolution
- Restrict activities of diplomats
- Alter existing meetings, programs, or schedules
- Heighten informational efforts directed at:
  - the international community
  - the people within the nation
  - the allies of the opponent
  - the coalition formed to overcome the crisis
- Prepare to withdraw U.S. embassy personnel
- Reduce national embassy personnel
- Take actions to win support of allies and friends
- Pursue measures to increase regional support
- Identify the national leader who may be able to solve the problem
- Coordinate efforts to strengthen international support
- Use the UN or other international institutions
- Develop or work within an existing coalition (avoid unilateral actions when possible)
- Show international resolve

Figure 6-6

had been initiated. CINCs include concepts for a counterattack option in MRC operation plans for deployment and employment of assigned and apportioned forces to achieve U.S. objectives.

(3) Force apportionment and multiple contingencies. Adaptive planning, centered on regional contingencies, is a framework for deliberate planning using force levels reduced from those needed to meet a global threat. Apportionment of some forces from these reduced force levels to more than one CINC for planning is required to generate decisive force in some regional contingencies. In addition, U.S. military strategy requires maintaining the capability to respond to two concurrent, sequentially developing regional contingencies. The purpose of this requirement is to deter potential adversaries from deciding that U.S. commitment of decisive force to one contingency might present a window of opportunity to successfully attack U.S. interests elsewhere. Adaptive planning minimizes conflict between the need to apportion some forces to more than one CINC for deliberate planning, and the need to plan responses to concurrent contingencies. While employment of some of the same forces may be planned by different CINCs for
Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options

- Heighten public awareness of the problem and potential for conflict
- Gain popular support
- Gain Congressional support
- Take measures to increase public support
- Maintain an open dialogue with the press
- Promote U.S. policy objectives through public policy statements
- Heighten informational efforts
  - quickly
  - honestly
  - within security restraints imposed by the crisis
- Take steps to gain and maintain confidence of the public
- Keep selected issues as lead stories
- Impose sanctions on C4I technology transfer
- Protect friendly C4I assets
- Interrupt satellite loan link transmissions

Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options

- Freeze monetary assets in the U.S.
- Seize real property in the U.S.
- Freeze international assets where possible
- Embargo goods and services
- Enact trade sanctions
- Cancel U.S.-funded programs
- Encourage corporations to restrict transactions
- Reduce security assistance programs
- Heighten informational efforts directed at:
  - financial institutions, questioning the soundness of continuing actions with the opponents’ businesses
  - reducing or eliminating corporate transactions

each of two concurrent contingencies, those forces cannot be simultaneously employed in both. The JSCP gives planning guidance that prioritizes apportioned forces into four cases for all MRCS. MRCs are the most demanding operation planning scenarios, and the OPLANs developed to respond to them will therefore be most dependent on those forces apportioned to more than one CINC. Even though the forces in all four cases are able to the CINCs for development of OPLANs, forces in some of the cases may not be available at execution of a response to one of two sequential, concurrent contingencies. The four cases are related to the range of options previously discussed.
Examples of Military Flexible Deterrent Options

- Employ readily in-place assets
- Upgrade alert status
- Increase strategic reconnaissance
- Increase collection efforts
- Initiate or increase show of force actions
- Employ electronic measures
- Conduct aircraft flyovers
- Increase exercise activities, schedules, and scope
- Increase military exchanges and staff visits to the area
- Increase naval port calls or air squadron visits to the area
- Increase Mobile Training Teams
- Impose restrictions on military personnel, retirements, separations, and leaves; establish curfews
- Institute provisions of existing host-nation agreements
- Open pre-positioned stockage facilities
- Use naval or air capability to enforce sanctions
- Deploy tactical fighter squadrons
- Order contingency forces to initiate actions to deploy
- Deploy AWACS to region
- Move MPS/APA to region
- Deploy Surface Action Group to the region
- Deploy CVBG to region
- Begin moving forces to air and sea ports of embarkation
- Move Marine Expeditionary Brigade to region
- Deploy the forward-deployed ARG/MEU to the region
- Activate procedures to begin reserve callup
- Pre-stage or deploy contingency-ready brigades
- Increase the use of SOF facilities
  - specially designed teams
- Pre-stage airlift
- Pre-stage airlift support assets
- Pre-stage sealift and airlift reception assets to air and seaports of embarkation
- Emplace logistics infrastructure where possible
- Open and secure sea and air lines of communication
- Increase informational efforts
  - PSYOP
  - measures directed at the military forces of the opponent
  - mission awareness

Figure 6-9

(a) Case 1 Forces (FDOs) Case 1 forces are primarily in-place and augmentation forces from the Active Component appropriate for an array of FDOs the CINC might develop for use during a period of ambiguous warning. Augmentation forces are rapidly deployable and relatively small, as previously described. The augmentation force may contain subunits of a larger force from Case 2.

(b) Case 2 Forces (Early Deployers for Deploy-Decisive-Force) Built on Case 1 forces, the Case 2 forces include Active and that portion of the Reserve forces needed to move and sustain a major force deployment from CONUS. They give the CINC a significant level of force that would be used in the early stages of a Deploy-Decisive-Force option.
(c) **Case 3 Forces (Deploy-Decisive-Force)** Built on Case 1 and Case 2 forces, the Case 3 forces are apportioned based on unambiguous warning in which the enemy initially may not have completed preparation for war. They include Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) and partial mobilization reinforcements, and are the forces available to the CINC during OPLAN development.

(d) **Case 4 Forces (Counterattack/Decisive Force)** The Case 4 forces build on Case 1, 2, and 3 forces and comprise additional Active units and Reserve forces required and made available under partial mobilization. Case 4 forces are phased into the OPLAN to support the concept with the decisive force needed to quickly end a regional conflict on terms favorable to the United States.

(e) **Concurrent Contingencies** The purpose of dividing MRC force apportionment into the four cases is to deconflict planned employment of forces apportioned to more than one CINC for planning in anticipation of concurrent contingencies. If an MRC is the first of two sequentially developing contingencies, not all of its Case 4 forces, even though phased into the OPLAN, may be available at execution, as those units could be allocated to a second contingency. In the case of the second of two sequentially developing contingencies where significant forces have been committed to the first, in-place Case 1 forces may be the only forces available for planning an initial response. Other later deploying (Case 4) forces are apportioned for the purpose of counteroffensive operations should deterrence fail. CINCs receive tasks in the JSCP to produce plans that outline how they will deal with such eventualities. It must be remembered that these force apportionment parameters are set forth in the JSCP to furnish the guidance necessary to conduct coordinated contingency planning. The NCA will determine priorities between actual concurrent contingencies and the actual major forces deployed to respond to them at execution.

### 605. PHASES OF DELIBERATE PLANNING

The five formal phases of the deliberate planning process begin when a commander receives a task assignment and end when supporting plans have been approved by the supported commander. However, from the supported commander’s perspective, deliberate planning never stops. Regular updating of plan information is required to ensure that plans are as accurate as possible. Maintenance of large plans may require planners to continually update elements of information. The products of deliberate planning are operation plans and Functional Plans. Operation plans are either OPLANs or CONPLANs. The process is the same for development of both, but CONPLANs are less fully developed (only require, as a minimum, annexes A through D, J, and K), especially in the area of detailed resource planning, and generally will not contain a TPFDD. Functional Plans, like CONPLANs, require annexes A through D, J, and K. Operation plans are developed using all phases of the deliberate planning process. Approved plans remain in effect and must be maintained until canceled.
or superseded by another plan. **Figure 6-10** shows the five formal phases of the deliberate planning process.

a. In the **initiation phase** planning tasks are assigned, major combat forces and strategic transportation assets are apportioned for planning, and the groundwork is laid for planning to begin.

b. Several things happen during the **concept development phase**. The combatant commander derives the mission from the assigned task, issues planning guidance to his staff and subordinate commands, and collects and analyzes information on the enemy. From this, the staff proposes and analyzes tentative courses of action (COAs), the combatant commander selects the best COA, and the staff develops that COA into a complete concept of operations. The concept of operations, documented as the CINC’s Strategic Concept, is forwarded to the CJCS for review. By authority of the CJCS, the Joint Staff reviews the CINC’s Strategic Concept and, when approved, it becomes the concept of operations for the plan.

c. In the **plan development phase** the combatant commander’s staff, the staffs of subordinate and supporting commands, and other members of the JPEC develop the operation plan to the level of detail and in the format required by CJCSM 3122.03 (JOPES Volume II). If the CINC considers it necessary, a CONPLAN or Functional Plan can be developed in more detail than JOPES requires. For all OPLANs and some designated CONPLANs, a detailed transportation-feasible flow of resources into the theater is developed to support the concept of operations. Forces are selected and time-phased, support requirements are determined and time-phased, and the strategic transportation flow is computer simulated. The information required for the plan, i.e., the combat and support units along with the equipment and supply support, is collected in the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) file using JOPES ADP. This phase ends when the fully documented plan, including TPFDD when required, is forwarded to the CJCS for final review and approval.

d. The **plan review phase** is a formal element of the deliberate planning process. The CINC submits all elements of the now fully developed plan to the JPEC for review and CJCS approval.

e. In the **supporting plans phase** each subordinate and supporting commander who is assigned a task in the CINC’s plan prepares a supporting plan. The subordinate and supporting commanders submit these plans to the supported commander for review and approval. The planning process continues through development of supporting employment and deployment plans that further ready the CINC’s plan for implementation.
f. The planning cycle for the deliberate planning process is defined by the principal task-assigning document, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The approved operation plans prepared as directed by the JSCP are considered effective until superseded. The CJCS publishes the schedule for document submission dates, dates for the TPFDD refinement conferences held late in the plan development phase, and dates for the TPFDD maintenance conferences. The CINCs play a key role in establishing the administrative schedules as well as recommending to the CJCS whether current operation plans remain valid, need updating, or should be canceled.
INITIATION PHASE

606. INITIATION PHASE OF DELIBERATE PLANNING

a. Background

(1) Military action is not the only possible response to situations that threaten U.S. national interests. All elements of national power—the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational elements—are considered in the formulation of national policy. Military plans developed through the deliberate planning process also consider diplomatic, economic, and informational options. In fact, CINCs must explicitly relate military Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) to FDOs under the other elements of national power as they develop their operation plans according to adaptive planning principles. Several examples of deterrent options are listed in Figures 6-5 through 6-8.

(2) The nation’s strategic direction is developed by the President and his advisers. The National Security Council (NSC) staffs and prepares the national strategy. One administration published this strategy as a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) signed by the President; the exact title of the President’s decision document may vary from one administration to another. After the national strategy is published, the CJCS translates the worldwide military strategy into specific planning requirements.

b. Task-assigning documents

(1) The CJCS outlines the nation’s military strategy in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which assigns preparation of specific contingency plans to the combatant commanders.

(a) The JSCP assigns the CINCs the tasks of preparing operation plans in complete format (OPLANs), in concept, or abbreviated, format (CONPLANs), or as Functional Plans. Formats for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans are described in detail in CJCSI 3122.03 (JOPES Volume II). Briefly, the CONPLAN does not require the detailed identification of units and preparation of movement schedules found in the OPLAN and its accompanying TPFDD file. Presently, CONPLANs are required to have at least annexes A through D, J, and K. The Functional Plan summarizes the CINC’s concept in even broader terms than the CONPLAN, is normally associated with peacetime operations, and, like the CONPLAN, is required to have at least annexes A through D, J, and Figure 6-22.

(b) The JSCP identifies major combat forces and strategic transportation for the CINC to use to develop each operation plan. These are called apportioned resources, and may include any limited, critical asset, such as combat forces, support forces, supplies,
or strategic and theater transportation units. The JSCP generally apportions “major combat forces,” a term that covers combat, not support, units and, generally, units the size of Army brigades or larger, Air Force squadrons, Navy carrier battle groups and surface action groups, and Marine Corps MAGTFs. It is important to recognize that these apportioned resources may differ from the numbers that may ultimately be furnished, or allocated, when an operation is actually executed.

(c) The JSCP establishes priorities for OPLANs that compete for limited resources.

(2) The Unified Command Plan (UCP) gives basic guidance to the combatant commander on general responsibilities and identifies geographic and functional areas of responsibility (AORs).

(a) The Joint Chiefs of Staff issue the classified UCP as required and update it periodically. It is a task-assigning document and, therefore, specifically cites the authority the Secretary of Defense grants through memorandum or DOD directive. The President approves the UCP.

(b) In broad terms, the UCP directs the combatant commanders to be prepared to

- evacuate noncombatants,
- execute disaster recovery operations, and
- conduct “normal operations” within the assigned geographic or functional AOR.

The broad category “Normal Operations” includes responsibilities for planning and executing operations in contingencies, limited war, and general war; planning and conducting operations other than contingencies; planning and administering the security assistance program; and maintaining the relationship and exercising authority prescribed in Joint Pub 0-2 (UNAAF) and Joint Administrative Publication 1, Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff.

(c) The UCP, then, is a general task-assigning document that covers many contingencies for which the CINC has to prepare.

(3) Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), is also a task-assigning document. The unclassified CJCS guidance in UNAAF defines the exercise of authority by the combatant commander.

(a) UNAAF discusses the principles and doctrines governing joint activities of the Armed Forces:
restatement of the statutory guidelines and departmental directives that
govern the functions of the entire Department of Defense
functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments
principles governing the unified direction and the joint activities of the
Armed Forces
responsibility and authority of the combatant commander
functions and responsibilities of joint staff divisions
the command authority over forces and implications for transfer of
authority

(b) By broad definition, UNAAF initiates deliberate planning by assigning the
combatant commander the task of “planning and conducting military operations in response
to crises, to include the security of the command and protection of the United States, its
possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion.” Continuing operation of the
command and basic self-defense of the command are missions developed from that broad
task assignment.

(4) On occasion, the CJCS may direct preparation of additional plans not included
in the current JSCP. This task assignment may come in the form of a message or other directive. The new task will normally be incorporated into the next edition of the JSCP.

(5) The CINC’s planning tasks are not limited to those specified by higher authority. The CINC may prepare plans considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities described in the UCP and UNAAF, but not specifically assigned. The CINC may also determine that a need exists to prepare plans to cover contingencies not assigned by the JSCP. If the CINC expects to assign tasks to forces not currently under his combatant command, the CJCS must approve.

(6) The number of operation plans prepared by a CINC using deliberate planning procedures varies with each command.

c. **Products** In the deliberate planning process, the CINC is directed in the initiation
phase to produce operation plans in either complete (OPLAN) format or abbreviated nocept (CONPLAN) format, or to produce a Functional Plan.

(1) An OPLAN is a complete description of the CINC’s concept of operations and
demands much time and effort to produce. It identifies the forces and supplies required to
execute the plan and includes a movement schedule of the resources into the theater of operations. The documentation includes annexes that describe the concept and explain the
theater-wide support required in the subordinate commander’s supporting plan. OPLANs
describe deployment and employment of forces and resources and include a TPFDD. The
detailed planning essential in OPLAN development is normally required when the military
response to a hostile situation
• is sufficiently critical to U.S. national security to justify the detail involved,
• contributes to deterring enemy aggression by showing U.S. readiness through planning, or
• would tax total U.S. capability in forces, supplies, or transportation.

(2) In most situations the task does not require preparation of a detailed flow of resources. Though the same process is followed for producing CONPLANs as is used for OPLANs, the level of detail produced in the plan development phase of CONPLANs is abbreviated. Detailed support requirements generally need not be calculated, nor do strategic movements need to be simulated. CONPLANs do not generally include the detail typically found in OPLAN annexes, but require annexes A through D, J, and K or a TPFDD if the CJCS or CINC so directs. CONPLANs are normally prepared when

• the contingency is not sufficiently critical to national security to require detailed prior planning,
• the situation would not place unacceptable demands on U.S. resources,
• the probability of occurrence during the JSCP planning cycle is low, or
• planning flexibility is desired.

(3) A Functional Plan is used to respond to the requirements of the JSCP, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Combat Support Agencies. Development of Functional Plans follows the same process used for OPLANs and CONPLANs throughout the concept development phase of deliberate planning. They normally are plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements, such as

• disaster relief,
• nation assistance,
• logistics,
• communications,
• surveillance,
• protection of U.S. citizens,
• nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and
• continuity of operations, or similar discrete tasks.

d. **JPEC coordination** The Services also have an input during the initiation of planning. Since the CJCS apportions only major combat forces, the Services must give the CINC information about other combat, combat support, and combat service support forces that are available for planning. They also inform the combatant commander on Service doctrine, guidance, and priorities.
e. **Review of previous operations** Planners should access the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) and the Joint Universal Lessons Learned Systems (JULLS) database early in the planning process and periodically thereafter to obtain specific practical lessons in all areas of planning and execution gained from actual operation and exercise experiences. A regular review of such information during the planning process can alert planners to known pitfalls and successful, innovative ideas.

**CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT PHASE**

**607. INTRODUCTION**

a. After the CINC has received the task assignment, the staff analyzes the mission and develops tentative courses of action (COAs) to accomplish the mission. The concept development phase can be seen as an orderly series of six steps. The first five take the joint staff through a problem-solving process to develop the CINC’s Strategic Concept. In the sixth step the CJCS reviews the CINC’s Strategic Concept. With CJCS approval, the CINC’s Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan. Although the steps, illustrated in Figure 6-11, are diagrammed and discussed individually, in actual practice they may not be conducted separately or in the simple sequence listed. The dividing line between steps is sometimes hard to see, since steps are often repeated, combined, or done concurrently. Staff work done in one step affects work being done in others.

b. Once it has developed the CINC’s Strategic Concept, the staff forwards it to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for concept review. When approved, the CINC’s Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan, and the plan is approved for further development. This review process is the same for all operation plans (OPLANs and CONPLANs).

**608. STEP 1: MISSION ANALYSIS**

a. To begin developing the concept of operations, the combatant commander determines the objective, reviews what resources are available for use in developing the plan, analyzes the enemy and the physical conditions that affect the task, and reviews the guidance that has been given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The first step in the development of a military concept of operations begins with a careful analysis of the task assignment. In the language of deliberate planning, the CINC and joint staff view the overall operation to
Concept Development Phase

**Purpose:**
- To formally compare courses of action for CINC to make his concept decision

**Plan Development Phase**

**Purpose:**
- To formally develop and distribute CINC's decision and guidance to all participants

**Initiation Phase**

**Purpose:**
- To analyze assigned tasks to determine mission and to prepare guidance for subordinates

- determine assigned, implied, and subsidiary tasks in order to develop a concise mission statement;
- consider the forces that have been apportioned for planning, the capabilities of the enemy, the terrain, geographic features that support friendly and enemy forces, and weather;
- incorporate controlling factors levied by others that will influence the military operation, such as diplomatic understandings, economic conditions, host-nation issues, etc.

b. Until now, we have considered the task that has been assigned to the CINC by the JSCP or other directive. A transition from the assigned task to the CINC’s mission statement must be made.

1. Both Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* and Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF, define a mission as “the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for the action.” Neither the DOD Dictionary nor UNAAF defines “task.”
(2) Tasks are defined in Service documents. AR 310-25, the Dictionary of United States Army Terms defines tasks as “the specific Army, Navy, and Air tasks which have to be done to implement successfully the phased concept of operations stemming from . . . the overall strategic concept.”

c. For the purposes of deliberate planning, a clear distinction must be made between a task and a mission.

(1) AFSC defines a task as a job or function assigned to a subordinate unit or command by higher authority.

(2) Using the Joint Pub 1-02 definition, then, the subordinate’s mission is derived from the task assigned by a higher authority and includes the reason for that task.

(3) This distinction between mission and task is consistent with joint planning documents. The task assigned by higher authority and its contribution to the mission of that higher-echelon commander serve as the basis for developing the subordinate’s mission.

d. The product of Step 1 is the mission statement. The mission statement carries through the planning process and is included in the planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, the Commander’s Estimate, the CINC’s Strategic Concept, the concept of operations, and the completed operation plan.

(1) The mission statement is a clear, concise statement of the objective to be accomplished by the command (what) and the purpose to be achieved (why). Multiple tasks are normally described in the sequence in which they are to be done. Routine tasks or inherent responsibilities of the commander are not usually included in the mission statement.

(2) The mission statement developed during the mission analysis step is the basis for COA development, staff estimates, and the Commander’s Estimate. It is stated in the planning guidance the CINC issues to coordinate the planning effort, and, after further refinement, it will also be included in the final OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan. The elements of the mission statement are who, what, when, where, why, and, possibly, how. Normally, how the operation will be conducted is described in the concept of the operation or execution paragraph developed later in the planning process as greater detail is added.

(3) An example of a mission statement is found in the operation plan for the Philippine Campaign in World War II leading to Okinawa: CANF SWPA No. 16-44 of November 1944:

“[When this order is received] [t]he Pacific Fleet, including four carrier groups, will, in order to support the operation, have as its continuing task the destruction of enemy naval and air forces which threaten interference with the operation. Fast
carrier task forces will effect carrier strikes on the Empire, Okinawa, Formosa, and northern Luzon . . . ."

609. **STEP 2CPLANNING GUIDANCE**

Reference: NWP 11, *Naval Operational Planning*

a. This step has two objectives: first, to give enough initial planning guidance to the supported CINC’s staff for work to begin on COAs and, second, to communicate planning guidance to the subordinate commanders through a written planning directive or a planning conference.

b. **Initial guidance.** The following paragraphs describe the information that a supported commander may give a staff to understand the assigned task, derived mission statement, and restrictions or other considerations that will affect their planning.

   (1) **Mission.** The mission statement was developed in Step 1 from the CINC’s analysis of the task.

   (2) **Assumptions**

      (a) The DOD Dictionary defines an assumption as

      “A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action.”

      (b) An assumption normally covers the issues over which the commander has no control and is used to fill a gap in knowledge so planning can continue. It is stated as if it were a fact. Subordinate commanders and supporting commanders treat the assumptions of the higher-echelon commander as facts and often do not plan for the possibility that they are not. Therefore, the statement of assumptions is a critical element in the development of the concept.

      (c) Assumptions have a significant impact on the planning process. When dealing with an assumption, a “branch” to the plan would be developed should the assumption prove to be incorrect. Because of their influence on planning, the fewest possible assumptions are included in an operation plan. A valid assumption has three characteristics: it is logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue.

      (d) Assumptions are made for both friendly and enemy situations. For example, planners can assume the success of friendly supporting operations that are essential
to the success of their own plan, but cannot assume the success of their own operation. For instance, COM5THFLEET included this assumption in his OPLAN for the capture of Okinawa in 1945, “. . . that the assault shipping, supporting naval forces, and army troops to be used in the operation are released promptly from Philippine operations.”

(e) Planners should use a worst-case scenario. The planner should plan that the enemy will use every capability at its disposal and operate in the most efficient manner possible. To dismiss these enemy possibilities could dangerously limit the depth of planning. Planners should never assume away an enemy capability.

(f) Planners cannot assume a condition simply because of a lack of accurate knowledge of friendly forces or a lack of intelligence about the enemy.

(g) As planning proceeds, additional assumptions may be needed, some early assumptions may prove to be faulty, and still others may be replaced with facts or new information gained during the planning process. The use of assumptions is more prevalent for operations planned far into the future; the situation is less certain and assumptions must be made to complete the planning.

(3) Nuclear and chemical warfare Planning for nuclear and chemical warfare is especially sensitive. The commander issues guidance as early in the planning process as possible. A highly specialized staff does the planning for these capabilities.

(4) Political considerations

(a) Planning for the use of military forces includes a discussion of the political implications of their transportation, staging, and employment. Political factors can have a significant effect on the prosecution of a military operation. Unfortunately, in peacetime planning they are extremely difficult to predict. Political considerations may have to be treated as assumptions.

(b) Most unified combatant commanders with a geographic area of responsibility have a Political Adviser (POLAD) as a member of their personal staffs. The POLAD is a representative from the Department of State experienced in the political and diplomatic situation in the theater. The POLAD is helpful in advising the CINC and staff on political or diplomatic issues crucial to the planning process, such as overflight and transit rights for deploying forces, basing and servicing agreements, etc.
(5) **Tentative courses of action**

(a) The CINC gives the staff his preliminary thinking on possible military actions early in the planning process to focus their actions. These preliminary or tentative COAs are activities initially seen to be open to the military commander that will lead to successful accomplishment of the mission. Normally, these tentative COAs are not fully analyzed for feasibility and seldom contain all elements of a refined COA.

(b) Tentative COAs may include only what military action is to be accomplished, that is, amphibious or airborne assault, naval blockade, etc., and where the military action could take place. The refined COA contains who, what, when, where, and how.

(6) **Planning schedule**

(a) The commander usually issues a planning schedule with his initial guidance, although practice varies from command to command.

(b) Normally drawn up by the chief of staff, the planning schedule sets milestones or deadline dates for completing staff estimates, submitting data from subordinate and supporting commands, and completing and distributing various elements of the plan.

(7) **Initial staff briefings**

(a) Initial briefings on such subjects as terrain and hydrography of the area of operations, enemy capabilities, forces available, logistics support, and others are vital to the staff early in the planning process. They help the J-5 staff formulate additional tentative COAs and focus the joint staff divisions as they analyze tentative COAs and develop recommendations for the CINC.

(b) In most cases, the appropriate staff directorates prepare and present these initial briefings.

c. **Commander’s intent** The commanders’ intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation, not a summary of the concept of the operation. It may include how the posture of units at end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the commander’s assessment of the enemy commander’s intent. The commander’s intent is the initial impetus for the entire planning process. The commander refines his intent as he considers staff estimates and the commander’s Estimate. The intent statement may also contain an assessment of where the commander will accept risk during the operation. The commander’s intent helps subordinates pursue the desired end state without further orders. Thus, the commander’s intent provides focus for all subordinate elements.
d. **Planning directive** The CINC normally communicates initial guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders by publishing a planning directive to ensure that everyone understands the commander’s intent and is “reading from the same sheet of music.”

(1) Generally, the head of the plans and policy directorate, J-5, coordinates staff action for deliberate planning. The J-5 staff receives the CINC’s initial guidance and combines it with the information gained from the initial staff briefings; this information becomes the written planning directive issued by the CINC. The contents of a planning directive are not officially prescribed in deliberate planning procedures, but generally include the information discussed in paragraph b. preceding. A suggested format appears in Appendix A of this publication, adapted from Appendix 1 to Annex P of Joint Pub 5-03.1 (JOPES Volume I) to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01.

(2) The CINC, through the J-5, may convene a preliminary planning conference for members of the JPEC who will be involved with the plan. This is the opportunity for representatives to meet face-to-face. At the conference, the CINC and selected members of the staff brief the attendees on important aspects of the plan and may solicit their initial reactions. Many potential conflicts can be avoided by this early exchange of information. The supported commander’s staff normally prepares and distributes minutes of the conference. The record of these proceedings can also serve as the basis for a planning directive.

(3) It is absolutely vital to the success of the planning process that all members of the JPEC be kept informed. The ultimate success of the supported commander’s mission will depend on the support and cooperation of each subordinate and supporting commander. A large measure of that success results from a clear understanding of the commander’s intent. Of course, each new plan spawns supporting plans; early CINC guidance allows supporting commanders to begin concurrent planning to develop those supporting plans.

### 610. STEP 3: STAFF ESTIMATES

a. **Introduction** Staff estimates are the foundation for the CINC’s selection of a course of action. In this step, the staff divisions analyze and refine each COA to determine its supportability. The thoroughness of these staff estimates may determine the success of the military operation.

(1) Not every situation needs an extensive and lengthy planning effort. It is conceivable that a commander could review the assigned task, receive oral briefings, make a quick decision, and direct the writing of a plan. This would complete the process and might be suitable if the task were simple and straightforward.

(2) Most combatant commanders, however, demand the thorough, well-coordinated plan that necessitates a complex staff estimate step. Although written staff
estimates are not mandatory, most will be carefully prepared and coordinated and fully documented.

b. The CINC’s entire staff is deeply involved in the deliberate planning effort. The J-5 normally coordinates the overall process of long-range planning, prepares the initial planning guidance, and coordinates the staff estimates. As illustrated in Figure 6-12, most major joint staff divisions, J-1, J-2, J-4, and J-6, prepare staff estimates; in addition, input may be solicited from the CINC’s special staff on specialized or technical matters. The J-5 gathers information and, with the J-3, proposes and revises tentative COAs. The J-3 might also complete a staff estimate to compare COAs for supportability and recommend a preferred COA to the J-5. In the later stages of staff analysis, the J-5 begins to focus on selecting information from the staff estimates to assist the CINC in preparing the Commander’s Estimate.

c. The purpose of staff estimates is to determine whether the mission can be accomplished and to determine which COA can best be supported. This, together with the supporting discussion, gives the CINC the best possible information to select a COA.

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**Staff Estimates**

Staff Estimates Influence the Commander’s Estimate

- **Commander’s Estimate**
  1. Mission
  2. Situation and courses of action
  3. Analysis of opposing courses of action
  4. Comparison of own courses of action
  5. Decision

- **Staff Estimates**
- **Personnel**
  1. Mission
  2. Situation and considerations
  3. Analysis
  4. Comparison
  5. Conclusions

- **Intelligence**
  1. Mission
  2. Enemy situation
  3. Enemy capabilities
  4. Analysis of enemy capabilities
  5. Conclusions

- **Operations**
  1. Mission
  2. Situation and courses of action
  3. Analysis or opposing courses of action
  4. Comparison or own courses of action
  5. Recommendation

- **Logistics**
  1. Mission
  2. Situation and considerations
  3. Analysis
  4. Comparison
  5. Conclusions

- **C4**
  1. Mission
  2. Situation and considerations
  3. Analysis
  4. Comparison
  5. Conclusions

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(1) Each joint staff division

• reviews the mission and situation from its own staff functional perspective,
• examines the factors for which it is the responsible staff,
• analyzes each COA from its staff functional perspective,
• compares each COA based on its staff functional analysis, and
• concludes whether the mission can be supported and which COA can best be supported from its particular staff functional perspective.

(2) Because of the unique talents of each joint staff division, involvement of all is vital. Each staff estimate takes on a different focus that identifies certain assumptions, detailed aspects of the COAs, and potential deficiencies that are simply not known at any other level, but nevertheless must be considered. Such a detailed study of the COAs involves the corresponding staffs of subordinate and supporting commands; this coordination is essential, since they bring details of force support and employment not viewed at the theater level.

(3) The form and, possibly, the number of COAs under consideration change during this step. These changes result in refined courses of action.

d. The product of this step is the sum total of the individual efforts of the staff divisions. Complete, fully documented staff estimates are extremely useful to the J-5 staff, which extracts information from them for the Commander’s Estimate. The estimates are also valuable to planners in subordinate and supporting commands as they prepare supporting plans. Although documenting the staff estimates can be delayed until after the preparation of the Commander’s Estimate, they should be sent to subordinate and supporting commanders in time to help them prepare annexes for their supporting plans.

(4) The principal elements of the staff estimate normally include mission, situation and considerations, analysis of friendly COAs, comparison of friendly COAs, and conclusions. The details in each basic category vary with the staff performing the analysis. The principal staff divisions have a similar perspective--they focus on friendly COAs and their supportability. However, the J-2 estimate on intelligence concentrates on the enemy: enemy situation, enemy capabilities and an analysis of those capabilities, and conclusions drawn from that analysis. The analysis of enemy capabilities includes analysis of the various courses of action available to the enemy according to its capabilities, which include attacking, withdrawing, defending, delaying, etc. The J-2’s conclusion will indicate the enemy’s most likely course of action.

(2) Guidance on the format for staff estimates is found in Appendixes 2 through 5 to Annex P of Joint Pub 5-03.1, JOPES Volume 1, to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01. Appendixes B through E of AFSC Pub 1 include staff estimate formats adapted from

AFSC PUB 1
JOPES Volume 1. Combatant commanders may direct that additional details be included in their particular staff estimates.

e. Often the steps in the concept development phase are not separate and distinct, as the evolution of the refined COA illustrates.

(1) During planning guidance and early in the staff estimates step, the initial COAs may have been developed from initial impressions and based on limited staff support. But as concept development progresses, COAs are refined and evolve to include as many of the following as applicable:

- what military operations are considered, where they will be performed
- who will conduct the operation
- when the operation is planned to occur
- in general terms, how the operation will be conducted

(2) These refined COAs are developed by an iterative process of modifying, adding to, and deleting from the original, tentative list. The staff continually estimates and reestimates the situation as the planning process continues. Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff. In the beginning, they emphasize information collection more than analysis. It is only in the later stages of the process that the staff estimates are expected to indicate which COAs can best be supported.

611. **STEP 4.COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE**

a. **Definition**. Joint Pub 1-02 defines the Commander’s Estimate (of the Situation) as “a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission.” In deliberate planning, it is the document that clearly states the CINC’s decision and summarizes the CINC’s rationale for that decision. The Commander’s Estimate becomes a tool to communicate valuable guidance from the CINC to the staff and subordinate commanders. As such, it is a valuable planning tool for the staff and subordinate commanders.

b. Generally, after receiving direction from the CINC and drawing from information in the staff estimates, the J-5 assembles the staff estimates and drafts the documentation for the Commander’s Estimate. It is prepared for the CINC to describe the chosen COA. In deliberate planning, the Commander’s Estimate is a planning document used by the command. Appendix 6 to Annex P of Joint Pub 5-03.1 (JOPES Volume 1) to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01 furnishes a format for the Commander’s Estimate; Appendix F of AFSC Pub 1 also includes a format adapted from JOPES Volume 1. Figure 6-13 shows the basic
subdivision of information; the five main paragraph headings outline steps to basic problem solving. A more detailed guide to preparing a Commander’s Estimate is contained in Figure 6-14 “A Primer on the Commander’s Estimate.”

612. STEP 5 CINC’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

a. Introduction The CINC’s Strategic Concept is the proposed concept of operations for the plan, an expanded version of the COA selected in the Commander’s Estimate prepared in Step 4. It is a narrative statement of how the CINC expects to conduct operations to accomplish the mission. It serves two purposes:

Commander’s Estimate

1. Mission
2. Situation and course of action
   a. Considerations affecting the possible courses of action
      (1) Characteristics of the area of operations
      (2) Relative combat power
   b. Enemy capabilities
   c. Own courses of action
3. Analysis of enemy capabilities
4. Comparison of own courses of action
5. Decision

(1) It clarifies the intent of the commander in the deployment, employment, and support of apportioned forces.

(2) It identifies major objectives and target dates for their attainment.

b. Format The CINC’s Strategic Concept is written in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the CINC’s overall view of how the operation will be conducted, or concept of operations. The particular format for submission of the CINC’s Strategic Concept is prescribed in CJCSI 3122.011 and Appendix G of AFSC Pub 1. The elements of information that clearly convey the CINC’s concept of operations include the following.
The Commander’s Estimate is an essential tool in deliberate and crisis planning. Using the staff work of the preceding steps, it documents the decision process used by the combatant commander (CINC) in choosing his course of action (COA). It becomes the foundation of the CINC’s concept of operations and all future planning. The document is more than a collection of information from prior staff work; it is the statement of the CINC’s decision process to select a COA. Often prepared by the J-5 for the CINC’s signature, it is a definitive statement of the direction of subsequent deliberate planning.

A Commander’s Estimate is used in both deliberate and crisis-action planning. Its format in deliberate planning is set forth in Appendix G to Annex P of CJCSI 3122.01, JOPES Volume I. Appendix F to AFSC Pub 1 includes a format adapted from JOPES Volume I. The estimate consists of five paragraphs.

PARAGRAPH 1—MISSION The mission statement that was developed in the mission analysis step, written during planning guidance, and refined during the staff estimate step is restated in Paragraph 1. This mission statement will be used throughout the operation plan.

PARAGRAPH 2—THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION This information is limited to the significant factors that influence the CINC’s choice of COA. Separate subparagraphs will describe enemy capabilities and list friendly COAs to be considered.

- CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION Under each of the selected headings in the format are facts that are known about the situation. If facts are not available, necessary assumptions are stated. Two categories of topics are discussed.

1. Characteristics of the area of operations. This information is furnished by J-2. The topics suggested in Pub 1 Appendix F illustrate information that may be influential in selecting a COA. The list is neither mandatory nor exhaustive.

2. Relative combat power. This is not simply a list of the numbers of combat troops and weapons. The planner also assesses the competence and characteristics of the forces, their composition, location, disposition, and information that measures combat effectiveness.

- ENEMY CAPABILITIES Enemy capabilities are defined by Joint Pub 1-02 as “those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and which, if adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission....” The planner discusses not only our adversary’s general capabilities to attack, defend, delay, reinforce, and/or withdraw, but also more specific capabilities, if pertinent. Information for this paragraph can be taken from the intelligence staff estimate, including the probabilities of the enemy’s exercising the capabilities, and the vulnerabilities that might result from those actions. It is important to make a statement of joint enemy capabilities, since the CINC will be opposed by the combined strength of ground, air, and naval forces.

- OWN COURSES OF ACTION The friendly COAs that survived the staff estimate step are listed. In practice, the length and complexity of the staff estimate process dictate that the number of refined COAs has probably been reduced to two or three. These refined COAs all pass the tests described in Figure 6-15.

PARAGRAPH 3—ANALYSIS OF ENEMY ABILITIES The purpose of Paragraph 3 is to evaluate each proposed friendly course of action as though opposed by each enemy capability. This series of wargaming exercises illustrates that the commander considered the most significant and influential confrontations.

The comprehensive analysis that is documented in Paragraph 3 is sometimes difficult for new planners to begin. First, planners organize their thoughts: consider enemy capability #1 against friendly COA #1, e.g., consider the enemy’s capability to defend against our amphibious assault. How will the terrain affect the matchup? What effect will the lines of communication have? What is the relative combat power of forces?

How will this confrontation affect further operations? Comprehensive planning at this point does not restrict the flow of ideas under consideration. The process of selection comes later. No reasonable possibility should be overlooked.
A PRIMER ON THE COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE (cont’d.)

The planner will note that certain features begin to appear dominant as the wargaming and analysis continue. Some of these factors will clearly favor friendly forces and others will favor the enemy. These dominant considerations are known as governing factors. They are used by the J-5 and the CINC to focus the evaluation of friendly COAs.

The total enemy capabilities may be numerous, yet the decision-maker must focus on a small, manageable number to permit comprehensive analysis. Two methods have been developed to reduce the number of enemy capabilities under consideration without compromising the value of the wargaming exercise.

- **GROUPING** While Service component forces operate in distinct environments, they mutually support one another and generally center on a major ground, air, or sea objective. It may be possible to focus staff analysis on an identifiable, pivotal operation, e.g., the initial battle to secure the beachhead in an amphibious operation. The planner may concentrate on the broad enemy capability most relevant and “group” all others in its support. For example, against our amphibious operation, group enemy air and naval capabilities as support and concentrate on analyzing enemy ground defense, the more significant issue, in opposition to our assault; or against our mission of sea control, recognize and group the supporting enemy capabilities in air and ground arenas to permit our in-depth study of the enemy’s pivotal naval capability. Obviously, extreme care must be exercised to avoid overlooking any significant enemy capability or misreading the contribution of other capabilities.

- **SELECTION** This technique further reduces the workload by selecting for analysis only those enemy capabilities that uniquely affect the outcome of a particular friendly COA. Comparatively, there is little to gain by considering the enemy’s capabilities that similarly affect all friendly COAs. For example, the enemy’s air defense capability may affect the friendly air superiority mission regardless of which ground-based COA is used. If that is the case, that particular enemy capability is not likely to govern the commander’s choice. Although an enemy capability may be unquestionably critical to our success, it may not contribute to the decision-maker’s choice of one COA over another.

- When further reduction in the number of enemy capabilities is needed, the planner analyzes enemy capabilities in the expected order of adoption identified in the intelligence estimate. The planner may elect to restrict analysis to only the most likely enemy capabilities. This selection process must be used very carefully. Enemy commanders, too, understand that surprise is important! A critical enemy capability must not be overlooked or arbitrarily excluded from consideration merely for the convenience of the planner.

**PARAGRAPH 4--COMPARISON OF FRIENDLY COA’S.** This paragraph weighs the advantages and disadvantages of each friendly COA in light of the governing factors, e.g., relative combat power, logistics support, terrain, mobility, etc. It is a narrative description of the advantages and disadvantages of each COA as seen by the CINC. In preparation, it may be useful for planners to summarize their analysis. In reality, the actual comparison may be a mental process that lacks documentation or a computer simulation weighing sensitivity of the COA to enemy capabilities. In this paragraph the CINC describes his method for comparing each COA measured in factors he considers important to the success of the operation.

Normally, the supporting tools used in the analysis are not included in the final document. A clear picture is given of the results of the analysis that led to the decision of COA.

The final part of paragraph 4 is a statement that concludes, “Course of action # _____ is favored because . . . .”

**PARAGRAPH 5--DECISION** In practice, the J-5 may prepare, coordinate, and submit to the CINC a recommended COA, but the final product, when signed by the CINC, gives the rationale used in the decision process. The document need not be the compelling argument as to the choice of a particular COA; it is, however, a statement of the CINC’s decision for use by planners in understanding the rationale that went into the choice of the COA.
TESTS FOR COURSE OF ACTION

ADEQUACY. Will the course of action actually accomplish the mission when carried out successfully? In other words, is it aimed at the correct objectives?

FEASIBILITY. Do we have the required resources, i.e., the personnel, the transportation, the resupply, the facilities, etc.? Can the resources be made available in the time contemplated?

ACCEPTABILITY. Even though the action will accomplish the mission and we have the necessary resources, is it worth the cost in terms of excessive losses in personnel, equipment, material, time, or position? Is the action consistent with the law of war and militarily/politically supportable?

VARIETY. OPLANs will comply with joint doctrine as stated in approved/test publications in the Joint Publication System. Incorporating appropriate joint doctrine when preparing OPLANs facilitates crisis action planning and the execution of planned operations. There are military operations in which only one feasible course of action exists. Generally, in joint operations this is not the case. The Commander’s Estimate analyzes and compares substantially different courses of action. Listing alternative, but only superficially different, COAs preempts the CINC’s decision and eliminates an important and useful purpose of the Commander’s Estimate.

COMPLETENESS. When the COAs have been reduced to a manageable number, a last check is given to confirm that they are technically complete. Does each retained course of action adequately answer

- Who (what forces) will execute it?
- What type of action is contemplated?
- When it is to begin?
- Where it will take place?
- How it will be accomplished? There is no inhibition to clearly explaining how the COA will be executed.

The refined COAs are used by the CINC in his final decision; they must be explicit to allow sound judgments to be made. Care is shown not to usurp the initiative and prerogative of subordinate commanders by including too much of the “how.”

(1) Situation

- probable preconditions for implementation of the plan
- deterrent options included in the plan
- enemy forces
- general tasks of friendly forces
- expected operations of other friendly commands that will influence the plan
- assumptions, including level of mobilization
- legal considerations
(2) Mission

(3) Execution

- who will be employed
- where forces will be employed
- when forces are to be phased into theater
- general description of how forces are to be employed
- conventional, nuclear, and other supporting operations
- deception
- necessary deployment of forces
- tasks of each subordinate and supporting command
- required supporting plans

(4) Administration and Logistics

- transportation during deployment and employment
- concept of logistics support
  - stockage levels, pre-positioned war reserve stocks consumption levels
  - mutual allies’ support requirements and inter-Service support

(5) Command and Control

- command relationships
- command and control requirements
- succession to command

c. Concept Development Conference The CINC may call a concept development conference involving representatives of subordinate and supporting commands, the Services, Joint Staff, and other interested parties. Such a conference might be convened if additional work is required from subordinate and supporting commanders, which may be the situation either when the original task is to prepare an OPLAN and substantial subordinate commander involvement is required in the next phase (plan development) or when considerable effort will be required to prepare supporting plans. The conference would be convened to ensure that adequate direction is given to subordinates. Subordinate and supporting commanders base further planning on guidelines in the CINC’s Strategic Concept.

d. The transmittal of the concept The commander must ensure that his concept is accurately described both to members of the planning community, so they can continue planning in support of the operations, and to the CJCS for review and approval.
613. **STEP 6 CCJCS CONCEPT REVIEW** Once the CINC’s Strategic Concept is prepared, it is forwarded to the CJCS for review and approval. The process is the same for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans, whether they are new plans or existing plans for which the concept has changed. Reviews should be completed within 60 days of referral; however, the Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if necessary. With CJCS approval, the CINC’s Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan. It will be used in paragraph 3 (Execution) of the Basic Plan and described in detail in Annex C of the OPLAN.

   a. **Initiation of review** The Joint Staff conducts the review for the CJCS. When the Joint Staff receives the CINC’s Strategic Concept, it determines whether the concept is in the proper format, conforms with JSCP guidance, is consistent with joint doctrine, and is therefore ready for review. If not, the submitting headquarters is notified by memorandum or message.

   b. **Review responsibilities** The Joint Staff, Services, and designated defense agencies (National Security Agency (NSA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)) conduct independent reviews and submit comments within 30 days of referral. Comments by Joint Staff directorates and defense agencies are submitted to the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), which has primary staff responsibility for conducting reviews. The Services submit comments to the Secretary, Joint Staff.

   c. **Review criteria** The purpose of the concept review is to

      (1) determine whether the scope and concept of operations are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned,

      (2) assess the validity of the assumptions,

      (3) evaluate compliance with CJCS guidance and joint doctrine, and

      (4) evaluate acceptability with regard to expected costs and military and political supportability.

   d. **Review comments** Comments back to the CINC concerning his concept are classified as execution-critical, substantive, or administrative.

      (1) **Execution-critical** comments describe major deficiencies that negatively affect the capability of the plan to meet the JSCP objective and may prevent execution of the plan as written. Examples of such deficiencies include such things as failure to meet assigned tasks, deviations from joint policy, and major logistics shortfalls.
(2) **Substantive** comments pertain to less critical deficiencies such as deviations from CJCS guidance or JOPES formatting. These deficiencies would not prevent execution of the plan.

(3) **Administrative** comments are offered for clarity, accuracy, and consistency. They include such items as outdated references, improper terminology, and minor errors.

e. **Review results** Results of the review are forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum or message stating that the concept is either

   (1) approved for further plan development or

   (2) disapproved and requires significant changes before resubmission.

f. **Post-review actions** The supported commander incorporates changes required by the CJCS as follows:

   (1) A formal change incorporating all execution-critical comments is submitted to the CJCS within 30 days of receipt of the review results.

   (2) Substantive comments must be incorporated when the plan is submitted for review in its entirety in the plan review phase of the deliberate planning process.

614. **SUMMARY OF CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT**

   a. The deliberate planning process has progressed from receipt of the task assignment to development of the CINC’s concept of how the assigned task will be accomplished. The CINC has documented the plan in sufficient detail for the reviewing authority, the CJCS, to understand fully the overall military concept of operations. Moreover, the transmittal of the concept gives continuing guidance to subordinates as they begin more detailed planning. The procedures in concept development are not rigid. Through each step, the planners identify and analyze factors that could adversely affect the accomplishment of the CINC’s mission. This discovery and problem-solving process continues even while they are preparing the CINC’s Strategic Concept; they may adjust or revise the concept at any time. Shortages in types, quantities, or timing of forces or resources (called shortfalls) are among the most critical factors. The identification and resolution of shortfalls continue throughout the entire planning process.

   b. Joint Planning and Execution Community coordination. The planning procedures during the concept development phase are conducted primarily by the CINC and the CINC’s staff. The component commanders, joint task force commanders, and subordinate unified commanders have been involved. Outside the CINC’s theater, supporting commands, such as USTRANSCOM and other combatant commanders, and defense agencies
cies, have attended coordination meetings, received the supported CINC’s guidance, and given valuable insight during development of the concept.

c. The development of the CINC’s concept of operations has been described as the most difficult phase of deliberate planning, because of the many subjective determinations that must be made. Now begins the detailed development of the flow of resources and the determination of whether that operation is possible with the apportioned forces and transportation. This next phase, plan development, is undoubtedly the most time-consuming phase.

PLAN DEVELOPMENT PHASE

615. INTRODUCTION

a. Overview. At the close of concept development, the CINC sends his Strategic Concept to the CJCS for review and approval. Once approved, it becomes the concept of operations for plan development and subsequent phases of the deliberate planning process. In the plan development phase, the staff expands and formally documents the concept of operations in the appropriate operation plan format. The process is the same for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans.

b. CONPLANs and Functional Plans are not as fully developed as OPLANs. CONPLANs do not require the level of detailed planning in support, sustainment, or transportation that OPLANs do. Unless the supported commander requires it, annexes and appendixes are not required to be as fully developed as in an OPLAN, and, generally, TPFDD development is not required. Therefore, CONPLANs present a less complicated plan development problem than OPLANs. Because OPLAN development requires all the procedures for the plan development phase to be accomplished and CONPLAN development does not, subsequent discussion of the plan development phase will focus on planning procedures for OPLANs.

c. During the initial steps of this phase, the spotlight moves to the subordinate commanders; generally, in unified combatant commands, these are the component commanders. Planners on the staffs of the component commands begin developing the total package of forces required for the operation. They start with the major combat forces selected from those apportioned for planning in the original task-assigning document and included in the CINC’s concept of operations. Working closely with the staffs of Service headquarters, other supporting commands, and combat support agencies, they identify requirements for support forces and sustainment.

d. The supported commander consolidates each component’s forces and supplies, and phases their movement into the theater of operations. The resources are proposed for
arrival in-theater and at the final destination using apportioned intertheater transportation, CINC-controlled theater transportation, and transportation organic to the subordinate command. The strategic movement is simulated in a computer model; reasonable assurances can then be given by the CINC that the operation is transportation feasible.

e. The later steps of the phase fill the plan’s hypothetical (notional) units with actual units and those supply entries that can be replaced. In the refinement step, movement of these units is again computer-simulated, and USTRANSCOM develops movement tables. The final documentation for the transportation-feasible OPLAN is prepared. Two phases follow plan development in the deliberate planning process. The first presents the OPLAN package to the CJCS for final review and approval, and the second sees subordinate and supporting commanders developing necessary supporting plans.

f. For clarity, the plan development phase will be described in eight sequential steps shown in Figure 6-16. In reality, these steps may overlap, be accomplished simultaneously, or repeat. The same flexibility displayed in the course of action refinement process of the preceding phase is seen again here, as shortfalls are discovered and eliminated. The sheer magnitude of the problem is enormous; tens of thousands of separate combat and support units and materiel shipments make up large OPLANS. Computer support within JOPES makes the timely development of a realistic flow of manpower and supplies possible.

g. ADP support The plan development phase produces huge amounts of information about the forces, the equipment and materiel support to those forces, and the time-time-phased movement of personnel and materiel to the area of operations. To manage this mountain of information, planners need ADP support. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) provides ADP support to operation plan development. JOPES is accessed by planners and throughout the JPEC through the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Planners use specialized application programs in JOPES and interface with other application programs through JOPES, to create a Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) computer file. The TPFDD is created by entering and relating data supplied by sources throughout the JPEC and generated by JOPES and JOPES-related applications. The discussion of plan development in this volume will first cover the eight steps previously mentioned, followed by a section covering the ADP support available in JOPES to help accomplish the steps.

h. TPFDD LOI The supported commander publishes a letter of instruction (LOI) at the beginning of the plan development phase of deliberate planning. The purpose of the LOI is to give the CINC’s component commanders and supporting commands and agencies specific guidance on how the plan is to be developed. The supported commander’s staff coordinates with affected commands such as USTRANSCOM and its
components before publication to ensure that the guidance given in the LOI is current. The LOI must furnish specific guidance concerning these items:

- priority of air movement for major units
- apportionment of airlift capability between Service components and resupply
- standard time windows for resupply defined by earliest arrival date (EAD) and latest arrival date (LAD)
- resupply and nonunit personnel replacement planning factors
- retrograde, chemical, and nuclear TPFDD procedures
- attrition planning factors
- standard ports of embarkation (POEs) and ports of debarkation (PODs) for forces, and channels for resupply
- administrative management of identifiers used within JOPES application software to identify, manipulate, and track force, cargo, and personnel requirements (e.g., unit line numbers (ULNs), cargo increment numbers (CINs), personnel increment numbers (PINs), and force record numbers (FRNs))
- the CINC’s required delivery dates (RDDs) and TPFDD points of contact for the supported and supporting CINC’s staffs
616. **STEP I: FORCE PLANNING**

a. **Introduction** The purpose of force planning is to identify all forces needed to accomplish the CINC’s concept of operations and phase them into the theater of operations. Force planning is based on CJCS, Service, and USSOCOM (for special operations) guidance and doctrine. It consists of force requirements determination, force list development and refinement in light of force availability, and force shortfall identification and resolution. Force planning is ultimately the responsibility of the supported commander, but the components do most of the work.

(1) The original task-assigning instrument, the JSCP or other such directive, identifies major combat forces. Tasks assigned in the UCP and UNAAF generally use in-place forces already under the combatant command of the CINC. Forces apportioned for use in making operation plans will be those projected to be actually available during the JSCP period at the level of mobilization specified for planning. CJCS approval is required when CINC-initiated OPLANs cannot be supported with apportioned resources. The CINC’s strategic concept clearly identifies the principal combat forces required by the concept of operations.

(2) A total force list includes much more than just major combat troops. Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces, as well as smaller units of combat forces, are essential to the success of any military operation. The most up-to-date guidance on combat and support capabilities and methods of employment is available in Service planning documents and directly from Service headquarters commands. Therefore, each component command develops its own total force list composed of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces (C, CS, CSS) using Service planning documents: *Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES)* in four volumes, *Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP)* and fleet planning guidance, *Marine Capabilities Plan (MCP)*, and the *Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP)* in five volumes. Essential combat and support forces that are available for planning may also be listed in the applicable JSCP supplemental instructions.

(3) The apportioned major combat forces may have been described in relatively large fighting units, such as Army division and brigade, Navy carrier battle group and surface action group, Marine expeditionary force and brigade, and Air Force wing and squadron. The final product for each component’s total force list will include detail down to unit level, i.e., battalions, squadrons, detachments, teams, etc. Certain terms describing the movement of forces are essential to understanding this step of the planning problem and later discussions of the JOPES ADP applications that planners access to build the TPFDD.

b. **Movement terms** Forces move from their home location to a specified destination in the theater. This movement involves planning by several echelons of command, possibly stops at several intermediate locations en route, and a schedule constrained
by a variety of operational requirements. These essential items of information are first considered and identified during the force planning step. Figure 6-17 illustrates the flow of resources.

(1) Key locations routinely used in deliberate planning include the following:

(a) The actual calculation of dates and the determination of locations used in deliberate planning begin with the destination (DEST), the geographic location where the force is to be employed. It is the terminal geographic location for the movement of forces in the TPFDD. To reach the DEST may require strategic and theater transportation controlled by the CINC as well as theater transportation controlled by subordinate and supporting commanders. Arrival at the DEST is not to be equated to coming into direct contact with an opposing force; rather, arrival at the DEST only satisfies the concept of operations envisioned by the CINC and subordinate commander. For example, the DEST for an Army terminal service unit may be a transshipment point many miles from direct contact with the enemy.

(b) The port of debarkation (POD) is the airport (APOD) or seaport (SPOD) within the theater of operations where the strategic transportation requirement for forces is completed, generally a large airport or seaport. It may or may not be the ultimate destination. For example, troops landing at an airfield in country Blue, the POD, may have to be transported many kilometers to their planned defensive position on the country Blue-country Red border (DEST). In some cases, the POD and DEST are the same place, e.g., an airfield in Germany may be the POD and the final destination for an

![Movement of Resources Diagram](image-url)
Air Force squadron. The port of support (POS) is the geographic location within the objective area where strategic transportation ends for air-transported supplies, resupply, and replacement personnel; sealift ammo; sealift POL; and sealift supplies and resupply. This is expected to be a distribution point; intratheater transportation from this geographic point may be required.

(c) The port of embarkation (POE) is the point where strategic air or sea transportation begins. Generally, it is the location in CONUS where strategic shipments begin. For Reserve units, the POE probably will not coincide with the home location (HOME) or mobilization station. The origin (ORIGIN) is the beginning point for a deployment move. For Active forces the ORIGIN and the POE will probably not be the same geographic location. For instance, Fort Bragg is the ORIGIN and Pope AFB is the POE for the 82d Airborne Division. Transportation to the POE is the planning responsibility of the providing commander or Service, with either organic transportation or transportation arranged by a supporting commander, such as USTRANSCOM’s component, the Army Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

(d) Several additional locations within the theater may also influence deployment; an intermediate location (ILOC) is a stopping point in the deployment movement that may be used for strategic staging, changing mode of transport, necessary cargo handling, training, or marrying forces and equipment that are being transported by split shipment. The ILOC can occur between ORIGIN and POE, between POE and POD, or between POD and DEST. A marshalling area is the location where troops are matched with pre-positioned war stocks of equipment and supplies, such as the Army War Reserve Pre-positioned Sets (AWRPS) located in Europe, Italy, Norway, Korea, Kuwait, and Qatar. These pre-positioned stocks may also be afloat as part of the Army’s AWR-3 configuration or with one of three U.S. Marine Corps Maritime Pre-positioned Ships (MPS). Another ILOC may be a strategic staging location for holding forces not yet directly committed to the theater’s military operation. Finally, the Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) is the location where units assemble before tactical employment.

(e) These locations all play important roles in the deployment of forces and supplies. Since the arrival at the DEST is the key to successful participation in the CINC’s concept, readying forces and supplies at the ORIGIN or POE, scheduling intermediate stops, and scheduling theater transportation from POD to DEST influence the planning and timing of the movement.

(2) Timing is crucial. Times are important because they offer a method to track the movement of resources and measure attainment of the CINC’s schedule for involvement of the forces and required arrival of supplies. In addition, the assignment of dates allows JOPES application software to compare simulated movement with the CINC’s desired movement schedule to determine whether the concept is transportation-feasible.
(a) The force must arrive and unload at its destination by the required delivery date (RDD) if it is to take a supportive part in the operation and contribute meaningfully to its outcome. It is not enough just to get a unit to its destination; it must arrive on or before the RDD. Arriving too early may create an unnecessary logistics support problem; too late may mean that the forces cannot affect the outcome of the operation. Another date, the CINC’s required date (CRD), has been introduced in response to the administrative shifting of the RDD that sometimes takes place during plan development to resolve simulated shortfalls. It is the original RDD, established by the CINC, and is listed in the TPFDD to give visibility to RDDs that do shift and to show the impact of later arrivals. It is intended that CRDs not be changed without CINC approval, as such changes can significantly alter the concept of operations.

(b) For the strategic move, planners begin with the RDD to determine some important interim dates. Deployment planners are interested in having units arrive at the POD between an earliest arrival date (EAD) and the latest arrival date (LAD). The EAD is the earliest a planner can allow the first element of personnel or equipment to offload from strategic lift at the POD; the LAD is the latest date for the last element to arrive at the POD and complete offloading in time to arrive at the DEST by the RDD. The unloading of the last unit is termed “closing the force.” Whatever transportation time may be required to move between the POD and DEST is the difference between LAD and RDD.

(c) At the other end of the route, the mobilization and intra-CONUS planners (the Services, force-providing organizations, and the supporting transportation demands) are primarily concerned with preparing and scheduling the forces at the HOME, mobilization site, and ORIGIN. The ready-to-load date (RLD) is the earliest date a unit is available at the origin for onward transportation to the POE. The available-to-load date (ALD) is the earliest time that the unit can begin loading at the POE. An earliest date of completion (EDC) of loading is the scheduled time that all loading is completed at the POE. The earliest departure date (EDD) is the earliest date after the ALD that the shipment is ready to depart from the POE. Theoretically, these dates would be calculated backward from the RDD after considering marshalling and assembly times, theater and strategic deployment transportation times, etc. In fact, there is seldom any slack early in the planning period; the RLD and ALD are generally the minimum time required to prepare the units and materiel and transport them to the POE. Delays here may adversely affect arrival time at DEST.

(d) In practice, planners calculate the arrival window at the POD by determining the time to complete each link in tactical, intratheater transportation. Beginning with the RDD (or CRD) set by the CINC, deployment planners determine the time it will take to get from the POD to the DEST—time both to match with split-shipped or AWRPS equipment and to perform necessary assembly. Since most units cannot fully arrive on one day, there is an EAD-LAD window from the earliest arrival of the units and/or equipment at the POD and the latest departure from the POD to the DEST that will still satisfy the RDD. In theory, subtracting the time to perform strategic lift between POE and POD
from those dates would result in the deadline required to complete assembly at the HOME/ORIGIN/POE for onward shipment. In practice, planners realize that on execution, competing demands will be made to mobilize, prepare for movement, and transport forces, equipment, and supplies. An RLD-ALD window is generally determined for the embarkation end of strategic transportation, and compromises begin to ease the impact on the final delivery date at the DEST. The possible loss of visibility of the original RDD that can result from these compromises led to the introduction of an inviolate CRD.

(3) Planners must have a clear understanding of force planning.

(a) It is easy to visualize a complicated movement of Reserve units. They may require movement from their home location (HOME) to their mobilization site and, possibly, onward to an Active base (ORIGIN) for training and marrying with equipment. Further movement may be required to the POE, where strategic transports will be met. These can become transportation planning problems even before troops and equipment leave CONUS. Such movement requirements are not limited to the Reserve Component. Active-duty units may also require intra-CONUS transportation from ORIGIN to POE. This enormous field of planning is basically the responsibility of the Services and executed through the USTRANSCOM component, MTMC. This is called mobilization planning. It can significantly affect strategic lift and, ultimately, the arrival of combat units under the CINC’s concept, and is therefore important to supported commanders. ADP applications for mobility planning are envisioned within JOPES to furnish planning tools that facilitate this crucial transportation link.

(b) Strategic deployment planning is the central focus of deliberate planning. It involves the strategic transportation of forces from POE to POD and of supplies and replacement personnel from POE to POS. Planning is done for transportation by sea and air lift assets that are apportioned to the CINC for planning. This lift is furnished by a supporting commander when the OPLAN is implemented.

(c) Within the theater, transportation may be required from a POD to the DEST. Transportation may be done in several ways, but of primary interest to the CINC is the requirement for limited theater airlift, a resource that may also be apportioned in the JSCP or limited by Service capabilities. This onward movement from POD to DEST is termed theater deployment planning and may be significant to the CINC if requirements for use of theater lift assets exceed the CINC’s theater capabilities or if the simulated intratheater movement is not scheduled to meet the RDD. Arrival of the force at the right place and time (factors that are determined by an employment scheme and the concept of operations) is the ultimate objective of the deployment.
(d) Employment planning is another area vital to the successful execution of the CINC’s concept of operations. It involves the actual use of personnel and materiel in the theater of operations. Detailed planning for employment is normally the responsibility of the subordinate commanders, such as component commanders or a joint task force commander.

(e) Overarching the mobilization, deployment, and employment planning processes is the Services’ responsibility to sustain their forces. Though such sustainment planning is not completely supportable within the current capabilities of JOPES, improvements to JOPES ADP will include applications with much more capability to support it. Sustainment involves the resupply of materiel and replacement of personnel lost in the operation.

(f) The traditional focus of deliberate planning has been on strategic deployment. Improvements in ADP hardware, application software, and planning procedures continue to expand the view and control of the CINC in deliberate planning. Requirements for JOPES ADP to deal with the full planning spectrum from initial generation of force lists in mobilization through monitoring of employment and sustainment have been identified. The scope of JOPES is discussed in Chapter 5.

c. Building the force list  Given the mission and the concept of operations to accomplish it, the component planner reviews the forces apportioned for planning and included in the CINC’s concept of operations, confirms the appropriateness of those forces, and determines the applicable CS and CSS forces from Service planning documents. The component force lists are developed with the full involvement of the supported commander. The subordinate commander submits the time-phased force list to the CINC for review and approval. By submitting the component force list, the supporting commander indicates full understanding of the concept of operations and assurance that the forces in the force list will support that concept. The CINC’s staff merges the component force lists and evaluates the resulting consolidated force list. It analyzes the consolidated force list to confirm that it is adequate to perform the mission. When the supported commander concurs with the consolidated force list, the components then add any missing information needed to deploy the forces. Planners may build a force list in different ways.

d. Planners can create a force list unit by unit, starting with the apportioned combat forces and adding all necessary CS and CSS forces identified in doctrinal publications. This is a time-consuming effort, since OPLANs can contain several thousand separately identifiable units, or force requirements, and scores of data elements for each entry are needed to plan the movement adequately. An alternative method uses force modules. These are groupings of C, CS, and CSS forces, as well as a calculated amount of sustainment. Using either method manually would take an extremely long time. Fortunately, JOPES ADP support greatly aids in building the force lists for a plan, and is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
(1) Understandably, each Active and Reserve unit in the U.S. Armed Forces today differs from the others. Even seemingly similar units within a Service may have different unit performance characteristics, various physical sizes of personnel and equipment assets, and even different unit readiness and combat capability. It is impossible to distinguish each unit separately at this stage of force planning, and no attempt is made to do so. Instead, a model is substituted, one that generally represents each different category of unit in each Service. Each model is a generic (notional), or type, unit--one that is representative of an operational capability. Nearly 8,500 type units are on file representing units ranging in size from a two-person Air Force personnel team unit to a 6,500-member nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Type units are used to build a force list line by line.

(a) To build a force list line by line requires the following unit descriptive information about the forces to be listed:

- approximate physical characteristics listed in number of personnel and weight and volume of equipment and accompanying supplies
- approximate movement characteristics in terms of self-deploying aircraft and operators, size of palletable materiel, and its ability to fit on current-inventory tactical and strategic lift platforms
- special characteristics of supplies, such as whether they are hazardous, explosive, etc., so special handling can be arranged
- unique operational characteristics that may aid in shipping less than the entire unit

(b) The unit movement information, such as ORIGIN, POE, ILOC, POD, and DEST, is needed.

(c) In addition, suggested times are introduced for RLD at the ORIGIN, ALD at the POE, and EAD and LAD at the POD. These times are determined from the expected transportation modes using apportioned strategic and tactical lift assets, planners' professional assessments of necessary loading and unloading times, marshalling and assembly times, final transport time to the DEST, and the RDD set by the CINC.

(d) In fact, when the necessary routing information is included, there are 96 separate identifiers that peacetime planners find useful in describing the movement and physical characteristics of an individual unit. Almost 75 percent of these must be entered individually.

(e) The process is further complicated by mixing the CS and CSS forces identified in Service doctrine with the combat forces. Their movement into the theater is phased to meet operational requirements of the fighting force as well as operational constraints levied by transportation.
(2) A more efficient way to build force lists is through the use of force modules. Force modules are planning and execution tools used within JOPES to link major combat units with supporting units and a minimum of 30 days’ sustaining logistics supplies. Movement for the entire package is phased to support the concept of operations. The force module concept permits rapid construction of a combat force and satisfies the long-standing need to link support and sustainment requirements with each major combat force in both deliberate planning and crisis action planning, and permits the monitoring of execution. Many force and support requirements can be added to a plan’s database with a three-character force module identifier (FMI). There are three types of force modules:

(a) The first type is the Service force module. Service force modules are built by the Service headquarters to represent the generic (notional) structure of major combat units. Each Service force module contains the combat forces, the combat service (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces required to support the combat forces, and associated sustainment for all of these for at least 30 days. Service force modules are designed to be basic building blocks to aid the planner in quickly creating force lists in both deliberate and crisis action planning. A basic library of Service force modules is maintained by the Services in the JOPES database.

(b) The second type of force module is the OPLAN-dependent force module. Like Service force modules, OPLAN-dependent force modules group combat, CS, CSS, and sustainment elements, but they are developed by the CINC to meet the specific demands of a particular OPLAN. They may begin as Service force modules that are then tailored to fit the requirements of the OPLAN in development, or they may be created by the CINC or components to fulfill a specific planning task. OPLAN-dependent force modules recognize theater-specific conditions: anticipated weather conditions, expected host-nation support contributions, expected intensity and nature of conflict, etc. OPLAN-dependent force modules are extremely useful to planners. Maintained as components of approved OPLAN TPFDDs, they reside in the JOPES deployment database and are accessible to planners for use in building TPFDDs for other plans. Because they have been tailored to specific anticipated scenarios and conditions, they are more directly applicable to similar scenarios in both deliberate and crisis action planning.

(c) The third type of force module is the force tracking force module. This force module is OPLAN-dependent and does not contain sustainment data. Force tracking force modules consist of major combat units and are required for all OPLANs.

(d) Administratively, force modules are extremely convenient for identifying and monitoring groupings of forces. They are valuable because they facilitate block manipulation of data associated with each module, display large amounts of aggregated information about the forces and cargo included in an OPLAN, and facilitate tracking of forces planned for use in various options within an OPLAN, such as the options required by adaptive planning. Both the current JSCP and JOPES procedures require use of force modules in deliberate planning.
(e) Expanding on the utility of force modules is the concept of force module packages (FMPs). These are groups of force modules oriented on specific functional capabilities (e.g., air superiority, close air support, or reconnaissance). They can facilitate even more rapid TPFDD building in deliberate planning plan development or in crisis action planning.

617. STEP 2 SUPPORT PLANNING

a. Overview. The purpose of support planning is to identify the quantities of supplies, equipment, and replacement personnel required to sustain the forces identified in Step 1, and phase their movement into the theater to support the concept of operations. Support planning determines the quantities of supply by broad category and converts them into weights and volumes that can be compared to lift capability. Thus, they become calculations of phased movements that become deployment movement requirements. The intent is not to identify the detailed levels of particular supplies, but to identify and phase into the theater the gross quantities of needed sustainment. These quantities are based on the number and types of C, CS, and CSS units to be employed in the operation. Support planning is completed when all significant supply, equipment, and personnel requirements have been determined, consolidated by the supported commander, and then entered into the TPFDD file for the plan.

(1) Sustainment capability is a function of U.S. logistics capability, inter-Service and inter-allied support, Service guidance, theater guidance, and the resulting time-phasing. Appropriate Combat Support Agencies and the General Services Administration (GSA) give the Services planning information concerning the origin and availability of non-Service-controlled materiel.

(2) The actual support calculation uses consumption rates developed and maintained by the Services under their responsibility to supply, equip, and maintain their forces assigned to combatant commanders. This calculation is generally made by the component commanders, who refer to Service and USSOCOM planning guidelines and doctrine. It is also possible for the supported commander to perform the calculations using component-supplied force lists and planning factors.

(3) Support requirements include supplies, equipment, materiel, and replacement personnel for the forces, as well as civil engineering, medical, and EPW materiel, and equipment and supplies to support the civil affairs effort.

(4) During the support planning step, planners are primarily concerned with how much strategic lift will be needed to move the support requirements. Thus, the gross estimates of supplies and replacement personnel do little more than initially determine the amount of space and number of passenger seats needed. Before the operation plan is
complete, and definitely before it can be implemented, logistics and personnel planners will attempt to define the requirements in more detail.

b. **Guidance from the CINC** The initial concept of support was developed during the concept development phase. Early in the planning the CINC gives guidance to the subordinate and supporting commands that defines the length of the operation, strategic lift availability, supply buildup policies, and anticipated supply shortages. The supported commander also gives guidance on transportation priorities, available common- and cross-serving agreements between subordinate and supporting commands, personnel attrition factors, ports of support, etc.

c. **Calculations** The computation of sustainment uses Service planning factors, or consumption rates, and the number of forces, or consumers, to be supported. The product of these factors becomes a total supply requirement, as illustrated Figure 6-18. This total must be expressed as gross movement requirements in barrels of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL); short tons or measurement tons of equipment and materiel identified by broad supply class or subclass; and numbers of personnel. These calculations are generally made by the component commanders.

![Support Planning Factors Diagram](image-url)
(1) The actual calculations are usually done using planning factors from the Services. These planning factors can be applied to numbers of people, numbers of equipment types, or numbers of recurring type units, for instance, rations: 6.8 lbs per person per day; spare parts: 25 filters per 10-18 tractors per month operating in a dusty environment; or munitions: number of high-explosive rounds per day fired by 155mm batteries in heavy rate of fire.

(2) Performed manually, the calculations for the many force records in a typical TPFDD would be overwhelming. Consumption rates vary with the class and subclass of supply, theater or area within the theater of operation, intensity of combat for different Services and time periods, etc. JOPES ADP is a great help in performing these calculations and adding the supplies to the TPFDD. Supplies are phased into the theater in increments to avoid overloading logistics support facilities and transportation. It is important to note that the key to successful support planning is the prudent choice of planning factors.

d. Definitions. Numerous terms are fundamental to an understanding of support planning and the JOPES ADP that supports it. Support requirements for deploying forces are divided into two major categories: unit-related supplies and equipment, and non-unit-related supplies and equipment. The relationships of the supply categories are shown in Figure 6-19.
(1) Unit-related supplies and equipment include a unit’s organic equipment, basic load, and additional accompanying supplies specified by the CINC.

(a) The basic load is the quantity of supplies required to be on hand within a unit. This is the materiel that makes the unit capable of engaging the enemy immediately on arrival at the DEST. The Service determines this quantity, and it is included in the Service-generated description of each type unit, indistinguishable without reference to Service documents. Some units carry no basic load, others may deploy with 3, 5, 15, 30, or 60 days of supply. When a planner selects a type unit and enters it into the OPLAN TPFDD, the unit-related supplies already included in the type unit description are added automatically to the TPFDD as well. The planner must know the days of supply and the expected supply consumption that are considered basic load and already included in the type unit description.

(b) To maintain effective contact with the enemy may require considerably more than the basic load. When a unit deploys, it is normally required to arrive with enough supplies to perform its mission without being resupplied for a stated period ranging from one to five days. The CINC defines in the concept of operations the length of time that the unit must be self-sustaining. Additional accompanying supplies extend the period supported by the basic load. The amount of additional accompanying supplies that must be added to the basic load quantities varies from unit to unit; it depends on the unit’s mission and doctrine. The quantity of additional accompanying supplies must be calculated and added to the OPLAN TPFDD for arrival with the unit. These supplies are unit specific and are readily identifiable for the specific unit.

(2) Non-unit-related supplies and equipment include all support requirements that are not in the Service-generated type unit descriptions or augmented by accompanying supplies. These supplies are not identified for a specific unit, thus the designation non-unit-related. It is useful to further divide the broad category of non-unit-related supplies into subcategories.

(a) Army War Reserve Pre-positioned Sets (AWRPS) are a forward-deployed part of the nation’s total war reserve stocks. Because strategic transportation assets are limited, especially in the early days of a deployment, pre-positioning supplies eliminates some of the competition for strategic lift. Pre-positioning is an essential sustainment asset that further bridges the time between when a unit begins to operate in the theater and when continuous resupply is established. The Army’s AWR-3 Program, the Marine Corps Maritime Pre-positioning Ships, and the Army and Air Force Afloat Pre-positioning Ships (APS) program in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean are examples of pre-positioned war materials that substantially reduce the near-term strategic lift requirement for unit equipment allowance, basic load, and additional accompanying supplies.

(b) Sustaining supplies are needed by forces to support the from the time their accompanying supplies and APF (if available) run out until the continuous resupply
pipeline opens. This is especially true if forces have deployed over long distances. The continuous resupply pipeline largely depends on sealift. Sealift could take days or weeks to begin making regular deliveries, because of the loading and unloading time at the ports, and the sailing time between them. Sustaining supplies, therefore, are normally delivered by airlift.

(c) Resupply includes all the materiel needed to sustain the forces and is the supplies necessary to replenish the consumed supplies. Quantities to supply all in-place and deploying units in the theater are computed. Resupply will be a continuous requirement as long as forces remain in an area of operations.

(d) Supply buildup includes all supplies above the consumption rate that can be delivered into the area of operations and stockpiled. The stockpile then acts as a buffer in the supply system that can continue to sustain the forces should the supply pipeline be temporarily interrupted. Supply buildup policy is defined in the concept of support in the CINC’s Strategic Concept. For example, the policy may specify that a 15-day supply buildup of all supply classes be in place at the end of 30 days.

(e) Replacement personnel are categorized as a non-unit-related requirement that is designed to keep all units daily at 100 percent combat effectiveness. The requirement for replacement personnel is computed using Service attrition factors at various rates for noncombat losses and intensities of combat. Replacements are time-phased into replacement centers within the objective area at regular intervals. On the other hand, filler personnel are individuals of suitable grade and skill initially required to bring a unit to its authorized strength.

(3) The ADP support for deliberate planning generates the strategic deployment of supply requirements to a port of support (POS), which is essentially to supplies what a POD is to forces--the terminus of strategic movement. The POS is also significant because some supplies, POL and ammunition for instance, require special facilities or cannot be offloaded at some ports without significant disruption of port activity. From each POS, supplies will be made available to designated units. For each place where their forces will be located, component planners designate a POS for air cargo, general sea cargo, POL, and munitions. From the POS the responsibility for onward transport may fall to the component commander, depending on how the CINC sets up intratheater supply through his directive authority.

(4) The terms “classes” and “subclasses” of supply have been used. The hundreds of thousands of items in the Federal supply system are categorized in one of ten broad classes. Figure 6-20 lists these classes. It further indicates the magnitude of the
Classes and Subclasses of Supply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS I</th>
<th>Symbols</th>
<th>Subclasses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Subsistence | ![milk icon] | A - NONPERISHABLE  
C - COMBAT RATIONS  
R - REFRIGERATED  
S - NONREFRIGERATED  
W - WATER |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS II</th>
<th>Symbols</th>
<th>Subclasses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Clothing, individual eqpt., tools, admin. supplies | ![gun icon] | A - AIR  
B - GROUND SUPPORT MATERIEL  
E - GENERAL SUPPLIES  
F - CLOTHING  
G - ELECTRONICS  
M - WEAPONS  
T - INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS III</th>
<th>Symbols</th>
<th>Subclasses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Petroleum, oils, lubricants | ![barrel icon] | A - POL FOR AIRCRAFT  
W - POL FOR SURFACE VEHICLES  
P - PACKAGED POL |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS IV</th>
<th>Symbols</th>
<th>Subclasses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Construction materiel | ![scaffolding icon] | A - CONSTRUCTION  
B - BARRIER |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS V</th>
<th>Symbols</th>
<th>Subclasses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Ammunition | ![munition icon] | A - AIR DELIVERY  
W - GROUND |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS VI</th>
<th>Symbols</th>
<th>Subclasses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Personal demand items | ![person icon] | A - AIR  
B - GROUND SUPPORT MATERIEL  
D - ADMIN. VEHICLES  
G - ELECTRONICS  
K - TACTICAL VEHICLES  
L - MISSILES  
M - WEAPONS  
N - SPECIAL WEAPONS  
T - INDUSTRIAL MATERIEL  
X - AIRCRAFT ENGINES |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS VII</th>
<th>Symbols</th>
<th>Subclasses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Major end items: racks, pylons, tracked vehicles, etc. | ![racks icon] | A - AIR  
B - GROUND SUPPORT MATERIEL  
D - ADMIN. VEHICLES  
G - ELECTRONICS  
K - TACTICAL VEHICLES  
L - MISSILES  
M - WEAPONS  
N - SPECIAL WEAPONS  
T - INDUSTRIAL MATERIEL  
X - AIRCRAFT ENGINES |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS VIII</th>
<th>Symbols</th>
<th>Subclasses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Medical materials | ![medical icon] | A - MEDICAL MATERIEL  
B - BLOOD/FLUIDS |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS IX</th>
<th>Symbols</th>
<th>Subclasses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Repair parts | ![repair parts icon] | A - AIR  
B - GROUND SUPPORT MATERIEL  
D - ADMIN. VEHICLES  
B - ELECTRONICS  
K - TACTICAL VEHICLES  
L - MISSILES  
M - WEAPONS  
N - SPECIAL WEAPONS  
T - INDUSTRIAL MATERIEL  
X - AIRCRAFT ENGINES |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS X</th>
<th>Symbols</th>
<th>Subclasses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Material for nonmilitary programs | ![ca icon] | A - AIR  
B - GROUND SUPPORT MATERIEL  
D - ADMIN. VEHICLES  
B - ELECTRONICS  
K - TACTICAL VEHICLES  
L - MISSILES  
M - WEAPONS  
N - SPECIAL WEAPONS  
T - INDUSTRIAL MATERIEL  
X - AIRCRAFT ENGINES |

Figure 6-20
planning problem that must result in calculations, even in general terms, of the supplies required to first prepare an armed force for an operation and then continue to sustain it. Deployment planning focuses on very broad categories, but it does subdivide the 10 classes into a total of just over 40 subclasses. For instance, ammunition is subdivided into ammo-air and ammo-ground; subsistence is divided into subclasses for in-flight rations, refrigerated rations, nonrefrigerated rations, combat rations, and water.

618. **STEP 3: NBC DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR PLANNING**

   a. **NBC defense planning**

      (1) Enemy use of NBC weapons has the potential to significantly affect U.S. operations. The enemy’s capability presents major defensive problems and requires indepth study and detailed planning.

      (2) The component commands submit their NBC defense requirements to the supported command. Service component commanders’ plans for operations in a nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) environment are consolidated into a single joint stand-alone TPFDD file, separate from the OPLAN TPFDD. Guidance for NBC defense operations is found in Appendix 2 to Annex C in CJCSM 3122.03). Planning considerations include enemy NBC capabilities; friendly NBC defensive capabilities; participation of allies in NBC defense operations; related assumptions; shipment, intratheater receipt, prepositioning, issue, and accountability of NBC defense equipment; subordinate tasks; and procedures and responsibilities for furnishing NBC defensive logistics support to allied forces, if applicable.

   b. **Nuclear planning**

      (1) **Introduction** The possible proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world presents the joint planner with new problems. Nuclear planning considers the possibility that nuclear weapons may be introduced in combat; planners must assess the impact that will have on their operations. Because the use of nuclear weapons in any military operation would be so influential, there is a temptation to make one of two tacit assumptions during planning: nuclear weapons will not be used at all or nuclear weapons can be quickly employed by friendly forces if the need arises. Either assumption can be dangerous. The joint planner must work with a realistic appreciation of both the possibility of the employment of nuclear weapons and the CINC’s lack of effective control over the decision for their initial use. Nuclear planning guidance issued at the unified or combined command level is usually based on political policies. It stems from national-level considerations, but is influenced by the military mission. Nuclear planning is conducted by the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) in coordination with U.S. combatant commanders and certain allied commanders.
(2) Guidance for documenting the planning for nuclear operations is found in CJCSI 3122.11. There are several areas to consider: nuclear initiation, assumptions, enemy nuclear capabilities and defense options, friendly nuclear assigned support tasks, missions, concept of nuclear operations, weapon allocations, targeting, subordinate tasks, limitations, supply, storage and transportation, support for allied forces, command and control, including release procedures, and nuclear options and reconnaissance operations to support nuclear options.

619. **STEP 4 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING**

a. **Overview of transportation planning**

(1) The supported commander does transportation planning. This step and two others outline the procedures to solve the complex strategic movement problem. The task is to simulate the strategic movement of requirements generated by component planners during the force planning and support planning steps using organic lift and the apportioned common-user strategic transportation resources. The goal in transportation planning is to produce a feasible strategic transportation movement in support of the CINC’s plan, a very difficult and complex thing to do. It is an iterative process: if the simulation of movement indicates that the forces and nonunit supplies cannot be moved in time, planners identify the problems, evaluate their impact on the overall plan, incorporate solutions, and, if necessary, simulate the strategic move again. Figure 6-21 illustrates the relationships between the three steps: transportation planning, shortfall identification, and transportation feasibility analysis.

(2) As Figure 6-17 illustrates, the strategic movement is only part of a complex logistics problem: units must travel from home or ORIGIN to POE, supplies must be positioned and delivered on time to the POE, combat force loading must be done according to the type of offloading expected (amphibious assault, airdrop, administrative, etc.), and there are always competing demands for lift resources and support facilities. Transportation feasibility should not be confused with overall plan feasibility. Strategic transportation is only one element in the picture of overall plan feasibility; transportation from ORIGIN to POE, and POD to DEST, must be available as well as the actual capability to furnish the nonunit supply requirements calculated in the support planning step.

b. Before the iterative transportation planning process can begin, all force and nonunit records must be entered into the TPFDD. Each entry equates to a movement requirement; if not all the requirements are known, their movement cannot be simulated to determine feasibility and make adjustments as required.
(1) Component commanders have already considered the competing demands for limited strategic transportation; limitations of the support capabilities at intermediate locations along the route; limitations of the personnel processing, materiel handling, and materiel storage capabilities at the POE and POD; capabilities of theater transportation between POD and DEST; and required transport time between POD and DEST, etc. In concept development, component planners determined key logistic elements, such as the size of forces, equipment, and nonunit supplies; probable ORIGIN, POE, POD, POS, marshalling and assembly requirements, and DEST; the expected timing to reach each stop along the way, etc. Phasing of movement was planned, and the CINC may have already issued guidelines to divide apportioned lift resources among the components.

(2) At this point in deployment planning, a completed movement plan considers competition for limited lift assets, mobility support facilities, and priorities of the CINC to support the concept of operations. USTRANSCOM reviews the TPFDD file with CINC-assigned PODs and identifies preferred POEs.

(3) The Service component planners designate as many actual units as they can to replace the generic (notional) type units in the force list, taking into account the CINC-assigned POD and USTRANSCOM’s preferred POE, and identify any support problems...
to the supported commander. This process of assigning actual units to force requirements is known as sourcing.

(a) Army sourcing of CONUS-based forces begins in force selection by USACOM’s Army component, the Forces Command (FORSCOM).

(b) The Air Force distributes its apportioned force list to major commands and separate operating agencies to source combat and support units; the War Mobilization Plan, Volume 3, the Air Force planning document, identifies real-world forces available for deployment, employment, and redeployment in support of listed OPLANs.

(c) At this stage in planning, the Navy sources only a few requirements. The OPLAN is a planning document covering the period specified by the JSCP, while specific Navy resources that would be used in the plan are highly mobile. For example, a carrier battle group that is in Norfolk today may be in the Indian Ocean a month later. Generally, the Navy will complete sourcing only during crisis action planning, when operation plans are converted to OPORDs.

(d) Sourced requirements in the TPFDD file contain the same kinds of detailed data for actual real-world units that they previously contained for the generic (notional) type units.

(4) The TPFDD is modeled using the Joint Flow Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST); that is, the strategic deployment of all transportation requirements, forces and supplies, is simulated reflecting the deployment. The LAD at the POD or POS, as applicable, was established for each requirement when TPFDD record entries were completed. The movement simulation software in JFAST calculates a feasible available to load date (FALD) for each requirement at its POE, if the requirement requires land movement provided by the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). JFAST also provides an arrival/unloading date at the POD or POS, given the factors that influence the movement of forces and nonunit supplies, and the data in the TPFDD. The transportation feasibility of the OPLAN is determined by comparing the arrival/unloading dates reflected by JFAST to the LAD for TPFDD, checking to see that there is sufficient port throughput capability, and looking to see if there is sufficient common-user airlift and sealift capacity to move the force and its support. If these conditions are met, the plan can be judged to be grossly transportation-feasible.

(5) When it is determined that the expected arrival of forces and supplies at the DEST does not conform to CINC requirements, a shortfall is said to exist. The shortfall may be attributed to any or a combination of many causes, but the shortfalls discussed here are transportation shortfalls. The realization that a shortfall exists may come from a detailed computer simulation, manual calculations by skilled logisticians, or a “best guess” by an operation-oriented planner. The earlier a shortfall is discovered, the earlier planners can explore solutions and correct the plan.
620. RETROGRADE, NEO, AND MEDEVAC PLANNING

a. **Introduction** Although not included as a distinct step in plan development, the requirement to transport personnel and materiel from the theater of operations requires close coordination. The movement of equipment requiring repair, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and medical evacuation out of the combat theater are also concerns of the logistics planner. Recent experience with transportation simulation has demonstrated that the transportation requirements for these categories are far more of a problem than originally anticipated. The expectation of “more than enough airplanes to haul stuff back to the States” is no longer accepted without considerable planning effort to support it. To consolidate medical evacuation, NEO, and other retrograde requirements, a separate retrograde TPFDD is usually created.

b. The Department of State is primarily responsible for NEO and determines whether and when NEO operations are executed. The combatant commands are responsible for furnishing support and conducting NEO operations. DOD Directive 5100.51, “Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad,” gives guidance on protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens. The supported commander develops time-phased NEO requirements in coordination with the Department of State and USCINCTRANS. These requirements are entered into the OPLAN TPFDD or the retrograde TPFDD, if developed.

1. The joint planner preparing NEO plans works in coordination with the Department of State and the embassy in the country concerned. Biennially, the Department of State submits to the Department of Defense an estimate of the number of Americans in each country, their status, and transportation requirements at each alert condition. The Department of State alert system is graduated from warning to imminent unrest/hostile action.

2. The Department of State has a crisis response organization to monitor and advise on NEO. The operations center keeps 24-hour watch on world conditions; the staff includes a military representative. The regional bureaus and country desks monitor specific activities within their geographic areas of responsibility. A task force working group of national agencies, called the Washington Liaison Group, may be established to plan and conduct operations during heightened alert conditions. The embassy in-country team, made up of the ambassador and staff, is the focal point for combatant command coordination of NEO planning.

3. A Department of State request for assistance generally does not come until an alert condition of imminent unrest/hostile actions exists or host-nation and civil channels are not available to conduct NEO.
621. **STEP 5C SHORTFALL IDENTIFICATION**

a. Shortfall identification, like transportation planning, does not occur at only one point in deliberate planning. The supported commander should continually identify shortfalls throughout the planning process and, where possible, should resolve them by early coordination and conference with component commanders and supporting commanders. This step focuses on identifying and resolving transportation shortfalls highlighted by the deployment simulation conducted during transportation planning.

b. Shortfalls are identified in a variety of ways; the computer-simulated movement performed in transportation planning, however, identifies the simulated late arrival of forces and nonunit records. Reports generated during the computer simulation also identify reasons for the late arrivals: shortage of lift resources, overloaded mobility support facilities, excessive requirements for intratheater lift, etc.

   (1) Planners make reasonable corrections or adjustments to the movement requirements. For example, analysis might show that shortfalls are caused by inadequate materiel-handling capacity. Planners could initiate a solution by rescheduling shipments when the POE is not operating at full capacity or identifying an alternate POE for some TPFDD movement requirements. They should restrict adjustments to those that will not affect the CINC’s concept of operations or concept of support.

   (2) Planners identify unresolved shortfalls for corrective action by higher-level decision-makers, or those that must be resolved with other commanders by compromise or mutual agreement. The CINC alone approves changes that affect the concept of operations or the concept of support.

c. In conjunction with subordinate and supporting commanders, planners may use any one or a combination of the following alternatives to resolve transportation shortfalls:

   - change priority of force or nonunit cargo records
   - adjust POEs, PODs, routing, and timing
   - change mode or source of strategic lift
   - adjust pre-positioned forces or resources
   - enhance facility capabilities with new construction or upgrading;
   - seek additional assets
   - conclude contractual agreements or inter-Service support agreements
   - arrange for host-nation support
   - as a last resort, redefine the concept of operations

d. Situations may occur when the identified shortfall simply cannot be resolved (inadequate forces or transportation apportioned in the JSCP or furnished by the Services to accomplish the assigned task) and no alternative within the CINC’s authority would result in a satisfactory solution.
(1) In such a situation, the shortfall and other critical limiting factors and their impact on mission accomplishment, the associated risk of not resolving the shortfall, the threat level that apportioned resources can meet, and any recommended change in the task assignment are submitted to the CJCS for resolution.

(2) However, plan development based on apportioned resources continues; OPLAN completion is not delayed pending resolution of shortfalls or limiting factors. Paragraph 10 of the Plan Summary will assess the impact of shortfalls and limiting factors and list the tasks that cannot be accomplished. Planners submit a separate TPFDD identifying shortfall force and unit cargo records.

(3) When planners identify a problem that adversely affects the OPLAN, they act immediately either to correct it or to coordinate its resolution. Problems get more difficult to handle the longer they go unresolved. If numerous shortfalls are left for resolution until this step in planning, the work required to resolve them becomes complicated and frustrating.

e. The CINC usually calls a plan development conference to develop initial closure profiles and to assess the feasibility of closure to meet the CINC’s concept of operations. Here planners consider shortfalls unresolved by the planning staffs, explore solutions, and assess resulting risks. All subordinate and supporting commands attend the conference at the invitation of the supported commander. This is not the first time the planning staffs of supporting commanders have coordinated on the development of the plan. It may be the first time that they make hard decisions and compromises to resolve crucial, previously unresolvable shortfalls.

622. STEP 6 TRANSPORTATION FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS

a. Transportation planning has been going on long before the planner reaches this step in plan development. Hasty analyses that manually simulated the transportation movement were performed as early as the staff estimate step in the concept development phase; repeatedly, shortfalls have been identified and resolved without fanfare. In the transportation planning and shortfall identification steps, planners collected and added information to the computer database, identified shortfalls, and implemented the formal process for handling the unresolved shortfalls.

b. Strategic transportation is formally analyzed in Step 6. After the computer simulation and, possibly, several iterations of the transportation steps, the result is the conclusion by the CINC that the OPLAN is grossly transportation-feasible and ready for TPFDD refinement. There is no finite definition for “grossly transportation-feasible.”
Computer modeling of the TPFDD can demonstrate whether or not the CINC has sufficient strategic lift capability apportioned; and whether or not POEs and PODs have sufficient throughput capacity to handle the planned flow of forces and their sustainment.

623. **STEP 7: TPFDD REFINEMENT**

   a. For OPLAN development, the TPFDD refinement process consists of several discrete steps or phases that may be conducted sequentially or concurrently, in whole or in part. These steps support other elements of the plan development phase: force planning, support planning, transportation planning, and shortfall identification. These plan development steps are collectively referred to as TPFDD refinement. The normal TPFDD refinement process consists of sequentially refining forces, logistics, and transportation data to develop a TPFDD file that supports a feasible and adequate plan. Database size and time constraints may cause overlapping of several refinement phases. The TPFDD file for regional plans is normally refined using two refinement conferences, a combined Forces and Logistics Conference, and a Transportation Conference. TPFDD files for MRC OPLANs may be refined at three separate conferences (Forces, Logistics, and Transportation Conferences) as are TPFDD files for global plans. Refinement conferences may be combined or omitted as required to provide for the most efficient refinement of either a single OPLAN or a family of OPLANs developed for a common planning task. For regional plans, that decision is made by the supported commander in consultation with the Joint Staff and USTRANSCOM. For global planning, the decision will be made by the Joint Staff in coordination with the combatant commands. The supported commander conducts conferences for regional plans in conjunction with USTRANSCOM and in coordination with the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff conducts conferences for global plans in conjunction with USTRANSCOM and in coordination with the combatant commanders.

   1) **Forces refinement.** This initial phase of TPFDD refinement is conducted in coordination with supported and supporting commanders, the Services, the Joint Staff, and other supporting agencies. USCINTRANS normally hosts forces refinement conferences at the request of the supported commander. The purpose of forces refinement is to confirm that forces are sourced and tailored within JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance; to assess the adequacy of CS and CSS force planning; and to resolve shortfalls. USTRANSCOM furnishes sealift and airlift capability estimates based on lift apportionment throughout the process to ensure transportation feasibility.

   a) Before any forces refinement conference, supported commanders update force lists against the latest TUCHA file, which contains the type unit information accessed by JOPES application software. The Services update the TUCHA file quarterly to reflect current force structure and data.
(b) Movement requirements to compensate for shortfalls of pre-positioned equipment are furnished to the supported commander by the appropriate component command before any forces refinement conference.

(c) Before any forces refinement conference, the Services ensure that the Logistics Factors File and Civil Engineering Support Planning File reflect current data. These files are OPLAN-specific and interface with other JOPES applications to generate TPFDD requirements.

(d) Before any forces refinement conference, the Services ensure that the latest quarterly update of the Service Force Module Library has been completed.

(e) Forces TPFDD files are sourced by sourcing agencies at least 30 days (or as specified in coordinating instructions) before any forces refinement conference. Joint Staff J-3, as functional database manager, monitors and facilitates the transfer of data, as required.

2 Logistics refinement This second phase of TPFDD refinement is primarily conducted by the Service logistics sourcing agencies, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and CINC components under the overall direction of the Joint Staff and/or the supported commander. USCINTRANS normally hosts logistics refinement conferences for the Joint Staff and the supported commander. The purpose of logistics refinement is to ensure firm sourcing of logistics requirements per JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance and to assess (by the Joint Staff and the supported commander) the adequacy of resources furnished by support planning, including complete medical and civil engineering planning.

(a) The logistics community begins refinement of the TPFDD with a completely sourced and adequate force list TPFDD furnished by the supported commander.

(b) Before logistics refinement conferences, the CINCs, Services, and defense agencies involved develop and/or source facilities and materiel support requirements.

(c) Before the start of the logistics phase, Services and supported commanders ensure that the appropriate planning factors are mutually agreeable and used throughout the logistics refinement process.

(d) During logistics refinement conferences, the CINCs, Services, and defense agencies involved resolve problems regarding non-unit-related personnel, cargo, retrograde, medical evacuee, and resupply records, including shortfalls.

(e) Before a logistics refinement conference, USCINTRANS assesses initial common-user transportation feasibility in coordination with the supported commander and the Joint Staff, and gives the results to the conference participants. At the conclusion of the logistics refinement conference, USCINTRANS reassesses transportation feasibility.
ity for the supported commander to ensure that the TPFDD is ready for transportation component command flow.

(3) Transportation refinement. Transportation refinement is conducted by USCINCTRANS in coordination with the supported CINC, Joint Staff, Services, and other CINCs. USCINCTRANS normally hosts transportation refinement conferences. The purpose of transportation refinement is to adjust the flow of OPLANs to ensure that they are transportation-feasible and are consistent with JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance.

(a) Transportation refinement begins with the supported commander giving a sourced TPFDD file to USCINCTRANS for transportation flow.

(b) During the transportation conference, participants resolve transportation-related problems, as well as coordinate combined transportation requirements and shortfalls. Movement tables are furnished and the supported commander determines whether the closure profile is consistent with his concept of operations.

b. USTRANSCOM assesses the gross transportation feasibility of the OPLAN when force and logistics TPFDD refinement is completed. If a plan is determined to be grossly transportation-feasible at that stage, the Joint Staff in coordination with the supported commander may consider the OPLAN “effective for planning.” This concept recognizes that the work to date is valid and current and could be used for execution before submitting the final OPLAN for CJCS approval. Designation as effective for planning is predicated on the fact that the CINC’s Strategic Concept for the plan has received CJCS approval, sustainment requirements have been generated, and the check for gross transportation feasibility indicated the plan was transportation-feasible.

c. The supported commander, in coordination with the Joint Staff and USCINCTRANS, publishes refinement guidance in the TPFDD LOI prepared at the beginning of the plan development phase of deliberate planning.

(1) To enhance the flexibility and utility of the JOPES database, TPFDD data is intensively managed and updated. This is done to ensure database accuracy to facilitate rapid conversion to an OPORD in crisis action planning. This intensive management includes replacing sourced units that are changed or deactivated, updating the TUCHA and other standard reference files, and updating force lists based on JSCP changes to Service force structure.

(2) Normally, representatives of the supported commander, supporting commanders, the Joint Staff, Services, defense agencies, and components attend refinement conferences.

(3) Completed TPFDD files are normally made available to refinement participants through USCINCTRANS no less than 30 days before refinement conferences.
Medical working files, personnel working files, planning factors files, ports of support files, unit consumption factors files, and control files will be submitted with the TPFDD file.

(4) The supported commander certifies that the TPFDD file is ready for refinement.

624. **STEP 8: PLAN DOCUMENTATION**

a. **Definition.** Plan documentation is the final step in the plan development phase of deliberate planning. The objective is to document the operation plan in JOPES format for submission to the CJCS for final review and distribution to the JPEC. The fully documented plan, including its refined TPFDD, is an operation plan in complete format (OPLAN).

(1) The OPLAN includes a summary, the basic plan, a series of detailed annexes, and other administrative documents describing the CINC’s concept in great detail. The basic plan describes the situation, mission, plan of execution, and administration and logistics concepts, and identifies the CINC’s plan for command and control.

(2) The annexes give an exhaustive treatment of the basic subjects: commands supporting the plan (task organization), intelligence, operations, logistics, personnel, and a multitude of other vital subjects. The annexes are further expanded by a long list of appendices that contain an even more detailed statement of the CINC’s concept for specific elements of the plan. CJCSI 3122.04, the classified supplement to JOPES Volume II, contains guidance for preparing many of the classified annexes and appendixes.

(3) Information gathered by the planning staff during the entire deliberate planning process is used for plan documentation. The actual writing of individual elements of the plan need not wait until this step; it begins when there is enough assembled information for the particular topic. The CINC’s Strategic Concept prepared during the concept development phase may have been a substantial beginning to OPLAN documentation.
Information on the details of particular annexes that was not included in the CINC’s Strategic Concept is now developed and collected for the final OPLAN document.

(4) CJCSI 3122.03 (JOPES Volume II) contains administrative guidance and formats for the OPLAN. Figure 6-22 shows the major elements of an OPLAN and a list of annexes.

(5) The documentation of the OPLAN reflects the latest changes to the TPFDD resulting from the refinement process. Planners often make changes that are absolutely necessary to close the force. While the CINC or other appropriate members of the staff approved them, it is possible that these changes altered the original concept of operations. The documentation step is the final opportunity to meld the computer description of the operation, manifested in the TPFDD, with its written description.
b. The documentation step includes not only preparing the written package but also producing the TPFDD updated by the refinement process. Supporting commands and agencies that receive the plan can review the database on-line via GCCS. If the plan is sent to an organization that does not have access to the necessary JOPES ADP capabilities, selected information can be extracted from the TPFDD and included in the written plan. The Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) is just such a printed computer product that displays extracts of specific data from the TPFDD file. The TPFDL may be included as Appendix 1 to Annex A of the OPLAN.

PLANNING REVIEW PHASE

625. PLAN REVIEW PHASE

Reference: Joint Pub 5-03.1, JOPES Volume I to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01 DJCS-438-95, 5 April 1995, Plan Review Guide
Joint Administrative Instruction 5204.01E DJSM-438-95, Plan Review Guide

a. **Introduction** In this phase, the Joint Staff performs or coordinates a final review of operation plans submitted by the combatant CINCs. It is a formal review of the entire operation plan. Approval of the plan is the signal to subordinate and supporting commands to develop their plans in support of the CINC’s concept. The supporting commanders don’t wait until the plan is approved before beginning to develop their supporting plans; they have been involved in doing this while the CINC has been building the plan.

b. **Sources of plans for review** The CJCS has statutory responsibility for reviewing contingency plans. By this authority, the Joint Staff reviews plans from the following sources:

- OPLANs, CONPLANS, and Functional Plans submitted by the CINCs:
  - new plans in response to JSCP or CJCS task assignments
  - changes to existing plans
  - existing plans recommended for continuation
  - existing plans recommended for cancellation
- bilateral military plans and planning studies
- military plans of international treaty organizations
- other OPLANs, CJCS-designated or requested by a Service Chief or CINC
c. **Types of review.** The Joint Staff and JPEC conducts two types of reviews as reflected in Figure 6-23

(1) **Concept review** is the final step in the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The CINC’s Strategic Concept is reviewed for adequacy, feasibility, validity of assumptions, compliance with CJCS guidance, consistency with joint doctrine, and acceptability with regard to expected costs and military and political portability. CJCS concept review is discussed in detail in paragraph 613 of this publication and in Chapter IV of Joint Pub 5-03.1 to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01, JOPES Volume 1.

(2) **Final plan review** is conducted during the Plan Review Phase of the deliberate planning process and is applicable to all operation plans. It is a formal review of the entire plan, including TPFDD, updated medical working file, and appropriate civil engineering support planning files, if applicable. When an operation plan is approved, it is effective for execution when directed.

d. **Review criteria** Approval of the operation plan during final review depends on whether it satisfies the CJCS task assignment and demonstrates the effective use of appropriated resources. This is summarized as adequacy and feasibility. In addition, operation plans are reviewed for consistency with joint doctrine and acceptability.
(1) The review for adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations are capable of satisfying the task assigned in the JSCP. The review assesses the validity of the assumptions and compliance with CJCS guidance.

(2) The review for feasibility determines whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished using available resources. The primary factors considered are whether the resources apportioned to the CINC for planning by the JSCP and Service planning documents are being used effectively or whether they are being exceeded.

(3) Operation plans incorporate appropriate joint doctrine as stated in approved and final draft or test publications contained in the Joint Doctrine Publication System. Incorporation of appropriate joint doctrine when preparing operation plans streamlines adaptation of operation plans to specific crises in crisis action planning and facilitates execution of operations during all phases and operations for crisis resolution.

(4) The review for acceptability ensures that plans are proportional and worth the expected costs. It joins with the criterion of feasibility in ensuring that the mission can be accomplished with available resources and adds the dimension that the plan can be accomplished without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. Using this criterion, the plans are also reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with domestic and international law, including the Law of War, and are militarily and politically supportable.

e. **CJCS action** Operation plans submitted to the CJCS for review are referred to the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J-7, which conducts and coordinates the final plan review. Other Joint Staff directorates, the Services, and defense agencies are consulted as required.

(1) **Review comments** are categorized as follows:

   (a) **Execution-critical** comments are major deficiencies that negatively affect the capability of the plan to meet the JSCP objective and may prevent execution of the plan as written. Examples include such items as failure to meet assigned tasks, deviations from joint policy, and major logistics shortfalls.

   (b) **Substantive** comments are less significant deficiencies that include deviations from CJCS guidance or JOPES formatting, or significant errors involving the TPFDD. These deficiencies would not prevent execution of the plan.

   (c) **Administrative** comments are offered for clarity, accuracy, and consistency. They include corrections for such items as outdated references, improper terminology, and other minor errors.
(2) Reviews are processed under the provisions of JSI 3140.01. The review should be completed within 60 days of referral. The Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if circumstances warrant.

(3) Review results are forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum (or message) stating that the plan is given one of the following dispositions:

   (a) Approved (effective for execution, when directed). Any critical shortfalls within plans that cannot be resolved by the supported commander will be outlined within the review comments and the approval memorandum.

   (b) Disapproved.

f. **Post-review actions**

(1) Within 30 days of receipt of the CJCS review results memorandum, the supported commander sends a message to the CJCS, stating his intentions concerning incorporating all execution-critical comments. A formal change incorporating CJCS action-critical comments to correct resolvable items must be submitted to the CJCS with 60 days of receipt of the review results. Substantive comments must be incorporated into the first change to the operation plan or by the next CJCS review.

(2) Within 15 days of receipt of the CJCS review results memorandum, the supported commander sends a message to the component commands notifying them of

   (a) operation plan approval status;

   (b) operation plans replaced, deleted, or changed as a result of CJCS review; and

   (c) component commands’ responsibilities to notify supporting commands and agencies of operation plan effectiveness and tasks.

(3) Within 15 days of receipt of the supported command’s operation plan review notification message, component commanders send a message to all supporting commands and Service agencies who are assigned tasks within the plan, relaying operation plan status and effectiveness.

(4) When a formal change is received, the Joint Staff reviews it to verify incorporation of CJCS comments. The scope of the review is determined case by case.

(5) The supported commander normally reviews and approves supporting plans prepared by subordinate and supporting commanders and other agencies. Supported
commanders advise the Joint Staff when issues from these reviews cannot be resolved between the commanders concerned.

SUPPORTING PLANS PHASE

626. SUPPORTING PLANS PHASE

Reference: Joint Pub 5-03.1, JOPES Volume I, to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01

a. During this final phase of the deliberate planning process, the supported commander directs the preparation and submission of supporting plans. These deal with mobilization, deployment, and employment. Paragraph 3 of the operation plan and paragraph 3 of the Plan Summary clearly document the task assignments. As required by the CINC’s task assignment, component commanders, joint task force commanders, supporting commanders, or other agencies develop supporting plans. As shown Figure 6-24 many of these commanders in turn assign their subordinates the task of preparing additional supporting plans. As an extreme example, a local unit-recall roster ordering an individual Service member to report for duty in case of a contingency can be considered a supporting plan.

b. Chapter 1 of Joint Pub 5-03.1, JOPES Volume 1, to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01, contains specific instructions for assigning discrete plan identification numbers (PIDs) to every operation plan entered into the JOPES system. Supporting plans are assigned a PID identical to that of the supported plan. In some cases, however, a command is required to perform essentially the same actions to support two or more supported commander’s plans. In these situations, the supporting commander may prepare a single, omnibus plan rather than multiple supporting plans that restate identical material. The supporting plan summary lists the plans it supports, and the supporting plan PID is assigned without regard to the PIDs of the plans it supports.

c. Employment plans normally are the responsibility of the commander who will direct the forces when the plan is converted into an OPORD and executed. In many cases, however, the politico-military situation cannot be clearly predicted, so detailed employment planning may be delayed until circumstances require it.

d. Supporting plans, when required by the supported commander, are submitted by the supporting command or agency within 60 days after CJCS approval of the supported plan. Information in the supported plan need not be repeated in the supporting plan unless the supported commander so directs. In the absence of Joint Staff instructions to the contrary, the supported commander will review and approve supporting plans. The CJCS
may be asked to resolve issues that arise during the review of supporting plans, and the Joint Staff, on behalf of the CJCS, can review any supporting plan.

**JOPES ADP SUPPORT FOR PLANNING**

**627. INTRODUCTION** The JOPES deliberate planning process would be unacceptably slow, unresponsive, and inflexible without the support of JOPES automated data processing (ADP). In the deliberate planning process, planners develop, analyze, refine, review, and maintain joint operation plans and prepare supporting plans using JOPES ADP. It is also used in crisis action planning to tailor and refine existing operation plans to produce executable OPORDs, or rapidly develop wholly new COAs and work them into executable OPORDs, in response to contingencies as they arise. In deliberate planning, JOPES ADP helps primarily in the plan development phase to build and flow the force list, calculate and flow nonunit cargo and personnel required to sustain that force,
complete specialized planning such as civil engineering and medical support, and test for gross transportation feasibility. The product of this process is the TPFDD, a transportation-feasible database containing all the forces, materiel, and personnel required to execute and support the CINC’s concept of operations, phased into the area of operations at the places and times required by the CINC’s concept. The TPFDD can be thought of as an expression of the CINC’s concept of operations through the scheduled deployment of the forces and sustainment required to execute it. Throughout the planning process, planners have access to several applications programs first to initialize the TPFDD (create the database), then to add forces, then support, then transportation planning data. During this process the TPFDD grows. Once the TPFDD is built, JOPES ADP helps refine it before and during the refinement conferences. JOPES ADP supports plan review, the development of supporting plans, and TPFDD maintenance to keep the database current.

628. JOPES FILES. The JOPES application programs accessed by the planner while building the TPFDD draw information from numerous data files. Standard reference files, several of which are listed in Figures 6-25 and 6-26 contain basic, relatively imperishable data required to build any TPFDD. Planning and execution files and support files also furnish data for manipulation by JOPES application programs. The user generates many of these through JOPES application programs. Most standard reference files are plan-independent; that is, the data they contain are not plan-specific, but are valid for generating any plan. Such files as the TUCHA, GEOFILE, and CHSTR are plan-independent. Plan-unique files contain data valid only for a specific plan. Most plan-unique files are created by JOPES applications while building the TPFDD, and information is drawn from them by various JOPES applications to generate plan-specific TPFDD data. Figure 6-27 lists several examples of plan-unique files. The TPFDD itself is the ultimate plan-unique file.

629. JOPES/GCCS ADP FOR FORCE PLANNING

a. Unit movement characteristics

(1) Information on movement characteristics of a type (notional) unit is contained in the Type Unit Data File (TUCHA). The acronym “TUCHA” comes from the previous name of the file, Type Unit Characteristics File. The TUCHA describes the capabilities of each type unit in narrative form and defines the unit in terms of total personnel; numbers requiring transportation; categories of cargo in the unit; weight of equipment and accompanying supplies; volume of equipment categorized as bulk, outsize, oversize, or non-air-transportable; and numbers and dimensions of individual units of equipment. The Services maintain the file and update it quarterly.
**JOPES ADP STANDARD REFERENCE FILES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>APORTS</strong></th>
<th>Aerial Ports and Air Operating Bases File</th>
<th>• Airfield planning factors, e.g., throughput capacities for free-world air facilities, runway length &amp; width, weight-bearing capacity, A/C parking space, fuel &amp; cargo storage capacity, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASSETS</strong></td>
<td>Transportation Assets</td>
<td>• Time-phased availability of common-carrier air- &amp; sealift capabilities &amp; types &amp; source of military and commercial transportation assets &amp; created from data in JSCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHSTR</strong></td>
<td>Characteristics of Transportation Resources</td>
<td>• Standard planning factors for airlift available for deployment planning, e.g., utilization rate, passenger &amp; cargo capacity, speed, range, load/off-load times, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PORTS</strong></td>
<td>Port Characteristics</td>
<td>• Standard planning factors for sealift available for deployment planning, e.g., ship category capacity, average speed, load/off-load times, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SDF</strong></td>
<td>Standard Distance File</td>
<td>• Information on physical and operating characteristics of selected free-world ports, e.g., size, depth, number of berths, beach data, categories &amp; capacities of cargo-handling &amp; storage facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TUCHA</strong></td>
<td>Type Unit Data</td>
<td>• Distance between POE-POD pairs listing mode of transport, POE-POD, GEOLOC code, Suez/Panama Canal status, OPLAN identification, number of stops, computed distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TUDET</strong></td>
<td>Type Unit Equipment Detail</td>
<td>• Movement characteristics for standard deployable units &amp; force descriptions for nondeployable unit types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LFF</strong></td>
<td>Logistics Factors File</td>
<td>• Descriptions &amp; dimensions of specific pieces of wheel/track equipment for TUCHA file type units &amp; all hazardous cargo &amp; non-self-deployable aircraft &amp; floating craft &amp; items measuring more than 35'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CEF</strong></td>
<td>Civil Engineering Files</td>
<td>• Standard logistics planning factors to compute resupplied termine ESI, and identify shortfalls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FM LIBRARY</strong></td>
<td>Force Module Library</td>
<td>• Description of deployable facility sets &amp; operational capability of Service construction units &amp; description of Service facility component systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6-25

**STANDARD REFERENCE FILES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>GEOFILE</strong></th>
<th>Standard Geographic Locations</th>
<th>• Automated repository of the DOD for the registration of military locations, and worldwide geographic locations subject to reference during military planning and operations. Examples: worldwide geographic locations and sites listed by country &amp; states, installation types, and CINC AORs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GSORTS</strong></td>
<td>Status of Resources and Training System</td>
<td>• Report of unit readiness in terms of authorized/actual personnel strength &amp; percent of assigned equipment ready for operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# PLAN-UNIQUE FILES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>TPFDD</strong></th>
<th><strong>Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data File</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SRF</strong></td>
<td><strong>Summary Reference File</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PFF</strong></td>
<td><strong>Planning Factors File</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PWF</strong></td>
<td><strong>Personnel Working File</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FREF</strong></td>
<td><strong>Force Record Extract File</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POSF</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ports of Support File</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UCFF</strong></td>
<td><strong>UTC Consumption Factors File</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MWF</strong></td>
<td><strong>Medical Working File</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Description</strong></th>
<th><strong>Routing</strong></th>
<th><strong>Aggregated Cargo Movement Characteristics</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TPFDD</strong></td>
<td>Description, routing, and aggregated cargo movement characteristics of forces defined for a specific OPLAN as well as the nonunit sustainment, i.e., supplies and cargo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SRF</strong></td>
<td>Major repository for summarized or detailed information about specific records in the TPFDD file or other general information relating to the specific OPLAN, i.e., movement tables, cargo detail for tailored and nonstandard units, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PFF</strong></td>
<td>Planning factors and parameters used in all phases of support planning, i.e., theater factors, lbs. of rations per person per day, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PWF</strong></td>
<td>Used in the support planning to designate origins and APOEs for replacement personnel as well as percentages to be routed from each ORIGIN or POE.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FREF</strong></td>
<td>File created for LOGSAFE processing that contains cargo resupply factors, i.e., attrition factors for equipment, based on threat level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POSF</strong></td>
<td>Reference file to determine ports of support for the non-unit-related records.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UCFF</strong></td>
<td>Resupply consumption factors by UTC that are extracted from Logistics Factors File or introduced by the user, i.e., air defense ordnance used per day, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MWF</strong></td>
<td>Population at risk records from OPLAN force list and planning factors entered by the medical planner, e.g., admission rates, evacuation policies, combat intensity, etc. (used in MEPES).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References: Applicable users' manuals

Figure 6-27

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(2) Data in the TUCHA are accessed by using unit type codes (UTCs). These are five-element alphanumeric codes that identify units of common functional characteristics. Service planning documents and automated files list units and show the number of each type available for planning.

(3) The unit identified by UTC in the TUCHA is a type, or “notional” (generic), unit. It is a representative unit with the approximate physical and movement characteristics of all the actual (real-world) units that it represents. It is, therefore, an average, generic approximation of what real-world units of that type should be. It is, for example, an infantry battalion as opposed to, say, the 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry; a CVN as opposed to, say, the USS Nimitz; or an F-15 fighter squadron as opposed to, say, the 94th Fighter Squadron.

b. **Timing of movements** Before development of each force requirement is finished, the key dates for required movement must be determined and entered for each force record. Beginning with the CINC’s RDD or CRD, the supported commander and subordinate planners calculate the EAD-LAD window at the POD or POS in addition to the EADs and LADs at intermediate locations. Soon, more detailed planning is required, and the Service, supporting commander, and defense agency planners develop the RLDs and ALDs at the ORIGINs and POEs. Determination of these dates is not automated—the responsible planner must enter them.

c. **Unique force record descriptions**
(1) After the force list has been finished and assembled, each separate force record, or line entry, in it is assigned a plan-unique alphanumeric code called a force requirement number (FRN). When an FRN has been assigned to a unit in a plan, it generally is not changed in the course of the plan. The FRN is useful because it allows the planner to track a unit that may change sequence position in the TPFDD as the TPFDD is worked and refined. FRNs are two, three, four, or five alphanumeric characters that identify a single force requirement.

(2) Two additional characters, called fragmentation and insert codes, may be added to the FRN in positions 6 and 7. These two additional characters identify a force entry that requires more than one iteration of the FRN to satisfy the force requirement, such as three individual brigades to satisfy the requirement for a division, etc. The resulting identifier becomes the unit line number (ULN).

(3) JOPES and the JSCP both require that force planning be done using force modules, described in paragraph 616.d.(2) of this chapter. Generally, force modules are groupings of combat, combat service, and combat service support forces, with or without appropriate non-unit-related personnel and supplies. The elements of force modules are linked together or uniquely identified so that they can be tracked, extracted, or adjusted as an entity in the planning and execution databases. Force modules offer an efficient way to do force planning and build forces rapidly in the TPFDD. Each individual ULN is identified as being associated with one or more force modules. Each force module in a plan is identified by a three-character alphanumeric identifier called a force module identifier (FMID).

(4) To differentiate between CINC OPLAN TPFDD files and force modules in the JOPES database, the first characters of ULNs and FMIDs are assigned in JOPES Volume II. Whenever possible, the force module identifiers for a given TPFDD should be identical to the parent ULN for major combat forces.

d. The preceding descriptors are needed to explain force movements either in narrative form or computer jargon. The JOPES ADP programs use these terms to describe the CINC’s concept of operations in the TPFDD. Three basic application programs assist the planner in the force build step.

e. The application program in JOPES/GCCS that deals specifically with force planning is the Requirements Development and Analysis (RDA) system. It was first developed for force planning as DART and has been integrated into GCCS. RDA assists the planner in creating a force requirements file, analyzing the data, and changing the data. These data will be used later to determine the gross feasibility of transportation. The codes and nomenclature of application programs are often confusing. Some JOPES abbreviations and acronyms will be introduced as necessary information in the force planning step. ADP
support is introduced here because it includes the manual procedures and the rational process for assembling the force list.

(1) **Purpose**  RDA allows planners to create, analyze and edit Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). RDA supports force deployment during execution, and logistics planners and operators in deliberate and crisis action planning. RDA provides the capability for creating and modifying force and nonunit requirements associated with OPLANs. It allows manipulation of TPFDD data and creates graphical displays to ease editing and compare transportation capabilities. It allows planners to analyze the force records; select, delete, or modify type units or force modules and modify the information defining movements and narrative descriptions; split the movement of a force record into air and sea shipment; assign movement parameters to individual units or groups of force records; reorder the list of movements, using planner-selected descriptions; selectively create summaries of transportation requirements; identify for analysis a categorized listing of support forces; lay the groundwork to analyze the gross transportation feasibility of the force records; audit the file for format and content; and perform a miscellany of administrative functions.

(3) **Files.** RDA draws information from numerous databases: TUCHA; descriptions and characteristics of major equipment or cargo categories listed in the major equipment file (MEF); standard worldwide geographic locations (GEOFILE); characteristics of transportation resources (CHSTR); the permanent databases used for reference, including standard distance files (SDF) and characteristics of airports (APORTS) and seaports (PORTS); transportation assets (ASSETS); and dimensions of equipment found in the type unit equipment detail file (TUDET). The planner creates the TPFDD and SRF described in detail the CINC’s concept of operations. The planner may also call for standard or ad hoc printed formats for use in analysis and to satisfy administrative requirements of the OPLAN.

Access to and within RDA is controlled by the Information Resource Manager (IRM) application in GCCS. Major RDA functions include the following:

f. A much quicker way to identify and add large numbers of units to a plan uses Service/joint force modules and previously created OPLAN-dependent force modules. The Force Module Edit (FMEdit ) function of RDA allows planners to review and modify groups of TPFDD records using forces module identifiers.

(1) **Purpose**  Force modules (FMs) already exist that include complete combat packages made up of C, CS, and CSS forces in addition to some nonunit cargo and personnel. By gaining access to this library, the planner may build a new TPFDD or modify an existing TPFDD quickly and effectively. RDA also allows the planner to go into an existing TPFDD and group force entries into a new or existing FM. A very valuable secondary function of RDA is that large groupings of force entries can be identified for ease of monitoring during plan execution or for use in executing deterrent options.
(2) **Foundation.** The force modeling function of RDA allows the planner to seek FMs that are either already built and maintained by the Services or built by a CINC during prior OPLAN creation. A supported command’s existing OPLANs are especially useful because they have already been sourced and incorporate numerous planning factors and operating parameters that are unique to their areas of responsibility. Significant combinations of these forces and supplies have already been identified by a unique force module identifier in existing OPLANs for use in subsequent deliberate and crisis action planning. As a result of that work, the CINC can now display and retrieve vast quantities of force module information.

(3) **Flexibility.** The force modeling function of RDA should include the same functionality that existed in JOPES on WWMCCS:

- Maintenance defines new force modules, modifies and deletes existing modules, and allows the planner to audit the files by Cargo Increment Number (CIN), Personnel Increment Number (PIN), and ULN.
- Paging allows display of FM title, description, and selected indexes.
- The report function furnishes a printed copy.
- Data retrieval permits the planner to include records in or exclude them from the TPFDD/ SRF.
- Rollup offers a quick look at what is to be moved and by what source; it displays the quantity of associated cargo and personnel in each FM by totals for force and separate totals for air and sea transport and source of lift.
- The build function permits the planner to create an OPLAN TPFDD by loading an FM library entry into a plan that already includes a plan identifier, classification, and starting FRN/CIN/PIN. Selected FMs can then be quickly added to the new file.

g. **Application**  Component planners use JOPES ADP force-building applications to compile a total component force list. Given the mission, the planner reviews the type combat forces apportioned in the task-assigning document and called for in the CINC’s concept of operations, and determines applicable CS and CSS units from Service planning documents. The plan is built by selecting individual units by UTC or by selecting entire force modules; however, all force requirements are included in force modules.

(1) The merged collection of the components’ force lists becomes the CINC’s consolidated force list. The database is called the OPLAN Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data file (TPFDD); numerous working papers can be printed that selectively display elements from the data file.

(2) The summary reference file (SRF) is created in the database along with the TPFDD. It includes administrative information on the plan identification number, date of
the concept of operations, and number of records; force and nonunit record summaries
describing numbers of unit and force records, fragmented forces, and aggregated cargo
shipments; movement data for nonstandard units not included in the TUCHA; and de-
scriptions of the planning factors and simulated environments used in the ADP support
process.

(3) The components can use actual (real-world) forces, if they are known, to
build their force lists. This obviously solves many problems early in planning by permitting
actual data to be used in place of representative sizes, locations, etc. Some Services list
actual units in Service planning documents; others, like the Navy, are unable to identify
specific units very far in advance because of their mobility. Eventually, the type (notional)
units will have to be replaced with more accurate information before the completion of
plan development. In the case of the Navy, the geographic locations of both combat and
support forces change drastically month to month, and most units are self-deploying.
Type units are used for most Navy force requirements throughout the deliberate planning
process.

(4) Supported commander’s role. The supported commander participates fully
in development of the component force lists. The subordinate commander submits the
time-phased force list to the CINC for review and approval. The supported commander
has been involved in the concept development and, now, in the details of force planning.
By submitting the component force list, the supporting commander indicates full un-
derstanding of the concept of operations and confidence that the forces in the force list will
support that concept. The CINC’s staff merges the component force lists and evaluates
the resulting consolidated force list. This consolidated list is analyzed to confirm that it is
adequate to perform the mission. When the supported commander concurs with the consol-
diated force list, the components then add any missing information needed to deploy the
forces from origin to destination, such as mode and source of transportation, POD, EAD-
LAD, priority of off-load at POD, DEST, and RDD.

630. JOPES ADP FOR SUPPORT PLANNING

a. The Logistics Sustainability and Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE) is the
GCCS ADP tool currently used in support planning. This application program calculates
the gross non-unit-related equipment and supplies to support the OPLAN. These calcula-
tions determine the nonunit movement requirements by using numbers of personnel, nu-
mer and types of UTCs, Service planning factors, and user-supplied CINC planning gui-
ance from the CINC’s Strategic Concept and TPFDD LOI. These gross determinations
for supplies are translated into weights and volumes and added to the TPFDD as move-
ment requirements.

(1) Purpose. LOGSAFE allows the planner to
• use data from a reference file to create an OPLAN-dependent ports of support file (POSF) categorized by Service, supply destination, air and sea transport, and munitions and POL;
• use data from a JOPES ADP reference file to create Planning Factor Files (PFFs) and UTC Consumption Factor Files (UCFFs) based on Service-developed logistics factors; and
• calculate the nonunit movement requirements.

The planner can also selectively aggregate the data to reduce the number of nonunit cargo records using the EAD-LAD window at each POS and, thus, best phase the movement requirement for sustainment cargos to support the concept of operations while most efficiently using available lift, and port and materiel handling or transport facilities.

(2) Foundation. Planning parameters for the calculations are chosen from two sources: the UCFF uses resupply consumption factors for unit type codes (UTCs) and the PFF includes a wide variety of planning factors that are used throughout the LOGSAFE process. Daily consumption rates for 43 subclasses of supply are computed by either pounds or gallons per UTC, or pounds or gallons per person per day. Fuel, ammunition, repair parts, and major end items are equipment-related supplies and are computed as a function of numbers of force records, for example, number of UTCs that describe 155mm artillery batteries. Other items of supply, such as food, clothing, and medical supplies, are better suited for planning factors listed in units of pounds per person per day. The Logistics Factors File (LFF), a JOPES standard reference file, is the foundation for the UCFF and PFF. The LFF uses Service-developed consumption rates for UTCs, and origins for resupply. The LFF initializes the PFF, which the user can then update and modify with factors to describe more accurately the situation in the theater.

(3) Flexibility. The planner has great flexibility in using planning factors in LOGSAFE. The planner can modify the following parameters:

• size of the EAD-LAD window
• beginning day of strategic resupply by sea
• period of time for resupply by air of specified supply subclasses
• up to ten origins for each supply class
• buildup increments by supply class
• rate of consumption by supply subclass modified by theater multiplier
• average travel time from POD to DEST in each of up to 26 objective area countries
• safety level of supplies in number of days to be maintained in-country
• conversion of up to 35 subclasses of supply from weight to volume
• identification of fuel types up to 15 types for each fuel resupply egbr
• percentage of attrition of supplies to combat loss for four time periods and 20 subclasses of supply
specification of five combat intensity levels over four time periods

(4) **Information required.** To execute LOGSAFE, users need a minimum of information: the period of planning for the OPLAN, the increments in which resupply will be delivered, the supply class/subclass consumption factors for each UTC in the plan, the weight-to-volume multipliers for converting short tons to measurement tons, specification of the objective area for determining theater-specific multipliers, and the combat intensity rate for periods of planning.

(5) **Files.** LOGSAFE uses information from various standard reference files available to all users: TUCHA, GEOFILE, and LFF. It uses and adds to the unique, OPLAN-dependent files prepared in the force development step: TPFDD and summary reference (SRF) files. LOGSAFE creates unique files for use in its calculations: temporary working data files, POSF, UCFF, and PFF.

b. In addition to calculating supplies, the CINC must analyze civil engineering requirements of planned contingency operations. The resulting analysis is not precise, but is a tool the planner uses to analyze actual facility asset data, anticipate new facility requirements, project war damage, recognize actual and projected civil engineering forces, determine required civil engineering materials, and acknowledge available support from the host nation. The formal document, called a Civil Engineering Support Plan (CESP), includes analysis of facility support requirements and any other sustainment engineering requirements associated with execution of the OPLAN. The GCCS software package that generates facility requirements data which is analyzed to determine the adequacy of engineering support for an OPLAN is the Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System (JEPES). A JEPES user can produce reports and graphics to reflect generated engineering requirements, existing assets, and engineering resources. JEPES extracts pertinent TPFDD records, computes facility requirements, and determines if adequate facilities exist to support deployed forces. The reports can be used to identify facility deficiencies and shortfalls in engineering capability, information that is used by components for detailed planning. Normally, responsible component commanders are given the task of coordinating the CESP for their specific construction management areas. These area CESP's are then consolidated by the CINC into a single theater-wide CESP for the operation plan.

(1) **Purpose.** The modules used in the ADP support package offer the capability to maintain unit and facility information in the existing files; analyze troop and facility requirements data from the TPFDD; determine facility requirements based on forces employed, unit mission, and war damage; schedule existing engineering manpower; and prepare the necessary reports and tabs to identify facility and construction requirements and develop scheduling information.

(2) **Foundation.** JEPES uses the TUCHA to develop the master list of essential mission facilities for each separate UTC in the force list; the TPFDD file is used to build
the TROOP file for determining units that have initial facility requirements; and numerous planning factor files are developed and maintained by the Services to define the support required.

(3) **Flexibility.** The planner uses JEPES to determine expected facility requirements that must be met with new construction and war damage repair. The planner can alter the following parameters: number of personnel, aircraft, and vehicles supported; amount of host-nation assets that can be used by friendly forces; anticipated amount of war damage to existing facilities; priority of construction effort; conversion of engineering troop strength to engineering capability; decreased engineering unit efficiency during early operations; attrition of personnel, equipment, and construction products as a result of enemy action; required completion date for new construction; and circuitous routing of supplies from POS to DEST.

(4) **Files.** JEPES uses both Service-maintained files for basic planning guidance and the OPLAN-dependent TPFDD files to determine specific facility requirements. The Services define and set priorities for the facilities required for each UTC, the capabilities of engineering units, planning factors to convert personnel loading at a base to specific facility requirements, and the acceptability of existing facilities to meet contingency operations. JEPES application functions include the following:

- LOGSAFE system data preparation support
- JEPES database file import/export utilities
- Database maintenance
- Requirements generation and analysis
- Reports and queries

c. **Medical Planning and Execution System (MEPES)** is a baseline GCCS application that supports both deliberate and crisis planning. The process considers the population at risk, length of stay in hospital facilities, and Service-developed frequency data for injury and death. The result is a planning tool to determine patient load, requirements for patient evacuations, and both Service and component medical planning requirements.

(1) **Purpose.** The system uses an interactive mode to create working files and modify planning factors, and to perform calculations and print reports. The reports include theater-wide analysis and component planning details, such as number of several categories of physicians, operating room requirements, and whole blood and intravenous fluid requirements, and planning factors for use in the nonunit resupply calculation procedures. The products of MEPES are used in the medical annex to the OPLAN, input to the personnel and sustainment models, identification of possible medical planning deficiencies in the OPLAN, and analysis of the impact of COAs on medical requirements.

(2) **Foundation.** Planners develop the population at risk (PAR) from the TPFDD file. Through automated interface with the TPFDD, MEPES assists the medical
planner in quantifying the impact of a proposed OPLAN COA on the medical system using data from the existing TPFDD, the Medical Reference database, population at risk files, and the Medical Planning File. It gives medical planners a tool to perform gross medical feasibility and supportability assessments using scenarios that focus on particular OPLANs, series of OPLANs, or specific geographic areas that consider varying enemy threats, tempos of operations, climates, and frequency of patient distribution. The medical database estimates numbers of personnel who are wounded in action, killed in action, administratively lost, and dead of wounds, and evacuation rates and length of stay conforming to evacuation policies.

(3) **Flexibility.** MEPES resource forecasts include the following:

- Health service support requirements across the battlefield
- Planning parameters for developing medical force structure
- Projections of medical evacuation airlift requirements
- Planning parameters for processing patients at varying levels of conflict
- Planning parameters for consumption rates
- Flow patterns for medical supplies

The result is a calculation of medical requirements that reflects a forecast of the theater medical resource requirements based on the warfighting scenario and supports time-phased medical sustainability analysis by generating estimates of time-phased casualties by type, medical evacuees, and returns to duty.

(4) **Files.** A temporary medical working file (MWF) is created from reference files and planner-modified planning factors. The resulting detailed planning reports are for use by theater and Service planners:

- medical planning factors
- personnel loading
- requirements for physicians, hospital beds, operating rooms, blood and fluid supplies (JOPES supply subclass VIII-B), and all other medical supplies (JOPES supply subclass VIII-A)
- graphic comparisons of capabilities and requirements for beds and evacuation

d. Two systems have been developed for GCCS to support personnel and mobilization planning and replace the WWMCCS-based Non-unit Personnel Generator (NPG):
(1) **Individual Manpower Requirements and Availability System (IMRAS).** IMRAS functions as a personnel planning system to assist in individual manpower mobilization planning and execution. It supports manpower and personnel planners during mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities for both deliberate and crisis action planning. IMRAS supports development of the personnel estimate of the situation and personnel appendices to plans.

(2) **Force Augmentation Planning and Execution System (FAPES) Prototype** is a decision support tool that enables the mobilization staff officer at the supported command, Joint Staff, Services, and supporting commands to support mobilization planning, monitoring, and execution requirements. The prototype is a Windows-based application designed to use reserve component unit TPFDD and GSORTS data stored in the GCCS core database.

e. The MRG was the original model used to compute requirements of supply and replacement personnel. However, the MRG did not consider the availability of supplies from Service and Defense Logistics Agency inventories. For logistics, therefore, joint operation planning with the MRG was not a true capabilities activity. Moreover, the MRG only aggregated supplies into one of ten classes by POE-POS channel. A more accurate method of calculating resupply was needed. The Logistics Capability Estimator (LCE) was an attempt to answer this need. However, the LCE never achieved required levels of performance, and neither the MRG nor LCE is used. The Logistics Sustainability Analysis Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE) was developed to replace the MRG and the LCE. It is part of GCCS initial operational capability. It can rapidly generate nonunit sustainment records; identify, quantify, and integrate time-phased CINC-critical items; compare requirements with available assets; identify shortfalls and chart sustainability; identify substitute items to overcome sustainment shortfalls and relate these items to the employment of forces; and support determination of the overall logistics feasibility of COAs.

f. **Summary.** The GCCS applications for support planning are essential to determining feasibility of the CINC’s concept of operations. The original WWMCCS-based Movements Requirements Generator program, the MRG, made gross estimates of nonunit resupply and replacement personnel. Logistics planners have expanded the original scope of the sustainment calculation. It is now possible to calculate more accurately medical requirements for physicians, supplies, and facilities with MEPES; the requirements for personnel replacements and reserve force mobilization with FAPES/IMRAS; civil engineering requirements for construction of facilities and war damage repair using the JEPES; and, with LOGSAFE, supply requirements. Not all calculations of sustainment are automatically added to the OPLAN TPFDD; planners must run some of these programs separately, and add their calculations manually. Further, work remains to be done in automating the calculation of requirements in support of civil affairs and enemy POW programs. Nevertheless, the rapid development of resupply calculations has greatly improved the planner’s
ability to develop a feasible OPLAN and to appraise the supportability of tentative COAs. This is especially useful in crisis action planning.

631. JOPES ADP FOR TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

a. Introduction. The purpose of the three steps of transportation planning is to determine the gross strategic transportation feasibility of the CINC’s OPLAN. The CINC compares each subordinate commander’s transportation requirements and the total apportioned strategic transportation capabilities. A GCCS application program called Joint Feasibility Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) simulates strategic movement. Planners at the supported command run a computer simulation of air, land and sea movements of the forces and their support requirements from ORIGIN to POE to POD. JFAST uses the transportation assets identified in the JSCP for the OPLAN to “move” the forces and supplies. JFAST incorporates all the factors that influence the movement of force and nonunit requirements and calculates computer-simulated feasible dates to arrive and be unloaded at the POD. The feasibility of the OPLAN is determined when the modeled dates are compared with the CINC’s latest arrival dates (LADs). The simulated deployment movement of a requirement that results in an arrival on or before the LAD is considered by the CINC to be grossly transportation feasible. Numerous conditions, including lift capacity and port capability, are attached to this transportation simulation, since neither all transportation assets, OPLAN force records, nor resupplies may have been sourced. Therefore, even when simulated results indicate arrival earlier than a LAD, it cannot be stated with absolute certainty that the OPLAN will close. All that can be said is that the plan is grossly feasible when considering strategic transportation.

b. Purpose. JFAST uses planner-specified parameters to determine whether the movement can be accomplished within the timeframe established by the CINC.

c. Foundation. Information about the movement of forces and supplies has been created in the OPLAN-dependent computer files: the TPFDD, files created by the GCCS/JOPES ADP application programs, such as RDA, and the miscellany of support programs and modules, for example, the LOGSAFE, MEPES, FAPES, IMRAS, and JEPES. The resulting file lists force and nonunit records by individual identifiers, i.e., ULN, CIN, PIN, that include the amounts to be moved, the timing, and the channel of flow for the planned movement.

(1) The planner must evaluate the TPFDD to analyze information such as POE-POD channel data, port throughout capability, airlift and sealift capacity, numbers of personnel, tons of materiel, and barrels of POL.

(2) The planner may create new files or modify standard files, including transportation assets, characteristics of transportation, ports and airfields, identified from the TPFDD to meet the constraints of the particular operational concept. Transportation-a
sets are selected that match the apportioned forces from the JSCP or task-assigning document, the asset characteristics are defined, and the attrition rates are introduced.

(3) JFAST models the transportation flow based on the identified parameters; the results are displayed in graphic or tabular reports form. Simulations of the movements are calculated using the ALD at the port of embarkation, travel time, and EAD at the port of debarkation. There are three simulations, LAND, SEA, and AIR.

(4) JFAST produces reports that identify the computed estimated feasible able to load (FALD) date at POE (if the LAND model is run), the departure date from the POE, and arrival and unloading dates at the POD. Standard reports display information needed by the planner to analyze the movements.

(5) JFAST draws from the OPLAN TPFDD, summary reference file, and standard reference files, such as ASSETS, GEOFILE, CHSTR, PORTS, APORTS, TUCHA, and a ship availability file.

(6) Reports produced by JFAST include the following:

- POE/POD facility daily workload
- strategic lift requirements
- intratheater daily lift requirement, i.e., POD-DEST channel
- daily aircraft and ship use
- summaries of force and nonunit records delivered
- summary of planning factors

(7) JFAST is especially useful to planners because of its speed of analysis, but because it displays the results of that analysis graphically. This greatly enhances the planner’s ability to assess the feasibility of the plan and identify transportation shortfalls. The user can modify lift allocation and port throughput capability within JFAST to aid in shortfall resolution. If resolution requires altering the phasing of resources, the TPFDD must be modified outside of JFAST and then brought back into JFAST for further transportation analysis.

(8) An especially useful feature of JFAST called the Notional Requirements Generator (NRG) allows rapid phasing of representative real-world forces, with CS, CSS, and sustainment, for transportation analysis. The combat forces in the NRG database represent real-world forces. The model generates appropriate CS and CSS, according to Service doctrine, for the combat forces selected by the planner, and also generates sustainment. Sustainment is generated using planning factors generally consistent with Service doctrine; the planner can modify some sustainment planning factors, including climate, supply buildup policy, and level of combat. Though not as accurate as formal TPFDD development, the NRG allows the planner to rapidly create, in effect, a list of
movement requirements and analyze it for transportation feasibility in JFAST. This feature is particularly valuable for exploring COA feasibility early in the deliberate planning process (before full TPFDDs are developed) and in Crisis Action Planning when the time for planning is constrained.

d. **Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool (DART)**

DART preceded RDA for force planning and continues as a very useful planning tool available to the JPEC. It has been successfully used in both deliberate and crisis action planning. DART is an integrated set of automated data processing tools and a database management system that gives joint planners the ability to rapidly create, edit, and analyze TPFDDs for data accuracy and transportation feasibility. DART makes it possible for planners to consider more alternatives (COAs, shortfall resolution options, etc.) than before and to produce, in less time, a potentially feasible COA, thus facilitating more rapid decision-making. DART is capable of rapid TPFDD modification. Planners find using both DART and JFAST together to be particularly effective--DART for rapid TPFDD manipulation, and JFAST for detailed transportation feasibility analysis.

632. **JOPES ADP SUPPORT SUMMARY.** JOPES ADP, which resides on the Global Command and Control System, is used in the deliberate planning process by the JPEC to develop, analyze, refine, review, and maintain joint operation plans and prepare supporting plans. JOPES ADP is used primarily in the plan development phase by the components to build the force list, calculate the flow of nonunit cargo and personnel, and complete specialized planning such as civil engineering and medical support. Through this process the TPFDD grows. When the components complete this work, the CINC’s staff merges the TPFDDs and tests gross transportation feasibility. ADP is used to refine the database before and during refinement conferences. In the plan review phase JOPES ADP supports the review process, and, in the supporting plans phase, supporting commands may use JOPES ADP to analyze the supported command’s TPFDD. Finally, during maintenance of the TPFDD, JOPES ADP is used to make necessary updates.

633. **TPFDD MAINTENANCE.** TPFDD maintenance is a process designed to keep a contingency plan as up to date as possible. When an OPLAN is published at the conclusion of the deliberate planning process, it is considered to be adequate and feasible in light of apportioned resources. Since it is based on existing intelligence information, it is current. However, the situation described in the OPLAN changes; the real-world conditions that led to the response outlined in the CINC’s concept may change over time, and the CINC’s concept may no longer be the most effective response. When the concept requires major revision, the entire deliberate planning process may have to be repeated; operation plans are periodically reviewed to make such determinations. However, even when the basic concept remains valid, the data contained in TPFDD files become outdated for many reasons. The objective of TPFDD maintenance is to systematically and effectively incorporate changes to TPFDD files required to maintain as up to date as possible
the database of phased forces, materiel, and sustainment that makes up the CINC’s concept. TPFDD maintenance focuses largely on the changes to deployment data that have occurred since refinement. Its aim is to reduce the amount of change required to adapt the TPFDD for response to an emergent contingency. Although the supported commander is ultimately responsible for TPFDD maintenance, USTRANSCOM plays a key role in keeping the TPFDD current.

a. Periodic TPFDD maintenance is a relatively routine administrative job performed at defined intervals after the TPFDD becomes effective for execution with CJCS approval resulting from the plan review phase of deliberate planning. JOPES ADP is used for TPFDD maintenance, and supported CINCs ensure that changes are loaded at scheduled intervals designated by the Joint Staff. Changes in sourcing, unit equipment, location, or state of unit readiness affect the plan, since they may change the amount of materiel to be deployed or the POE where it will be loaded. As the force structure changes, alternate units may have to be designated and substituted to satisfy the force record requirement of the TPFDD. The sources of information used to keep the deployment database current are as varied as the information itself. All members of the JPEC are responsible for keeping the JOPES database current, and regular reporting procedures have been established in Joint Pub 1-03 series, Joint Reporting Structure.

b. It is highly unlikely that a plan would be implemented in its entirety without changes. Any changes made in early stages of the operation are likely to affect events taking place later on. Therefore, it makes sense to concentrate the planners’ efforts on keeping the initial stages of a plan current. Normally, the JPEC intensively manages the first 7 days of air and 30 days of sea movement requirements to ensure continued database accuracy when converted to an OPORD. Different periods of intensive management can be specified by the supported commander. For example, in a very large and complex OPLAN, the commander may decide to have only the first five days of air movements intensively managed. When a plan is being implemented, later portions of the plan will be incrementally updated as earlier portions are being executed, to adjust to the actual results of the execution of earlier portions.

c. Being ultimately responsible for TPFDD maintenance, the supported commander is the final authority for approving changes to the OPLAN TPFDD.
Crisis Action Planning

Chapter 7

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Crisis Action Planning

700. INTRODUCTION TO TIME-SENSITIVE PLANNING

a. Overview. In peacetime, deliberate planning procedures are used to evaluate anticipated future situations to which the United States must be prepared to respond militarily. These situations are hypothetical predictions of regional conditions and scenarios that are considered so critical—because of their relative probability, importance to U.S. national security, and difficulty in scale of military response required to resolve them—that plans to respond to them must be prepared before they occur. Twelve months or more may be required to identify adequate responses, conduct the evaluation to select the best course of action, and prepare a feasible OPLAN. It is noteworthy that these potential situations are based on the best available intelligence, but are still hypothetical to the extent that not all conditions can be predicted, and, even if all variations of a future situation could be anticipated, they could not all be planned for. Further, in deliberate planning, resources are apportioned for planning. Even though forces, sustainment, and transportation resources apportioned to a plan may be sourced to that plan’s requirements in anticipation of the event, the actual situation with respect to those particular resources may prevent them from being allocated by the NCA to a real-time crisis response derived from that plan.

(1) While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there are always situations arising in the present that might require U.S. military response. Such situations may approximate those previously planned for in deliberate planning, though it is unlikely they would be identical, and sometimes they will be completely unanticipated. Usually, the time available to plan responses to such real-time events is short. In as little as a few days, a feasible course of action must be developed and approved, and timely identification of resources accomplished to ready forces, schedule transportation, and prepare supplies for movement and employment of U.S. military force. In such crisis or time-sensitive situations, the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) uses Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedures, prescribed in Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I.

(2) In a crisis, the situation is dynamic, with the body of knowledge growing hour by hour from the latest intelligence reports. An adequate and feasible military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures keyed to the time available, to communications that are rapid and effective, and to the use of previous planning, whenever possible. The principal players need to know what others are doing, and they need to know what is expected of them.
(3) Crisis Action Planning procedures are used by the JPEC to plan for and execute deployment and employment of U.S. military forces in time-sensitive situations. These procedures ensure

- following **logical procedures** that begin with recognizing the problem and developing the solution, and progress to preparing and executing the operation order;
- **rapid and effective exchange of information** about the situation, its analysis, and alternative military responses;
- **timely preparation** of military courses of action for consideration by the National Command Authorities (NCA); and
- **timely relay** of the decisions of the NCA to the combatant commander to permit effective execution.

(4) The system is divided logically into separate phases illustrated **Figure 7-1**; each has a definite start, a finish, and actions to be performed. The roles of the key members of the JPEC are described both for use as a checklist and for other community members to view the overall process. The procedures begin when the situation develops; the theater commander recognizes the potential significance of the event and reports it, along with his assessment, to the National Military Command Center. The NCA assess its diplomatic, economic, and informational implications and decide that a possible military response should be prepared. The CINC develops courses of action in response to the situation. The NCA select the COA. By direction of CJCS, the CINC prepares the detailed operation order (OPORD) to support the selected COA. At the direction of the NCA, the CINC executes the OPORD. This is an academic description, of course. In reality, the process is flexible; it permits the steps to be done sequentially or concurrently, or skipped altogether. The exact flow of the procedures is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis.

(5) Members of the JPEC are busy during the accelerated planning of a military response to a crisis. **Figure 7-2** illustrates the primary responsibilities of the Joint Planning and Execution Community during crisis action.
### SUMMARY OF TIME-SENSITIVE PLANNING PHASES

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<td>Course of Action Development</td>
<td>Course of Action Selection</td>
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<td>Execution</td>
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#### Event
- Event occurs with possible national security implications
- CINC's Report/Assessment received
- CJCS sends Warning Order
- CJCS presents refined and prioritized COAs to NCA
- NCA decides to execute OPORD

#### Action
- Monitor world situation
- Recognize problem
- Submit CINC's Assessment
- Increase awareness
- Increase reporting
- JS assess situation
- JS advises on possible military action
- NCA-CJCS evaluation
- Develop COAs
- CINC assigns tasks to subordinates by evaluation request message
- CINC reviews evaluation response messages
- Create/modify TPFDD
- USTRANSCOM prepares deployment estimates
- Evaluate COAs
- CJCS advice to NCA
- CJCS may send Planning Order to begin execution planning before formal selection of COA by NCA
- CINC develops OPORD
- Refine TPFDD
- Force preparation
- CJCS sends Execute Order by authority of SECDEF
- CINC executes OPORD
- JOPES database maintained
- JPEC reports execution status
- Begin redeployment planning

#### Outcome
- Assess that event may have national implications
- Report the event to NCA/CJCS
- NCA/CJCS decide to develop military COA
- CINC sends Commander's Estimate with recommended COA
- NCA selects COA
- CJCS releases COA selection by NCA in Alert Order
- CINC sends OPORD
- Crisis resolved
- Redeployment of forces

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(6) Military planners facing time-sensitive planning requirements must understand that the NCA are considering diplomatic, informational, economic, and military options. The military option may initially be the least desirable option, and a decision to execute may be made only after other, less severe options have been judged unsuitable. In reaching a decision to develop a military solution, the NCA may consider the possible range of flexible deterrent options, as described in Chapter 6, pages 6-15 through 6-19. Ultimate responsibility and authority in a crisis rest with the NCA, who must approve a COA and authorize the major actions to be taken, including the deployment, employment, or redeployment of forces.
ACTIVITIES OF THE JOINT PLANNING & EXECUTION COMMUNITY DURING CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

| **NCA** | • Approve the COA  
|         | • Direct that major actions be taken, e.g., change deployment status, deploy forces  
|         | • Authorize conduct of military operations against a potential enemy  |
| **CJCS, The Joint Staff** | • Manage planning process: review & analyze reports, resolve conflicts & shortfalls monitor deployment or employment  
|         | • Offer options and recommendations to the NCA  
|         | • Convey NCA decisions  |
| **Supported Command** | • Responds to a crisis  
|         | • Prepares Commander’s Estimate  
|         | • Develops COAs  
|         | • Develops Operation Order for deployment or employment  |
| **Subordinate Command** | • Determines the force and resource requirements  
|         | • Develops employment plan  |
| **Supporting Command** | • Generates and sources force and support requirements  
|         | • Makes deployment estimates for organic lift assets  |
| **USTRANSCOM** | • Coordinates deployment planning & execution  
|         | • Makes deployment estimates  
|         | • Develops transportation-feasible schedules  
|         | • Optimizes use of transportation capability  
|         | • Reports progress of deployment to CJCS and supported commander  |
| **Services** | • Furnish additional support forces through subordinate component commanders  
|         | • Identify and prepare reserve forces  |

Figure 7-2

b. Definition

(1) Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* and Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I, define a crisis within the context of joint operation planning and execution as “an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.”

(2) Several characteristics of a crisis can be given: it may occur with little or no warning; it is fast breaking and requires accelerated decisions; and, sometimes, a single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere. Whatever the nature or perceived magnitude of
the situation, a commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is being considered as a solution. In the U.S. defense establishment, the use of military force requires a decision by the NCA.

c. **Available guidelines.** The procedures in Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I, are used to outline a military response in a crisis. The six phases of CAP are a logical sequence of events that lead to the timely preparation of a COA for a military response. Further, the procedures describe the flow of information from the combatant commander; the integration of CJCS military advice in the analysis of military options; the decision process by which the NCA begin detailed military planning, change deployment posture of the identified force, and execute the military option; and the mechanisms for monitoring the execution of the eventual operation order.

d. **Communications.** Timely, accurate communications are essential in exchanging information and transmitting directions during a crisis. Several means are available: oral transmission confirmed with record copy as soon as possible; narrative text messages to transmit the initial report, situation updates, CINC’s assessment of the situation, and orders, including decisions of the NCA; and deployment data transmitted via the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Only through rapid, accurate, and secure communication can the military response to a crisis be managed. Today, several means exist to heighten overall operations security of the planning and management of CAP: special category (SPECAT) messages and close-hold procedures for GCCS and data transfer procedures, and limited access to the JOPES database. The reporting procedures to be followed in crisis action planning are defined in the Joint Pub 1-03 series: Joint Reporting Structure, and Joint Pub 6-04, Joint Doctrine for Message Text Formatting. CAP uses the OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT (OPREP-3PCA) format for the immediate reporting of serious incidents and events by the cognizant CINC. These reports establish the basis for crisis recognition and for the initiation of CAP.

e. **Available ADP support.** The rapid development of an adequate and feasible military response is the purpose of crisis planning. The planner must quickly evaluate the adequacy of proposed COAs, rapidly build a force list and calculate sustainment, and effectively determine transportation feasibility. Crisis action procedures use the same ADP that supports deliberate planning in JOPES. Using JOPES ADP, the crisis action planner may build a TPFDD through access to plans prepared in deliberate planning.

f. **Differences between deliberate & crisis action planning.** Figure 7-3 illustrates the significant differences between the deliberate planning procedures discussed in Chapter 6 and the CAP procedures discussed here.
## COMPARING CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCEDURES WITH DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCEDURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Crisis Action Planning</th>
<th>Deliberate Planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time Available to Plan</strong></td>
<td>Hours or days</td>
<td>18-24 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JPEC Involvement</strong></td>
<td>For security reasons, possibly very limited using close-hold procedures</td>
<td>Participates fully</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phases</strong></td>
<td>6 Phases from Situation Development to Execution</td>
<td>5 Phases from Initiation to Supporting Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Document Assigning Tasks</strong></td>
<td>WARNING ORDER to CINC; CINC assigns tasks with EVALUATION REQUEST message</td>
<td>JSCP to CINC: CINC assigns tasks with planning or other written directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forces for Planning</strong></td>
<td>ALLOCATED in the WARNING, PLANNING, ALERT, or EXECUTE ORDER</td>
<td>APPORTIONED in JSCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early Planning Guidance to Staff</strong></td>
<td>WARNING ORDER from CJCS; CINC’s EVALUATION REQUEST</td>
<td>Planning Directive issued by CINC after planning guidance step of concept development phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commander’s Estimate</strong></td>
<td>Communicates recommendations of CINC to the CJCS/NCA</td>
<td>Communicates the CINC’s DECISION to staff and subordinate commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision on COA</strong></td>
<td>NCA decide COA</td>
<td>CINC decides COA with review by CJCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Execution Document</strong></td>
<td>EXECUTE ORDER</td>
<td>When an operation plan is implemented, it is converted to an OPORD, and executed with an EXECUTE ORDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Products</strong></td>
<td>Campaign plan (if required) with supporting OPORDs, or OPORD with supporting OPORDs</td>
<td>OPLAN or CONPLAN with supporting plans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reference: Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as JCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I  

Figure 7-3
701. CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES

a. **Concept.** Since each crisis is unique, it is not reasonable to expect to use a rigid set of rules in response to every situation. JOPES Volume I defines a coordinated process that includes people, procedures, communications, and ADP hardware and software, and that produces a detailed plan to best accomplish the military mission.

(1) Crisis Action Planning procedures give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs procedures for getting vital decision-making information up the chain of command to the NCA; they allow the NCA to communicate their decisions accurately through CJCS down the chain of command to the CINC and subordinate and supporting commanders, the Services, and supporting defense agencies; and they permit the key players in the JPEC to exchange essential deployment data rapidly and accurately.

(2) The result is an ability to develop an adequate and transportation-feasible military response during a time-constrained planning period. In addition, JOPES ADP offers the JPEC the capability to monitor strategic movement during execution of the plan.

(3) The procedures accommodate the need for different degrees of detail, given the different amounts of time available for planning among the many command levels. They describe actions to be performed by the JPEC from the beginning of a crisis either through the commitment of U.S. military forces or to the point where the need for military force ends and military activity is canceled.

b. **Phases.** The procedures are categorized into six phases. Each phase of CAP begins with an event, such as the receipt of a report or order, and ends with a decision or resolution of the crisis. When the process moves into a new phase, the primary responsibility for taking action shifts between the NCA and CINC.

(1) Before beginning a full examination of CAP, it is important to understand that the time-sensitivity of certain critical situations may require so rapid a response that the normal procedural sequence may be altered significantly, i.e., CAP phases may be compressed, repeated, carried out concurrently, or eliminated. While there are detailed procedures to be followed in the process, circumstances may dictate that they be abbreviated, that is, decisions may be reached in conference and initially communicated orally. The amount of time spent in each phase depends on the tasks to be done and the time available.

(2) Within the CAP sequence of events, there are several points where decisions must be made for planning to continue, further actions are placed on “hold,” or planning reverts to a previous phase. Following each major decision reached by the NCA, CJCS issues a formal order implementing that decision. **NOTE:** Chart 4 in Appendix K illustrates the crisis action procedures in an expanded diagram.)
SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

a. Phase I

(1) Introduction. As a matter of routine, organizations of the U.S. Government monitor the world situation. In the course of that monitoring, an event may occur that has possible security implications for the United States or its interests. Monitoring organizations recognize the event, analyze it to determine whether U.S. interests are threatened, and report it to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Crisis Action Planning procedures generally begin once the event is reported to the NMCC. The situation development phase contains four related variables—the day-to-day situation is monitored, an event occurs, the event is recognized as a problem, and the event is reported.

(a) Situation monitoring is the continuous review and analysis of events occurring worldwide. Many available resources are used, ranging from strategic intelligence sources, to routine observations by a member of the military attaché staff, to television news broadcasts. So diverse are the sources of observation that the report could come up through the chain of command from observer to supervisor to senior military officer to component command to unified command watch officer. Just as likely, though, an event may be first seen in the Pentagon by a watch team member monitoring a cable news report. An event comes to the attention of a U.S. official through situation monitoring.

(b) An event is an occurrence assessed to be out of the ordinary and viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on U.S. national interests and national security.

(c) The recognition of the event as a problem follows from the observation.

(d) A report of the event may come from various sources, e.g., CINC, subordinate unit such as an activity or unit commander, TV news, etc. However, regardless of the source, the focal point for reporting information crucial to the national security is the NMCC in Washington, D.C. Figure 7-4 illustrates the diversity of information sources that report to the NMCC. Joint Pub 1-03 series Joint Reporting Structure is the source of detailed instructions for reporting an event through military channels. Events may be reported initially to the NMCC by any means available, but the two most common means are the Critical Intelligence Report (CRITIC) and the OPREP-3 PINNACLE.
(OPREP-3P) Sample OPREP-3 reports are contained in JOPES Volume I as well as Joint Pub 1-03.6. Receipt of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE at the NMCC from a CINC is a likely way for CAP to be initiated. However, in this day of instant worldwide communications, it is realistic that the theater may learn of a crisis by means of a phone call from Washington.

Communications Interfaces

![Diagram of Communications Interfaces]

Figure 7-4

(2) Actions taken during situation development

(a) In Phase I the focus is generally on the CINC who is responsible for the U.S. military action that may be taken within a theater. The activities of the JPEC during Phase I are summarized in Figure 7-5. The major occurrences in the combatant command include the following:
THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PLANNING
PHASE I -- SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CJCS, The Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Evaluate incoming reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Evaluate actions of CINC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supported Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Reports significant event to NMCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Publishes CINC’s assessment:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nature of crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forces available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>major constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action being taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COAs being considered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subordinate &amp; Supporting Commands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Gather intelligence information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Furnish information and support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USTRANSCOM Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Monitors developing crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 7-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• observation of an event with potential national security implications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• an assessment by the CINC that the potential of the situation warrants higher-echelon awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• report to the NMCC by CRITIC or OPREP-3 PINNACLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• publication of the OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC’s ASSESSMENT, the CINC’s assessment of action being considered or actions already taken. This is an important step and would be crucial to the CINC’s influencing future decisions in a fast-breaking crisis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The Joint Staff monitors the situation, requests a report from the geographic CINC, evaluates the CINC’s actions being taken under the rules of engagement, orders additional intelligence gathering, if necessary, and advises the NCA as the situation develops.

(c) If possible, other members of the JPEC collect information on the situation and develop an accurate picture of the crisis.
(3) Exchange of reports during Phase I. The initial report of the event, which any individual can make, must be timely and accurate. The CRITIC or OPREP-3 PINNACLE reports are normally used. They can be issued orally with a record copy to follow. Any commander may issue OPREP-3 PINNACLE (general) to report any incident or event where national-level interest is indicated. The commander of a combatant command may issue OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT to report the command's assessment of a developing or potential crisis. If the CINC does not make the initial report of an event, the NMCC will make every effort to establish communications with the CINC and request a report. In this instance, the CINC will normally send an OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT that would include the following information described in Joint Pub 1-03.6:

- information on the current situation
- action being taken within the constraints of the current rules of engagement
- forces readily available
- expected time for earliest commitment of forces
- major constraints on the employment of forces
- succinct discussion of various COAs under consideration or recommended by the commander, as appropriate

(4) ADP support. During this phase the CINC’s staff reviews applicable contingency plans. The JOPES database holds all the files for current complete plans, and the CINC reviews plans through access to GCCS. If circumstances warrant, a GCCS Teleconference (TLCF) may be established to allow a rapid exchange of information.

(5) Conclusion of Phase I. The situation development phase ends when the event is reported and the CINC’s assessment is submitted to CJCS and NCA through the NMCC.

**CRISIS ASSESSMENT**

b. Phase II. In this phase, the NCA and Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation to determine whether a military option should be prepared to deal with the evolving problem. The phase is characterized by increased information gathering and review of available options by the NCA.

(1) Introduction. The phase begins with the receipt of the CINC’s report and assessment of the event. The CINC has categorized the event as a problem of potential national concern. The detail and frequency of reporting increase to give the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information that is needed to evaluate developments and allow them to offer sound military advice to the NCA.
(2) Actions taken during crisis assessment. The focus of Phase II is on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the NCA.

(a) The NCA identify the national interests at stake; the national objectives related to those interests; and possible diplomatic, political, economic, and military options to achieve the objectives. The NCA decide that a crisis exists and that military COAs will be developed by the CINC.

(b) CJCS assesses the situation from the military point of view including operations, logistics, and command and control implications, and reviews current strategy and existing OPLAN data in JOPES. The Joint Staff reviews and evaluates reports from the CINC. CJCS may recommend to the NCA that orders be published to prepare to deploy or to deploy forces, and may establish or direct the establishment of a crisis GCCS TLCF if the CINC has not already done so.

(c) Having reported the event and offered an assessment of the situation in Phase I, the CINC continues to issue status reports, assesses the disposition of assigned and available forces, and takes appropriate military action under current rules of engagement.

(d) The other members of the JPEC continue to monitor the situation: the Services may improve readiness and sustainability of forces that could be used and identify possible Reserve components; USCINCTRANS improves the disposition and readiness of strategic lift assets, etc. Figure 7-6 summarizes the activities of the JPEC.

(e) Because crisis action procedures are flexible, the NCA and CJCS have the latitude to either remain in this phase, increase reporting, and gather additional information for study; return to Phase I and continue to monitor the situation without further planning action; or progress to the next phase of CAP.

(3) Crisis response organizations. During the crisis assessment phase, special teams are assembled at all levels where the problem and its resolution are being developed. These teams vary in size and composition, as well as in name. They may be called crisis action teams, crisis response cells, battle staffs, emergency response teams, operations action groups, or operation planning groups. Specially constituted crisis action organizations generally include representatives from all command staff divisions and may include representatives from a wide range of involved organizations. Figure 7-7 illustrates the variety of organizations that respond to crises.
THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PLANNING
PHASE II -- CRISIS ASSESSMENT

| NCA | • Decide to develop the military COA |
| CJCS, The Joint Staff | • Give military assessment to NCA  
• Advise on possible military COAs  
• Review existing OPLANs & CONPLANs for suitability  
• Review & evaluate reports from CINC & other sources  
• Establish crisis TLCF as required |
| Supported Command | • Continues to report status of situation  
• Evaluates event  
• Reviews existing OPLANs & CONPLANS for applicability  
• Evaluates disposition of assigned and available forces  
• Evaluates status of theater transportation assets |
| Subordinate & Supporting Commands | • Continue to monitor the crisis |
| USTRANSCOM | • Reviews status of strategic lift assets  
• Improves disposition & readiness of strategic lift assets |
| Services | • Evaluate available military force  
• Act to improve force readiness & sustainability  
• Identify Reserve component requirement |

Figure 7-6

(4) Exchange of reports during Phase II. At any time during CAP, the NCA may find it desirable to prepare selected units for possible military action. They increase unit readiness by designating alert conditions or ordering a specified deployability posture (see Figure 7-8) to reduce the response time of selected forces. Increased readiness actions may be taken during any phase. Deployment Preparation Orders and Deployment Orders are used to increase or decrease deployability posture, deploy or redeploy forces, establish or disestablish joint task forces and their headquarters, or signal U.S. intent to undertake or terminate action. Changing the deployment posture of a unit is a strong statement that the United States is beginning action to conduct military operations. Both orders are issued by CJCS and specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense. The stage of a unit’s readiness is defined by the deployability posture.

(a) The Deployment Preparation Order and the Deployment Order are addressed to all combatant commanders and the National Security Agency/Central Security Services. The Secretary of State, the White House Situation Room, and appropriate others receive copies.
## CRISIS MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Composition of Response Element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Office of Secretary of Defense** | Crisis Coordinating Group                                               | • Disseminates crisis information in a timely fashion
• Facilitates coordination within OSD
• Draws on parent offices for support, guidance, and information
• Chaired by DUSD(P)
• Staffed with representatives of principal OSD staff officers, military departments, combat support agencies, & Department of State |
| **National Military Command Center** | Operations Team (OT)                                                                                    | • Monitors operational activities worldwide
• Gathers information on developing situations
• Performs 24-hour monitoring of particular situations
• Assigned NMCC personnel
• OT augmented as necessary with staff personnel |
| **CJCS, The Joint Staff** | Response Cell (RC) or Crisis Action Team (CAT) or Operations Planners Group (OPG) | • Staffed full time by qualified personnel
• May occupy normal workspaces
• Reviews current strategy & applicable OPLANs/CONPLANs
• Gathers intelligence
• Reviews status of forces
• Develops broad COAs
• Assembles Situation Books
• Formed by J-3
• Team Chief is an 0-6
• Assigned representatives from Joint Staff directorates
• Usually does not contain Service reps
• Specific manning is tailored to fit the situation |
| **Supported Command Staff** | Battle Staffs of Crisis Action Teams                                                                             | • Generate, exchange, and receive information
• Develop military options, COAs, and concepts of operations
• Regularly assigned and augmenting personnel
• Special response centers for Intelligence, Logistics
• Nuclear operations
• Special operations |
| **USTRANSCOM** | Crisis Action Team                                                       | • Orchestrates and monitors deployment
• Deployment Directorate personnel |

*Figure 7-7*
Deployability Postures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployability Posture</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ND Normal</td>
<td>No overt action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID Increased</td>
<td>Personnel recalled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD Advanced</td>
<td>Unit packed and positioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD Marshalled</td>
<td>Unit, transport moved to POE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD Loaded</td>
<td>First increment loaded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7-8

(b) The format for both of these orders is in JOPES Volume I. They include all necessary information to deploy the forces, if it is not already given in other planning guidance documents from CJCS. The order takes the following overall outline:

- clear statement that it is a Deployment Preparation/Deployment Order issued under the authorization of the Secretary of Defense
- situation
- mission
- execution
- administration and logistics
- command and signal

(c) Note that, while these orders are designed to increase deployability posture, positioning forces or taking preparatory actions may signal U.S. intent to conduct military operations. This may not be the desired message, and the CJCS and NCA may consider the requirements for secrecy and surprise, and balance them against the need to notify selected Armed Forces for possible action. Operations security is vital and is practiced.

(5) ADP support. A GCCS TLCF should be established between crisis participants. The JPEC may review available JOPES deployment databases.

(6) Conclusion of Phase II  The crisis assessment phase ends with the decision by the NCA to have military options developed for their consideration. These are added to the full spectrum of possible U.S. responses. The NCA decision may also include specific guidance on COAs to be developed. For this reason, the CINC’s initial assessment
has great influence. That assessment is an early, professional recommendation from the scene; lack of time may make the CINC’s assessment the only alternative considered.

**COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT**

c. **Phase III.** Following the decision of the NCA to develop military options, CJCS publishes a Warning Order directing the development of COAs in response to the situation. The COA development phase shifts emphasis to the CINC, who develops and submits recommended COAs to CJCS and the NCA. The CINC includes the COAs in the Commander’s Estimate, an abbreviated version of the type of information in the Commander’s Estimate prepared during the concept development phase of deliberate planning.

   (1) **Introduction** Phase III begins when the NCA decide to develop possible military solutions to the crisis. The military response may be only one of many available options open to the NCA. In fact, the initial reluctance to use military forces may substantially alter the situation and thus limit the available military options when a decision to use military force is finally made.

   (2) Actions taken during COA development. [Figure 7-9] illustrates, the center of activity shifts to the supported commander:

   (a) CJCS publishes a Warning Order to give initial guidance to the JPEC and requests that the CINC respond with a recommended COA to meet the situation.

   (b) The supported commander develops COAs; this involves the subordinate and supporting commanders. With the Evaluation Request Message the CINC assigns those commands the task of identifying the forces and resources for the COAs being considered. If time and security considerations permit, subordinate evaluation of tentative COAs is valuable. Existing OPLANs and CONPLANs may prove useful in the rapid development of the COAs. The databases that outline the flow of forces and sustainment can be made available to the JPEC by the supported commander. Finally, the CINC prepares the Commander’s Estimate, the recommended COA.

   (c) The subordinate and supporting commanders respond to the CINC with an Evaluation Response Message. Alternative COAs are evaluated and forces are identified to support the operation. Existing plans in the JOPES database can be used; a force list for this operation can be created in the JOPES database. Sustainment planning begins with coordination between the Service headquarters and the theater components. The Services monitor deployment planning and force readiness.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>NCA</strong></th>
<th>Give guidance to CINC via CJCS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **CJCS, The Joint Staff** | - Publish Warning Order  
- establish command relationships  
- define tasks, objectives, constraints  
- either allocate forces & lift or request CINC requirements  
- set tentative C-day & L-hour  
- direct CINC to develop COAs and submit  
- Commander’s Estimate  
- Monitor COA development with JDS  
- Review Commander’s Estimate |
| **Supported Command** | - Responds to Warning Order  
- Develops and evaluates COAs using JOPES ADP  
- Coordinates involvement of subordinates  
- Releases Evaluation Request Message  
- Reviews existing OPLANs for applicability  
- Prepares & submits Commander’s Estimate to CJCS |
| **Subordinate & Supporting Commands** | - Respond to Evaluation Request Message  
- Analyze COAs, as directed  
- Identify C, CS, CSS forces and generate movement requirement estimates  
- Create deployment database in JOPES for each COA  
- Coordinate sustainment calculations & movement requirements  
- Prepare Evaluation Response Message |
| **USTRANSCOM** | - Reviews CINC’s COAs  
- Activates Crisis Action Team  
- Assists in refining requirements  
- Prepares deployment estimate for each COA  
- Sends deployment estimate to supported commander |
| **Services** | - Monitor COA development  
- Plan for sustainment  
- Monitor force readiness |

**Figure 7-9**

(d) USCINCENTRANS reviews the proposed COAs for supportability and prepares deployment estimates for each COA to send to the supported commander. As time permits, and as directed by the supported commander, JOPES data are used to develop a preliminary force deployment estimate and closure profile.

(3) Exchange of reports during Phase III. Several orders or messages may be published during this phase.

(a) Following the decision of the NCA to plan a military response, CJCS normally authorizes the release of a Warning Order. If it contains force deployment preparation or deployment orders, Secretary of Defense approval is required. The War
Order equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process; an example is illustrated in JOPES Volume I. This message should

- describe the situation;
- establish command relationships;
- state mission, objectives, and assumptions;
- refer to applicable OPLANs and CONPLANs;
- allocate forces and transportation assets or request that the CINC identify resource requirements;
- establish a tentative C-day and L-hour or solicit the CINC’s recommendation;
- identify the anticipated D-day for planning purposes; and
- discuss guidance for administrative, logistics, public affairs, civil affairs, and C3 subjects.

The order will definitely request that the CINC develop COAs for review and approval by the NCA. In a fast-breaking crisis, the initial Warning Order could be communicated by a telephone conference with a follow-on record copy to ensure that the JPEC is kept advised. Messages referring to this initial order transmit additional information and guidance. The order may also discuss and focus the CINC’s attention toward COAs that have already been identified or considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA. However, the CINC has flexibility to determine how to carry out the assigned tasks. If the NCA have already selected a COA, they may issue direction to begin execution planning (Phase V of CAP).

(b) The basic Operations Planning Report (OPREP-1) describes the formats of four messages exchanged in this phase:

- Commander’s Evaluation Request
- Subordinate/supporting commanders’ Evaluation Response
- USTRANSCOM’s Deployment Estimate
- The Commander’s Estimate

Joint Pub 1-03.8, JRS Situation Reporting, discusses a general format for the OPREP-1. The recommended format is flexible; listed sections can be omitted or other paragraphs can be added to meet the situation.

(c) If time permits, the CINC issues Commander’s Evaluation Request in OPREP-1 format to subordinate and supporting commanders. This communicates necessary planning guidance and assigns to members of the JPEC the task of evaluating the proposed COA, submitting force and support requirements, or supporting the CINC’s recommended COA. This communication includes the following:

- operation description -- cites reference
- narrative -- task, situation, factors affecting possible COAs, enemy capabilities, concept of operations, operational constraints

AFSC PUB 1
• objective -- amplifies guidance for developing COA evaluations
• remarks -- describe the OPLAN file used and its location in the JOPES database

(d) The subordinate and supporting commanders reply with a component’s course of action Evaluation Response message. The format is similar to the OPREP-1 reports already discussed: description, narrative, objective, and remarks.

(e) In addition, if time permits, USTRANSCOM sends the preliminary Deployment Estimate to the supported commander. It is in OPREP-1 format and may include the following:

• operation description
• narrative -- description of the closure estimate in days or hours for each COA
• remarks -- identification of planning factors used in the simulation

(f) The final product of Phase III is the Commander’s Estimate prepared by the CINC. Its purpose is to give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information for the NCA to consider in their selection of a military COA. It is the CINC’s analysis of the COAs that were considered. Contents of the message vary, depending on the situation. Joint Pub 1-03.8, Joint Reporting Structure, details a recommended format for the report. It is an abbreviation of the CINC’s total staff work and may have been developed in a matter of hours. The abbreviated guidelines are also found in JOPES Volume I; it should contain the following:

• operation description -- cite references, description of military operations
• narrative -- five paragraphs described in JOPES Volume I: mission, situation and COAs, analysis of opposing COAs (enemy capabilities), comparison of own COAs, and recommendation
• objective -- identify operational objective, object of reporting the information
• remarks -- planning factors, file within JOPES where force list may be found, etc.

(4) ADP support. Time available to the CINC is a most critical variable during this phase. Vast amounts of planning data must be transferred rapidly among JPEL participants. The GCCS and the JOPES deployment database maintained by the Joint Staff
are the primary means for exchanging detailed planning information. The planning tasks to develop tentative COAs, evaluate the adequacy of each COA, create force lists and support packages, estimate transportation feasibility of each COA, and begin to prepare deployment estimates for the recommended COA require much time. Fortunately, there is ADP support to help the crisis action planner take advantage of previous planning efforts that are already in the JOPES database, or to rapidly develop a plan from scratch.

(a) **Develop tentative COAs.** An existing OPLAN may have been built that can be modified. An existing CONPLAN may be available that can be fully developed beyond the stage of an approved concept of operations. Both of these formats are stored in the JOPES database and are available for planner review. For situations that have not been considered by prior planning, a “NOPLAN” situation is said to exist; timely creation of a concept of operations and the time-phasing of forces and support are required.

(b) **Determine adequacy of each proposed COA** An objective, comprehensive evaluation of proposed COAs is difficult even without time constraints. Some combatant commands are developing computer simulations to assist in measuring sensitivity of COAs to key parameters.

(c) **Develop force lists and support packages** Using the force modules in JOPES, the planner can rapidly build an effective combat force, add support forces, and calculate sustainment. Using force modules from current OPLANs reduces the planning time, because these force modules are already “sourced” with actual Army and Air Force units and some Sea Service units.

(d) **Prepare deployment estimates** The USTRANSCOM components begin to build the deployment estimates from information exchanged through the GCCS. USTRANSCOM integrates the deployment estimates and furnishes a consolidated deployment estimate to CJCS and the CINC via GCCS and OPREP-1 message.

(5) **Conclusion of Phase III** Course of action development concludes with the release of the CINC’s Commander’s Estimate. Emphasis once again shifts to CJCS and the NCA for the selection of a COA.

**COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION**

d.  **Phase IV.** In this phase, CJCS in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews and analyzes the Commander’s Estimate and deployment estimates and, ultimately, presents COAs in order of priority to the NCA for their decision. The activities of the JPEC are illustrated in Figure 7-10.
(1) **Introduction.** Phase IV of CAP begins when the recommended COAs are presented to the NCA. CJCS has received the Commander’s Estimate from the CINC. The Joint Staff has evaluated the recommendation; the COAs may have been refined or revised, or new COAs may have been developed in light of a changing situation. In fact, when there is no clearly superior COA, a ranked list of recommendations may have to be given to the NCA.

(2) **Actions taken during COA selection.** The focus of activity is with CJCS and the NCA:

   (a) CJCS performs his role as principal military adviser to the NCA, evaluating the COAs recommended by the CINC in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Depending on the recommendation to the NCA, CJCS may choose to issue guidance to the CINC and the JPEC with Planning Order this is used to speed up the execution planning and does not replace formal NCA approval of a COA.

   (b) The NCA select a COA and direct that execution planning begin. On receipt of an NCA decision, CJCS issues an Alert Order to the CINC advising of the selected COA. With the authority of the Secretary of Defense, CJCS may issue a Deployment Preparation Order or Deployment Order.
(c) The CINC and the other members of the JPEC are continuing deployment and employment planning with the knowledge they have of the pending decision.

(3) **Exchange of reports during Phase IV.** Depending on the situation, either of two communications may be exchanged in this phase:

(a) CJCS issues the Planning Order before the NCA make a decision. The intent is to expedite execution planning and permit flexibility in responding to fast-breaking events as the crisis develops. It may be issued orally, by WIN message, or by AUTODIN to the CINC with copies to all members of the JPEC. It is conceivable that the Planning Order could be the first record communication between CJCS and the JPEC on the crisis. In this situation, vital planning information would be exchanged now. However, it is desirable to use this message merely to update CJCS guidance that has been given earlier. The contents of the Planning Order may vary depending on the situation, but it should

- identify forces and resources for planning;
- define the objective, tasks, and constraints;
- contain further planning guidance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
- give a deadline for submitting the operation order (OPORD).

JOPES Volume I outlines an example of a Planning Order that illustrates a standardized format patterned after the OPREP-1 message in Joint Pub 1-03.8. The JOPES Volume I example includes a multisection narrative detailing situation, mission, details about the COA to be executed, resources allocated, and guidance for administration, logistics, PSYOP, public affairs, etc.

(b) On receiving the NCA decision on the course of action, CJCS publishes an **Alert Order**. The order is a record communication that the NCA have decided to develop in detail a military solution to the crisis. The contents of an Alert Order may vary, and sections may be deleted if the information has already been published. The contents are similar in format to the Planning Order, except that the operation description clearly states that the message is an Alert Order, and execution planning for the selected COA has been authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

(4) **Conclusion of Phase IV** This phase ends with the NCA selection of a COA and the decision to begin execution planning. The Alert Order publishes that decision.
EXECUTION PLANNING

e. **Phase V.** In the execution planning phase, the supported commander transforms the NCA-selected COA into an operation order (OPORD). Phase V is similar in function to the plan development phase of the deliberate planning process. In this phase the necessary detailed planning is performed to execute the approved COA when directed by the NCA. The actual forces, sustainment, and strategic transportation resources are identified, and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format.

(1) **Introduction.** The NCA select the military course of action that will be further developed. Execution planning begins when the CINC and members of the JPEC receive the Planning Order or the Alert Order.

(2) **Actions taken during execution planning.** The execution planning stage encompasses three major tasks: execution planning, force preparation, and deployability posture reporting.

- **Execution planning** is the timely development of the OPORD that can be executed when the NCA direct. The OPORD is developed by modifying an existing OPLAN, expanding an existing CONPLAN, or building an OPORD from scratch when no plan exists (NOPLAN). Understandably, the speed of completion is greatly affected by the amount of prior planning. JPEC actions are the same whether an Alert Order or Planning Order initiates execution planning.

- **Force preparation** focuses on the actual units designated to participate in the planned operation and their readiness for deployment. The five categories for deployability posture describe the status of troops and equipment, the unit availability to deploy, positioning of units on strategic lift, positioning of transportation support units at intermediate and debarkation ports, etc. The deployment posture is changed by direction of the Secretary of Defense.

- **Deployability posture reporting** After receiving the CJCS Alert Order, commanders issue situation reports (SITREPs) per Joint Pub 1-03.8 to report early attainment of, or deviations from, a specified deployability posture. Newly identified forces report the time they anticipate attaining the directed deployability posture.

   (a) Emphasis during the phase, particularly during the task of execution planning, rests with the CINC and subordinate and supporting commanders summarized in Figure 7-11. They review the Planning or Alert Order to get the latest guidance on forces, timing, constraints, etc. They update and adjust planning done in Phase III, COA development, for any new force and sustainment requirements, and source forces and lift resources. All members of the JPEC act to identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations. The Services and the CINC’s component commanders are sourcing the
forces identified for planning. Planning concentrates on the earliest deploying units. Execution planning results in the preparation of the OPORD by the CINC. The subordinate and supporting commanders prepare supporting OPORDs.

(b) CJCS monitors the development of the CINC’s OPORD in JOPES and resolves shortfalls that are presented. CJCS also reviews the final product for adequacy and feasibility and gives military advice to the NCA on the status of the situation.

(c) USTRANSCOM furnishes effective air, land, and sea transportation to support the approved COA or OPORD by applying transportation assets against the transportation requirements identified by the supported commander. Air and sea channels for movement of nonunit sustainment and personnel are established, and schedules for air and sea are created. Concentration is on the initial increment of movements, i.e., 7 days by air and 30 days by sealift.
(3) **Exchange of reports during Phase V.** The Planning/Alert Order is sent to the CINC as action addressee and also forwarded to subordinate commanders for their planning guidance. In addition, two important communications are exchanged in this phase.

(a) The supported commander publishes a TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI) that furnishes procedures for deployment, replacement, and redeployment of forces. The LOI gives instructions and direction to the components, supporting commands, and other members of the JPEC concerning lift allocation, reporting and validation requirements, and management of TPFDD data in general. JOPES Volume I gives an example of a TPFDD LOI.

(b) The OPORD is the product of the execution planning phase. Joint Pub 1-02 defines it as “a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for effecting coordinated execution of an operation.” Joint Pub 1-03.8 gives the format for this OPREP-1 report, and Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I shows an abbreviated example. See Appendix H of this publication for a more detailed description of the contents of an OPORD. The supported commander’s OPORD is published with a major force list, instructions for the conduct of operations in the objective area, and the logistics and administrative plans for support of the operation. Movement data and schedules are entered into the JOPES database for access by all members of the JPEC. Subordinate and supporting commands develop supporting OPORDs as required by the CINC. They transmit copies of their completed OPORDs by GENSER to CJCS to review for adequacy and feasibility. If an OPORD is contrary to the guidance contained in the CJCS Alert Order, or if circumstances change, requiring an adjustment in the OPORD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informs the CINC of the differences.

(4) **ADP support.** GCCS and JOPES ADP take on greater significance during this phase of the crisis: JPEC participants continue to use GCCS for communicating among themselves; GCCS allows rapid, accurate, and secure data transfer and offers a means for file updating. The JPEC uses JOPES procedures and guidance furnished in the TPFDD LOI to build and refine the TPFDD. When planning participants do not have access to the JOPES computer files, they can use secure voice systems or AUTODIN communications to exchange essential force and deployment data.

(5) **Conclusion of Phase V.** The phase ends when the NCA decide to execute the OPORD, place it on hold, or cancel it pending resolution by some other means.

(6) **Phase timing.** The procedures in the preceding discussion have been described as occurring sequentially. During a crisis they may, in fact, be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. For example, the CINC’s ASSESSMENT in Phase I may serve as the recommended COA in the Commander’s Estimate normally developed in Phase III. In some situations, no formal JCS Warning Order
is issued, and the first record communication that the supported commander receives is the CJCS Planning Order or Alert Order containing the COA to be used for execution planning. It is equally possible that an NCA decision to commit forces may be made shortly after an event occurs, thereby compressing greatly Phases II through V. To appreciate fully the usefulness of CAP, it is important to recognize that no definitive length of time can be associated with any particular phase. Note also that severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information orally, including the decision to commit forces. In actual practice, much coordination is done over secure telephone throughout the JPEC during the entire CAP process.

EXECUTION

f. Phase VI. The execution phase starts with the NCA decision to choose the military option to deal with the crisis and execute the OPORD. The Secretary of Defense will authorize CJCS to issue an Execute Order that directs the CINC to carry out the OPORD. The CINC then executes the OPORD and directs subordinate and supporting commanders to execute their supporting OPORDs.

(1) Introduction. The Execute Order is a record communication that may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. During execution, the supported and supporting commanders, Services, and defense agencies update information in the JOPES deployment database. USTRANSCOM monitors and coordinates the deployment per the supported commander’s force and sustainment priorities. Members of the JPEC report movement of forces in the deployment database.

(2) Actions taken during execution. During the execution phase, changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical and intelligence considerations, force and nonunit cargo availability, availability of strategic lift assets, and POE and POD capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules, and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities, are required. The JOPES deployment database should contain at least the following information at the time of OPORD execution: first, sourced combat, combat support, and combat service support requirements for assigned and augmentation forces; second, integrated critical resupply requirements identified by supply category, POD, and LAD; and third, integrated nonunit personnel filler and casualty replacements by numbers and day. Practical considerations require that planning concentrate on the first 7 days of air movement and the first 30 days of surface movement. Major changes to deployment plans with effective dates more than about seven days or so in the future will have very little impact on the scheduling process; however, changes with effective dates of seven days or less may adversely affect the timely development of the airlift flow schedule. Adding requirements within those management windows may cause delays in other scheduled movements.
(a) CJCS publishes the CJCS Execute Order that defines D-day and the source allocation and directs execution of the OPORD. Throughout execution, the staff monitors movements, assesses achievement of tasks, and resolves shortfalls as necessary.

(b) The CINC executes the order and transmits his own guidance to subordinates and supporting commanders. The CINC also monitors; assesses and reports achievement of objectives; ensures that data are updated in the JOPES database; and plans, redeploys, or terminates operations as necessary.

(c) The subordinate and supporting commanders execute their CINC-directed OPORDs, revalidate the sourcing and scheduling of units, report movement of organic lift, and report deployment movements on the JOPES database. These commanders conduct the operation as directed and fulfill their responsibilities to sustain their Service forces in the combat theater. USTRANSCOM components validate transportation movement planned for the first increment, adjust deployment flow and reschedule as required, and continue to develop transportation schedules for subsequent increments. Both status of movements and future movement schedules are entered in the JOPES database. Figure 7-12 summarizes the activities of the JPEC during this phase of CAP.

(3) Exchange of reports during Phase VI. Two communications are exchanged in this phase: the CJCS Execute Order addressed to the CINC with copies to the other members of the JPEC and the CINC’s Execute Order addressed to subordinates and supporting commanders.

(a) CJCS Execute Order is the authorization by the NCA to execute the military operation, i.e., the NCA-selected course of action detailed in the CINC’s OPORD. Ideally, the execution will follow the procedures outlined in the preceding phases of CAP: information will have been exchanged in OPREP-1 CINC Assessment Reports and Commander’s Estimates, guidance will have been received via the CJCS-published Warning and Planning Orders, preparation will have been permitted using the Deployment Preparation/Deployment Orders, and formal NCA direction will have been received in the Secretary of Defense-authorized Alert Order. Following these procedures, the most current guidance will have been given, periodic updates will have been received, and modifications reflecting changing conditions will have been issued as necessary. This is the preferred exchange of information.
TABLE 7-12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NCA</th>
<th>• Authorize release of Execute Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| CJCS, The Joint Staff | • Publish Execute Order to  
  C direct deployment & employment of forces  
  C set D-day & H-hour (if necessary)  
  C convey essential information not contained in the Warning & Alert Orders  
  • Monitor deployment & employment of forces  
  • Resolve or direct resolution of conflicts |
| Supported Command | • Executes OPORD  
  • Monitors force deployment  
  • Validates movement requirements in increments  
  • Resolves, reports shortfalls  
  • Controls employment of forces  
  • Issues Execute Order to subordinates  
  • Updates deployment status on JDS |
| Subordinate & Supporting Commands | • Execute supporting OPORDs  
  • Continue to furnish forces  
  • Report movement requirements |
| USTRANSCOM | • Manages common-user transportation assets for transportation of forces and supplies  
  • Reports progress of deployment to CJCS and CINC  
  • Reports lift shortfalls to CJCS for resolution |
| Services | • Sustain forces |

(b) Unfortunately, in a fast-developing crisis the CJCS Execute Order may be the first record communication generated by CJCS. The record communication may be preceded by a voice announcement. The issuance of the Execute Order is time-sensitive; the format may differ depending on the amount of previous record correspondence and applicability of prior guidance. Annex H to JOPES Volume I contains the format for the CJCS Execute Order. Information already communicated in the Warning, Planning, or Alert Orders is not repeated. Under these conditions, the Execute Order need only contain the authority to execute the operation and any additional essential guidance, such as the date and time for execution. The broad outline of information that has already passed to the JPEC in the preceding Warning, Planning, or Alert Orders includes the following:

- reference
- narrative
- authority
- situation
- mission -- a refined statement of tasks and purpose
- execution -- course of action, allocation of combat forces, coordinating instructions, C-day and D-day, expected duration, PSYOP guidance, deployability status, OPSEC, deception guidance, etc.
- admin and logistics -- allocation of strategic lift, load planning logistics factors, public affairs guidance, etc.
- command and signal -- communications guidance, command relationships and signal

(c) The recommended format for the CINC’s Execute Order to subordinates and supporting commanders is in JOPES Volume I. This follows the receipt of the CJCS message; it may give the detailed planning guidance resulting from updated or amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance that the CJCS Execute Order does not cover.

(4) ADP support. During execution the rapid exchange of information is necessary to allow a timely response to changing situations. GCCS permits communication of deployment schedules and rapid information update, and gives the JPEC the ability to monitor and report resource movement.

(5) Conclusion of Phase VI. The execution phase continues until the operation is completed or canceled.

703. CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES--MULTIPLE-CRISIS ENVIRONMENT

Reference: Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I

a. Definition. Multiple-crisis procedures apply when these conditions are met:

- Crisis Action Planning procedures are in progress for two or more crises;
- competing demands for resources exceed availability; and
- the supported commanders involved are unable to resolve the conflict of competing requirements.

b. Guidelines. The possibility exists that multiple crises that have a conflicting impact on national security issues can occur either within a single supported commander’s theater of operations or in separate theaters that involve two or more CINCs.

c. Procedures. JOPES Volume I discusses multiple-crisis guidelines to supplement the CAP single-crisis procedures. The procedures unique to multiple-crisis situations follow:
(1) Phase I -- Situation Development. There are no unique procedures in observing and reporting multiple crises.

(2) Phase II -- Crisis Assessment. The exchange of information between members of the JPEC is essential early in the planning process when elements are exploring responses to dynamic situations. When crises occur in two or more theaters, initial reports and subsequent status reports will be furnished to all the supported commanders involved.

(3) Phase III -- COA Development. The Warning Order for each crisis allocates combat force and lift resources to supported commanders. CJCS has established mechanisms for resolving conflicts over resources, such as the Joint Transportation Board (JTB) and Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB). Support forces generally will be allocated by the Services in rough proportion to the allocation of combat forces. The planning in Phase III can identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations early.

(4) Phase IV -- COA Selection. In recommending COAs to the NCA, CJCS will include the impact of each COA on other COAs approved or contemplated. If necessary, CJCS will recommend plan priority, and that resources be allocated according to that priority.

(5) Phase V -- Execution Planning. Conflicts between CINC's in satisfying resource requirements are resolved at the CJCS level. The JTB and JMPAB may be convened. Force and nonunit cargo requirements are sourced, conflicts from units assigned multiple tasks are resolved, and shortfalls from unfilled requirements are identified. USTRANSCOM will develop and integrate transportation movement schedules.

(6) Phase VI -- Execution. The recognition during the execution of one OPORD of new threats from multiple crises may require the reallocation of resources, even though existing deployments may need to be halted or redirected.

d. Summary. The planning and execution of simultaneous military operations requires early identification of conflicts and shortfalls. Early resolution permits alternative COA development, earliest possible identification of allocated resources, and effective coordination between members of the JPEC. Mechanisms exist within supported commands and at the CJCS level to resolve resource allocation problems. Guidance from the NCA or the CJCS will ultimately establish priorities and determine allocations for overcommitted forces or resources. Late resolution may result in revising the mission statements and replanning or amending existing OPORDs.
704. **JOINT PLANNING SUMMARY** Figure 7-13 illustrates the relationship between deliberate planning and Crisis Action Planning. Operation plans developed during deliberate planning are entered into the JOPES deployment database, where the data are maintained to keep them current. That information is always available to the JPEC for developing COAs and OPORDs in response to crises as they occur.

a. **Deliberate Planning** During peacetime, joint planners use the deliberate planning process to develop Concept Summaries, CONPLANs, and detailed OPLANs for contingencies as assigned in the JSCP. OPLANs are completed in detail, including a transportation-feasible TPFDD, to furnish some assurance that such major contingencies could be responded to in a timely manner should they arise. The development of an OPLAN with its detailed identification of force and sustainment requirements and their necessary phased introduction into theater can take 18 months or more. Once developed, the information is maintained in the JOPES deployment database to permit rapid retrieval and modification to meet a crisis.
b. **Crisis Action Planning** In a crisis, the luxury of time available for lengthy detailed planning does not exist. For a contingency considered in the JSCP, the JPEC may build an OPORD using or adapting an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN. For contingencies not anticipated by deliberate planning, joint planners and operators are likely to be in a NOPLAN situation. They must develop COAs, a concept of operations, and a deployment database without the months of previous planning for the contingency. However, even though the crisis at hand may not resemble existing operation plans in detail, there are probably aspects of one or more plans in the database that could be adapted to the situation, speeding up the CAP process. Even if the response to a crisis has to be completely developed without adapting plans or parts of plans in the database, the process of developing the database in deliberate planning is what keeps the JPEC familiar with the procedures, policies, and JOPES ADP capabilities that make rapid development of OPORDs possible. Throughout the CAP process, planning information is exchanged over the GCCS, on secure phone, and by OPREP messages. The product of CAP is an executable OPORD published by the supported commander. The NCA exercise the ultimate authority over selection of the COA and execution of the OPORD.

c. **The role of JOPES** The framework of policies, procedures, processes, and ADP capabilities within which the JPEC carries out both deliberate and crisis action planning is JOPES. Figure 7-14 depicts the relationship to both forms of planning of the functions of JOPES, discussed in Chapter 5. As can be seen, JOPES is an entire system for conducting joint contingency planning in both the deliberate and crisis response modes; it encompasses but is not limited to the ADP capabilities that joint planners use as tools to get the planning job done.
JOPES Functions and Joint Planning

JOPES Functions
- Threat Identification & Assessment
  - Strategy Determination
  - COA Development
  - Detailed Planning
  - Implementation

Deliberate Planning
- Phase I Initiation
- Phase II Concept Development
- Phase III Plan Development
- Phase IV Plan Review
- Phase V Supporting Plans

Crisis Action Planning
- Situation Development Phase I
- Crisis Assessment Phase II
- COA Development Phase III
- COA Selection Phase IV
- Executive Planning Phase V

Approved for Further Planning

Figure 7-14
Appendix A  Planning Directive

Planning guidance is given as early in the planning process as possible. After the CINC has received initial briefings from the staff and furnished planning guidance to them, the guidance must also be given to the subordinate and supporting commands, components, and other agencies of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) that will be involved in the coordinated planning effort. This guidance is often issued at a planning conference held by the CINC. Written planning guidance is most effective in furnishing the CINC’s guidance to all players, and, while not specifically required in JOPES procedures, is normally issued in a Planning Directive. The following format is adapted from Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01).

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Copy Number __________
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Message Reference/Number (Date-time Group, Month, Year)

PLANNING DIRECTIVE FOR (Plan designation)

( ) REFERENCES:  a. Maps or charts
b. Pertinent documents

1. ( ) Mission
   a. ( ) Write a clear and concise statement of the mission for the command.
   b. ( ) A paragraph should list the tasks, including the following:
      (1) ( ) Those assigned by higher headquarters
      (2) ( ) Deduced or implied tasks that must be described to convey a clear under-
      standing of the overall mission
   c. ( ) If the analysis of the mission or tasks has not progressed to the point where it can be formally stated, present the commander’s best estimate of the mission.

2. ( ) Commander’s Analysis
   a. ( ) This paragraph contains the commander’s analysis of the mission and, in broad terms, how the mission is to be carried out.
b. ( ) Outline, in broad terms, the phasing of the operation.

3. ( ) Assumptions
   
a. ( ) State assumptions necessary to continue planning. They will be treated as facts by subordinate commands.
   
b. ( ) The list is not final; assumptions may be added or dropped during planning.

4. ( ) Forces Apportioned. Give information on the type and availability of major combat forces.
   
a. ( ) Assigned forces
   
b. ( ) Augmenting forces

5. ( ) Proposed Courses of Action
   
a. ( ) List courses of action (COAs) to be considered by the staff. Include tentative COAs that were suggested by the commander in the planning guidance, as well as those proposed by the J-5 for consideration.
   
b. ( ) Any of these COAs may be discarded and/or refined and new ones identified and proposed as the planning process continues.

6. ( ) Guidance
   
a. ( ) Nuclear Weapons
      
      (1) ( ) Include a brief statement by the commander that outlines the conditions under which nuclear weapons might be used.
      
      (2) ( ) If their encounter or use is considered a reasonable possibility include preliminary estimates of allocations, priorities, and restraints.
   
   b. ( ) Political Considerations
      
      (1) ( ) Include guidance from higher authority.
      
      (2) ( ) List Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) or basing rights that affect the operation.
   
   c. ( ) Mobility Resources
(1) ( ) Identify strategic or tactical lift assets apportioned for planning.

(2) ( ) Highlight priorities or constraints for transportation assets.

d. ( ) Supporting and Subordinate Commands and Agencies. Give preliminary information about support from adjacent and lower echelons.

e. ( ) Command and Control. State the command and control organization selected by the commander.

f. ( ) Other. Include guidance that the commander determines to be necessary.

7. ( ) Tasks

a. ( ) Delineate staff responsibilities to begin development of staff estimates.

b. ( ) Outline Coordinating Instructions

   (1) ( ) Joint board requirements

   (2) ( ) Adjacent and subordinate command and agency coordination required

   (3) ( ) Uni-Service, common, and cross-Servicing coordination required

8. ( ) Administration

a. ( ) Planning Schedule

   (1) ( ) Planning conferences scheduled

   (2) ( ) Plan completion suspense

   (3) ( ) Annex completion suspense

   (4) ( ) Other milestone events determined to be necessary

b. ( ) Interstaff Liaison Instructions

c. ( ) Coordination

   (1) ( ) Action officer designation

   (2) ( ) Reports known or anticipated
Appendix B Personnel Estimate

This description is adapted from Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01).

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Section, Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date-time Group, Month, Year

PERSONNEL ESTIMATE NUMBER ____________

( ) REFERENCES:  
  a. Maps and charts
  b. Other pertinent documents

1. ( ) Mission. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander’s mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements.

2. ( ) Situation and Considerations

  a. ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operation. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting personnel activities.

  b. ( ) Enemy Forces

    (1) ( ) Strength and Dispositions. Refer to current intelligence estimate.

    (2) ( ) Enemy Capabilities. Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on personnel matters.

  c. ( ) Friendly Forces

*When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

**Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.
(1) ( ) Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.

(2) ( ) Own Courses of Action. State the proposed COAs under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.

(3) ( ) Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments necessary in initial and subsequent phases of the operation proposed.

d. ( ) Logistics Situation. State known logistics problems, if any, that may affect the personnel situation.

e. ( ) Command, Control, and Communications Situation. State the command, control, and communications situation, emphasizing known problems that may affect the personnel situation.

f. ( ) Assumptions. State assumptions about the personnel situation made for this estimate. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain personnel assumptions that may have been made in preparing this estimate should be stated here.

g. ( ) Special Features. List anything not covered elsewhere in the estimate that may influence the personnel situation. For example, identify civil and indigenous labor resources available or essential to support military operations.

h. ( ) Personnel Situation. State known or anticipated personnel problems that may influence selection of a specific COA.

3. ( ) Personnel Analysis of Own Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of the personnel factors influencing the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of that influence and to isolate the personnel implications that should be weighed by the commander in the Commander’s Estimate of the Situation.

a. ( ) Analyze each COA from the personnel point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

b. ( ) The personnel factors described in paragraph 2 establish the elements to be analyzed for each COA under consideration. Examine these personnel factors realistically and include appropriate considerations of climate and weather, terrain, hydrography, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may have an impact on the personnel situation as it affects the COAs.
Throughout the analysis, keep personnel considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision but to ensure that all applicable personnel factors have been considered and to be the basis of paragraphs 4 and 5.

4. Comparison of Own Courses of Action
   a. List the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA--from the J-1’s point of view.
   b. Use a worksheet similar to the one in the Commander’s Estimate, if necessary.

5. Conclusions
   a. State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a personnel standpoint.
   b. State which COA under consideration can best be supported from a personnel standpoint.
   c. Identify the major personnel deficiencies that must be brought to the commander’s attention. Include recommendations of methods to eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

   (Signed) ____________________________
   J-1

ANNEXES: Use annexes when the information is in such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. Annexes should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)
Appendix C Intelligence Estimate

This description is adapted from Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01).

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Section, Issuign Headquarters
Place of Issue
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER ________________

( ) REFERENCES: a. Maps and charts
    b. Other relevant documents

1. ( ) Mission. State the assigned task and its purpose. The mission of the command
   as a whole is taken from the commander’s mission analysis, planning guidance, or other
   statement.

2. ( ) Enemy Situation. State conditions that exist and indicate effects of these condi-
   tions on enemy capabilities and the assigned mission. This paragraph describes the area of
   operations, the enemy military situation, and the effect of these two factors on enemy ca-
   pabilities.

    a. ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operations. Discuss the effect of the physical
       characteristics of the area of operations on military activities of both combatants. If an
       analysis of the area has been prepared separately, this paragraph in the intelligence estimate
       may simply refer to it, then discuss the effects of the existing situation on military
       operations in the area.

       (1) ( ) Military Geography
           (a) ( ) Topography

*When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the
heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate
is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other
official according to local policy.

**Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.
1. ( ) Existing Situation. Describe relief and drainage, vegetation, surface materials, cultural features, and other characteristics in terms of their effect on key terrain, observation, fields of fire, obstacles, cover and concealment, avenues of approach, lines of communication, and landing areas and zones.

2. ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effect of topography on broad enemy capabilities such as attack and defense, describing generally how the topography affects each type of activity. The effect on employment of nuclear and CB weapons; amphibious, airborne, or airlanded forces; surveillance devices and systems; communications equipment and systems; electronic warfare; psychological operations, OPSEC, and military deception; logistics support; and other appropriate considerations should be included.

3. ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of topography on friendly forces’ military operations (attack, defense, etc.) in the same fashion as for enemy capabilities in the preceding subparagraphs.

(b) ( ) Hydrography

1. ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the nature of the coastline; adjacent islands; location, extent, and capacity of landing beaches and their approaches and exits; nature of the offshore approaches, including type of bottom and gradients; natural obstacles; surf, tide, and current conditions.

2. ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing situation on broad enemy capabilities.

3. ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(c) ( ) Climate and Weather

1. ( ) Existing Situation. Describe temperature, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, light data, and other climate and weather conditions and their general effects on roads, rivers, soil trafficability, and observation.

2. ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing climate and weather situation on broad enemy capabilities.

3. ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing climate and weather situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(2) ( ) Transportation
(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe roads, railways, inland waterways, airfields, and other physical characteristics of the transportation system; capabilities of the transportation system in terms of rolling stock, barge capacities, and terminal facilities; and other pertinent data.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(3) ( ) Telecommunications

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe telecommunications facilities and capabilities in the area.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing telecommunications situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing telecommunications situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(4) ( ) Politics

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the organization and operation of civil government in the area of operation.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Consider the effects of the political situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Consider the effects of the political situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(5) ( ) Economics

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe industry, public works and utilities, finance, banking, currency, commerce, agriculture, trades and professions, labor force, and other related factors.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the economic situation on broad enemy capabilities.
(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the economic situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(6) ( ) Sociology

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe language, religion, social institutions and attitudes, minority groups, population distribution, health and sanitation, and other related factors.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(7) ( ) Science and Technology

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the level of science and technology in the area of operations.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of science and technology on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of science and technology on broad COAs for friendly forces.

b. ( ) Enemy Military Situation (Ground, Naval, Air, Other Service)

(1) ( ) Strength. State the number and size of enemy units committed and enemy reinforcements available for use in the area of operations. Ground strength, air power, naval forces, nuclear and CB weapons, electronic warfare, unconventional warfare, surveillance potential, and all other strengths (that might be significant) are considered.

(2) ( ) Composition. Outline the structure of enemy forces (order of battle) and describe unusual organizational features, identity, armament, and weapon systems.

(3) ( ) Location and Disposition. Describe the geographic location of enemy forces in the area, including fire support elements; command and control facilities; air, naval, and missile forces; and bases.

(4) ( ) Availability of Reinforcements. Describe enemy reinforcement capabilities in terms of ground, air, naval, missile, nuclear, and CB forces and weapons; terrain, weather, road and rail nets, transportation, replacements, labor forces, prisoner of war policy; and possible aid from sympathetic or participating neighbors.
 Movements and Activities. Describe the latest known enemy activities in the area.

Logistics. Describe levels of supply, resupply ability, and capacity of beaches, ports, roads, railways, airfields, and other facilities to support supply and resupply. Consider hospitalization and evacuation, military construction, labor resources, and maintenance of combat equipment.

Operational Capability to Launch Missiles. Describe the total missile capability that can be brought to bear on forces operating in the area, including characteristics of missile systems, location and capacity of launch or delivery units, initial and sustained launch rates, size and location of stockpiles, and other pertinent factors.

Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft. Describe the total aircraft inventory by type, performance characteristics of operational aircraft, initial and sustained sortie rates of aircraft by type, and other pertinent factors.

Operational Capabilities of Combatant Vessels. Describe the number, type, and operational characteristics of ships, boats, and craft in the naval inventory; base location; and capacity for support.

Technical Characteristics of Equipment. Describe the technical characteristics of major items of equipment in the enemy inventory not already considered (such as missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels).

Electronics Intelligence. Describe the enemy intelligence-gathering capability using electronic devices.

Nuclear and CB Weapons. Describe the types and characteristics of nuclear and CB weapons in the enemy inventory, stockpile data, delivery capabilities, nuclear and CB employment policies and techniques, and other pertinent factors.

Significant Strengths and Weaknesses. Discuss the significant enemy strengths and weaknesses perceived from the facts presented in the preceding subparagphs.

c. Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation

Guerrilla. Describe the enemy capability for, policy with regard to, and current status in the area of guerrilla or insurgent operations.

Psychological. Describe enemy doctrine, techniques, methods, organization for, and conduct of psychological operations in the area of operations.
3. (  ) Enemy Capabilities. List each enemy capability that can affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Each enemy capability should contain information on the following: What the enemy forces can do. Where they can do it. When they can start it and get it done. What strength they can devote to the task. In describing enemy capabilities, the J-2 must be able to tell the commander what the enemy can do using its forces in a joint effort. First, of course, the J-2 must assess the enemy’s ground, naval, and air forces. It is customary to enumerate separately the nuclear, CB, and unconventional warfare capacities. Hypothetical examples follow:

a. (  ) Ground Capabilities

(1) (  ) The enemy can attack at any time along our front with an estimated 6 infantry divisions and 2 tank divisions supported by 24 battalions of artillery.

(2) (  ) The enemy can defend now in its present position with 7 infantry divisions supported by 2 tank divisions and 16 battalions of medium and light artillery.

(3) (  ) The enemy can reinforce its attack (or defense) with all or part of the following units in the times and places indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>315th Airborne Div</td>
<td>Vic RESOGA</td>
<td>8 hrs. after starting time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st Motorized</td>
<td>Vic CARDINAL</td>
<td>6 hrs. after starting time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. (  ) Air Capabilities

(1) (  ) Starting now, and based on an estimated strength of 300 fighters and 100 medium bomber aircraft, the enemy can attack in the area of operations with 240 fighter sorties per day for the first 2 days, followed by a sustained rate of 150 sorties per day, and 60 bomber sorties per day, for 1 day followed by a sustained rate of 48 sorties per day.

(2) (  ) Using airfields in the vicinity of __________, the enemy has sufficient transport sorties to lift one regiment in a single lift to airfields in the vicinity of ________, ________, and ________ within 4 hours’ flying time.
c. ( ) Naval Capabilities. Starting now, the enemy can conduct sustained sea and air operations in the entire area with 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 1 CV, 7 SSNs, a mine force of 20 craft, and 70 gunboats and smaller craft now on station in the area.

d. ( ) Nuclear Capabilities. The enemy can employ at any time and in any part of the area of operations an estimated 40 to 60 nuclear weapons of yields from 2 to 50 kt delivered by cannon and rocket artillery, guided missile, and aircraft.

e. ( ) CB Capabilities. The enemy can employ the CB agents ______, ______, and ______ in the area of operations at any time delivered by air, cannon, and rocket artillery and by guided missile.

f. ( ) UW Capability. The enemy can conduct UW operations in the area within 10 days after starting the operation using dissident ethnic elements and the political adversaries of the current government.

g. ( ) Joint Capabilities. The enemy can continue to defend in its present position with 6 infantry divisions, supported by 16 artillery battalions, and reinforced by 3 mechanized divisions within 8 hours after starting movement.

   Enemy defense also can be supported by 150 fighter sorties daily for a sustained period and by continuous naval surface and air operations employing 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 7 SSNs, and 1 CV.

4. ( ) Analysis of Enemy Capabilities. Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission, considering all applicable factors from paragraph 2 above, and attempt to determine and give reasons for the relative order probability of adoption by the enemy. Discuss enemy vulnerabilities. In this paragraph, examine the enemy capability by discussing the factors that favor or militate against its adoption by the enemy. When applicable, the analysis of each capability should also include a discussion of enemy vulnerabilities attendant to that capability, e.g., conditions or circumstances of the enemy situation that render the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. Finally, the analysis should include a discussion of any indications that point to possible adoption of the capability. For example, the following:

   a. ( ) Attack now with forces along the forward edge of the battle area . . .

      (1) ( ) The following factors favor the enemy’s adoption of this capability:

         (a) ( ) . . .

         (b) ( ) . . .
(2) ( ) The following factors militate against the enemy’s adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) Road and rail nets will not support large-scale troop and supply movements necessary for an attack in the area.

(b) ( ) Terrain in the area does not favor an attack.

(3) ( ) Adoption of this capability will expose the enemy’s west flank to counterattack.

(4) ( ) Except for minor patrol activity in the area, there are no indications of adoption of this capability.

b. ( ) Delay from present positions along the ____ River lie . . . .

(1) ( ) The following factors favor the enemy’s adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) There are several excellent natural barriers between the river and the mountains.

(b) ( ) The effectiveness of the water barriers will improve, and trafficability on the upland slopes of the terrain barriers will deteriorate with advent of the monsoon.

(2) ( ) The following factors militate against the enemy’s adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) . . . .

(b) ( ) . . . .

(3) ( ) In the adoption of this capability, the enemy’s lines of communication will be restricted by a limited road and rail net that can easily be interdicted.

(4) ( ) The following facts indicate adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) Aerial photography indicates some preparation of barriers in successive positions.

(b) ( ) Considerable troop movement and pre-positioning of floating bridge equipment along the water barriers have been detected.
5. ( ) Conclusions. Conclusions resulting from discussion in paragraph 4 above. Include, when possible, a concise statement of the effects of each capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Cite enemy vulnerabilities where applicable. This paragraph contains a summary of enemy capabilities most likely to be adopted, listed in the order of relative probability if sufficient information is available to permit such an estimate. If appropriate, it should also include a concise statement of the effects of each enemy capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Exploitable vulnerabilities should also be listed, where applicable.

a. ( ) Enemy Capabilities in Relative Probability of Adoption

   (1) ( ) Defend in present locations with . . . .

   (2) ( ) Delay from present positions along . . . .

   (3) ( ) Reinforce the defense or delay with . . . .

   (4) ( ) Conduct UW operations in the area . . . .

b. ( ) Vulnerabilities

   (1) ( ) Enemy left (west) flank is open to envelopment by amphibious assault . . . .

   (2) ( ) The enemy’s air search radar coverage is poor in the left (west) portion of its defensive sector . . . .

(Signed)_________________________

J-2

(The staff division chief signs the staff estimates produced by that division. If the estimate is to be distributed outside the headquarters, the heading and signature block must be changed to reflect that fact.)

ANNEXES: (By letter and title) Annexes should be included where the information is in graphs or of such detail and volume that inclusion makes the body of the estimate cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)
Appendix D  Logistic Estimate

This description is adapted from Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01).

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Division, Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date-time Group, Month, Year

LOGISTIC ESTIMATE NUMBER ____________

( ) REFERENCES:  a. Maps and charts
               b. Other pertinent documents

1. ( ) Mission.  State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander’s mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements.

2. ( ) Situation and Considerations

   a. ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operation.  Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting logistics activities.

   b. ( ) Enemy Forces

      (1) ( ) Strength and Dispositions.  Refer to current intelligence estimate.

      (2) ( ) Enemy Capabilities.  Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on the logistics situation. Describe enemy abilities to interdict strategic sealift and airlift, to attack and reduce the

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**Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.
effectiveness of transportation nodes, and to attack pre-positioned stocks ashore and afloat, if applicable.

c. ( ) Friendly Forces

   (1) ( ) Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.

   (2) ( ) Own Courses of Action. State the proposed COAs under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.

   (3) ( ) Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments and logistics preparations necessary in all phases of the operation proposed.

d. ( ) Logistics Situation. State known personnel problems, if any, that may affect the logistics situation.

e. ( ) Command, Control, and Communications Situation. State the command, control, and communications situation, emphasizing known command, control, and communications problems that may affect the logistics situation.

f. ( ) Assumptions. State assumptions about the logistics aspects of the situation made for this estimate. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain logistics assumptions may have been made in preparing this estimate, and those should be stated.

g. ( ) Special Features. Special features not covered elsewhere in the estimate that may influence the logistics situation may be stated here.

h. ( ) Logistics Situation

   (1) ( ) Supply and Service Installations. Describe and give location of key supply and service installations that will be used to support the operation.

   (2) ( ) Supply. State availability of PWRS, authorized levels of supply, known deficiencies of supply stocks and supply systems, and responsibilities and policies regarding supply.

   (3) ( ) Transportation. List air, sea, and surface transportation availability, coordination, regulations, lift capability, responsibilities, and policies regarding supply.
4. ( ) Medical Services. Describe availability of evacuation and hospital facilities and medical responsibilities and policies, including the anticipated evacuation policy.

5. ( ) Civil Engineering Support. List responsibilities for civil engineering support, limiting factors, and other appropriate considerations.

6. ( ) Miscellaneous. Include other logistics matters not considered elsewhere that may influence selection of a specific COA. Include identity of known deficiencies of combat service support. Include identity of civil and indigenous material resources available or essential to support military operations. Also, consider the requirement to meet minimum essential needs of civil populace for whom the commander may become responsible.

3. ( ) Logistic Analysis of Own Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of the logistics factors influencing the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of that influence. The objective of this analysis is to determine if the logistics requirements can be met and to isolate the logistics implications that should be weighed by the commander in the Commander’s Estimate of the Situation.

   a. ( ) Analyze each COA from the logistics point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

   b. ( ) For each COA under consideration, analyze the logistics factors described in paragraph 2. Examine these factors realistically from the standpoint of requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities, climate and weather, hydrography, time and space, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may have an impact on the logistics situation as it affects the COAs.

   c. ( ) Throughout the analysis, keep logistics considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision; it is intended to ensure that all applicable logistics factors have been properly considered and serve as the basis for the comparisons in paragraph 4.

4. ( ) Comparison of Own Courses of Action

   a. ( ) List the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA--from the J-4 point of view.

   b. ( ) Use a worksheet similar to that used for the Commander’s Estimate, if necessary.
5. ( ) Conclusions

   a. ( ) State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a logistics standpoint.

   b. ( ) State which COA under consideration can best be supported from a logistics standpoint.

   c. ( ) Identify the major logistics deficiencies that must be brought to the commander’s attention. Include recommendations concerning the methods to eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

      (Signed) __________________________

      J-4

ANNEXES: (By letter and title). Use annexes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. Annexes should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)
Appendix E

Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Estimate

This description is adapted from Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01).

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Division, Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date-time Group, Month, Year

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS ESTIMATE NUMBER ____________

( ) REFERENCES:  
  a. Maps and charts
  b. Other pertinent documents

1. ( ) Mission. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the command’s mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements.

2. ( ) Situation and Considerations

   a. ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operation. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting C4 activities.

   b. ( ) Enemy Forces

      (1) ( ) Strength and Dispositions. Refer to current intelligence estimate.

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*When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

**Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.
(2) ( ) Enemy Capabilities. Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on the C4 situation.

c. ( ) Friendly Forces

(1) ( ) Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.

(2) ( ) Own Courses of Action. State the proposed COAs under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.

(3) ( ) Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments and C4 preparations necessary in all phases of the operation proposed. IW against enemy capabilities should be included.

d. ( ) Personnel Situation. State known personnel problems that may affect the C4 situation.

e. ( ) Logistic Situation. State known logistics problems that may affect the C4 situation.

f. ( ) Assumptions. State assumptions about the C4 aspects of the situation made for this estimate. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain C4 assumptions may have been made in preparing this estimate, and those should be stated here.

g. ( ) Special Features. State special features that are not covered elsewhere in the estimate but that may influence the C4 situation.

h. ( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Situation. Consideration should be given to line-of-sight communications, satellite communications (SATCOM), UHF SATCOM, ground mobile command post, the DSCS Ground Mobile Segment, and DCS Interface.

*(1) ( ) C2 Communications

*(2) ( ) Administrative Communications

Each subparagraph analyzes systems requirements, identifies capability and availability of equipment, and identifies facilities, installations, and units needed to satisfy requirements and furnish adequate support for the subject of that paragraph.
3. ( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Analysis of Own Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of the C4 factors influencing the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of that influence. The objective of this analysis is to isolate the C4 implications that should be weighed by the commander in the Commander’s Estimate of the Situation.

   a. ( ) Analyze each COA from a C4 point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

   b. ( ) The C4 factors in paragraph 2 are the elements to be analyzed for each COA under consideration. Examine these factors realistically and include appropriate considerations of climate and weather, hydrography, time and space, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may have an impact on the C4 situation as it affects the COAs.

   c. ( ) Throughout the analysis, keep C4 foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision but to ensure that all applicable factors have been properly considered and serve as the basis for the comparisons in paragraph 4.

4. ( ) Comparison of Own Courses of Action

   a. ( ) As in the Commander’s Estimate, list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed course of action from the J-6 point of view.

   b. ( ) Use a worksheet similar to the one in the Commander’s Estimate, if necessary.
5. ( ) Conclusions

   a. ( ) State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a C4 standpoint.

   b. ( ) State which COA under consideration can best be supported from a C4 standpoint.

   c. ( ) Identify the major C4 deficiencies that must be brought to the commander’s attention. Include recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the effects of those deficiencies.

   (Signed) _____________________________

   J-6

ANNEXES: (By letter and title.) Use annexes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate. Subject areas that should be discussed are communications security, C4 systems protection (including identification of initial nodes), and communications planning.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)
Appendix F Commander’s Estimate of the Situation

This description is adapted from Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01).

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
Place
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

( ) REFERENCES: a. Maps and charts
b. Other pertinent documents

1. ( ) Mission. State the assigned or deduced task and its purpose. If the mission is multiple, determine priorities. List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, necessary to the accomplishment of the mission.

2. ( ) The Situation and Courses of Action

   a. ( ) Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Determine and analyze factors that will influence the choice of a COA as well as those that affect the capabilities of the enemy. Consider any of the following and other factors that are involved, include under each a statement of each fact (or an assumption, if necessary), and deduce the probable influence on enemy or friendly actions.

      (1) ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operations

         (a) ( ) Military Geography

1. ( ) Topography. Consider factors of relief and drainage, vegetation, surface materials, and similar characteristics because they affect such elements of an operation as observation, maneuver, fire support, concealment, cover, air and surface movement, LOCs, avenues of approach, key
terrain, nuclear and CB weapons employment, electronic emissions of all types, and unconventional, psychological, and other significant activities.

2. ( ) Hydrography. Include the characteristics of offshore areas, approaches to the beaches, currents, tides, the beaches themselves, ports, docks, and similar maritime considerations.

3. ( ) Climate and Weather. Determine and state extremes of temperature, wind velocities, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, and other such factors that can affect military operations. Sunrise, sunset, and twilight data are normally given in this subparagraph.

(b) ( ) Transportation. Indicate characteristics of roads, railways, inland waterways, and airfields, including such factors as size, capacity, conditions, and other facts that affect enemy capabilities and friendly COA.

(c) ( ) Telecommunications. List radio, cable, landline, and other communications facilities in the area of operations that might aid in the exercise of command over military forces. Facilities considered by this subparagraph are not those in the organic capability of the opposing forces, but rather those present in the area.

(d) ( ) Politics. Include such considerations as political stability, alliances, relations with other countries, aspects of international law, control over subversion and dissidence, and similar factors that may influence selection of a COA. Neutrality or nonneutrality of neighboring states in the area is often listed here.

(e) ( ) Economics. Include the organization of the economy and sometimes its mobilization capacity; the industrial base of the antagonists to support hostilities, finance, and foreign trade; and similar influences as they affect selection of a COA.

(f) ( ) Sociology. Consider social conditions, which run a wide range from the psychological ability of the populace to withstand the rigors of war to health and sanitation conditions in the area of operations. Language, social institutions and attitudes, and similar factors that may affect selection of a COA must be considered.

(g) ( ) Science and Technology. Although little immediate military impact may result from the state of science and technology in a target area, consider the long-range effects of such factors as technical skill level of the population and scientific and technical resources in manpower and facilities in cases where they may affect the choice of a COA.
(2) Relative Combat Power

(a) Enemy

1. Strength. Give number and size of enemy units committed and those available for reinforcement in the area. This is not intended to be a tabulation of numbers of aircraft, ships, missiles, or other military weaponry. Rather, it is a study of what strength the enemy commander can bring to bear in the area in terms of ground units committed and reinforcing; aircraft sortie rates, missile delivery rates; and unconventional, psychological, and other strengths the commander thinks may affect the balance of power.

2. Composition. Include order of battle of major enemy combat formations, equivalent strengths of enemy and friendly units, and major weapon systems and armaments in the enemy arsenal and their operational characteristics.

3. Location and Disposition. Indicate geographic location of enemy units; fire support elements; command and control facilities; air, naval, and missile forces; and other combat power in or deployable to the area of operations.

4. Reinforcements. Estimate the enemy reinforcement capabilities that can influence the battle in the area under consideration. This study should include ground, air, naval, and missile forces; nuclear, CB, and other advanced weapon systems; and an estimate of the relative capacity to move these forces about, to, and in the battle area.

5. Logistics. Summarize enemy ability to support the capabilities with which it has been credited and include such considerations as supply, maintenance, hospitalization and evacuation, transportation, labor, construction, and other essential logistics means. Broadly speaking, it is a feasibility test for enemy capabilities.

6. Time and Space Factors. Estimate where and when initial forces and reinforcements can be deployed and employed. Such a study will normally include distances and travel times by land, sea, and air from major bases or mounting areas into the battle area.

7. Combat Efficiency. Estimate enemy state of training, readiness, battle experience, physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation, tactical doctrine, discipline, and whatever significant strengths or weaknesses may appear.

(b) Friendly. In general, follow the same pattern used for analysis of the enemy when appraising the commander’s own force. The descriptions of what to consider and the approach to the problem outlined in subparagraph 2a (2) (a) apply to the analysis of friendly forces.
(3) Assumptions. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors on which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such in paragraph 2 of the Commander’s Estimate.

(a) Enemy Capabilities. State the enemy capabilities that can affect the accomplishment of the operations envisioned.

(b) Own Courses of Action. State all practicable COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission.

3. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. Determine the probable effect of each enemy capability on the success of each of the commander’s own COAs.

4. Comparison of Own Courses of Action. Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each of the commander’s COAs with respect to the governing factors. Decide which COA promises to be the most successful in accomplishing the mission.

5. Decision. Translate the COA selected into a concise statement of what the force as a whole is to do, and as much of the elements of when, where, how, and why as may be appropriate.

(Signed) __________________________
Commander

ANNEXES: (As required: by letter and title)

DISTRIBUTION: (According to policies and procedures of the issuing headquarters)

*Obtained from the Intelligence Estimate of the Situation
Appendix G  CINC’s Strategic Concept

This description is adapted from Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01).

This annex contains guidance for the format and content of the Basic Plan and CINC’s Strategic Concept to be used for the development of operation plans (OPLANs) or concept plans (CONPLANs). The Strategic Concept format will be used to forward the CINC’s concept of operations for CJCS concept review.

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
Address
Date

Command Plan Number (U)
Plan Title

( ) REFERENCES: List any maps, charts, or other documents essential to comprehension of the Basic Plan.

( ) TASK ORGANIZATION. Annex A

1. ( ) Situation

   a. ( ) General. Describe the general politico-military environment that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan. When submitting a CINC’s Strategic Concept, include as an opening statement in this subparagraph a reference to the task assignment from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) or other task-assigning document. Summarize the competing political goals that caused the conflict. Identify primary antagonists. State U.S. policy goals and the estimated goals of other parties, and political decisions wanted from other countries in order to obtain U.S. policy goals and conduct effective U.S. military operations to attain U.S. military missions.

   b. ( ) Area of Concern

      (1) ( ) Area of Responsibility. Describe the geography of the commander’s area of responsibility. A map may also be included as an attachment.
(2) ( ) Area of Interest. Describe the geography of the general area of interest covered by the CINC’s Strategic Concept and/or Basic Plan. This description should cover all air, ground, and sea areas that directly affect the operation. A map may also be included as attachments.

(3) ( ) Area of Operations. Describe the geography of the specific areas to be covered in each option contained in the CINC’s Strategic Concept and/or Basic Plan. Maps may also be included as attachments.

c. ( ) Deterrent Options. Delineate desired deterrent options, including categories specified in the current JSCP. Specific units (type of units for CINC’s Strategic Concept format) and resources will be prioritized in terms of LAD relative to C-day. Include possible military support for diplomatic, political, or economic deterrent options that would support U.S. mission accomplishment.

d. ( ) Enemy Forces. Identify the opposing forces expected on execution and praise their general capabilities. When preparing the Basic Plan, the reader may be referred to Annex B for details; however, include the information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitude of the hostile threat. When preparing a CINC’s Strategic Concept, include all information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitude of the hostile threat.

e. ( ) Friendly Forces

(1) ( ) Describe the operations of unassigned forces, other than those assigned the task of supporting this operation, that could have a direct significant influence on the operations envisaged in this plan.

(2) ( ) List the specific tasks of friendly forces, commands, or Government agencies that would directly support OPORD execution (e.g., USCINCTRANS, CINCSAC, DIA).

f. ( ) Assumptions. List the necessary assumptions, including common assumptions contained in the JSCP or other task-assigning document, on which the plan is based (i.e., those contingent conditions the absence of which will have a significant impact on this plan or supporting plans). State expected conditions over which the commander has no control. Include assumptions that are directly relevant to the development of this plan and supporting plans and assumptions that express conditions that, should they not occur as expected, would invalidate the entire OPLAN/CONPLAN or its concept of operations. Include additional assumptions relevant to specific aspects of the operation in appropriate annexes. Specify the degree of mobilization assumed (e.g., full, partial, or none) and applicability of the Presidential 200,000 Selected Reserve callup authority.
g. ( ) Legal Considerations. List significant legal considerations on which the plan is based.

2. ( ) Mission. State concisely the task and purpose to be accomplished on execution. This statement should answer the following questions: who, what, when, where, why, and sometimes how. State the mission of the commander originating the plan (e.g., the mission may be the task assigned by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or it may be deduced from the Commander’s Estimate based on a task assigned by the Chairman). If the plan being prepared is a supporting plan, indicate the plan that it supports and include, when applicable, plans prepared by commanders of allied forces.

3. ( ) Execution

   a. ( ) Concept of Operations. For most OPLANs, CONPLANs, and the CINC’s Strategic Concept, include the entire concept of operations in this section. However, some OPLANs necessarily encompass alternative COAs for accomplishing the mission, and others require considerable detail to convey adequate guidance for the development of supporting plans. Accordingly, the entire concept may be placed in Annex C.

      (1) ( ) General. Base the concept of operations on the Commander’s Estimate of the Situation. The estimate states how the commander intends to accomplish his mission, including the forces involved; the time-phasing of operations; the general nature and purpose of operations to be conducted; and the interrelated or cross-Service support, coordination, and cooperation necessary to successful execution. The concept of operations should be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of the level and duration of conflict to give supporting and subordinate commanders a basis for preparing adequate supporting plans. A graphic timeline may be used to assist in describing the various options or phases covered in the concept, including items such as warning and response times, major deployments, and employment phases. The concept should show how the initiative will be gained, security against enemy actions will be maintained, and superiority and surprise will be achieved. Requirements to maintain essential secrecy and to use theater or tactical military deception initiatives during the planning and preparatory phases, during movement to objective areas, and after operations are over should be briefly outlined. In the Basic Plan, reference should be made to Annex A for detailed force requirements. Alternatively, if commanders are planning for sustained armed conflict in their theater, the concept of operations should outline land, air, maritime, and unconventional warfare, psychological operations campaigns, and broad concepts for their mutually supporting conduct. A knowledge that details of campaigns cannot be determined before armed conflict, sufficient detail should be included to guide force structure, organization, and development, and the planning and conduct of preconflict operations.

      (2) ( ) OPLAN Structure. For plans covering situations that could involve armed conflict, the concept of operations will include a separate description for each stage of deterrence and warfighting as depicted in the JSCP.
(3) Employment. Describe the concept of how the forces are employed in each of the stages, options, and phases contained in OPLAN structure listed above. The concept should clearly outline plans for the use of nuclear weapons and chemical munitions or agents, if any. Plans to conduct supporting operations (e.g., EW, PSYOP, SOW, SAR, deception, and reconnaissance) will be indicated in this section for the CINC’s Strategic Concept or by reference to appropriate appendixes of Annex C for the Basic Plan. When a nuclear or deception appendix is not prepared for Annex C, a statement to that effect will be made in this paragraph. A graphic timeline may be used to assisting in describing the various options and phases covered.

(4) Deployment. Summarize the requirements to deploy forces from their normal peacetime locations to the area of operations. Such deployments may include those to be carried out within the command area, as well as deployments of augmentation forces. Particular attention should be given to expected deployments that may be required in order to implement and support the plan when directed. Consideration should also be given to the deployment of rapid reaction forces as a partial implementation of the plan and to deception measures required to provide security, mislead the enemy, and achieve surprise. A graphic timeline may be used to assist in describing the various options and phases covered.

b. Tasks. List the tasks assigned to each element of the supported and supporting commands in separate numbered sub-subparagraphs. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed either in future planning for the operation or on execution of the OPORD. The task assignment should encompass all key actions that subordinate and supporting elements must perform in order to fulfill the concept of operations, including theater and tactical military deceptions. However, do not link the actions to deception. If the actions cannot stand alone without exposing the deception, they must be published only in the deception appendix (C-7) to the plan in order to receive special handling. When the plan requires the establishment of a subordinate joint force, tasks are assigned to the component commanders, supporting commanders, and subordinate joint force commanders, as appropriate. The support that each component is expected to give another is stated.

c. Coordinating Instructions. List the instructions applicable to the entire command or two or more elements of the command that are necessary for proper coordination of the operation but are not appropriate for inclusion in a particular annex. Coordinating instructions establish, in particular, the conditions for execution. Terms pertaining to the timing of execution and deployments should be explained, as should other operational terms that appear in the plan but are not defined in the Joint Staff publications.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Concept of Support. In preparing the Basic Plan, most guidance on Service support is normally contained in a series of detailed annexes listed in the subsequent su
paragraphs. For a general understanding of the requirements for logistics support, personnel policies, and administrative plans, this subparagraph should include broad guidance as to how such support is to be furnished. Additional subparagraphs refer to the annexes that contain detailed guidance on each major aspect of support. When preparing the CINC’s Strategic Concept, this subparagraph will state the same broad guidance as to how such support is to be furnished and, instead of referring to specific annexes in the subsequent subparagraphs, will contain additional summary-level guidance.

b. Logistics. In preparing a Basic Plan, refer to Annex D. When preparing the CINC’s Strategic Concept, state the policies, guidance, and procedures to support options for operations contained in the CINC’s Strategic Concept. Logistics phases will be concurrent with operational phases. This subparagraph should cover sustainment priorities and resources; base development and other civil engineering requirements; host-nation support; and inter-Service responsibilities. The priority and movement of major logistics items should be identified for each option and phase of the concept. Strategic and theater ports for resupply should be identified. Transportation policies, guidance, and procedures for all options should be outlined. Logistics and transportation assumptions should be identified and included with other plan assumptions in subparagraph l.f. Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate task assignments.

c. Personnel. In preparing a Basic Plan, refer to Annex E. When preparing the CINC’s Strategic Concept, state the policies, guidance, and procedures to support options contained in the CINC’s Strategic Concept. Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate task assignments. Assign tasks for establishing and operating joint personnel facilities and making provisions for staffing them. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, command replacement policies, and required staff augmentation to command headquarters.

d. Public Affairs. In preparing the Basic Plan refer to Annex F.

e. Civil Affairs. In preparing the Basic Plan refer to Annex G.

f. Environmental Services. In preparing the Basic Plan refer to Annex H.

g. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. In preparing the Basic Plan refer to Annex M.

h. Medical Services. In preparing the Basic Plan, refer to Annex Q. When preparing the CINC’s Strategic Concept, outline the policies and guidance for medical care and support. Identify planning requirements and subordinate task assignments for hospitalization and evacuation. Describe critical medical supplies and resources. Assign tasks for establishing joint medical authorities and provisions for staffing them. Medical assumptions should be identified and included in subparagraph 1f, Assumptions. Wartime host-nation support agreements or provisions to support should be referenced in Annex P.
5. ( ) Command and Control

   a. ( ) Command Relationships. In preparing a Basic Plan refer to Annex J. When preparing the CINC’s Strategic Concept, state the organizational structure expected to exist during plan implementation. Indicate any changes to major command and control organizations and the time of the expected shift. Identify all Command Arrangement Agreements (CAAs) and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) used and those that require development.

   b. ( ) Command Posts. List the designations and locations of each major headquarters involved in execution. When headquarters are to be deployed or the OPLAN provides for the relocation of headquarters to an alternate command post, indicate the location and time of opening and closing of each headquarters.

   c. ( ) Succession to Command. Designate in order of succession the commanders responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific applicable circumstances.

   d. ( ) Command, Control, and Communications Systems. State generally the scope of C3 systems and procedures required to support the operation. Highlight any C3 systems or procedures requiring special emphasis. When preparing a Basic Plan, refer the reader to Annex K for details.

   \[/\]
   General
   Commander in Chief

Annexes: (For a Basic Plan, list only those actually published.) Listing not required when preparing CINC’s Strategic Concept.

A--TASK ORGANIZATION
B--INTELLIGENCE
C--OPERATIONS
D--LOGISTICS
E--PERSONNEL
F--PUBLIC AFFAIRS
G--CIVIL AFFAIRS
H--ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
J--COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
K--COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
L--OPERATIONS SECURITY
M--MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY
N--SPACE OPERATIONS
P--WARTIME HOST-NATION SUPPORT
Q--MEDICAL SERVICES
R--CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES
X--EXECUTION CHECKLIST
Z--DISTRIBUTION

OFFICIAL:
s/
t/
Rank
Director, J-5
Appendix H  Operation Order (OPORD)

Adapted from Joint Pub 1-03.8 (to become CJCSM 3150.05), Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), and MIL-STD 6040.

This appendix contains a description of the general format for an operation order (OPORD) used in Crisis Action Planning (CAP), and an overview of the kinds of information included in it and how that information is organized. Annex J to Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), parts of which are used in this description, contains a detailed example of an OPORD. This appendix is offered as a general reference, most useful to those who do not have ready access to the joint publications from which it is adapted, but need to understand what information is included in an OPORD and how it is organized. The OPORD is an OPREP-formatted message document. This appendix describes generically the types of information included in that format and gives general examples. MIL-STD 6040 series includes detailed information on message text formatting. Always refer to actual joint publications for complete details.

1. **TRANSMISSION INFORMATION** Standard message transmission information is included. The message is from the command originating the OPORD, normally the supported commander. Appropriate planning participants and supporting and subordinate commands as identified by the originator are action addressees. Information addressees are all other interested planning participants as determined by the originator and, in some cases, specific addressees identified in the implementing directive. Distribution is by policy and procedure of the issuing headquarters.

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
TO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
    USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
    USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
    CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
    USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
    USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
    USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
    USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
    USCINCRSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
    USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
    DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
2. **TASK ORGANIZATION** This section describes the task organization and forces required to conduct the operation. Forces may or may not be sourced, depending on the point to which detailed planning has progressed when the OPORD is sent. Information should be given in sufficient detail so all concerned understand the size and composition of forces involved, and the command organization to be used to employ them.

5UNIT
/UNITDES /UNITLOC /CMNTS
/USCINCDCENT /MACDILL AFB, FL
/USCINCINCLANT /NORFOLK, VA
/USCINCEUR /VAIHINGEN, GE
/USCINCPCAP /CAMP SMITH, HI
/USCINCTRANS /SCOTT AFB, IL /2 TACTICAL AIRLIFT SQ, 6 KC-10
/USCINCSTRAT /OFFUTT AFB, NE 2 RC-135
/CINCFOR /FT MCPHERSON, GA
/NSA/CSS
/HQ USCENTCOM FWD - /(JTF 1000)
/HQ USARCENT (MINUS) /1 ARMOR BDE (PLUS)
/1 INF BDE (M) (PLUS)
/1 PSYOP CO
/HQ USCENTAF (MINUS) /1 TFW
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
3. **BEGINNING TEXT** This section of the OPORD contains the security classification of the message, message identification information, references, time zone reference, and identification of the supported operation.

CLASSIFICATION
OPER/BLUE NOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/USCINCCENT//
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
REF/A/DOC/CJCS/211742ZNOV _____//
/1 RESCUE WG
/1 RECON SQ
/4 E-3A (AWACS)
/HQ USNAVCENT (MINUS)
/SUPPORTING FORCES
/COMSUPNAVFOR
/CTG 60.1 (CVBG)
/15 MEB
/MPS
/VP SQDN (P-3) //

4. **SITUATION** Give briefly the general picture, so that subordinate commanders will understand the current situation, under the following headings.

   a. **Enemy Forces** Give composition, disposition, location, movements, estimated strengths, identification, and capabilities. Summarize the enemy situation in the intended
area of operations. References may be made to other record documents that amplify information included here.

b. Friendly Forces Give information on friendly forces that may directly affect the action of subordinate commanders. These forces include those not attached or organic to the command for the contemplated operation, but whose presence on a flank or other adjacent area is of interest. Include information on such forces that subordinate commanders need to know to accomplish their tasks.

5. MISSION State clearly and concisely the task of the commander and its purpose. The mission of the command as a whole for the contemplated operation is stated here in full.

6. EXECUTION Summarize the overall course of action intended, or concept of operations. In subsequent paragraphs, assign specific tasks to each element of the task organization charged with the execution of operations required to accomplish the concept of operations or support those operations, and give details of coordination and task organization not already given in the task organization section. Instructions applicable to two or more elements of the task organization can be set forth in a final paragraph of this section headed “coordinating instructions.”

a. Concept of Operations Describe, in brief, how the commander visualizes the execution of the operation from start to completion. Accurately convey to subordinates the commander’s intent so that mission accomplishment is possible in the time available and in the absence of additional communications or further instructions. The concept should set forth the phases of the operation; schemes of maneuver for major subordinate task elements that describe precisely what the commander expects to be done; general plans for employment of supporting fires and weapons, including nuclear and chemical weapons; and the general plan for the landing force in amphibious operations.

b. Task Assignments Following the concept of operations, subsequent paragraphs of the execution section assign specific tasks to each element of the task organization charged with execution of operations to accomplish the concept of operations.

c. Coordinating Instructions The last paragraph in the execution section contains coordinating instructions pertaining to two or more elements of the task organization. Typically, such instructions might include boundaries, objectives, beaches, lines of departure, time and direction of attack, and other specifics needed to coordinate the activities of different task elements. Other information is also included, such as reporting instructions, anticipated time of execution (D-day and H-hour), and when the order becomes effective for planning and/or execution.

7. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS State administrative and logistics arrangements applicable to the operation. Describe the manner of logistics support for the contemplated operation. Include enough information to make clear the basic concept for
logistics support. Summarize the overall operation from the combat service and combat
service support perspectives. List materiel and services for supply, maintenance, transporta-
tion, and construction, and allocation of labor for logistics purposes. List plans and
policies for hospitalization and evacuation of military and civilian personnel. List unit
strengths, replacements, and personnel policies and procedures, including those pertaining
to civilians and enemy prisoners of war. Describe control of civil population, refugees,
and other relevant civil affairs matters. In many cases, reference to administration and log-
istics policies and procedures in an existing plan as amended by the OPORD will suffice.

8. **COMMAND AND SIGNAL** Include signal, recognition, and identification instruc-
tions; electronic policy; headquarters locations and movements; code words; code names
and liaison.

   a. **Command, Control, and Communications** Give information about pertinent
command, control, and communications nets; operating procedures; recognition and
identification procedures; electronic emission constraints; and so on. A separate annex
may be required, or reference to an existing plan may be made.

   b. **Command** Joint operations can have complex command relationships. Joint
OPORDs must be specific concerning these arrangements, including shifts that may take
place as the operation progresses from one phase to the next. Clearly state all command
relationships. Include command posts, alternate command posts, flagships, and alternate
flagships along with their times of activation and deactivation.
Appendix I  Sample OPREP-3 Pinnacle Command Assessment/CINC

SAMPLE OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT/CINC ASSESSMENT

Voice Report

“This is a PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT from USCINCCENT for the NMCC. In response to a report by USCENTCOM FORWARD BRIGHT STAR that an attack by rebel forces on Blueland Desert West Air Base has taken place, U.S. forces in position for Exercise BRIGHT STAR will maintain an increased alert posture and will be prepared to assist the Government of Blueland as required. Support will initially be limited to aerial warning and surveillance capability using E-3As and RC-135s currently in place at Desert West Air Base for Exercise BRIGHT STAR. Confirmation message will follow.”

Message Report
{PRECEDENCE}
FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILLAFB FL
TO: NMCC WASHINGTON DC
{OTHER ADDRESSEES AS REQUIRED}
CLASSIFICATION
OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/OPREP-3PCA/USCINCCENT//
REF/A/VMG/USCINCCENT/120050ZAPRXX//
AMPN/VOICE REPORT TO NMCC//
FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/COMMAND ASSESSMENT//
GENTEXT/COMMAND ASSESSMENT/

1. ( ) REBEL FORCES HAVE ATTACKED BLUELAND A/C AT DESERT WEST AB. VOICE REPORT TO NMCC 120050Z APR _________.

2. ( ) USCENTCOM FWD {BRIGHT STAR} HAS REPORTED REBEL FORCES INFILTRATED DESERT WEST AB AND DETONATED EXPLOSIVE CHARGES ON TWO BLUELAND F-4S AND ONE F-16 CAUSING CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO THE A/C.
3. ( ) ONE REBEL KILLED AND ANOTHER CAPTURED. IT APPEARS REBELS ARE BEING SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF YELLOWLAND.

4. ( ) INTENTIONS OF BLUELAND FORCES ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.

5. ( ) US FORCES IN POSITION FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR ARE ON INCREASED ALERT AND WILL BE PREPARED TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND, AS REQUIRED.

6. ( ) SUPPORT INITIALLY WILL BE LIMITED TO AERIAL WARNING AND SURVEILLANCE USING E-3AS AND RC-135S CURRENTLY IN PLACE AT DESERT WEST AB FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR.

7. ( ) ANTICIPATE FURTHER OPREP-3 REPORTS ON THIS INCIDENT.//

DECL/OADR//
Appendix J  CJCS Warning Order

Refer to Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01) for sample format.

1. Purpose. The WARNING ORDER will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate Phase III--Course of Action Development. If the crisis warrants change in the alert status of units or pre-positioning of units, then the WARNING ORDER can contain a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER. The WARNING ORDER is normally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the order contains deployment of forces, Secretary of Defense authorization is required.

2. When Issued. The WARNING ORDER will be issued at the earliest practicable time following recognition of a crisis.

3. How Issued. The WARNING ORDER normally will be issued by record communication, using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate. If the situation is time-sensitive, voice communications or WIN TLCF should be used initially to pass WARNING ORDER information. A voice order or a WIN TLCF may be acted immediately; however, a record communication will be forwarded as soon as practicable to confirm oral or WIN orders, tasks, etc., and to keep all crisis participants informed. The Focal Point system will be used if the situation dictates. Restricted access SPECAT handling with a specific authorized code word on messages is often used to ensure maximum security for operational intentions and is generally transmitted to predetermined addressees.

4. Addressees. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees in the AIG include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. Contents

a. The WARNING ORDER of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and should contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the WARNING ORDER may vary widely depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be given essential guidance necessary to permit him to begin crisis planning. The WARNING ORDER should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available. During the preparation of the WARNING ORDER, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff will use the WIN TLCF to interact with the supported commander to ensure that mission requirements are adequately detailed. Normally, the WARNING ORDER will either allocate major combat forces and strategic lift available for planning or request the supported commander’s assessment of forces and strategic lift required to accomplish the mission. Additional information should be sent as soon as possible, in message form, referencing the initial warning order.

b. The WARNING ORDER defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, command relationships, and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, such as changes to existing ROE or any specific directions from the NCA, will also be included as necessary, but maximum flexibility will be left to the supported commander in determining how to carry out the assigned mission and tasks.

c. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the WARNING ORDER are as follows:

(1) Purpose Statement. State that the message is a WARNING ORDER. Indicate specific task assignments or requests to supported and supporting commanders, such as the deadline for receipt of the Commander’s Estimate and preliminary deployment estimates.

(2) Situation. Short summary of the situation, including the following, appropriate:

(a) Political situation and possible enemy forces in the expected area of operation, and a brief description of the area of operation

(b) Anticipated attitude and actions of friendly nations

(c) Type, level, and source of major combat forces available for planning or a request for the commander’s assessment of forces and strategic lift required

(d) Assumptions that may significantly affect the commander’s planning

(3) Mission. A concise statement of the mission to be accomplished and its purpose
(4) Execution

(a) Courses of Action. If the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish specific COAs to be examined, they will be listed here. Otherwise, the supported commander will develop the COAs he considers appropriate. Reference will be made to an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN if applicable.

(b) OPSEC and Deception Guidance

(c) PSYOP Guidance

1. PSYOP Mission. Directions to conduct PSYOP in support of the military mission. Circumstances may dictate a more definitive statement.

2. PSYOP Objectives. List specific target audience perceptions and behaviors sought.

3. PSYOP Themes. List themes to stress and avoid to achieve each objective, or refer to themes in an OPLAN.

(d) Intelligence Guidance

1. Intelligence personnel and equipment available to augment the supported commander

2. Availability of national intelligence collection and communications assets

3. Delegation of SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority

4. ROE for intelligence collection operations

(e) Counterintelligence (CI) Guidance

1. Designate Services to furnish CI elements.

2. Establish CI liaison responsibilities.

3. Develop CI collection requirements.

(f) Civil Affairs (CA) Guidance

1. CA Mission. List required actions and specific results sought, such as minimizing interference and maximizing influence regarding the civilian popul
tion’s impact on military operations; satisfying legal and moral obligations of the commander to the civil population; determining the availability of host-nation support resources; supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations; enhancing friendly nation stability and infrastructure development; and facilitating postconflict restoration or transition activities.

2. CA Objectives. List specific results sought, such as assessment of civil, indigenous, and host-nation support resources; support for humanitarian assistance and population or resource control operations; assistance to civil requirements; facilitation of postconflict transition activities; and enhancing friendly nation self-help capabilities to furnish socioeconomic services.

(g) Coordinating Instructions

1. Tentative C-day and L-hour (if other than 0001Z) for planning

2. Anticipated date of execution (D-day). The date may be highly tentative at this time, but it gives the commander a relative timeframe for planning, based on the NCA perception of urgency.

3. Anticipated duration of operations

4. DEFCON or deployability posture

5. Known operational constraints; e.g., overflight, port clearances

6. Use of JOPES

7. ROE guidance

8. Supporting commander coordination or monitoring instructions

9. Authorization for direct liaison between commanders

(5) Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation, as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority

*Updated, if required, in a PLANNING ORDER or ALERT ORDER. Firmly established by a CJCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER or EXECUTE ORDER.
2. Allocation of strategic lift resources available for planning, if applicable (number and type, if known)

3. Load planning factors for each lift resource type, if available (allowable cabin load (ACL); number of passengers; outsize, bulk, and oversize cargo)

4. Other strategic movement planning guidance as appropriate (such as fund cites for pre-positioning strategic lift resources)

(b) JOPES instructions

(c) Force activity designators (FADs) assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code if warranted (The CJCS project code is obtainable from JMPAB.)

(d) Known logistics constraints

(e) Personnel deployment criteria

(f) Code words or nicknames of the operation

(g) Reporting instructions: special instructions and suspenses for the submission of reports

(h) Classification and declassification guidance

(i) Public affairs guidance

(j) Combat camera

(k) Restricted access SPECAT handling

(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications guidance

(b) Command relationships. Specify the supported and supporting commanders and supporting agencies, coordination instructions, and list the NCA-approved command relationship the gaining command will exercise (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) over transferred forces (if known and if NCA approval has been obtained at this point in the crisis response).

(c) WIN TLCF guidance
6. DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION and DEPLOYMENT ORDERS. If required by prevailing circumstances, the WARNING ORDER may include a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER or DEPLOYMENT ORDER, i.e., changes to alert status of units and movement of selected forces to pre-position for impending operations. If the WARNING ORDER contains such information, the first paragraph will state “This is a WARNING ORDER. The Secretary of Defense has authorized . . . .”
SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS WARNING ORDER

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO: USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FL*
    USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
    USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
    CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
    USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
    USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
    USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
    USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
    USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
    USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
    DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
INFO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
    SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
    SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//
    CSA WASHINGTON DC
    CNO WASHINGTON DC
    DOCDIV
    CSAF WASHINGTON DC
    CMC WASHINGTON DC
    CDRUSEL NORAD PETERSON AFB CO
    HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
    CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
    COMSC WASHINGTON DC
    DISA WASHINGTON DC
    DIA WASHINGTON DC
    DLA CAMERON STATION VA
    HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
    CIA WASHINGTON DC
    CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
    COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
    COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA

**AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINC s and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting cam- mands. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested com- mands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addres- sers to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
CINPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
ORDTYP/WARNORD/CJCS//
TIMEZONE/Z//
ORDREF/OPLAN/USCINCCENT..XXX//
HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

5UNIT
/UNITDES /UNITLOC /CMNTS
/ITF HEADQUARTERS / / 
/JCSE (JTF SUP DET) / / 
/198TH MECH BRIGADE // 
/2ND ARMOR BRIGADE / 
/112TH PSYOP CO/ / 
/CVBG / 
/MARITIME PREPOS SHIPS / 
/MEB / 
/123RD COMP WG / 
/91 TAS / 
/312 COMPAERWG// / 

AMPN/SUFFICIENT USTRANSCOM AERIAL TANKER ASSETS TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION ARE APPORTIONED FOR PLANNING//

NARR/( ) THIS IS A WARNING ORDER. REQUEST USCINCCENT COMMANDERS ESTIMATE WITH ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION FOR NCA CONSIDERATION BY 231000Z NOV _______. USTRANSCOM WILL FURNISH
PRELIMINARY DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES AND FORCE CLOSURE PROFILES TO THE SUPPORTED CINC ON REQUEST.//

GENTEX/SITUATION/*

1. ( ) THE SITUATION IN ORANGLAND IS EXTREMELY TENSE FOLLOWING AN ATTEMPTED COUP BY PRO-YELLOWLAND REBELS ON 20 NOV. THE CAPITAL REMAINS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL, BUT EL ASSID AIRFIELD SOUTH OF THE CAPITAL HAS FALLEN TO REBEL FORCES. YELLOWLAND, RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR AID BY THE REBELS, FLEW IN ELEMENTS OF TWO COMMANDO UNITS FROM EL ODD TO EL ASSID AIRFIELD AND HAS CONDUCTED TU-22/BLINDER BOMBING MISSIONS FROM EL ODD AGAINST THE CAPITAL. THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE AGAINST THE CAPITAL IS AS YET UNDETERMINED. PRESIDENT NOSS OF ORANGLAND HAS REQUESTED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE FROM BLUELAND UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THEIR MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT. TENSIONS BETWEEN YELLOWLAND AND ORANGLAND HAVE BEEN AT A HIGH LEVEL THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. COL HOMM SUPPORTED AN EARLIER COUP ATTEMPT IN MID-FEBRUARY AND, IN RECENT MONTHS, HAS INCREASED ARMS SHIPMENTS TO REBEL FORCES WHILE DETAINING DISSIDENTS IN CAMPS WITHIN YELLOWLAND. THE LATEST COUP ATTEMPT FOLLOWS IN THE WAKE OF HOMM’S CALL FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT AND A RECENT ALLIANCE OF HERETOFORE ANTAGONISTIC REBEL FORCES. AS A RESULT OF THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE AREA, THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND (GOB) HAS MADE DIPLOMATIC INQUIRIES ABOUT POSSIBLE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT BLUELAND EFFORTS IN ORANGLAND.

2. ( ) THE GOB WILL ASSIST US FORCES AND FURNISH NECESSARY ACCESS TO FACILITIES AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT WHERE FEASIBLE.

3. ( ) EASTLAND MAY BE EXPECTED TO DENY BASING ACCESS TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION.//

/* If DEPLOYMENT ORDERs or DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERs are incorporated within a WARNING ORDER, the message must be issued by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense (i.e., THIS IS A WARNING ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED. . . . ) The Secretary of Defense should then be an information addressee as well as AMEMB and USDAO, if appropriate.

/** Situation Assessments will be prepared by or in coordination with DIA.
4. ( ) WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOB TO PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCS)./

5. ( ) COURSES OF ACTION. US ASSISTANCE MAY INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS: ASSIST IN NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO), CONDUCT SHOWS OF FORCE, PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS, CONDUCT OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED, AND PARTICIPATE IN A PEACEKEEPING ROLE.

   A. ( ) USCINCPAC. THE 15TH MEB AND MPS SHIPPING IN USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX ARE NO LONGER AlLOCATED TO USCINCPAC.

   B. ( ) USCINCLANT. FURNISH ONE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMPOSED OF AN AMPHIBIOUS MEB AND REQUISITE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPPING TO USCINCPAC.

   C. ( ) USCINTRANS. PLAN FOR EARLY DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE INVOLVEMENT AND PLAN TO ARRANGE HIGHEST PRIORITY MOVEMENT OF QUALIFIED MATERIAL DURING THIS OPERATION.

   D. ( ) DIRNSA. SUPPORT WITH SIGINT AS REQUIRED.

   E. ( ) DIA. SUPPORT WITH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AS REQUIRED.

   F. ( ) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. EACH COA SHOULD BE EVALUATED IN TERMS OF THE OPSEC MEASURES NEEDED TO ENSURE THE CONDITIONS OF ESSENTIAL SECRECY REQUIRED FOR ITS EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION. IN ADDITION TO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI) DELINEATED IN THE REF, YOUR OPSEC PLANNING SHOULD ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING EEFI: (FURNISH ADDITIONAL NCA AND CJCS EEFI, AS APPROPRIATE, CONCERNING THE CURRENT SITUATION).

6. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE

   A. ( ) PSYOP MISSION STATEMENT
B. ( ) PSYOP OBJECTIVES

(1) ( ) PERSUADE OPPOSING FORCES NOT TO FIGHT.

(2) ( ) PERSUADE LOCAL POPULACE NOT TO INTERFERE.

C. ( ) PSYOP THEMES TO STRESS

(1) ( ) US ACTIONS ARE LAWFUL.

(2) ( ) US FORCES ARE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO WIN.

D. ( ) PSYOP THEMES TO AVOID

(1) ( ) STEREOTYPES OF RELIGION, RACE, ETC.

(2) ( ) PROMISES THAT CANNOT BE KEPT

E. ( ) PSYOP OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

(1) ( ) DATE TO INITIATE IN-THEATER PSYOP

(2) ( ) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

(3) ( ) TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY

(4) ( ) COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS

7. ( ) INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE

8. ( ) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE

9. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) GUIDANCE

A. ( ) CA MISSION STATEMENT

B. ( ) CA OBJECTIVES

(1) ( ) FACILITATE OR COORDINATE ESSENTIAL POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES TO MINIMIZE CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS.
(2) ( ) ASSIST COMMAND COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL LAW OR HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS MEETING ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN POPULACE NEEDS.

(3) ( ) DETERMINE INDIGENOUS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT CAPABILITY OR RESOURCES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS.

(4) ( ) ASSIST IN OBTAINING AVAILABLE INDIGENOUS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT.

(5) ( ) SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS.

(6) ( ) FACILITATE COMMANDER’S ACTIVITIES IN ACHIEVING DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS IN FRIENDLY NATIONS.

(7) ( ) COORDINATE SUPPORT FOR RESTORATION OF BASIC SERVICES IN AN OCCUPIED OR FRIENDLY COUNTRY.

C. ( ) CA OPERATION CONSIDERATIONS

(1) ( ) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

(2) ( ) TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY

(3) ( ) COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS

(4) ( ) COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS

10. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. ( ) TENTATIVE M-DAY AND F-HOUR. 21000IZ NOV ____.

B. ( ) TENTATIVE C-DAY AND L-HOUR. 29000IZ NOV ____.

C. ( ) ANTICIPATED D-DAY. 1 DEC ___.

D. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS

E. ( ) DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE. AS DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT

F. ( ) KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
G. ( ) NO CHANGE IN USCINCCENT ROE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF IS EXPECTED.

H. ( ) SUPPORTING COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY SUPPORTED COMMANDERS. FOR EXAMPLE, USCINCTRANS WILL SUPPORT AIR-REFUELING AS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

I. ( ) UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.

J. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED. // GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

11. ( ) TRANSPORT

A. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY. 1B2.

B. ( ) ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES IS FOR INITIAL PLANNING, SUBJECT TO FURTHER REFINEMENT IN PLANNING, ALERT, DEPLOYMENT, AND EXECUTE ORDERS.

(1) ( ) GENERAL. FOR PLANNING, PARTIAL MOBILIZATION WAS AUTHORIZED ON 17 NOV ___ IN SUPPORT OF EXECUTION OF USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX. AIRLIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM PLUS CRAFT STAGE II. SEALIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET PLUS THE RRF AND SELECTIVE REQUISITIONING OF US FLAG MERCHANT MARINE OVER AND ABOVE THE RRF.

(2) ( ) AIRLIFT. SUPPORTED CINC (USCINCPAC) FOR OPLAN XXXX MAY CONTINUE TO PLAN ON JSCP, ANNEX J, APPORTIONMENT (APPROXIMATELY ______ PERCENT OF THE TOTAL CAPABILITY AT PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AND CRAFT STAGE II).

(3) ( ) SEALIFT. USCINCPAC CAN CONTINUE TO PLAN ON USING ASSETS APPORTIONED BY JSCP, ANNEX J, IN THE APPROPRIATE TABLES UNDER PARTIAL MOBILIZATION CONDITIONS, INCLUDING USTRANSCOM AND ASSETS FROM THE RRF AND SRP.

(4) ( ) THE JOINT TRANSPORTATION BOARD (JTB) HAS DETERMINED THAT A MINIMUM OF ______ PERCENT OF TOTAL AIR- AND SEA-LIFT CAPABILITY MUST BE ALLOCATED TO SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER THEATERS AND TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL LOCS. FURTHER, IF REQUIRED,
THE JTB HAS APPROVED TWO SETS OF LIFT ALLOCATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT AS FOLLOWS:

(A) ( ) IF USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX IS IMPLEMENTED ALONE, USCINCPAC MAY PLAN ON ALL REMAINING CAPABILITY (____ PERCENT).

(B) ( ) IF USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX AND USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX ARE IMPLEMENTED CONCURRENTLY, USCINCPAC MAY CONTINUE TO PLAN ON JSCP, ANNEX J, APPORTIONMENT UNDER PARTIAL MOBILIZATION CONDITIONS WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS AS OUTLINED BELOW. USCINCCENT MAY PLAN FOR ASSETS MADE AVAILABLE AS A RESULT OF DECLARATION OF PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AND ACTIVATING CRAFT STAGE III (AT APPROXIMATELY USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX C-DAY MINUS 4 FOR CRAFT STAGE III). THE AIRLIFT ASSETS INCLUDE UP TO _____ WIDE-BODY CARGO, _____ WIDE-BODY PASSENGER, _____ NARROW-BODY CARGO, _____ NARROW-BODY PASSENGER, _____ C-5, _____ KC-10, AND _____ C-141 AIRCRAFT. IF REQUIRED, SPECIFIC PHASING OF THESE AIRCRAFT WILL BE OUTLINED IN THE USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX ALERT ORDER. REGARDING AND SHALLOW DRAFT TANKERS ARE ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE A MODIFICATIONS TO USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX PLANNING, THE TEMPORARY RELEASE OF USTRANSCOM AIRCRAFT FROM USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX SUPPORT WILL BE ON A ONE-FOR-ONE EXCHANGE FOR COMMERCIAL CAPABILITY FROM CRAFT STAGE III ASSETS. REGARDING SEALIFT, CLEAN PRODUCT TANKERS LIMITATION; THE JTB DEFERS BY-TYPE ALLOCATIONS OF THESE ASSETS PENDING CLEARER DEFINITION OF REQUIREMENTS AND OF NUMBER AND LOCATION OF TANKERS BY TYPE AND CAPACITY. USCINCTRANS AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, IN COORDINATION WITH CINCS, WILL APPLY THE APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT AND SHIP TYPES AND CONFIGURATIONS NEEDED TO MEET CARGO AND PAX MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS WITHIN EACH FLOW. IF JTB MUST DETERMINE ALLOCATIONS BY TYPE (E.G., C-5 AIRCRAFT OR RO/RO SHIPS), INCLUDE ALL NECESSARY DATA AND RATIONALE TO SUPPORT JTB ACTION IN TIME FOR ALERT ORDER.

(C) ( ) USE JSCP, ANNEX J, TO DETERMINE LOAD PLANNING FACTORS, WITH DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED BETWEEN ALCON IF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ARISE.

(D) ( ) THE JOINT STAFF WILL NOT FUND TRANSPORTATION COSTS. ALL REQUESTS FOR TRANSPORTATION WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOD 4500.32R, MILSTAMP. PARENT SERVICES OF DEPLOYING UNITS MUST ISSUE FUND CITES FOR MOVEMENTS. USTRANSCOM MAY PLAN ON NCA DECISION RESPONSE TO STRATEGIC WARNING WITH SUFFICIENT LEAD-TIME TO RESPOND TO CINC’S PRE-C-DAY MOVEMENT.
REQUIREMENTS BEGINNING AT C-2 WITH PARTIALLY MOBILIZED LIFT ASSETS AND PERSONNEL. PRE-C-DAY MOVES BEFORE C-2 MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH ORGANIC AND NONMOBILIZED CAPABILITY AND EQUIVALENT CIVIL AUGMENTATION. SERVICES WILL GIVE FUNDING GUIDANCE TO USTRANSCOM IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT AND EXECUTE ORDERS. IF SUPPORTED CINCS OR PROVIDING ORGANIZATIONS REQUIRE NON-OPORD INTRATHEATER LIFT SUPPORT BEFORE EXECUTE AND DEPLOYMENT ORDERS, THE PARENT SERVICES OF UNITS BEING SUPPORTED WILL FUND USTRANSCOM TARIFF CHARGES AS APPLICABLE.

12. ( ) JOPES WILL BE USED TO DEVELOP COA. COORDINATE WITH THE JNOCC FUNCTIONAL MANAGER TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE JOPES SITES (INCLUDING NMCC) ARE ON NETWORK DISTRIBUTION FOR EACH COA PID.

13. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY THE APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

14. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTICS CONSTRAINTS

   A. ( ) STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT ARE INADEQUATE TO GIVE TIMELY SUPPORT TO DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTIPLE REGIONAL PLANS. CINCS DESIGNATED FOR LESS THAN TOP PRIORITY FOR LIFT ALLOCATION MUST CONSIDER EXTENDING FORCE ARRIVAL DATES AND/OR CHANGING MODES OF LIFT. LESS THAN FULL MOBILIZATION AGGRAVATES THE SITUATION.

   B. ( ) SOME SUSTAINMENT COMMODITIES, ESPECIALLY HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS, ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY.

   C. ( ) EXPANSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE IS NOT VIALBE IN THE SHORT TERM, ESPECIALLY ON PARTIALLY MOBILIZED FOOTING.

15. ( ) PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. ESSENTIAL UNIT MESSING IS AUTHORIZED FOR PERSONNEL ATTACHED, ASSIGNED, OR SERVING IN A TEMPORARY DUTY OR TRAVEL STATUS.

16. ( ) CODE WORD ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION IS BLUENOSE.

17. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. USCINCCENT IS AUTHORIZED TO USE OREPREP-1 REPORTING PROCEDURES, AS REQUIRED PER JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION, SUBMIT DETAILED AFTER-ACTION REPORTS TO CJCS PER JOINT PUB 1-03.30 AND CJCS MOP 53.
18. ( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. PER USCINCENT OPLAN XXXX.

19. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

A. ( ) PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL FINAL APPROVAL HAS BEEN GIVEN BY OASD (PA). PUBLIC AND NEWS MEDIA INQUIRIES CONCERNING THIS OPERATION SHOULD BE TAKEN AND REFERRED TO THE DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, OASD(PA). DURING REGULAR DUTY HOURS, CALL DSN 227-5131, OR COMMERCIAL (703) 697-5131. AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT THE DOD PUBLIC AFFAIRS DUTY OFFICER AT THE SAME NUMBER (RECORDED MESSAGE WILL GIVE CELLULAR PHONE NUMBER OF DUTY OFFICER) OR CONTACT THE NMCC, DSN 227-8322 OR 225-1858 (COMMERCIAL IS 697 AND 695, RESPECTIVELY).

B. ( ) FURNISH INTERIM PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PPAG) VIA SEPARATE MESSAGE TO OASD(PA): DPL, WITH INFORMATION TO CJCS/PA. REFER TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF DOD INSTRUCTION 5405.3, DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE, FOR DETAILED GUIDANCE. ON APPROVAL BY OASD(PA), SUCH INTERIM GUIDANCE MAY BE USED IN THE EVENT OF AN INQUIRY REGARDING ANY PART OF THE PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THIS OPERATION, WHICH MAY HAVE BECOME OBVIOUS TO THE PUBLIC OR PRESS. IN GENERAL, THE INTERIM PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

1. ( ) A PROPOSED SHORT STATEMENT (GENERAL IN NATURE) WITH RELATED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, AS APPROPRIATE.

2. ( ) A PUBLIC AFFAIRS SITUATION AND ANALYSIS REPORT. THIS SECTION OF THE INTERIM PPAG SHOULD INCLUDE THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER’S ASSESSMENT REGARDING THE FOLLOWING:

   A. ( ) ANTICIPATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH (ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE)

   B. ( ) REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS ACTIVITIES

   C. ( ) ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT INFORMATION BUREAUS

   D. ( ) REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS FIELD COMMUNICATIONS AND INTERTHEATER AND INTRATHEATER TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT
20. ( ) COMBAT CAMERA. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED TO THE MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE EXTENT BY JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND PARTICIPATING MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA FORCES. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (WHEN APPROPRIATE), PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, TRAINING, COMBAT MEDICAL SUPPORT, INTELLIGENCE, AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. IMPLEMENT JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA PROCEDURES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF SIGNIFICANT GUN CAMERA VIDEO AND FILM IMAGERY DEPICTING THE DELIVERY OF ORDNANCE TO MEET NCA, CJCS, AND DOD REQUIREMENTS. NEITHER SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, OPERATIONS SECURITY, NOR SUBJECT SENSITIVITY SHOULD PRECLUDE COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION. COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY WILL BE CLASSIFIED TO THE LEVEL REQUIRED. EXPEDITE THE DELIVERY OF COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY TO THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER, THE PENTAGON, THROUGH THE DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE (CODEWORD ELIGIBLE ARTIST) OR OTHER APPROPRIATE TRANSPORTATION MEANS COMMENSURATE WITH THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THE IMAGERY. PRECOORDINATE THE MOVEMENT OF EXPEDITED COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL WITH THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER (JCCC). IT CAN RECEIVE MATERIAL FROM ANY OF THE WASHINGTON, DC, AREA AIRPORTS (NATIONAL, DULLES, OR BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL) AND FROM ANDREWS AFB. IT CAN ALSO RECEIVE MATERIAL THROUGH OVERNIGHT DELIVERY SERVICES AND SATELLITE TRANSMISSIONS. ADDRESS COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL GOING TO THE JCCC AS FOLLOWS: ATTENTION: JCCC

ROOM 5A518 PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20330-1000 (RACK 2)
TELEPHONE: DUTY HOURS:
21. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS, USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL VALIDATE AND FORWARD REQUIREMENTS FOR CJCS-CONTROLLED TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS PER CJCS MOP 3. BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE CAPACITY, USCINCCENT WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND relative PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

22. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USCINCCENT IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC, USCINCLANT, USCINCSPACE, USCINCTRANS, CINCFOR, USCINCSO, USCINCSOC, AND USCINCSTRAT ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS. COMACC IS A SUPPORTING RESOURCE MANAGER. NSA, DMA, DISA, AND DIA ARE SUPPORTING AGENCIES. THE NCA-APPROVED COMMAND RELATIONSHIP WILL BE DETAILED IN SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES.
Appendix K  CJCS Planning Order

1. Purpose. The PLANNING ORDER may be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate Phase V for the supported commander. It does not eliminate the CJCS requirement in Phase IV to obtain NCA approval of a COA before execution in Phase VI. The Planning Order is normally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. When Issued. A Planning Order is issued when execution planning is desired before NCA approval of a COA is obtained or to compress the phases of the CAP while obtaining NCA approval on a CJCS-recommended COA (also see Appendix L).

3. How Issued. A Planning Order is normally issued by record communication using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH. If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communications, GCCS Internet Relay Chatter (IRC), or Video Teleconferencing (VTC) can be used to pass Planning Order information; however, a record communication will be forwarded as soon as practicable to confirm oral or WIN orders, tasks, etc., and to keep all crisis participants informed.

4. Addressees. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are the CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. Contents
   a. At the Joint Staff level, the Planning Order generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and will contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the Planning Order may vary widely depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be given the guidance necessary to permit him to begin crisis planning. The Planning Order should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available. Normally, the PLANNING ORDER WILL ALLOCATE MAJOR COMBAT FORCES AND STRATEGIC LIFT AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SHOULD BE ISSUED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN MESSAGE FORM AND REFERENCE THE INITIAL PLANNING ORDER.
b. The Planning Order defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, including any specific direction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will also be included as necessary, but the supported commander will retain maximum flexibility in determining how he will carry out his assigned mission and tasks.

c. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the Planning Order are as follows:

(1) Statement That the Message is a Planning Order. State that the message is a Planning Order and indicate specific task assignments or requests to supported and supporting commanders, such as the deadline for receipt of the Operation Order. If not previously requested in a Commander’s Estimate Request Order, assign USTRANSCOM the task of sending a preliminary deployment estimate and force closure profile to the supported commander and inform the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Situation. A short summary of the situation, including the following, as appropriate:

(a) Political situation and possible enemy forces in the expected area of operation and a brief description of the area of operation

(b) Anticipated attitude and actions of friendly nations

(c) Type, level, and source of major combat forces available for planning or a request for the commander’s assessment of forces and strategic lift required

(d) Assumptions that may significantly affect the commander’s planning

(3) Mission. A concise statement of the mission to be accomplished and its purpose

(4) Execution

(a) Course of Action. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will specify a COA to be planned. Reference may be made to an existing OPLAN, CONPLAN, or functional plan.

(b) OPSEC Guidance. Include guidance similar to that in the Warning Order.

(c) PSYOP Guidance
1. PSYOP Mission. Give directions to conduct PSYOP in support of the military mission. Circumstances may dictate a more definitive statement.

2. PSYOP Objectives. List specific target audience perceptions and behaviors sought.

3. PSYOP Themes. List themes to stress and avoid to achieve each objective or refer to theme in an OPLAN.

(d) Intelligence Guidance

1. Intelligence personnel and equipment available to augment the supported commander

2. Availability of national intelligence collection and communications assets

3. Delegation of SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority

4. ROE for intelligence collection operations

(e) Counterintelligence (CI) Guidance

1. Designate Services to furnish forward CI elements.

2. Establish CI liaison responsibilities.

3. Develop CI collection requirements.

(f) Civil Affairs (CA) Guidance

1. CA Mission. List required actions and specific results sought, such as minimizing interference and maximizing influence regarding the civilian population’s impact on military operations; satisfying legal and moral obligations of the commander to the civil population; determining the availability of host-nation support resources; supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations; enhancing friendly nation stability and infrastructure development; and facilitating postconflict restoration or transition activities.

2. CA Objectives. List specific results sought, such as determining assessment of civil, indigenous, and host-nation support resources; supporting humanitarian assistance and population or resource control operations; assisting civil requirements; facilitating postconflict transition activities; and enhancing friendly nation self-help capabilities to furnish socioeconomic services.
Coordinating Instructions

1. Proposed C-day and L-hour (if other than 0001Z) for planning

2. Anticipated date of execution (D-day). This date may be tentative at this time, but it gives the commander a relative time-frame for planning, based on the CJCS perception of urgency.

3. Anticipated duration of operations

4. DEFCON or deployability posture

5. Known operational constraints; e.g., overflight, port clearances, and revisions to existing ROE

6. USTRANSCOM coordination and monitoring instructions

7. Authorization for direct liaison between commanders

Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation, as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority

2. Allocation of strategic lift resources available for planning, if applicable (number and type if known)

3. Load planning factors for each type of lift resource, if available (ACL; number of passengers; outsize, bulk, and oversize cargo)

4. Other strategic movement planning guidance as appropriate (such as fund cites for pre-positioning strategic lift resources)

(b) JOPES instructions

(c) Force activity designators (FADs) assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code if warranted (CJCS project code obtainable from JMPAB)

(d) Known logistics constraints

*Updated, if required, in ALERT ORDER. Firmly established by a CJCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER or EXECUTE ORDER.
(e) Personnel deployment criteria

(f) Code words and code numbers of the operation

(g) Reporting instructions: special instructions and suspenses for the submission of reports

(h) Classification and declassification guidance

(i) Public affairs guidance

(j) Combat camera

(k) Restricted access SPECAT handling

(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications guidance

(b) Command relationships. Include a designation of supported and supporting commanders, coordination instructions, and listing of the command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) being proposed for NCA approval that the gaining commander may exercise over transferred forces and the locations where the transfer will be effective (normally the AOR boundary). When it is decided that forces will not transfer from one CINC to another, but those forces must perform actions at the direction of the supported commander, then a “support” relationship must be established between the two combatant commanders.

(c) WIN TLCF guidance
SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS PLANNING ORDER

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
INFO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
USDP-CH/ASD:PA/
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
USDP-CH/ASD:PA/
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA

*AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.*
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC/CC/
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
REF/A/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//
NARR/COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE AND CJCS WARNING ORDER//
ORDTYP/OTR/CJCS//
AMPN/PLANNING ORDER--MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO BLUELAND//
TIMEZONE/Z//
ORDREF/OPLAN/USCINCCENT..XXXX//
HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

5UNIT

/JTF HEADQUARTERS
/UNITDES
/123INF BDE (SEP)
/1 AMPHIB RED GP
/MEU
/1 TFS (F-15)
/23 TFS (F-4)
/8 E3AS
/2 AERS//

AMPN/SUFFICIENT USTRANSCOM AERIAL TANKER ASSETS TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION ARE ALLOCATED//

*A Planning Order may be issued without a Warning Order.
NARR/( ) THIS IS A PLANNING ORDER. REQUEST USCINCCENT CONDUCT EXECUTION PLANNING IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE EXECUTION OF COA NUMBER ONE FROM REF A AND SUBMIT OPORD OR IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTION FOR NCA CONSIDERATION BY 251000Z NOV____.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/


2. ( ) THE GOB WILL ASSIST US FORCES AND ARRANGE NECESSARY ACCESS TO FACILITIES AND WILL FURNISH HOST-NATION SUPPORT WHERE FEASIBLE.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

3. ( ) WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOB TO PROTECT SHIPPING AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/


‘When not preceded by a Warning Order, insert “USTRANSCOM will furnish preliminary deployment estimates and force profiles to the supported commander on request with information to the Joint Staff in accordance with Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01).”

AFSC PUB 1
STRONG POINTS AND LOCS, ATTACK ORANGELAND AIRFIELDS AND PORTS AS NECESSARY, CONDUCT OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED SHORT OF MAJOR LAND ATTACKS IN ORANGELAND.

5. ( ) USCINCPAC. MAINTAIN ONE CVBG AND ONE ARG OR MEU IN THE NAS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. BE PREPARED TO AUGMENT COMIDEASTFOR WITH NTDS AND MISSILE-CAPABLE ESCORTS IF DIRECTED. BE PREPARED TO TRANSFER THESE FORCES TO USCINCCENT OPCON WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA.

6. ( ) COMACC. BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY AND TRANSFER FIGHTER SQUADRONS, RESCUE SQUADRON, AND E-3A AIRCRAFT TO USCINCCENT. TRANSFERRED FORCES SHOULD PLAN TO OPERATE UNDER USCINCCENT OPCON BE EXECUTED ON ENTERING USCINCCENT AOR.

7. ( ) DIRNSA. SUPPORT WITH SIGINT AS REQUIRED.

8. ( ) DIA. SUPPORT WITH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AS REQUIRED.

9. ( ) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT FORCE MOVEMENTS WILL GENERATE A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST FROM POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES. HOSTILE COLLECTION ASSETS WILL BE ACTIVE, AND OPSEC PROCEDURES THROUGHOUT THE PLANNING, EXECUTION, AND EXERCISE ARE IMPERATIVE. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI): (AS SPECIFIED IN OPLAN OR OPORD).

10. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE

   A. ( ) PSYOP MISSION STATEMENT

   B. ( ) PSYOP OBJECTIVES

      (1) ( ) PERSUADE OPPOSING FORCES NOT TO FIGHT.

      (2) ( ) PERSUADE LOCAL POPULACE NOT TO INTERFERE.

   C. ( ) PSYOP THEMES TO STRESS

      (1) ( ) US ACTIONS ARE LAWFUL.

      (2) ( ) US FORCES ARE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO WIN.

   D. ( ) PSYOP THEMES TO AVOID
11. INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE

12. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) GUIDANCE

   A. ( ) CA MISSION STATEMENT

   B. ( ) CA OBJECTIVES

      (1) ( ) DETERMINE INDIGENOUS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT CAPABILITY OR RESOURCES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS.

      (2) ( ) ASSIST IN OBTAINING AVAILABLE INDIGENOUS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT.

      (3) ( ) SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS.

      (4) ( ) FACILITATE OR COORDINATE ESSENTIAL POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES TO MINIMIZE CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS.

      (5) ( ) ASSIST COMMAND COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL LAW OR HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS MEETING ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN POPULACE NEEDS.

      (6) ( ) FACILITATE COMMANDER’S ACTIVITIES IN ACHIEVING DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS IN FRIENDLY NATIONS.

   C. ( ) CA OPERATION CONSIDERATIONS

      (1) ( ) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

      (2) ( ) TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY

      (3) ( ) COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS

13. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

   A. ( ) PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR, 280001Z NOV ____ REQUEST USTRANSCOM COORDINATE WITH THE SUPPORTED CINCS AND RECOMMEND FIRM C-DAY, L-HOUR TO CJCS.
B. ( ) TARGET DATE FOR EXECUTION IS 30 NOV ____.

C. ( ) SUPPORTING AND SUPPORTED COMMANDS’ DEPLOYMENT AND MOVEMENT DATA ARE REQUIRED TO USTRANSCOM BY 230400Z NOV ____.

D. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION IS IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.

E. ( ) USTRANSCOM WILL MANAGE DEPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT OF USCINCCENT.

F. ( ) DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE ARE AS DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT.

G. ( ) KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. ROE IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.//

H. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

14. ( ) TRANSPORT

A. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY IS 1B2

B. ( ) APPORTIONMENT OF STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES IS FOR INITIAL PLANNING, SUBJECT TO FURTHER REFINEMENT IN ALERT, DEPLOYMENT, AND EXECUTE ORDERS.

(1) ( ) AIRLIFT PLANNING TO BE BASED ON USTRANSCOM ASSETS. SEALIFT PLANNING TO BE BASED ON USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET FORCE PLUS THE RRF.

(2) ( ) USTRANSCOM AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, IN COORDINATION WITH THE CINCS, WILL APPLY THE APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT AND SHIP TYPE AND CONFIGURATIONS NEEDED TO MEET CARGO AND PAX MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS WITHIN EACH FLOW. IF JTB MUST DETERMINE ALLOCATIONS BY TYPE (E.G., C-5 AIRCRAFT OR RO/RO SHIPS), INCLUDE ALL NECESSARY DATA AND RATIONALE TO SUPPORT JTB ACTION IN TIME FOR ALERT ORDER.

15. ( ) THE JOINT STAFF WILL NOT FUND TRANSPORTATION COSTS. PARENT SERVICES OF DEPLOYING UNITS MUST ISSUE FUND CITES FOR
MOVEMENTS. SERVICES WILL GIVE FUNDING GUIDANCE TO USTRANSCOM IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT AND EXECUTE ORDERS. IF SUPPORTED CINCS OR PROVIDING ORGANIZATIONS REQUIRE NON-OPORD INTRATHEATER LIFT SUPPORT BEFORE EXECUTE AND DEPLOYMENT ORDERS, THE PARENT SERVICES OF UNITS BEING SUPPORTED WILL FUND TARIFF CHARGES AS APPLICABLE.

16. ( ) JOPES WILL BE USED TO DEVELOP COA. COORDINATE WITH THE JNOCC FUNCTIONAL MANAGER TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE JOPES SITES (INCLUDING NMCC) ARE ON NETWORK DISTRIBUTION FOR EACH COA PID.

17. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY THE APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

18. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTICS CONSTRAINTS

19. ( ) PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. ESSENTIAL UNIT MESSING IS AUTHORIZED FOR PERSONNEL ATTACHED, ASSIGNED, OR SERVING IN A TEMPORARY DUTY OR TRAVEL STATUS. DOD PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO CARRY A VALIDATED PASSPORT WHEN DEPLOYED TO BLUDELAND.

20. ( ) UNCLASSIFIED NICKNAME ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION IS BIRDMAN.

21. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. CINC IS AUTHORIZED TO USE OPREP-1 REPORTING PROCEDURES AS REQUIRED. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING AS PRESCRIBED IN JOINT PUBS 1-03 AND 6-04. MOVEMENT OF FORCES WILL BE REPORTED PER APPROVED CJCS PROCEDURES. SUBMIT DETAILED AFTER-ACTION REPORTS TO CJCS PER JOINT PUB 1-03.30.

22. ( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. PER USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

23. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

A. ( ) PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION (BEYOND ANY APPROVED INTERIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE THAT MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM CJCS WARNING ORDER TASK ASSIGNMENT) IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL APPROVED BY OASD(PA). PUBLIC AND MEDIA INQUIRIES, BEYOND THE SCOPE OF APPROVED INTERIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG), IF APPLICABLE, SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, OASD(PA). DURING REGULAR DUTY HOURS, CALL DSN 227-5131 OR COMMERCIAL (703) 697-5131. AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT THE DOD PUBLIC AFFAIRS DUTY OFFICER AT THE
SAME NUMBER (RECORDED MESSAGE WILL CONTAIN CELLULAR PHONE NUMBER OF DUTY OFFICER) OR CONTACT THE NMCC, DSN 227-8322 OR 225-1858 (COMMERCIAL IS 697 AND 695, RESPECTIVELY).

B. ( ) SEND DETAILED PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PPAG) VIA SEPARATE MESSAGE TO OASD(PA): DPL, WITH INFORMATION TO CJCS/PA. THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE WILL CONFORM TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF DOD INSTRUCTION 5404.3, DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE, AS FOLLOWS:

(1) ( ) REFERENCES. IDENTIFY PERTINENT MESSAGES OR DOCUMENTS.

(2) ( ) OPERATIONAL INFORMATION. EXPLAIN THE REFERENCES, THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT, AND ANY EXISTING OR ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS.

(3) ( ) COORDINATION INFORMATION. EXPLAIN THE PURPOSE OF THE MESSAGE; CONFIRM THAT IT HAS BEEN FULLY COORDINATED AND THEATER-APPROVED; REQUEST ASD(PA) APPROVAL AND SPECIFY THE DATE IT IS REQUIRED FOR USE.

(4) ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH. RECOMMEND ACTIVE OR PASSIVE APPROACH FOR THE OPERATION.

(5) ( ) PUBLIC STATEMENT. FURNISH A STATEMENT EXPLAINING THE OPERATION FOR PUBLIC RELEASE IN AN ACTIVE PA APPROACH OR FOR RESPONSE TO QUERY IN A PASSIVE PA APPROACH.

(6) ( ) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. LIST PROPOSED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED QUESTIONS.

(7) ( ) CONTINGENCY STATEMENT. FURNISH A CONTINGENCY STATEMENT TO BE USED BEFORE RELEASE OF THE FINAL PAG. THIS STATEMENT MAY BE THE SAME AS THAT PROPOSED EARLIER IN THE INTERIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE RESULTING FROM THE CJCS WARNING ORDER TASK ASSIGNMENT.

(8) ( ) MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION. GIVE OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:

(A) ( ) MEDIA INFORMATION CENTERS. COMPOSITION, RESPONSIBILITIES, SECURITY REVIEW PROCEDURES, ETC.
(B)  COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. DESIGNATION OF SOLE APPROVING AUTHORITY FOR ALL OPERATIONS-RELATED NEWS MATERIALS, PROCEDURES FOR THE RELEASE AND/OR CLEARANCE OF INFORMATION, HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS (IF APPLICABLE), ETC.

(C) MEDIA COVERAGE. STATE WHETHER MEDIA COVERAGE IS ENCOURAGED OR SOLICITED, GIVING RATIONALE, NEWS MEDIA TRANSPORTATION INSTRUCTIONS, POINT OF CONTACT AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING SUCH REQUESTS, REQUIREMENTS FOR NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES (VALID PASSPORT, WORKING MEDIA VISA), LOCAL ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS, FUNDS FOR FOOD, LODGING, RETURN TRAVEL (IF MILITARY AIR IS NOT AVAILABLE), ETC., INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING MEDIA REQUESTS FOR ACCOMPANYING TRAVEL BEFORE THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE OPERATION, ETC.

(D) DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL. IDENTIFY ARRANGEMENTS FOR LOCAL GROUND AND/OR AIR TRANSPORTATION, SPECIAL CLOTHING OR EQUIPMENT FURNISHED, MESSING, BILLETING, PROTECTION OF MEDIA EQUIPMENT AND GEAR, LOCAL ESCORT REQUIREMENTS, AND COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT FOR FILING OF POOL PRODUCTS. IDENTIFY THE PRIMARY POINT OF CONTACT SHOULD THE POOL BE ACTIVATED.

(E) INTERNAL MEDIA AND AUDIOVISUAL COVERAGE. IDENTIFY ASSISTANCE THAT WILL BE GIVEN, DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (INCLUDING WHETHER ESCORTS ARE NECESSARY), SCREENING OF VISUAL INFORMATION (VI) MATERIALS ON COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION, SPONSORING COMMAND POC FOR HANDLING INTERNAL INFORMATION MATTERS, ETC. ALSO INCLUDE GUIDELINES FOR ARMED FORCES AUDIOVISUAL TEAMS DOCUMENTING THE OPERATION.

(F) MEDIA OPPORTUNITIES. IF KNOWN IN ADVANCE, DESCRIBE CHRONOLOGY OF POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL EVENTS THAT WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO MEDIA.

(G) MISCELLANEOUS PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSIDERATIONS. INDICATE ANY OTHER PROPOSED PA ACTIVITIES OR CONSIDERATIONS.

(H) POINTS OF CONTACT. IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATING POC’S NAME AND PHONE NUMBER.

AFSC PUB 1
24. ( ) COMBAT CAMERA. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED TO THE MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE EXTENT BY JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND PARTICIPATING MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA FORCES. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (WHEN APPROPRIATE), PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, TRAINING, COMBAT MEDICAL SUPPORT, INTELLIGENCE, AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. IMPLEMENT JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA PROCEDURES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF SIGNIFICANT GUN CAMERA VIDEO AND FILM IMAGERY DEPICTING THE DELIVERY OF ORDNANCE TO MEET NCA, CJCS, AND DOD REQUIREMENTS. NEITHER SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, OPERATIONS SECURITY, NOR SUBJECT SENSITIVITY SHOULD PRECLUDE COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION. COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY WILL BE CLASSIFIED TO THE LEVEL REQUIRED. EXPEDITE THE DELIVERY OF COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY TO THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER, THE PENTAGON, THROUGH THE DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE (CODEWORD ELIGIBLE ARTIST) OR OTHER APPROPRIATE TRANSPORTATION MEANS COMMENSURATE WITH THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THE IMAGERY. PRECOORDINATE THE MOVEMENT OF EXPEDITED COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL WITH THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER (JCCC). IT CAN RECEIVE MATERIAL FROM ANY OF THE WASHINGTON, DC, AREA AIRPORTS (NATIONAL, DULLES, OR BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL) AND FROM ANDREWS AFB. IT CAN ALSO RECEIVE MATERIAL THROUGH OVERNIGHT DELIVERY SERVICES AND SATELLITE TRANSMISSIONS. ADDRESS COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL GOING TO THE JCCC AS FOLLOWS:
25. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS, USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL VALIDATE AND FORWARD REQUIREMENTS FOR CJCS-CONTROLLED TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS PER CJCS MOP 3. BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE CAPACITY, USCINCCENT WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

26. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USCINCCENT IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC, USCINCLANT, CINCFOR, USCINCSTRAT, AND USCINCTRANS ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS. (COMACC IS A SUPPORTING RESOURCE MANAGER. NSA, DMA, AND DIA ARE SUPPORTING AGENCIES.) FORCES TRANSFERRED FROM USCINCPAC AND COMACC TO USCINCCENT WILL PLAN TO OPERATE UNDER USCINCCENT OPCON. COMACC FORCES WILL PLAN TO TRANSFER AT THE USCINCCENT AOR BOUNDARY. LOCATION AND TIME OF TRANSFER OF USCINCPAC FORCES HAVE NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED BY THE NCA.

27. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP JOINT STAFF INFORMED USING COMMANDER’S SITREP PER JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04.//

AKNLG/Y//

DECL/OADR//
1. **Purpose.** The ALERT ORDER is issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The Alert Order requires Secretary of Defense authorization because it conveys the NCA decision on COA selection that might initiate execution planning.

2. **When Issued.** An Alert Order is normally issued following a decision by the NCA that conduct of military operations in support of national interests is a distinct possibility. The Alert Order is normally issued after the Commander’s Estimate is received. In a rapidly developing situation, however, the Alert Order may be issued immediately following recognition of a crisis without the prior exchange of information normally included in Phases I, II, and III of CAP procedures, or it may be omitted if a Planning Order has been issued (also see Appendix K).

3. **How Issued.** The Alert Order is issued by record communication, normally using a precedence of IMMEDIATE. In a particularly time-sensitive situation, a FLASH precedence or an emergency action message may be appropriate. Oral or other teleconferencing notification should be made, but must be followed by record communication.

4. **Addressees.** AIG 8790 is normally used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are the CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph designates supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees in the AIG include the Services and other interested commands and agencies’ component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. **Contents**
   
   a. The specific contents of the Alert Order may vary widely, as with the Warning Order or Planning Order, depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. An existing plan may be applicable as written, partially applicable, or adapted to fit the particular crisis. When no existing plan is adaptable to the crisis, the emergency preparation of an OPORD may be necessary.

   b. The Alert Order generally follows the major paragraph headings of an OPORD and may include any or all of the information listed in subparagraphs 5b(1) through (6) below. For valid information previously covered in the Warning Order or Planning Order, reference to the order is sufficient. Information that is not applicable or is irrelevant to execution planning may be omitted. Where an OPLAN is applicable, only minimal information such as the target date for execution or changes in ROE may be necessary. The following format is designed to serve as a checklist for guidance information that may be
relevant. It is not intended as a listing of mandatory information, and unnecessary headings should be deleted in situations where they are not required.

(1) Authority. Statement indicating authority for issuing the Alert Order. Indicate specific task assignments or requests to supported and supporting commanders.

(2) Situation. A description of the current politico-military situation as developed in the latest DIA intelligence assessment. Reference to enemy and friendly forces is not required unless necessary for execution planning or not otherwise available to the supported commander.

(3) Mission. A refined statement of the tasks and purpose to be accomplished. It may or may not have changed from the anticipated mission previously given in the Warning Order or Planning Order or the estimate of the supported commander.

(4) Execution

   (a) Course of Action. The COA as finally approved by the NCA in clear military objectives. This will be the basis for the concept of operations of the supported commander.

   (b) Combat Forces. A listing of the combat forces approved for the operation.

   (c) Strategic Lift Pre-positioning. Authority, if appropriate, to pre-position lift assets preparatory to deployment operations.

   (d) OPSEC Guidance. When no Warning or Planning Order has been issued, include guidance as shown in Appendix 1, Annex C, subparagraph 5e.

   (e) PSYOP Guidance. When no Warning or Planning Order has been issued, include guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4) (c).

   (f) Intelligence Guidance

   (g) Counterintelligence Guidance. When no Warning or Planning Order has been issued, include guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4) (e).

   (h) Civil Affairs Guidance. When no Warning or Planning Order has been issued, include guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4) (f).

   (i) Coordinating Instructions
1. Proposed C-day and L-hour for deployments
2. Proposed M-day for mobilization
3. Target D-day for execution
4. Estimated duration of the operation
5. DEFCON or deployability posture
6. Operational constraints, including any special ROE for this specific operation
7. Release of SIOP-committed forces
8. Unit combat readiness criteria
9. Authorization for direct liaison between commands

(j) Public Affairs Guidance. See CJCS Warning or Planning Order.

(k) Combat Camera Guidance. See CJCS Warning or Planning Order.

(5) Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation, as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority
2. Maximum numbers and types of strategic lift resources available
3. Load-planning factors for each type of lift resources
4. Other strategic movement planning guidance, as appropriate

*The CJCS or designated agent coordinates the proposed date with USCINTRANS and the other CINCs as required and recommends changes to C-day and L-hour, if required. The CJCS will establish or issue a firm C-day and L-hour. One C-day and L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. In establishing L-hour, effort should be made to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day.*
(b) Force activity designator (FAD) assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code, if warranted

(c) Fund citations, authorization to commit resources, or both

(d) Personnel deployment criteria

(e) Code names and code numbers of the operation

(f) Reporting instructions

(g) Classification and declassification guidance

(h) Known logistics constraints

(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications Guidance: specific guidance on request of CJCS-controlled assets

(b) Command Relationships

1. Designation of supported and supporting commanders and coordination instructions

2. NCA-approved command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) the gaining commander will exercise over forces transferred by the NCA and locations where the force transfers will be effective (normally AOR boundary)

6. DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERS or DEPLOYMENT ORDERS. If required by circumstances, the Alert Order may include a Deployment Preparation Order or Deployment Order, i.e., changes to alert status of units and movement of selected forces to pre-position for impending operations

7. Sample Alert Order. The Appendix is a sample Alert Order.

NOTE: Items previously included in the Warning Order or Planning Order and/or Deployment Preparation or Deployment Order need not be repeated unless information has changed.
SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS ALERT ORDER

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
     USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
     USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
     CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
     USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
     USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
     USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
     USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
     USCINCRON STRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
     USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
     DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
     HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA
     WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
     SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
     SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
     CSA WASHINGTON DC
     CNO WASHINGTON DC
     CSAF WASHINGTON DC
     CMC WASHINGTON DC
     CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
     HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL
     DISA WASHINGTON DC
     DIA WASHINGTON DC
     DLA CAMERON STATION VA
     HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
     CIA WASHINGTON DC
     CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
     CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
     COMSC WASHINGTON DC
     COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
     COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA

*AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.*
In addition to narrative information, the OPORD may contain a summary of major combat forces as allocated in the Warning Order. The primary method of passing force and deployment data is JOPES online, with formatted messages as a backup.
GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. ( ) COURSE OF ACTION. THE NCA APPROVED COA NUMBER 1 AS CONTAINED IN REF B.

4. ( ) MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. APPROVED AS PER REF A.

5. ( ) ________________. USCINTRANS IS AUTHORIZED TO MOVE AIRCRAFT AND STAGE CREWS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

6. ( ) OPSEC GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

7. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. ( ) INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

9. ( ) CI GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER

10. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

   A. ( ) PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR IS 29000IZ OCT ____. REQUEST USTRANSCOM COORDINATE WITH SUPPORTING CINCS AND RECOMMEND FIRM C-DAY, L-HOUR TO CJCS.

   B. ( ) TARGET DATE FOR EXECUTION IS 1 DEC _____.

   C. ( ) SUPPORTING COMMANDS’ DEPLOYMENT AND MOVEMENT DATA ARE MOVEMENT SCHEDULES REQUIRED TO USTRANSCOM BY 280400Z NOV ____. MOVEMENT SCHEDULES REQUIRED BY 290400Z NOV ___.

   D. ( ) USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY USCINCENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

   E. ( ) OTHER COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS PER WARNING ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER.

   F. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

*The primary method of passing the above data is via JOPES online with formatted messages as a backup.

AFSC PUB 1
11. ( ) TRANSPORT. ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT FOR REVISED
PLANNING, PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AUTHORIZED 17 NOV ___. AIRLIFT
PLANNING IS BASED ON USTRANSCOM PLUS CRAFT STAGE III (EFFECTIVE
PROPOSED C-DAY MINUS 4). SEALIFT PLANNING IS BASED ON
USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET PLUS THE RRF AND SELECTIVE
REQUISITIONING OF US FLAG MERCHANT MARINE OVER AND ABOVE THE
RRF.

   A. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY. 1B2.

   B. ( ) ACTIVATING CRAFT STAGE III IS PRUDENT GIVEN THE LIFT
REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT USCINCPAC OPLAN XXX. ACCORDINGLY,
STRATEGIC ASSETS FROM CRAFT STAGE III ARE MADE AVAILABLE AS
OUTLINED ABOVE. IF NECESSARY, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WILL BE
DESCRIBED IN THE CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. AS NOTED IN THE WARNING
OR PLANNING ORDER, USTRANSCOM AIRCRAFT FROM USCINCPAC OPLAN
XXXX SUPPORT WILL BE ON A ONE-FOR-ONE EXCHANGE FOR
COMMERCIAL CAPABILITY FROM CRAFT III ASSETS. THIS ACTION WILL
ENSURE THAT USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX SUPPORT WILL NOT BE AT THE
EXPENSE OF THE USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX FLOW.

12. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD). SEE CJCS WARNING AND
PLANNING ORDER.

13. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.

14. ( ) FUND CITATIONS WILL BE ISSUED SEPARATELY.

15. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTICS CONSTRAINTS.

16. ( ) PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE CJCS WARNING OR
PLANNING ORDER.

17. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. PER JOINT PUBS
1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER-ACTION REPORTS--PER JOINT PUB 1-03.30.

18. ( ) CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS
WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

19. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING
ORDER.
20. ( ) COMBAT CAMERA GUIDANCE. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED OF THIS OPERATION. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

21. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

22. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. THE NCA HAVE APPROVED USCINCCENT EXERCISE OF OPCON OVER USCINCPAC AND COMACC FORCES TRANSFERRED FOR THIS OPERATION. FOR COMACC FORCES, TRANSFER WILL OCCUR ON THEIR ENTRY INTO USCINCCENT AOR. FOR USCINCPAC FORCES, TRANSFER WILL OCCUR ON EXECUTION OF THE OPERATION.

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//
Appendix M

CJCS Deployment Preparation Orders, Deployment Orders, and Redeployment Orders

1. Purpose. A DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER or DEPLOYMENT ORDER can be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after authorization by the Secretary of Defense, to do the following:

   a. Increase deployability posture of units
   
   b. Decrease deployability posture of units
   
   c. Deploy forces
   
   d. Redeploy forces*
   
   e. Direct any other action that would signal planned U.S. military action or its termination in response to a particular crisis event or incident

2. When Issued. The Deployment Preparation or Deployment Order is issued on decision of the NCA to begin preparations for the conduct of a military operation (see Figure G-1). It may be issued at any point in the CAP development process. Deployment Preparation or Deployment Orders may be incorporated within Warning Orders, Planning Orders, and Alert Orders, if appropriate, and approved by the NCA.

3. How Issued. The Deployment Preparation or Deployment Order is normally issued by record communication using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH. If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communication or WIN teleconference can be used first to pass information. A record communication will be forwarded as soon as practicable.

NOTE: The Deployment Preparation Order and Deployment Order are included in CAP to permit the above changes at any time in CAP procedures sequence, independent of Warning Orders, Planning Orders, and Alert Orders, and to reserve the Execute Order

*Procedures for the redeployment of forces are the same as those to deploy forces.
solely for initiating or terminating the employment of U.S. military forces. A Deployment Preparation Order can be used to propose C-day and L-hour. A Deployment Order may be used to indicate the CJCS-established C-day and L-hour.

4. Addressees

a. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, the White House Situation Room, defense agencies, and others as appropriate. Interested commanders, heads of defense agencies, and component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

b. Action recipients of the implementing order should include the same addressees as the implementer in their responses to ensure that appropriate agencies are kept informed.

5. Contents

a. When prior execution planning has been accomplished through adaptation of an existing plan or the development of an emergency OPORD, most of the guidance necessary for deployment preparations will have already been passed to implementing commands in the Warning Order, Planning Order, or Alert Order.

b. If a crisis situation requires an increase in deployability posture, movement of forces, or establishment of a JTF (not covered in Warning Orders, Planning Orders, Alert Orders, or Execute Orders), the Deployment or Deployment Preparation Order must pass all essential guidance to effect these actions. This order will, in the first paragraph, include the appropriate authority; e.g., “The Secretary of Defense has authorized the movement of forces. . . .”

6. Sample CJCS Deployment Preparation, Deployment and Redeployment Orders. See Appendixes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
## DEPLOYMENT ORDER MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTENDED ACTION</th>
<th>DEPLOYMENT ORDER REQUIRED</th>
<th>SECDEF APPR REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINC REQUESTS ADDITIONAL FORCES (I MEF TO CENTCOM)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPLOY PARTS OF UNITS (SQUAD TO CENTCOM)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL PERS AND EQUIPMENT</td>
<td>NO*</td>
<td>NO*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESUPPLY, SUSTAINMENT, NON-UNIT-RELATED PERS/ EQUIP (BEANS, BULLETS, ETC.)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*UNLESS DIRECTED BY SECDEF, E.G., COUNTERDRUGS

Figure G-1. Deployment Order Matrix
SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO: USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FL
     USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
     USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
     CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
     USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
     USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
     USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
     USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
     USCINCRSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
     USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
     DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
INFO  WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
     SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
     SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
     INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
     CSA WASHINGTON DC
     CNO WASHINGTON DC
     CSAF WASHINGTON DC
     CMC WASHINGTON DC
     CDRUSEL NORAD PETERSON AFB CO
     HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL///CC///
     DISA WASHINGTON DC
     DIA WASHINGTON DC
     DLA CAMERON STATION VA
     HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
     CIA WASHINGTON DC
     CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
     CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
     COMSC WASHINGTON DC
     COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
     COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
     USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC///CC///

*AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.*
CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV ____/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV ____/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV ____/-/NOTAL//
NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION,
ALERT ORDER//
ORDTYP/OTR/CJCS//
AMPN/DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER//
TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/() THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED THE ALERTING OF FORCES IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. () USCINCCENT PREPARE TO EXECUTE DEPLOYMENT PER USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.
4. ( ) USCINCTRANS IS AUTHORIZED TO MOVE AIRCRAFT AND STAGE CREWS TO SUPPORT ALERT STATUS STATED ABOVE.

5. ( ) OPSEC GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

6. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

7. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
   
   A. ( ) PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR, 290001Z NOV ____

   B. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS

   C. ( ) USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY THE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDER.

   D. ( ) DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE. AS DETERMINED BY USCINCENT

   E. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED. //

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

9. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY

10. ( ) TRANSPORTATION FUNDING

11. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED

12. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

13. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTICS CONSTRAINTS

14. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING PER JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING PER JOINT PUB 1-03.30.

15. ( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. PER USCCINCENT OPLAN XXX.
16. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

17. ( ) STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, SERVICES, AND DEFENSE AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCA-APPROVED (OR THOSE PROPOSED FOR APPROVAL) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAINING COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE TRANSFER WILL BE EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THE AOR BOUNDARY).//
SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO:  USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECSDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTCMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA

*AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV ____/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV ____/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV ____/-/NOTAL//
NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE OF THE
SITUATION, ALERT ORDER//
ORDTYP/DEPLOYORD/CJCS//
TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/( ) THIS IS A DEPLOYMENT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HAS AUTHORIZED THE DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES TO BLUELAND IN
ANTICIPATION (OR SUPPORT) OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.//

GENTEX/SITUATION/

1. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEX/MISSION/

2. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, OR, IF REQUIRED,
WRITE A SHORT, CONCISE MISSION STATEMENT.//

GENTEX/EXECUTION/

3. ( ) USCINCCENT. BEGIN DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AS DEFINED IN
USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX. EMPLOYMENT OF US FORCES OUTSIDE OF
BLUELAND IS WITHHELD PENDING NCA DECISION.
M-10

4. ( ) USCINCTRANS. Furnish transportation support as required. Support air refueling as required.

5. ( ) COMACC. As a resource manager and with the concurrence of the forces for owning and gaining command, source the forces listed below to meet USCINCXXX requirements.

6. ( ) OPSEC guidance. See CJCS warning or planning order.

7. ( ) PSYOP guidance. See CJCS warning or planning order.

8. ( ) Civil affairs guidance. See CJCS warning or planning order.

9. ( ) Coordinating Instructions

   A. ( ) C-DAY, L-HOUR, 29000LZ NOV

   B. ( ) Anticipated length of operation. In excess of 30 days

   C. ( ) USTRANSCOM will coordinate and/or monitor deployments as required by the supported and supporting commander.

   D. ( ) Rules of engagement. See CJCS warning or planning order.

   E. ( ) Unit move with appropriate mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear.

   F. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. Keep the joint staff informed.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

10. ( ) Airlift movement priority

11. ( ) Funding for transportation costs

12. ( ) Force activity designator (FAD) will be issued by appropriate services.

13. ( ) Personnel deployment criteria. See CJCS warning or planning order.
14. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. PER JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING PER JOINT PUB 1-03.30.

15. ( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

16. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

17. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.

18. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTICS CONSTRAINTS/

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

19. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL ASSIST DEPLOYING UNITS WITH FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AS REQUIRED AND WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE SATELLITE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF DEPLOYING UNITS. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL PUBLISH COMSEC GUIDANCE TO ALCON.

20. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, RESOURCE MANAGERS, AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCA-APPROVED (OR THOSE PROPOSED FOR APPROVAL) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAINING COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE TRANSFER WILL BE EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THE AOR BOUNDARY)./

AKNLDG/Y/

DECL/OADR//
SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS REDEPLOYMENT ORDER

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
     USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
     USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
     CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
     USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
     USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
     USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
     USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
     DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
     HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
     DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SEC WASHINGTON DC
     CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL

INFO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
     SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
     SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//
     CSA WASHINGTON DC
     CNO WASHINGTON DC
     CSAF WASHINGTON DC
     CM C WASHINGTON DC
     CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
     HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
     DISA WASHINGTON DC
     DIA WASHINGTON DC
     DLA CAMERON STATION VA
     HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
     CIA WASHINGTON DC
     CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
     CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
     COMSC WASHINGTON DC

* AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINC and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commands. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.
CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUE NOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV ____/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/MSG/USCIN C CENT/242100ZNOV ____/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV ____/-/NOTAL//
NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, ALERT ORDER//
ORDTYP/OTR/CJCS//
TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/( ) THIS IS A REDEPLOYMENT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED THE REDEPLOYMENT AND/OR REASSIGNMENT OF US FORCES DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION BLUE NOSE.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. ( ) THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND REDUCED THREAT IN THE AOR PERMIT THE REDEPLOYMENT AND/OR REASSIGNMENT OF US FORCES DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION BLUE NOSE.//
M-14

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. ( ) REDEPLOY FORCES RETURNING TO ORIGINAL PROVIDING COMMANDS, HOME STATIONS, AND PORTS ACCORDING TO THE TIMETABLE DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT. MAINTAIN A DEFENSIVE COMBAT POSTURE FOR PHASED DRAWDOWN.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. ( ) USCINCCENT. REDEPLOY FORCES TO ORIGINAL PROVIDING COMMANDS, HOME STATIONS, AND PORTS AS APPROPRIATE. ISSUE REDEPLOYMENT PLAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. ( ) USCINCEUR, USCINCLANT, USCINCPAC, USCINCSO, USCINCSOC, USCINTRANS, CINCFOR, COMACC, CDRJCSE, AND SECTRANS. BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE REDEPLOYING FORCES PER PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE.

5. ( ) USCINTRANS. SUPPORT AIR REFUELING AND STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AS REQUIRED. TAKE ACTION AS NECESSARY TO REESTABLISH AIR BRIDGE AS REQUIRED TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT. ENSURE MAXIMUM USE OF ORGANIC STRATEGIC AIRLIFT. PRESENT CRAF AUTHORITIES REMAIN IN EFFECT.

6. ( ) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

7. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

9. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
   A. ( ) R-DAY, L-HOUR, 250001Z FEB ____  
   B. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS  
   C. ( ) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.  
   D. ( ) UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.
E.  ( ) KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.  SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

F.  ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON.  KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

10. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY

11. ( ) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS

12. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

13. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS.  REPORT INTENDED MOVEMENTS IN DAILY SITREP PER JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04.  AFTER-ACTION REPORTING PER JOINT PUB 1-03.30.

14. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.  SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS WILL ENSURE THAT ALL REDEPLOYING UNITS ARE REFLECTED IN JOPES CURRENT TPFDD ____ AND ALL SORTS DATABASES BEFORE REDEPLOYMENT.

15. ( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE.  SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

16. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS.  SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

17. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE.  SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

18. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.  STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, RESOURCE MANAGERS, AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE.  ALSO STATE THAT THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THAT THE GAINING COMMANDER WAS AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE ARE TERMINATED AND THAT REDEPLOYING FORCES ARE TRANSFERRED BACK (NORMALLY AT THE AOR BOUNDARY) TO THE PROVIDING COMMANDERS, WHO WILL EXERCISE THEIR ORIGINALLY AUTHORIZED COMMAND RELATIONSHIP.//

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//

AFSC PUB 1
Appendix N  CJCS Execute Order

1. Purpose. The EXECUTE ORDER will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to direct execution of an OPORD or other military operation to implement an NCA decision. The Execute Order will be issued by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.

2. When Issued. The Execute Order will be issued on decision by the NCA to execute a military operation. Under the full CAP procedures, an Execute Order would normally result from an NCA decision, following execution planning initiated by a Planning or Alert Order. In a particularly time-sensitive situation requiring an immediate response, an Execute Order may be issued without prior formal crisis planning, as would normally take place in Phases I through V of CAP.

3. How Issued. Normally, the Execute Order will be issued by record communication with IMMEDIATE or FLASH precedence. If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communication or WIN TLCF may be used initially to pass the Execute Order, with immediate followup record communication to confirm oral or WIN orders and keep all crisis participants informed.

4. Addressees. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees in the AIG include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. Contents
   a. When prior execution planning has been accomplished through adaptation of an existing plan or the development of an emergency OPORD, most of the guidance necessary for execution will already have been passed to the implementing commands, either through an existing plan or by a previously issued Warning Order, Planning Order, Alert Order, Deployment Preparation Order, Deployment Order, or Redeployment Order. Under these circumstances, the Execute Order need contain only the authority to execute the planned operation and any additional essential guidance, such as the date and time for execution. Reference to previous planning documents is sufficient for additional guidance.
b. In the no-prior-warning response situation where a crisis event or incident requires an immediate response without any prior formal planning, the Execute Order must convey all essential guidance that would normally be issued in the Warning Order, Planning Order, and Alert Order. Under such rapid reaction conditions, the Execute Order will generally follow the same paragraph headings as the Planning or Alert Order and may include the information listed in the following subparagraphs. Information and subheadings that are not applicable should be omitted. If some information may be desirable but is not readily available, it can be included in a subsequent message, because the Execute Order will normally be very time-sensitive.

c. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the Execute Order are as follows:

  (1) Authority. Statement indicating authority for issuing the Execute Order

  (2) Situation. A description of the latest politico-military situation that has generated a need for a response by U.S. military forces. Reference to enemy and friendly forces is not required unless necessary for execution planning and not otherwise available to the supported commander.

  (3) Mission. A refined statement of the tasks and purpose to be accomplished

  (4) Execution

  (a) Course of Action. Deployment (if not previously directed) and employment of forces approved by the NCA through the CJCS. Special or unusual tasks assigned to a specific commander (supported or supporting) will be enumerated as required. Designation of supported and supporting commands in subparagraph 5c(6) below automatically incorporates normal mission task assignment.

  (b) Major Combat Forces. A list of the major combat forces approved for the operation

  (c) OPSEC and Deception Guidance

  (d) PSYOP Guidance. If execution is directed without a Warning, Planning, or Alert Order, include guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4) (c).

  (e) Civil Affairs Guidance. If execution is directed without a Warning, Planning, or Alert Order, include guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4) (f).

  (f) Intelligence Guidance. If execution is directed without a Warning, Planning, or Alert Order, include guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4) (d).
(g) Counterintelligence Guidance. If execution is directed without a Warning, Planning, or Alert Order, include guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4) (e).

(h) Coordinating Instructions

1. C-day and L-hour for deployments
2. Target date and time for execution
3. Estimated duration of the operation. Circumstance or date that automatically terminates operations
4. DEFCON or deployability posture
5. Operational constraints, including any special ROE applicable to this specific operation
6. Release of SIOP-committed forces
7. Unit combat readiness criteria
8. Authorization for direct liaison between commands

(5) Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation, as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority
2. Allocation of strategic lift resources
3. Load planning factors for each type of lift resource
4. Other strategic movement planning guidance, as appropriate

(b) Force activity designator (FAD), if warranted

(c) Fund citations, authorization to commit resources, or both

(d) Personnel deployment criteria

(e) Reporting instructions

(f) Classification and declassification guidance, if required
(g) Known logistics constraints

(h) Public affairs guidance

(i) Combat camera guidance

(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications Guidance. Any specific guidance on the use or release of CJCS-controlled C2 assets contained in the JCSE

(b) Command Relationships

1. Designation of supported and supporting commands and coordination instructions

2. NCA-approved command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) the gaining commander will exercise over forces transferred by the NCA and locations where the force transfers will be effective (normally AOR boundary). When it is decided that forces will not transfer from one CINC to another, but those forces must perform actions at the direction of the supported commander, then a “support” relationship must be established between the two combatant commanders.

6. Sample Execute Orders. See Appendixes 1, 2, and 3.

NOTE: Items previously included in Alert, Planning, or Warning Orders need not be repeated unless information has changed.
SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS EXECUTE ORDER

(WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, OR ALERT ORDER PREVIOUSLY ISSUED)

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SEC WASHINGTON DC
CDRJCE MACDILL AFB FL
INFO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT

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OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
AMPN/EXECUTE ORDER--USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV ___/-/NOTAL//
REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV ___/-/NOTAL//
REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/261000ZNOV ____//
REF/D/ORDER/CJCS/261001ZNOV ____//
REF/E/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV ____//*
NARR/REFS A THROUGH F: CJCS WARNING ORDER, USCINCCENT COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE, CJCS DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER, CJCS PLANNING ORDER, CJCS ALERT ORDER, USCINCCENT ALERT ORDER//
ORDTYP/EXORD/CJCS//
TIMEZONE/Z//
NARR/( ) THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS DIREC TED EXECUTION OF OPERATION BLUENOSE.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. ( ) IN RESPONSE TO YELLOWLAND INCURSIONS IN ORANGELAND, THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND HAS FORMALLY REQUESTED SUBSTANTIAL US MILITARY ASSISTANCE BE DEPLOYED TO BLUELAND. THE NCA HAVE AUTHORIZED THE EXECUTION OF USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/
2. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.//
GENTEXT/EXECUTION/
3. ( ) COURSE OF ACTION. COA NUMBER 1 CONTAINED IN REF B IS APPROVED.

*If time has precluded prior issuance of these references by the CJCS, refer to instructions for preparation of Warning and Alert Orders to ensure consideration of all relevant aspects of the operations to be conducted.
4. ( ) MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. USE FORCES AS STATED IN REF A
5. ( ) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.
6. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.
7. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.
8. ( ) INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.
9. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
   A. ( ) AS STATED IN CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDERS
   B. ( ) EXECUTE BY 1 DEC _____
   C. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATIONS IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS. TERMINATE OPERATIONS WHEN DIRECTED.
   D. ( ) ROE AS CONTAINED IN USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX
   E. ( ) USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY USCINCCENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.
   F. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED. //

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/
10. ( ) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS. ISSUED SEPARATELY
11. ( ) PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.
12. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.
13. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING AS PRESCRIBED IN JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND MIL-STD 6040. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING PER JOINT PUB 1-03.30.

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14. ( ) MOVEMENT OF FORCES WILL BE REPORTED PER APPROVED CJCS PROCEDURES.

15. ( ) CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

16. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTICS CONSTRAINTS

17. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

18. ( ) COMBAT CAMERA GUIDANCE. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED OF THIS OPERATION. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

19. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL ASSIST DEPLOYING UNITS WITH FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AS REQUIRED AND WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE SATELLITE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF DEPLOYING UNITS. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL PUBLISH COMSEC GUIDANCE TO ALCON.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

20. ( ) STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, RESOURCE MANAGERS, AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCA-APPROVED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAINING COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE TRANSFER WILL BE EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THE AOR BOUNDARY).//

ANKLDG/Y//
DECL/OADR//
Appendix O  Definitions

acceptability  (DOD) Operation plan review criterion. The determination whether the contemplated course of action is worth the cost in manpower, materiel, and time involved; is consistent with the law of war; and militarily and politically supportable. See also adequacy; completeness; feasibility; suitability.

accompanying supplies (DOD) Unit supplies that deploy with forces. (JP 1-02)

adaptive planning  The concept that calls for development of a range of options, encompassing the elements of national power (diplomatic, political, economic, and military), during deliberate planning that can be adapted to a crisis as it develops. These options are referred to as Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOS). (adapted from the National Military Strategy)

adequacy  (DOD) Operation plan review criterion. The determination whether the scope and concept of a planned operation are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned. See also acceptability; completeness; feasibility; suitability. (JP 1-02)

administrative landing  (DOD) An unopposed landing involving debarkation from vehicles which have been administratively loaded. (JP 1-02)

aerial port  (DOD) An airfield that has been designated for the sustained air movement of personnel and materiel, and to serve as an authorized port for entrance into or departure from the country in which located. (JP 1-02)

airhead  (DOD, NATO) 1. A designated area in a hostile or threatened territory which, when seized and held, ensures the continuous air landing of troops and materiel and provides the maneuver space necessary for projected operations. Normally it is the area seized in the assault phase of an airborne operation. 2. A designated location in an area of operations used as a base for supply and evacuation by air. See also beachhead. (JP 1-02)

air movement  (DOD, NATO) Air transport of units, personnel, supplies, equipment, and materiel. (Approved by JMTGM# 046-95)

alert order  (DOD) 1. A crisis-action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning after the directing authority approves a military course of action. An alert order does not authorize execution
of the approved course of action. See also course of action; crisis action planning; execution planning.  (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

alliance  (DOD) An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members. See also coalition.  (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

allocation  (DOD) In a general sense, distribution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, etc. See also apportionment.  (JP 1-02)

annex  (DOD) A document appended to an operation order or other document to make it clearer or to give further details.  (JP 1-02)

apportionment  (DOD) In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. See also allocation.  (JP 1-02)

apportionment (budget)  The funds appropriated by Congress that are allocated by the Office of Management and Budget to a federal department. (adapted from the GAO glossary)

appreciations  (DOD) Personal conclusions, official estimates, and assumptions about another party’s intentions, military capabilities, and activities used in planning and decisionmaking. a. desired appreciations--Adversary personal conclusions and official estimates, valid or invalid, that result in adversary behaviors and official actions advantageous to friendly interests and objectives. b. harmful appreciations--Adversary personal conclusions, official estimates, or assumptions, valid or invalid, that result in adversary behaviors and official actions harmful to friendly interests and objectives.  (JP 1-02)

appropriation act  An act of Congress that permits federal agencies to incur obligations and make payments out of the treasury for a specified period of time and purpose.  (adapted from the GAO glossary)

area of operations  (DOD) An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. See also area of responsibility.  (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

area of responsibility  (DOD) 1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct
tions.  2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. Also called AOR.  (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

**Armed Services Medical Regulating Office (DOD)** A joint activity reporting directly to the Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command, the Department of Defense single manager for the regulation of movement of Uniformed Services patients. The Armed Services Medical Regulating Office authorizes transfers to medical treatment facilities of the Military Departments or the Department of Veterans Affairs and coordinates inter-theater and inside continental United States patient movement requirements with the appropriate transportation component commands of US Transportation Command. Also called ASMRO.  (JP 1-02)

**assembly area** (DOD, NATO) 1. An area in which a command is assembled preparatory to further action.  2. In a supply installation, the gross area used for collecting and combining components into complete units, kits, or assemblies.  (JP 1-02)

**assign** (DOD, NATO) 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel.  2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. See also attached forces.  (JP 1-02)

**assigned forces** Forces and resources placed under the combatant command of a CINC by the Secretary of Defense in his “Forces for Unified Command” memorandum available for normal peacetime operations.  (User’s Guide for Joint Operation Planning)

**assumption** (DOD) A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action.  (JP 1-02)

**attached forces** Units or personnel placed in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary.  (adapted from JP 1-02)

**augmentation forces** (DOD) Forces to be transferred from a supporting commander to the combatant command (command authority) or operational control of a supported commander during the execution of an operation order approved by the National Command Authorities.  (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

**authorizing legislation** Congressional legislation that sets up or continues the legal operations of a federal program or agency.  (adapted from the GAO glossary)
automated information system A combination of information, computer, and telecommunications resources and other information technology and personnel resources that collects, records, processes, stores, communicates, retrieves, and displays information. (Joint Pub 6-0)

available-to-load date (DOD) A day, relative to C-day in a time-phased force and deployment data, that unit and nonunit equipment and forces can begin loading on an aircraft or ship at the port of embarkation. Also called ALD. (JP 1-02)

basic load (DOD, NATO) The quantity of supplies required to be on hand within, and which can be moved by, a unit or formation. It is expressed according to the wartime organization of the unit or formation and maintained at the prescribed levels.

basic plan The part of an operation plan that forms the base structure for annexes and appendixes. It consists of general statements about the situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and control. (adapted from Joint Pub 5-03.2)

beachhead (DOD) A designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel, and provides maneuver space requisite for subsequent projected operations ashore. (JP 1-02)

breakbulk cargo Any commodity that, because of its weight, dimensions, or incompatibility with other cargo, must be shipped by mode other than MILVAN or SEAVAN. (AR 55-9/NAVSUPINST 4600.79/AFR 75-10/MCO 4610.31)

budget authority Authority conferred by law to enter into obligations, that is, appropriations, authority to borrow, or contract authority, that will result in immediate or future outlays involving Government funds. (adapted from the GAO glossary)

budget estimates submission Service and DOD agency budget estimates based on approved programs in the Program Decision Memorandums and the most recent fiscal and monetary guidelines and assumptions. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

bulk cargo (DOD) That which is generally shipped in volume where the transportation conveyance is the only external container; such as liquids, ore, or grain. (JP 1-02)

campaign (DOD) A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See also campaign plan. (JP 1-02)

campaign planning (DOD) The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become

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evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. See also campaign. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

capabilities-based planning Planning based on programmed forces, equipment, and supplies that are either available now or expected to be available at the end of a specific planning period. (User’s Guide for Joint Operation Planning)

cargo. (DOD, NATO) Commodities and supplies in transit. See also air cargo; dangerous cargo; essential cargo; immediately vital cargo; unwanted cargo; valuable cargo; wanted cargo. (JP 1-02)

cargo increment number A seven-character alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a nonunit cargo entry in a TPFDD. The first two characters identify the Service and the type of cargo; the last five are the CIN assignment. (adapted from JOPES User’s Manual)

casualty. (DOD) Any person who is lost to the organization by having been declared dead, duty status - whereabouts unknown, missing, ill, or injured. (JP 1-02)

centers of gravity (DOD) Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (JP 1-02)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

CINC’s required date (DOD) The original date relative to C-day, specified by the combatant commander for arrival of forces or cargo at the destination; shown in the time-phased force and deployment data to assess the impact of later arrival. Also called CRD. (JP 1-02)

CINC’s Strategic Concept (DOD) Final document produced in Step 5 of the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The CINC’s strategic concept is used as the vehicle to distribute the CINC’s decision and planning guidance for accomplishing joint strategic capabilities plan or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) taskings. CJCS approval of the strategic concept becomes the basis of the plan for development into an operation plan or operation plan in concept format. Formerly called “the concept of operations.” Also called CSC. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

civil affairs (DOD) The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military operations.
quent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil engineering support plan (DOD) An appendix to the Logistics annex or separate annex of an operation plan that identifies the minimum essential engineering services and construction requirements required to support the commitment of military forces. Also called CESP. See also operation plan. (Approved by JMTGM# 009-96)

civil reserve air fleet (DOD) A program in which the Department of Defense uses aircraft owned by a US entity or citizen. The aircraft are allocated by the Department of Transportation to augment the military airlift capability of the Department of Defense (DOD). These aircraft are allocated, in accordance with DOD requirements, to segments, according to their capabilities, such as Long-Range International (cargo and passenger), Short-Range International, Domestic, Alaskan, Aeromedical, and other segments as may be mutually agreed upon by the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) can be incrementally activated by the Department of Defense in three stages in response to defense-oriented situations, up to and including a declared national emergency or war, to satisfy DOD airlift requirements. When activated, CRAF aircraft are under the mission control of the Department of Defense while remaining a civil resource under the operational control of the responsible US entity or citizen. Also called CRAF. a. CRAF Stage I. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources that air carriers will furnish to the Department of Defense to support substantially expanded peacetime military airlift requirements. The Commander, Air Mobility Command, may authorize activation of this stage and assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage I. b. CRAF Stage II. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources that the air carriers will furnish to Department of Defense in a time of defense airlift emergency. The Secretary of Defense, or designee, may authorize activation of this stage permitting the Commander, Air Mobility Command, to assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage II. c. CRAF Stage III. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources owned by a US entity or citizen that the air carriers will furnish to the Department of Defense in a time of declared national defense-oriented emergency or war, or when otherwise necessary for the national defense. The aircraft in this stage are allocated by the Secretary of Transportation to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense may authorize activation of this stage permitting the Commander, Air Mobility Command, to assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage III. (JP 1-02)

close-hold plan (DOD) Operation plan with access to operation plan information extremely limited to specifically designated Worldwide Military Command and Control System user IDs and terminal IDs during initial course of action development before the involvement of outside commands, agencies, combatant commanders, Services, or the Joint Staff. (JP 1-02)
closure. (DOD) In transportation, the process of a unit arriving at a specified location. It begins when the first element arrives at a designated location, e.g., port of entry/port of departure, intermediate stops, or final destination, and ends when the last element does likewise. For the purposes of studies and command post exercises, a unit is considered essentially closed after 95 percent of its movement requirements for personnel and equipment are completed. (JP 1-02)

closure shortfall. (DOD) The specified movement requirement or portion thereof that did not meet scheduling criteria and/or movement dates. (JP 1-02)

coalition. (DOD) An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also alliance. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

coalition force. (DOD) A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02)

combat forces. (DOD) Those forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat. (JP 1-02)

combat service support. (DOD) The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. (JP 1-02)

combat support. (DOD, NATO) Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. (Approved by JMTGM# 046-95)

combatant command. (DOD) A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. See also specified command; unified command. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)
tion over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. See also combatant command; combatant commander; operational control. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

**combatant commander** (DOD) A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. See also combatant command. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

**combined** (DOD, NATO) Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., Combined Navies.) See also joint. (JP 1-02)

**command and control** (DOD) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

**command and control system** (DOD) The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned. (JP 1-02)

**command and control warfare** (DOD) The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare is an application of information warfare in military operations and is a subset of information warfare. Command and control warfare applies across the range of military operations and all levels of conflict. Also called C2W. C2W is both offensive and defensive: a. C2-attack. Prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system. b. C2-protect. Maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. See also command and control; electronic warfare; military deception; operations security; psychological operations. (Approved by JMTGM# 034-96)
command, control, communications, and computer systems (DOD) Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander’s exercise of command and control across the range of military operations. Also called C4 systems. See also command and control; tactical command, control, communications, and computer system(s). (Approved by JMTGM# 081-95)

commander’s estimate of the situation (DOD) A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander’s estimate which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions is called a commander’s long-range estimate of the situation. (JP 1-02)

common servicing (DOD) That function performed by one Military Service in support of another Military Service for which reimbursement is not required from the Service receiving support. (JP 1-02)

common supplies (DOD) Those supplies common to two or more Services. (JP 1-02)

common-user lift (DOD) US Transportation Command-controlled lift: The pool of strategic transportation assets either government owned or chartered that are under operational control of Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, or Military Traffic Management Command for the purpose of providing common-user transportation to the Department of Defense across the range of military operations. These assets range from common-user organic or chartered pool of common-user assets available day-to-day to a larger pool of common-user assets phased in from other sources. (JP 1-02)

communications zone (DOD, NATO) Rear part of theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, Establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. (JP 1-02)

completeness (DOD) Operation plan review criterion. The determination that each course of action must be complete and answer the questions: who, what, when, where, and how. See also acceptability; completeness; feasibility; suitability. (JP 1-02)

component (DOD) 1. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. Normally a joint force is organized with a combination of Service and functional components. 2. In logistics, a part or combination of parts having a specific function, which can be installed or replaced only as an entity. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)
concept of logistic support  (DOD) A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of how a commander intends to support and integrate with a concept of operations in an operation or campaign. (JP 1-02)

concept of operations  (DOD) A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander’s concept. (JP 1-02)

contingency  (DOD) An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. See also contingency planning. (JP 1-02)

contingency plan  (DOD) A plan for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of the command. See also joint operation planning. (Approved by JMTGM# 006-95)

contingency planning  The development of plans for potential crises involving military requirements that can reasonably be expected in an area of responsibility. Contingency planning can occur anywhere within the operational continuum from peace to conflict and war and may be performed deliberately or under crisis action conditions. Contingency planning for joint operations is coordinated at the national level by assigning planning tasks and relationships among the combatant commanders and apportioning or allocating to them the forces and resources available to accomplish those tasks. Commanders throughout the unified chain of command may give their staffs and subordinate commands additional contingency planning tasks beyond those specified at the national level to ensure broader contingency coverage. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

conventional planning and execution(DOD) Worldwide Military Command and Control System command and control application software and databases that are designed to support requirements relating to joint planning mobilization and deployment, including plan development, course of action development, execution planning, execution, movement monitoring, sustainment, and redeployment from origin to destination. (JP 1-02)

coordinating authority  (DOD) A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the
authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

**course of action** (DOD) 1. A plan that would accomplish, or is related to, the accomplishment of a mission. 2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. It is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander’s estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this data base will be contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the course of action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order. Also called COA. (JP 1-02)

**course of action development** (DOD) The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System within the crisis action planning process that provides for the development of military responses and includes, within the limits of the time allowed: establishing force and sustainment requirements with actual units; evaluating force, logistic, and transportation feasibility; identifying and resolving resource shortfalls; recommending resource allocations; and producing a course of action via a commander’s estimate that contains a concept of operations, employment concept, risk assessments, prioritized courses of action, and supporting data bases. See also course of action; crisis action planning. (JP 1-02)

**crisis** (DOD) An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

**crisis action planning** (DOD) 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)
critical item  (DOD) An essential item which is in short supply or expected to be in short supply for an extended period. (JP 1-02)

critical item list  (DOD) Prioritized list, compiled from commanders’ composite critical item lists, identifying items and weapon systems that assist Services and Defense Logistics Agency in selecting systems for production surge planning. (JP 1-02)

critical sustainability items  (DOD) Items described at National Stock Number level of detail, by Federal Supply Class, as part of the Logistic Factors File, that significantly affect the commander’s ability to execute an operation plan. (JP 1-02)

cross-servicing  (DOD) That function performed by one Military Service in support of another Military Service for which reimbursement is required from the Service receiving support. (JP 1-02)

debarkation  (DOD) The unloading of troops, equipment, or supplies from a ship or aircraft. (JP 1-02)

decoy means  (DOD) Methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target. There are three categories of deception means: a. physical means--Activities and resources used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power. (Examples: military operations, including exercises, reconnaissance, training activities, and movement of forces; the use of dummy equipment and devices; tactics; bases, logistic actions, stockpiles, and repair activity; and test and evaluation activities.) b. technical means--Military material resources and their associated operating techniques used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power through the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption, or reflection of energy; the emission or suppression of chemical or biological odors; and the emission or suppression of nuclear particles. c. administrative means--Resources, methods, and techniques to convey or deny oral, pictorial, documentary, or other physical evidence to a foreign power. (Approved by JMTGM# 055-2840-94)

decision  (DOD) In an estimate of the situation, a clear and concise statement of the line of action intended to be followed by the commander as the one most favorable to the successful accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02)

Defense Planning Guidance  (DOD) This document, issued by the Secretary of Defense, provides firm guidance in the form of goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of the Program Objective Memorandums by the Military Departments and Defense agencies. Also called DPG. (JP 1-02)

defense readiness conditions  (DOD) A uniform system of progressive alert postures for use between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified commands and for use by the Services. Defense readiness conditions are

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ated to match situations of varying military severity (status of alert). Defense readiness conditions are identified by the short title DEFCON (5), (4), (3), (2), and (1), as appropriate. Also called DEFCON. (JP 1-02)

deliberate planning (DOD) 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

demonstration (DOD, NATO) 1. An attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy. (DOD) 2. In military deception, a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought made to deceive an adversary. It is similar to a feint but no actual contact with the adversary is intended. (Approved by JMTGM# 055-2840-94)

deploy decisive force To take actions including the rapid deployment of sufficient and supportable warfighting force to a crisis region in order to defend U.S. interests, followed by sufficient additional force to end the conflict quickly and on terms favorable to the United States.

deployability posture (DOD) The state or stage of a unit’s preparedness for deployment to participate in a military operation, defined in five levels as follows: a. normal deployability posture. The unit is conducting normal activities. Commanders are monitoring the situation in any area of tension and reviewing plans. No visible overt actions are being taken to increase deployability posture. Units not at home station report their scheduled closure time at home station or the time required to return to home station if ordered to return before scheduled time and desired mode of transportation are available. b. increased deployability posture. The unit is relieved from commitments not pertaining to the mission. Personnel are recalled from training areas, pass, and leave, as required, to meet the deployment schedule. Preparation for deployment of equipment and supplies is initiated. Pre-deployment personnel actions are completed. Essential equipment and supplies located at continental United States (CONUS) or overseas installations are identified. c. advanced deployability posture. All essential personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies are checked, packed, rigged for deployment, and positioned with deploying unit. The unit remains at home station. Movement requirements are confirmed. d. marshaled deployability posture. The first increment of deploying personnel, mobility equipment, and
accompanying supplies is marshaled at designated ports of embarkation but not loaded. Sufficient aircraft or sealift assets are positioned at, or en route to, the port of embarkation, either to load the first increment or to sustain a flow, as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution. Supporting airlift control elements (ALCEs), stage crews (if required), and support personnel adequate to sustain the airlift flow at onload, en route, and offload locations will be positioned, as required. e. Loaded deployability posture. All first increment equipment and accompanying supplies are loaded aboard ships and prepared for departure to the designated objective area. Personnel are prepared for loading on minimum notice. Follow-on increments of cargo and personnel are en route or available to meet projected ship loading schedules. Sufficient airlift is positioned and loaded at the port of embarkation to move the first increment or to initiate and sustain a flow, as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution. Supporting ALCEs, stage aircrews (if required), and support personnel adequate to sustain the airlift flow at onload, en route, and offload locations are positioned, as required. (JP 1-02)

**deployment** (DOD) 1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within areas of operation. 3. The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. 4. The relocation of forces and materiel to desired areas of operations. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. See also deployment order; deployment planning; deployment preparation order. (JP 1-02)

**deployment data base** (DOD) The JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System) data base containing the necessary information on forces, materiel, and filler and replacement personnel movement requirements to support execution. The data base reflects information contained in the refined time-phased force and deployment data from the deliberate planning process or developed during the various phases of the crisis action planning process, and the movement schedules or tables developed by the transportation component commands to support the deployment of required forces, personnel, and materiel. See also time-phased force and deployment data. (JP 1-02)

**deployment estimate** The estimated time required for all ULNs, CINs, and PINs of a TPFDD to arrive at the PODs expressed in C-days, from the time of notification to deploy.

**deployment order** (DOD) A planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that authorizes and directs the transfer of forces between combatant commands by reassignment or attachment. A deployment order normally specifies the authority that the gaining combatant commander will exercise over the transferred forces. See also deployment; deployment planning; deployment preparation order. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)
deployment planning (DOD) Operational planning directed toward the movement of forces and sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area for conducting the joint operations contemplated in a given plan. Encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intracontinental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging areas, and holding areas. See also deployment; deployment order; deployment preparation order. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

deployment preparation order (DOD) An order issued by competent authority to move forces or prepare forces for movement (e.g., increase deployability posture of units). See also deployment; deployment planning; deployment preparation order. (JP 1-02)

destination (DEST) The terminal geographic location in the routing scheme for forces only. (Resupply and replacement personnel are routed to a port of support.) The destination identifies the station or location in the objective area where the unit will be employed. For some units, the destination may be the same as their POD. (JOPES User’s Manual)

deterrent options (DOD) A course of action, developed on the best economic, diplomatic, political, and military judgment, designed to dissuade an adversary from a current course of action or contemplated operations. (In constructing an operation plan, a range of options should be presented to effect deterrence. Each option requiring deployment of forces should be a separate force module.) (JP 1-02)

directive authority for logistics A CINC’s authority to issue directives, including peacetime measures, to subordinate commanders necessary to ensure effective execution of operations, economy of operation, and prevention of unnecessary duplication by the component commands. (Joint Pub 4-0)

doctrine (DOD) Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)

dynamic analysis and replanning tool An ADP application program designed to furnish a grossly transportation-feasible TPFDD for a COA or operation plan. It allows planners to build, edit, and manipulate TPFDD files. DART also offers capabilities to analyze proposed COAs in relation to asset allocation profiles and TPFDD files.

earliest arrival date (DOD) A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner as the earliest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can be accepted at a port of debarkation during a deployment. Used with the latest arrival date, it defines a delivery window for transportation planning. Also called EAD. See also latest arrival date. (JP 1-02)
electronic warfare  (DOD) Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.  

a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams).  

b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP.  

c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, both communications intelligence, and electronics intelligence. See also command and control warfare. (Approved by JMTGM# 034-96)

embarkation  (DOD, NATO) The process of putting personnel and/or vehicles and their associated stores and equipment into ships and/or aircraft. (JP 1-02)
employment (DOD) The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

deny enemy capabilities (DOD) Those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and that, if adopted, will affect accomplishment of our mission. The term “capabilities” includes not only the general courses of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. “Enemy capabilities” are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military operations, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces. In strategic thinking, the capabilities of a nation represent the courses of action within the power of the nation for accomplishing its national objectives throughout the range of military operations. (JP 1-02)

essential elements of friendly information (DOD) Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. Also called EEFI. (JP 1-02)

evacuation policy (DOD) 1. Command decision indicating the length in days of the maximum period of noneffectiveness that patients may be held within the command for treatment. Patients who, in the opinion of responsible medical officers, cannot be returned to duty status within the period prescribed are evacuated by the first available means, provided the travel involved will not aggravate their disabilities. 2. A command decision concerning the movement of civilians from the proximity of military operations for security and safety reasons and involving the need to arrange for movement, reception, care, and control of such individuals. 3. Command policy concerning the evacuation of unserviceable or abandoned materiel and including designation of channels and destinations for evacuated materiel, the establishment of controls and procedures, and the dissemination of condition standards and disposition instructions. (JP 1-02)

execute order (DOD) 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities decision to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

execution planning (DOD) The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System crisis action planning process that provides for the translation of an approved course of action into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete operation plan or operation order. Execution planning is detailed planning for the commitment of specified forces and resources. During crisis action planning, an approved operation plan or other National Command Authorities-approved course of action is adjusted, refined, and translated into an operation order. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning, or it can take place in the absence of prior planning.
See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

feasibility (DOD) Operation plan review criterion. The determination of whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources. See also acceptability; adequacy; completeness; suitability. (JP 1-02)

file A collection of one or more types of related computer records for some overall topic. (JOPES User’s Manual)

filler personnel (DOD) Individuals of suitable grade and skill initially required to bring a unit or organization to its authorized strength. (JP 1-02)

flexible deterrent options A planning framework intended to facilitate early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with deterrent-oriented options carefully tailored to send the right signal. These options should include limited (primarily active brigade, squadron, group) military forces and preplanned requests for economic, diplomatic, and political actions appropriate to particular military actions.

force augmentation planning and execution system An ADP application program designed to improve the ability of the Joint Staff to plan and monitor mobilization of an effective fighting force; determine and satisfy information requirements for augmentation forces by employment, deployment, and sustainment planning; analyze mobilization feasibility to determine shortfalls in personnel required; and support the integrated planning, monitoring, and execution of manpower mobilization.

force closure (DOD) The point in time when a supported commander determines that sufficient personnel and equipment resources are in the assigned area of operations to carry out assigned tasks. (JP 1-02)

force entry operations The aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, vehicles, and necessary support, or combinations thereof, embarked for the purpose of gaining access through land, air, or amphibious operations to an objective area. Force entry into an objective area may be opposed or unopposed. (Joint Pub 5-00.1)

force list (DOD) A total list of forces required by an operation plan, including assigned forces, augmentation forces, and other forces to be employed in support of the plan. (JP 1-02)

force module (DOD) A grouping of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, with their accompanying supplies and the required nonunit resupply and personnel necessary to sustain forces for a minimum of 30 days. The elements of force modules are linked together or are uniquely identified so that they may be extracted from or adjusted as an entity in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data bases to

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enhance flexibility and usefulness of the operation plan during a crisis. Also called FM. See also force module package. (JP 1-02)

force module package (DOD) A force module with a specific functional orientation (e.g. air superiority, close air support, reconnaissance, ground defense) that includes combat, associated combat support, and combat service support forces. Additionally, force module packages will contain sustainment in accordance with logistic policy contained in Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Annex B. Also called FMP. See also force module. (JP 1-02)

force record A description of a TPFDD unit composed of three parts:

1. force requirement routing data composed of force description information, such as FRN, UTC, unit level code (ULC), personnel strength, ILOC, POD, DEST, load configuration, movement dates, and preferred mode and source of transportation
2. force unit identification incorporating UIC, unit name, ORIGIN, RLD, POE, ALD, and preferred transportation mode
3. force movement characteristics, including passengers and cargo of a type unit defined by TUCHA file data for that standard UTC. It is part of the ULN. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-03.16)

force requirement number (DOD) An alphanumeric code used to uniquely identify force entries in a given operation plan time-phased force and deployment data. Also called FRN. (JP 1-02)

force sourcing (DOD) The identification of the actual units, their origins, ports of embarkation, and movement characteristics to satisfy the time-phased force requirements of a supported commander. (JP 1-02)

forcible entry Seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. (Joint Pub 5-00.1)

foreign internal defense (DOD) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

fragmentary order (DOD) An abbreviated form of an operation order, usually issued on a day-to-day basis, that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued in sections. (JP 1-02)

fragmentation code The sixth position of the ULN, used to identify elements of a force deploying in more than one increment. (JOPES User’s Manual)

functional plans (DOD) Plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements
such as disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of US citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations, or similar discrete tasks. They may be developed in response to the requirements of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defense agency. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of CINC-initiated plans is not normally required. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

future-year defense program The forces and resources associated with programs approved by the Secretary of Defense for the Department of Defense; residing in an automated database, it is updated and published at least three times each budget cycle. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

grossly transportation feasible (DOD) A determination made by the supported commander that a draft operation plan can be supported with the apportioned transportation assets. This determination is made by using a transportation feasibility estimator to simulate movement of personnel and cargo from port of embarkation to port of debarkation within a specified time frame. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support (DOD) Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Approved by JMTGM# 081-95)

implementation (DOD) Procedures governing the mobilization of the force and deployment, employment, and sustainment of military operations in response to execution orders issued by the National Command Authorities. (JP 1-02)

implementation planning (DOD) Operational planning associated with the conduct of a continuing operation, campaign, or war to attain defined objectives. At the national level, it includes the development of strategy and the assignment of strategic tasks to combatant commanders. At the theater level, it includes the development of campaign plans to attain assigned objectives and the preparation of operation plans and operation orders to prosecute the campaign. At lower levels, implementation planning prepares for the execution of assigned tasks or logistic missions. See also joint operation planning. (JP 1-02)

in-place force (DOD) 1. A NATO assigned force which, in peacetime, is principally stationed in the designated combat zone of the NATO command to which it is committed. 2. Force within a combatant commander’s area of responsibility and under the combatant commander’s combatant command (command authority). (JP 1-02)

integrated priority list (DOD) A list of a combatant commander’s highest priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the combatant commander, adversely affect the capability of the combatant commander’s forces to accomplish their assigned mission. The integrated
priority list provides the combatant commander’s recommendations for programming funds in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System process. Also called IPL. (JP 1-02)

intelligence estimate (DOD, NATO) The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. (JP 1-02)

intermediate location An intermediate stopping point in the deployment routing of a unit, used to lay over the force for a specified time, normally longer than one day. It is often used to unite the personnel and cargo of split shipments. This point may occur between the ORIGIN and POE, the POE and POD, or the POD and DEST. (JOPES User’s Manual)

international logistics (DOD) The negotiating, planning, and implementation of supporting logistics arrangements between nations, their forces, and agencies. It includes furnishing logistic support (major end items, materiel, and/or services) to, or receiving logistic support from, one or more friendly foreign governments, international organizations, or military forces, with or without reimbursement. It also includes planning and actions related to the intermeshing of a significant element, activity, or component of the military logistics systems or procedures of the United States with those of one or more foreign governments, international organizations, or military forces on a temporary or permanent basis. It includes planning and actions related to the utilization of United States logistics policies, systems, and/or procedures to meet requirements of one or more foreign governments, international organizations, or forces. (JP 1-02)

international logistic support (DOD) The provision of military logistic support by one participating nation to one or more participating nations, either with or without reimbursement. See also inter-Service support. (JP 1-02)

interoperability (DOD, NATO) 1. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (DOD) 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02)

inter-Service support (DOD) Action by one Military Service or element thereof to provide logistic and/or administrative support to another Military Service or element thereof. Such action can be recurring or nonrecurring in character on an installation, area, or worldwide basis. See also international logistic support. (JP 1-02)
intertheater. (DOD) Between theaters or between the continental United States and theaters. (JP 1-02)

intragtheater. (DOD) Within a theater. (JP 1-02)

issue books. The collection of major issues resulting from OSD staff review of Program Objective Memorandums. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

joint. (DOD) Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

joint flow and analysis system for transportation. Application software designed to furnish a quick-response capability to determine the transportation feasibility of a concept. JFAST accesses the TPFDD to perform closure estimates, determine optimum modes, assess the effects of attrition, identify shortfalls in movement capability versus required capability, and determine gross lift capability. JFAST replaces the TFE.

joint force. (DOD) A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force commander. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

joint force air component commander. (DOD) The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, rect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander’s responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander’s apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander’s guidance and authority, and coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. (DOD) A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. See also joint force. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

joint force land component commander. (DOD) The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces.
ning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force land component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFLCC. (JP 1-02)

**joint force maritime component commander** (DOD) The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of maritime forces and assets, planning and coordinating maritime operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force maritime component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of maritime forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFMCC. (JP 1-02)

**joint force special operations component commander** (DOD) The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 1-02)

**joint logistics** (DOD) The art and science of planning and carrying out, by a joint force commander and staff, logistic operations to support the protection, movement, maneuver, firepower, and sustainment of operating forces of two or more Services of the same nation. (JP 1-02)

**joint matters** (DOD) Matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to national military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified command. (JP 1-02)

**joint movement center** (DOD) The center established to coordinate the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through establishment of transportation policies within the assigned area of responsibility, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by a joint force commander. (JP 1-02)
**joint operations** (DOD) A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

**joint operation planning** (DOD) Planning for contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility or joint operations area of the command. Planning activities exclusively associated with the preparation of operation plans, operation plans in concept format, campaign plans, and operation orders (other than the single integrated operation plan) for the conduct of military operations by the combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint operation planning is coordinated at the national level to support Secretary of Defense Contingency Planning Guidance, strategic requirements in the National Military Strategy, and emerging crises. As such, joint operation planning includes mobilization planning, deployment planning, employment planning, sustainment planning, and redeployment planning procedures. Joint operation planning is performed in accordance with formally established planning and execution procedures. See also contingency plan; execution planning; implementation planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System; joint operation planning process. (Approved by JMTGM# 081-95)

**Joint Operation Planning and Execution System**(DOD) A continuously evolving system that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. See also joint operation planning. (JP 1-02)

**joint operation planning process** (DOD) A coordinated Joint Staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission. See also joint operation planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (Approved by JMTGM# 081-95)

**joint planning document** Formerly annexes of the National Military Strategy (NMS), this document supports the NMS by furnishing concise programming priorities, requirements, or advice to the Secretary of Defense for consideration during preparation of the DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE (DPG). The JPD is a stand-alone document published in a series of volumes dealing with specific areas. It is intended to furnish insight into the Chairman’s priorities in development of the defense program for the affected FYDP. (adapted from CJCS MOP 7, 1st Revision, 17 March 1993)
joint planning and execution community (DOD) Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. It usually consists of the Joint Staff, Services, Service major commands (including the Service wholesale logistics commands), unified commands (and their certain Service component commands), subunified commands, transportation component commands, joint task forces (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency) as may be appropriate to a given scenario. Also called JPEC. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

joint servicing That function performed by a jointly staffed and financed activity in support of two or more military Services. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations task force A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. (JP 1-02)

joint staff 1. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, or of a joint task force, which includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. 2. Joint Staff. The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman, and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman in carrying out their responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

joint strategic planning system The primary means by which the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINC, carries out his statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in giving strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and gives net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries. Also called JSPS. (JP 1-02)

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures The actions and methods which implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will be published by CJCS, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. (JP 1-02)
joint task force (DOD) A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

JOPES ADP. The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) standard computer-based system consisting of standard data files, standard ADP programs, and instructions for the reporting and exchange of data used to develop, analyze, refine, review, and maintain joint operation plans. It is supported by an integrated set of functional application software residing on the WWMCCS Information System (WIS) Workstation (WWS) coupled with a more advanced user interface to other applications. See also Technology Insertion Project (TIP). Access to these applications is through a client/server environment.

latest arrival date (DOD) A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner as the latest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can arrive and complete unloading at the port of debarkation and support the concept of operations. Also called LAD. See also earliest arrival date. (JP 1-02)

lesser regional contingency A regionally centered crisis based on a less compelling threat than those involved in an MRC. Missions range from conflict to the lower end of the combat spectrum.

level of detail (DOD) Within the current joint planning and execution systems, movement characteristics are described at five distinct levels of detail. These levels are: a. level I. aggregated level. Expressed as total number of passengers and total short tons, total measurement tons, total square feet and/or total hundreds of barrels by unit line number (ULN), cargo increment number (CIN), and personnel increment number (PIN). b. level II. summary level. Expressed as total number of passengers by ULN and PIN and short tons, measurement tons (including barrels), total square feet of bulk, oversize, outsize, and non-air-transportable cargo by ULN and CIN. c. level III. detail by cargo category. Expressed as total number of passengers by ULN and PIN and short tons, and/or measurement tons (including barrels), total square feet of cargo as identified by the ULN or CIN three-position cargo category code. d. level IV. detail expressed as number of passengers and individual dimensional data (expressed in length, width, and height in number of inches) of cargo by equipment type by ULN. e. level V. detail by priority of shipment. Expressed as total number of passengers by Service specialty code in deployment sequence by ULN individual weight (in pounds) and dimensional data (expressed in length, width, and height in number of inches) of equipment in deployment sequence by ULN. (JP 1-02)

lift Strategic lift Air, land, and sea transport assets designated for deploying forces and cargo between theaters of operations or between CONUS and theaters of operations.
Theater lift. Air, land, and sea transport assets assigned to a theater CINC for deploying forces and cargo within a theater of operations.

limited-access plan (DOD) The limited-access plan (like the close-hold plan) is an operation plan that has access restricted to individual Worldwide Military Command and Control System user IDs and terminal IDs. Unlike the close-hold plan, the limited-access plan can be distributed to more than one Joint Operation Planning and Execution System site. See also close-hold plan. (JP 1-02)

limiting factor (DOD) A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment. Illustrative examples are transportation network deficiencies, lack of in-place facilities, malpositioned forces or materiel, extreme climatic conditions, distance, transit or overflight rights, political conditions, etc. (JP 1-02)

lines of communications All the routes--land, water, and air--that connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (Joint Pub 4-0)

lodgment area See airhead. (JP 1-02)

logistics. (DOD) The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (Approved by JMTGM# 061-2846-94)

logistic assessment (DOD, NATO) An evaluation of: a. The logistic support required to support particular military operations in a theater of operations, country, or area. b. The actual and/or potential logistics support available for the conduct of military operations either within the theater, country, or area, or located elsewhere. (JP 1-02)

logistics-over-the-shore operations (DOD) The loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of fixed port facilities, in friendly or nondefended territory, and, in time of war, during phases of theater development in which there is no opposition by the enemy. Also called LOTS. (JP 1-02)

logistics sourcing (DOD) The identification of the origin and determination of the availability of the time-phased force and deployment data nonunit logistics requirements. (JP 1-02)
logistic support (DOD) Logistic support encompasses the logistic services, materiel, and transportation required to support the continental United States-based and worldwide deployed forces. (JP 1-02)

logistics sustainment analysis and feasibility estimator Application software that gives the JPEC the capability to estimate logistics sustainment requirements and evaluate materiel supportability for deliberate planning and COAs. LOGSAFE replaces the MRG.

maintain (DOD) When used in the context of deliberate planning, the directed command will keep the referenced operation plan, operation plan in concept format, or concept summary, and any associated Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) automated data processing files active in accordance with applicable tasking documents describing the type and level of update or maintenance to be performed. General guidance is contained in JOPES, Volumes I and II. See also retain. (JP 1-02)

major combat element (DOD) Those organizations and units described in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan that directly produce combat capability. The size of the element varies by Service, force capability, and the total number of such elements available. Examples are Army divisions and separate brigades, Air Force squadrons, Navy task forces, and Marine expeditionary forces. See also major force. (JP 1-02)

major defense program or major force program A category of program elements that represents a major force, mission, or support function, e.g., strategic forces, intelligence and communications, research and development, supply and maintenance, etc. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

major fleet (DOD) A principal, permanent subdivision of the operating forces of the Navy with certain supporting shore activities. Presently there are two such fleets: the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet. (JP 1-02)

major force (DOD) A military organization comprised of major combat elements and associated combat support, combat service support, and sustainment increments. The major force is capable of sustained military operations in response to plan employment requirements. See also major combat element. (JP 1-02)

major regional contingency A regionally centered crisis based on a significant threat to U.S. vital interest in a region that warrants the deployment of forces greater than division-wing combinations.

manifest (DOD) A document specifying in detail the passengers or items carried for a specific destination. (JP 1-02)

maritime prepositioning ships (DOD) Civilian-crewed, Military Sealift Command-chartered ships which are organized into three squadrons and are usually forward-
deployed. These ships are loaded with prepositioned equipment and 30 days of supplies to support three Marine expeditionary brigades. Also called MPS. (JP 1-02)

master force list (DOD) A file which contains the current status of each requirement for a given operation plan. The master force list is made available for file transfer service (FTS) transfer to other Global Command and Control System activities from a file produced from the joint deployment system data base. Also called MFL. (JP 1-02)

materiel (DOD) All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (JP 1-02)

materiel planning (DOD) A subset of logistic planning and consists of a four-step process: 

 a. requirements definition. Requirements for significant items must be calculated at item level detail (i.e., national stock number) to support sustainability planning and analysis. Requirements include unit roundout, consumption and attrition replacement, safety stock, and the needs of allies.

 b. apportionment. Items are apportioned to the combatant commanders based on a global scenario to avoid sourcing of items to multiple theaters. The basis for apportionment is the capability provided by unit stocks, host nation support, theater prepositioned war reserve stocks and industrial base, and continental United States Department of Defense stockpiles and available production. Item apportionment cannot exceed total capabilities.

 c. sourcing. Sourcing is the matching of available capabilities on a given date against item requirements to support sustainability analysis and the identification of locations to support transportation planning. Sourcing of any item is done within the combatant commander’s apportionment.

 d. documentation. Sourced item requirements and corresponding shortfalls are major inputs to the combatant commander’s sustainability analysis. Sourced item requirements are translated into movement requirements and documented in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base for transportation feasibility analysis. Movement requirements for nonsignificant items are estimated in tonnage. (JP 1-02)

medical evacuees (DOD) Personnel who are wounded, injured, or ill and must be moved to or between medical facilities. (JP 1-02)

medical planning module The JOPES ADP application program used to determine the impact of an operation on the total medical system, including the amount of medical support needed, such as bed, MEDEVAC, and blood/fluid requirements. (adapted from JOPES User’s Manual)

memorandum of policy A statement of policy approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and issued for the guidance of the Services, unified and specified commands, and Joint Staff. (Joint Pub 1-01)
military capability (DOD) The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. a. force structure--Numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our Defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, airwings. b. modernization--Technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipments. c. unit readiness--The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. d. sustainability--The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. See also readiness. (Approved by JMTGM# 017-95)

military deception (DOD) Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are: a. strategic military deception--Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator’s strategic military objectives, policies, and operations. b. operational military deception--Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations. c. tactical military deception--Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. d. Service military deception--Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems. e. military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC)--Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. See also deception means. (Approved by JMTGM# 055-2840-94)

military department One of the departments within the Department of Defense created by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (Department of the Army, Navy, or Air Force). (JP 1-02)

military objectives (DOD) The derived set of military actions to be taken to implement National Command Authorities guidance in support of national objectives. Defines the
results to be achieved by the military and assigns tasks to commanders. See also national objectives. (JP 1-02)

**military options** (DOD) A range of military force responses that can be projected to accomplish assigned tasks. Options include one or a combination of the following: civic action, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other military activities to develop positive relationships with other countries; confidence building and other measures to reduce military tensions; military presence; activities to convey threats to adversaries and truth projections; military deceptions and psychological operations; quarantines, blockades, and harassment operations; raids; intervention campaigns; armed conflict involving air, land, maritime, and strategic warfare campaigns and operations; support for law enforcement authorities to counter international criminal activities (terrorism, narcotics trafficking, slavery, and piracy); support for law enforcement authorities to suppress domestic rebellion; and support for insurgencies, counterinsurgency, and civil war in foreign countries. (JP 1-02)

**Military Service** (DOD) A branch of the Armed Forces of the United States, established by act of Congress, in which persons are appointed, enlisted, or inducted for military service, and which operates and is administered within a military or executive department. The Military Services are: the United States Army, the United States Navy, the United States Air Force, the United States Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard. (JP 1-02)

**mission** (DOD) 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 1-02)

**mission type order** (DOD) 1. Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. (JP 1-02)

**mobility** (DOD, NATO) A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. (JP 1-02)

**mobility analysis** (DOD) An in-depth examination of all aspects of transportation planning in support of operation plan and operation order development. (JP 1-02)

**mobilization** (DOD) 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components as well as a semblance and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories: a. selective mobilization--
Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units, individual ready reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack. b. partial mobilization--Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. c. full mobilization--Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months. d. total mobilization--Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-95)

mobilization-deployment planning The act of using authorized systems and measures for planning, coordinating, and monitoring movements and deployments of mobilized forces and materiel necessary to meet military objectives. (JOPES User’s Manual)

modified OPLAN A plan developed by modifying the primary OPLAN to cover a new concept of operations, with new assumptions, and an adjusted TPFDD.

module A collection of one or more software programs that accomplishes major functions in an application program or subsystem.

movement control (DOD) 1. The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. 2. An organization responsible for the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. Also called movement control center. See also non-unit-related cargo; non-unit-related personnel. (Approved by JMTGM# 046-95)

movement schedule (DOD) A schedule developed to monitor or track a separate entity whether it is a force requirement, cargo or personnel increment, or lift asset. The schedule reflects the assignment of specific lift resources (such as an aircraft or ship) that will be used to move the personnel and cargo included in a specific movement increment. Arrival and departure times at ports of embarkation, etc., are detailed to show a flow and workload at each location. Movement schedules are detailed enough to support plan implementation. (JP 1-02)
movement table (DOD, NATO) A table giving detailed instructions or data for a move. When necessary it will be qualified by the words road, rail, sea, air, etc., to signify the type of movement. Normally issued as an annex to a movement order or instruction. (JP 1-02)

multiapportionment The apportionment of the same forces to more than one CINC for use in developing plans that cover the same specific period of time.

multi-Service doctrine (DOD) Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is ratified by two or more Services, and is promulgated in multi-Service publications that identify the participating Services, e.g., Army-Navy doctrine. See also combined doctrine; joint doctrine; joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. (JP 1-02)

nation assistance (DOD) Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-95)

National Command Authorities (DOD) The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (JP 1-02)

national emergency (DOD) A condition declared by the President or the Congress by virtue of powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency actions to be undertaken in the national interest. Action to be taken may include partial, full, or total mobilization of national resources. See also mobilization. (JP 1-02)

National Military Command System (DOD) The priority component of the Global Command and Control System designed to support the National Command Authorities and Joint Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their responsibilities. Also called NMCS. (JP 1-02)

national objectives (DOD) The aims, derived from national goals and interests, toward which a national policy or strategy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied. See also military objectives. (JP 1-02)

National Security Council (DOD) A governmental body specifically designed to assist the President in integrating all spheres of national security policy. The President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense are statutory members. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serve as advisers. Also called NSC. (JP 1-02)
national security directive One of a series of directives that announce Presidential decisions implementing national policy objectives in all areas of national security. All NSDs in this series are individually identified by number and signed by the President.

national security interests (DOD) The foundation for the development of valid national objectives that define US goals or purposes. National security interests include preserving US political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic well-being; and bolstering international order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its allies. (JP 1-02)

non-air-transportable cargo Cargo that exceeds any of the following dimensions: 1,453” x 216” x 156”, or between 114” and 156” high and exceeding 144” wide. (adapted from JOPES User’s Data Element Dictionary)

noncombatant evacuation operations (DOD) Operations conducted to relocate threatened noncombatants from locations in a foreign country. These operations normally involve United States citizens whose lives are in danger, and may also include selected foreign nationals. Also called NEO. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-95)

noncombatant evacuees 1. U.S. citizens who may be ordered to evacuate by competent authority include the following: a. Civilian employees of all agencies of the U.S. Government and their dependents. b. Military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants.

nonorganic transportation requirement Unit personnel and cargo for which the transportation source must be an outside agency, normally a component of USTRANSCOM. (adapted from the JOPES User’s Manual)

nonstandard unit A force requirement identified in a TPFDD for which movement characteristics have not been described in the TUCHA file. The planner is required to submit detailed movement characteristics for these units. (adapted from JOPES User’s Manual)

nonunit record A TPFDD file entry for non-unit-related cargo and personnel; characteristics include using and providing organization, type of movement, routing data, cargo category, weight, volume, area required, and number of personnel requiring transportation. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-03.16)

non-unit-related cargo (DOD) All equipment and supplies requiring transportation to an area of operations, other than those identified as the equipment or accompanying supplies of a specific unit (e.g., resupply, military support for allies, and support for nonmilitary programs, such as civil relief). (JP 1-02)

non-unit-related personnel (DOD) All personnel requiring transportation to or from an area of operations, other than those assigned to a specific unit (e.g., filler personnel; r
placements; temporary duty/temporary additional duty personnel; civilians; medical evacuees; and retrograde personnel). (JP 1-02)

**NOPLAN.** Designation for a contingency for which no operation plan has been published.

**normal operations** (DOD) Generally and collectively, the broad functions which a combatant commander undertakes when assigned responsibility for a given geographic or functional area. Except as otherwise qualified in certain unified command plan paragraphs which relate to particular commands, “normal operations” of a combatant commander include: planning for and execution of operations throughout the range of military operations; planning and conduct of cold war activities; planning for and administration of military assistance; and maintaining the relationships and exercising the directive or coordinating authority prescribed in Joint Pub 0-2, Admin. Pub 1.1, and Joint Pub 4-01. (JP 1-02)

**obligations** Amounts of orders, contracts, services, and similar transactions that must be paid during a particular period. (adapted from the GAO glossary)

**on-call** (DOD) 1. A term used to signify that a prearranged concentration, air strike, or final protective fire may be called for. 2. Preplanned, identified force or materiel requirements without designated time-phase and destination information. Such requirements will be called forward upon order of competent authority. (JP 1-02)

**on-line** Having direct and immediate connection to the computer. (JOPES User’s Data Element Dictionary)

**operation.** (DOD, NATO) A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

**operation order.** (DOD) A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. (JP 1-02)

**operation plan** (DOD) Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file. a. OPLAN--An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC’s Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include
all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called OPLAN.  

b. CONPLAN--An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. Also called CONPLAN.  
c. CONPLAN with TPFDD--A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. See also operation order; time-phased force and deployment data. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

 operational chain of command The chain of command established for a particular operation or series of continuing operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

 operational continuum The general states of peace, conflict, and war within which various types of military operations and activities are conducted.
**operational control** (DOD) Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. See also combatant command; combatant command (command authority). (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

**operational level of war** (DOD) The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

**operational mobility** The quality or capability that permits military forces to move from place to place within designated areas of the theater while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission.

**operations security** (DOD) A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. See also command and control warfare. (JP 1-02)

**OPLAN-dependent force module** A force module that has been created or tailored by the supported commander or components to fit a specific planning task. OPLAN-dependent
force modules usually include sustainment based on theater planning factors and sourced force records.

**organic**  (DOD) Assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization; organic parts of a unit are those listed in its table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the administrative organizations of the operating forces for the Navy.  (JP 1-02)

**organic transportation**  Transportation resources that are assigned to a unit and can give the lift capability for all or part of that unit’s movement requirements.

**origin**  (DOD) Beginning point of a deployment where unit or non-unit-related cargo or personnel are located.  (JP 1-02)

**outlays**  Obligations that are liquidated when checks are issued or cash disbursed.  
(adapted from the GAO glossary)

**outsized cargo**  Cargo that exceeds 1,090” x 117” x 105”, that is, too large for C-130/C-141 aircraft.  (JOPES User’s Data Element Dictionary)

**oversized cargo**  Cargo that exceeds the usable dimension of a 463L pallet, 104” x 84” x 96”, or a height set by the particular model of aircraft.  (JOPES User’s Data Element Dictionary)

**peacetime**  A nonhostile state wherein political, economic, informational, and military measures, short of combat operations or active support to warring parties, are employed to achieve national objectives.

**permanent file**  A term used to identify disk storage that remains part of the computer resources at all times.  JOPES ADP files that are stored on permanent files include APORTS, PORTS, GEOFILE, TUCHA, ASSETS, and CHSTR.  (JOPES User’s Manual)

**personnel increment number**  (DOD) A seven-character, alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a non-unit-related personnel entry (line) in a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System time-phased force and deployment data. Also called PIN.  (JP 1-02)

**pipeline**  (DOD, NATO) In logistics, the channel of support or a specific portion thereof by means of which materiel or personnel flow from sources of procurement to their point of use.  (JP 1-02)

**plan identification number**  (DOD)  1. A command-unique four-digit number followed by a suffix indicating the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) year for which the plan is written, e.g., “2220-95”.  2. In the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
(JOPES) database, a five-digit number representing the command-unique four-digit identifier, followed by a one character, alphabetic suffix indicating the operation plan option, or a one-digit number numeric value indicating the JSCP year for which the plan is written. Also called PID. (JP 1-02)

plan information capability (DOD) This capability allows a supported command to enter and update key elements of information in an operation plan stored in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (JP 1-02)

plan summary A required element of an operation plan that gives a brief description of the mission, the general situation, the concept of operations, the major forces required, command arrangements, and the commander’s appraisal of logistics feasibility. (JOPES User’s Manual)

planned resupply The shipping of supplies in a regular flow described by existing planned schedules and organizations, which will usually include some form of planned procurement. (adapted from JP 1-02)

planning factor (DOD, NATO) A multiplier used in planning to estimate the amount and type of effort involved in a contemplated operation. Planning factors are often expressed as rates, ratios, or lengths of time. (JP 1-02)

planning order (DOD) 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate execution planning. The planning order will normally follow a commander’s estimate and a planning order will normally take the place of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert order. National Command Authorities approval of a selected course of action is not required before issuing a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning order. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military course of action. See also execution planning. (Approved by JMTG#094-0556-94)

planning, programming, and budgeting system The cyclic process that produces the DOD portion of the President’s budget submission to Congress. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.14)

port. (DOD) A place at which ships may discharge or receive their cargoes. It includes any port accessible to ships on the seacoast, navigable rivers or inland waterways. The term “ports” should not be used in conjunction with air facilities which are designated as aerial ports, airports, etc. (JP 1-02)

port of debarkation (DOD) The geographic point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. May be a seaport or aerial port of debarkation. For unit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the destination. Also called POD. See also port of embarkation. (JP 1-02)
port of embarkation. (DOD) The geographic point in a routing scheme from which cargo or personnel depart. May be a seaport or aerial port from which personnel and equipment flow to port of debarkation. For unit and nonunit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the origin. Also called POE. See also port of debarkation. (JP 1-02)

port of support. The geographic point (port or airport) in an objective area that is the terminal point for strategic deployment for non-unit-related supplies. Each component designates ports of support for four categories of resupply: general cargo, ammunition, POL, and air deliveries. (adapted from the JOPES User’s Manual)

preliminary movement schedule. (DOD) A projection of the routing of movement requirements reflected in the time-phased force and deployment data, from origin to destination, including identification of origins, ports of embarkation, ports of debarkation, and en route stops; associated time frames for arrival and departure at each location; type of lift assets required to accomplish the move; and cargo details by carrier. Schedules are sufficiently detailed to support comparative analysis of requirements against capabilities and to develop location workloads for reception and onward movement. (JP 1-02)

prepositioned war reserve requirement. (DOD) That portion of the war reserve materiel requirement which the current Secretary of Defense guidance dictates be reserved and positioned at or near the point of planned use or issue to the user prior to hostilities to reduce reaction time and to assure timely support of a specific force/project until replenishment can be effected. (JP 1-02)

prepositioned war reserve stock. (DOD) The assets that are designated to satisfy the prepositioned war reserve materiel requirement. (JP 1-02)

Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority(DOD) Provision of a public law (US Code, title 10 (DOD), section 12304) that provides the President a means to activate, without a declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for not more than 270 days to meet the support requirements of any operational mission. Members called under this provision may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress insurrection. This authority has particular utility when used in circumstances in which the escalatory national or international signals of partial or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this authority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization. Also called PSRC. See also mobilization. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-95)

president’s budget. The document sent to Congress each January estimating Government receipts and outlays for the next fiscal year and recommending appropriations in detail. (adapted from GAO glossary)
procedure.  (DOD) A procedure begins with a specific, documentable event that causes an activity to occur. The activity must produce a product that normally affects another external organization. Frequently, that product will be the event that causes another procedure to occur. It is important to recognize that a procedure determines “what” an organization must do at critical periods but does not direct “how” it will be done. (JP 1-02)

program decision memorandum. Secretary of Defense decision on the Program Objective Memorandums that are distributed to DOD components and OMB as the basis for the Budget Estimates Submission. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

program element. A primary data element in the Future-Years Defense Program that represents (1) DOD missions or (2) units and their resources. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

program objective memorandum. The recommendations of the Service secretaries, CINCSOCOM, and heads of DOD agencies to the Secretary of Defense on the allocation of resources for proposed programs to achieve assigned missions and objectives. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

program review group. A working group subordinate to the Defense Planning and Resources Board composed of DOD staff members who prepare papers and briefings for Defense Planning and Resources Board deliberations. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

psychological operations. (DOD) Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Approved by JMTGM# 070-95)

query. As applied to JOPES permissions, “query” is one of the ten functional permissions granted users. The permission is limited to retrieving and viewing information on the terminal display screen. The other primary functions allow users to update, perform database management and scheduling functions, and print charts and reports. (adapted from JOPES User’s Manual)

readiness planning. (DOD) Operational planning required for peacetime operations. Its objective is the maintenance of high states of readiness and the deterrence of potential enemies. It includes planning activities that influence day-to-day operations and the peacetime posture of forces. As such, its focus is on general capabilities and readiness rather than the specifics of a particular crisis, either actual or potential. The assignment of geographic responsibilities to combatant commanders, establishment of readiness standards and levels, development of peacetime deployment patterns, coordination of...
naissance and surveillance assets and capabilities, and planning of joint exercises are examples of readiness planning. No formal joint planning system exists for readiness planning such as exists for contingency and execution planning. (JP 1-02)

ready-to-load date (DOD) The day, relative to C-day, in a time-phased force and deployment data when the unit, nonunit equipment, and forces are prepared to depart their origin on organic transportation or are prepared to begin loading on US Transportation Command-provided transportation. Also called RLD. (JP 1-02)

record. A collection of data elements pertaining to one logical subject. In JOPES, for example, all the data elements used to describe a force requirement and its routing are stored in the “force record.” For resupply and replacement personnel, all the data elements are stored in non-unit-related cargo records and non-unit-related personnel records. (JDS User’s Manual)

redeployment (DOD) The transfer of a unit, an individual, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, or to the zone of interior for the purpose of further employment. (JP 1-02)

regeneration. The capability to generate additional military power in a timely manner to counter a rapid buildup of enemy forces. Actions include activation of all Reserve component units with increased readiness and training levels (up to full mobilization--no new units) and the acceleration of the industrial production base.

regional conflict A conflict with a specific focus in a CINC’s AOR.

replacements (DOD) Personnel required to take the place of others who depart a unit. (JP 1-02)

required delivery date (DOD) A date, relative to C-day, when a unit must arrive at its destination and complete offloading to properly support the concept of operations. Also called RDD. (JP 1-02)

requirements capability (DOD) This capability provides a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System user the ability to identify, update, review, and delete data on forces and sustainment required to support an operation plan or course of action. (JP 1-02)
reserve component category (DOD) The category that identifies an individual’s status in a reserve component. The three reserve component categories are Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. Each reservist is identified by a specific reserve component category designation. (JP 1-02)

resource and unit monitoring (DOD) Worldwide Military Command and Control System application systems that support approved requirements relating to resource and unit monitoring, readiness assessment, situation assessment, and operations by integrating data from functional areas such as operations, logistics, personnel, and medical. (JP 1-02)

resources. (DOD) The forces, materiel, and other assets or capabilities apportioned or allocated to the commander of a unified or specified command. (JP 1-02)

response time The estimated or actual time necessary for a unit, when alerted, to achieve the directed deployability posture.

retain. (DOD) When used in the context of deliberate planning, the directed command will keep the referenced operation plan, operation plan in concept format, or concept summary and any associated Joint Operation Planning and Execution System automated data processing files in an inactive library or status. The plan and its associated files will not be maintained unless directed by follow-on guidance. See also maintain. (JP 1-02)

retrograde cargo. (DOD) Cargo evacuated from a theater of operations. (JP 1-02)

retrograde personnel (DOD) Personnel evacuated from a theater of operations who may include medical patients, noncombatants, and civilians. (JP 1-02)

safety level of supply (DOD) The quantity of materiel, in addition to the operating level of supply, required to be on hand to permit continuous operations in the event of minor interruption of normal replenishment or unpredictable fluctuations in demand. (JP 1-02)

scheduled arrival date (DOD) The projected arrival date of a specified movement requirement at a specified location. (JP 1-02)

schedules. (DOD) The carrier itinerary which may involve cargo and passengers. (JP 1-02)

scheduling and movement capability (DOD) The capability required by Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planners and operators to allow for review and update of scheduling and movement data before and during implementation of a deployment operation. (JP 1-02)
sealift readiness program (DOD) A formal agreement, pursuant to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, between US-flag, dry-cargo carriers and the government for the acquisition of ships and related equipment under conditions of less than full mobilization. (JP 1-02)

security assistance (DOD) Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 1-02)

sequential operations Operations conducted in sequence or by phases that correspond to established execution priorities or to compensate for a lack of resources.

service force module A hypothetical force module built per Service doctrine composed of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment for an estimated period, e.g., 30 days.

short ton (STON or S/T) The unit of measure (2,000 lbs.) for equipment or supplies other than Class III. (JOPES User’s Manual)

shortfall (DOD) The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability, reflected as the difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those apportioned to a combatant commander for planning, that would adversely affect the command’s ability to accomplish its mission. (JP 1-02)

show of force (DOD) An operation, designed to demonstrate US resolve, which involves increased visibility of U.S. deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation, that if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to U.S. interests or national objectives. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-95)

SIGINT operational control (DOD) The authoritative direction of signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities, including tasking and allocation of effort, and the authoritative prescription of those uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT information is collected, processed, and reported. (JP 1-02)

sourcing (force) The deliberate planning or crisis action planning activity that identifies actual forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, and lift assets that could be made available, as of a specified date, to fill the requirements of operation plans.

sourcing (logistics) The identification of the origin and determination of the availability of the non-unit-related logistics requirements in the TPFDD. (JOPES User’s Manual)
special operations  (DOD) Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

specified command  (DOD) A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. Also called specified combatant command. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

staff estimates  (DOD) Assessments of courses of action by the various staff elements of a command that serve as the foundation of the commander’s estimate. (JP 1-02)

standard unit  A type unit whose UTC and movement characteristics are described in the TUCHA file. (JOPES User’s Manual)

strategic direction. The guidance expressed through national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy relative to the attainment of strategic goals and objectives. (Joint Pub 5-00.1)

strategic estimate  (DOD) The estimate of the broad strategic factors that influence the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the National Command Authorities or the authoritative body of an alliance or coalition. See also commander’s estimate of the situation. (JP 1-02)

strategic intent  The expression of the goals and desired ends of a strategy. (Joint Pub 5-00.1)

strategic level of war  (DOD) The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these obje
tives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. See also operational level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

strategic logistics  In a general sense, the art and science of harnessing the economic and societal strengths of a nation for national defense. In the specific sense, strategic logistics is the process of planning for, coordinating, and allocating the manpower, materiel, infrastructure, and services required for military, war production, and civil sector needs. It requires coordination between the executive and legislative branches, state governments, and industry. Force generation and mobilization are inclusive components of strategic logistics. (Joint Pub 5-00.1)

strategic mobility  (DOD) The capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy. See also mobility. (JP 1-02)

strategic sealift force  Common-user sealift assets of the MSC force, including fast sealift ships and pre-positioned ships on completion of their mission and release, that furnish the capability to deploy and sustain military forces. The normal peacetime force may be augmented by shipping from the Ready Reserve Fleet and National Defense Reserve Fleet and from U.S. and allied merchant fleets. (Joint Pub 1-01)

strategy determination  (DOD) The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System function in which analysis of changing events in the international environment and the development of national strategy to respond to those events is conducted. In joint operation planning, the responsibility for recommending military strategy to the National Command Authorities lies with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in concert with supported commanders. In the deliberate planning process, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is produced as a result of this process. In the Crisis Assessment Phase of the crisis action planning process, Crisis Action Planning procedures are used to formulate decisions for direct development of possible military courses of action. (JP 1-02)

subordinate command  (DOD) A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. (JP 1-02)

suitability  (DOD) Operation plan review criterion. The determination that the course of action will reasonably accomplish the identified objectives, mission, or task if carried out successfully. See also acceptability; adequacy; completeness; feasibility. (JP 1-02)

summary reference file  A JOPES file containing information that expands requirements data contained in a JOPES TPFDD. (adapted from JOPES User’s Manual)
supported commander (DOD) The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See also joint operation planning. (Approved by JMTGM# 081-95)

supporting commander (DOD) A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. See also supported commander; supporting plan. (JP 1-02)

supporting forces (DOD) Forces stationed in, or to be deployed to, an area of operations to provide support for the execution of an operation order. Combatant command (command authority) of supporting forces is not passed to the supported commander. (JP 1-02)

supporting plan (DOD) An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander’s plan. See also supported commander; supporting commander. (JP 1-02)

sustainability See military capability. (JP 1-02)

sustaining supply Materiel required to support a unit after arrival in-theater from the time accompanying supply and PWRMS are anticipated to run out until regular resupply begins. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02, “sustaining stocks”)

sustainment (DOD) The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (JP 1-02)

tactical command, control, communications, and computer system(s) (DOD) The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to theater-level and below-theater-level commanders for planning, directing, and controlling operations of a signed and attached forces pursuant to the mission assigned and which provide for the conveyance and/or exchange of data and information from one person or force to another. See also command, control, communications, and computer systems. (Approved by JMTGM# 081-95)

tactical level of war (DOD) The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. See also operational level of war; strategic level of war. (JP 1-02)
technology insertion project A project that permits the sharing of functional JOPES ADP applications across different computer systems. TIP combines and integrates existing and projected JOPES capabilities into an application server architecture. Through TIP, operational planners can access capabilities (DART, LOGSAFE, JFAST, FAPES) from a variety of workstations integrated into a network including a WWMCCS host mainframe.

termination objectives Specific objectives that define the intended manner of conflict termination and the required military and diplomatic achievements to attain it. (Joint Pub 5-00.1)

theater. (DOD) The geographical area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1-02)

theater of focus. (DOD) A theater in which operations are most critical to national interests and are assigned the highest priority for allocation of resources. (JP 1-02)

theater strategy. (DOD) The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, operations not involving the use of force within a theater. (JP 1-02)

threat identification and assessment (DOD) The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System function that provides timely warning of potential threats to US interests; intelligence collection requirements; the effects of environmental, physical, and health hazards, and cultural factors on friendly and enemy operations; and determines the enemy military posture and possible intentions. (JP 1-02)

throughput. (DOD) The average quantity of cargo and passengers that can pass through a port on a daily basis from arrival at the port to loading onto a ship or plane, or from the discharge from a ship or plane to the exit (clearance) from the port complex. Throughput is usually expressed in measurement tons, short tons, or passengers. Reception and storage limitation may affect final throughput. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data (DOD) The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan; including: a. In-place units. b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation. c. Routing of forces to be deployed. d. Movement data associated with deploying forces. e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces. f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fu
filled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. See also time-phased force and deployment list. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

time-phased force and deployment list(DOD) Appendix 1 to Annex A of the operation plan. It identifies types and/or actual units required to support the operation plan and indicates origin and ports of debarkation or ocean area. It may also be generated as a computer listing from the time-phased force and deployment data. Also called TPFDL. See also time-phased force and deployment data. (JP 1-02)

times (DOD) (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (zulu time) and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day. a. C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The letter “C” will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning. b. D-day. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. c. F-hour. The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units. d. H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. e. L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. f. M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence. g. N-day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment. h. R-day. Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation. i. S-day. The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve callup (not more than 200,000). j. T-day. The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of National Emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup). k. W-day. Declared by the National Command Authorities, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning). (JP 1-02)

total obligation authority or obligation authority The sum of (1) budget authority conferred for a given fiscal year, (2) balances of amounts brought forward from prior years that remain available for obligation, and (3) amounts authorized to be credited to a specific fund or account during that year. (adapted from the GAO glossary)
transmittal document. A general term for the document published at the conclusion of the concept development phase of deliberate planning to convey the CINC’s concept of operations, concept of support, and other planning information to the JPEC. The format is not specified, but may take one of several forms: an outline plan, a letter of instruction (LOI), a plan directive, or a draft OPLAN. (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1)

transportation closure (DOD) The actual arrival date of a specified movement requirement at port of debarkation. (JP 1-02)

transportation component command (DOD) The three component commands of USTRANSCOM: Air Force Air Mobility Command, Navy Military Sealift Command, and Army Military Traffic Management Command. Each transportation component command remains a major command of its parent Service and continues to organize, train, and equip its forces as specified by law. Each transportation component command also continues to perform Service-unique missions. Also called TCC. (JP 1-02)

transportation system (DOD) All the land, water, and air routes and transportation assets engaged in the movement of US forces and their supplies during peacetime training, conflict, or war, involving both mature and contingency theaters and at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. (JP 1-02)

type unit (DOD) A type of organizational or functional entity established within the Armed Forces and uniquely identified by a five-character, alphanumeric code called a unit type code. (JP 1-02)

type unit data file (DOD) A file that provides standard planning data and movement characteristics for personnel, cargo, and accompanying supplies associated with type units. (JP 1-02)

Unified Action Armed Forces (DOD) A publication setting forth the policies, principles, doctrines, and functions governing the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States when two or more Military Departments or Service elements thereof are acting together. Also called UNAAF. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

unified command (DOD) A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. See also combatant command; subordinate command. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

Unified Command Plan (DOD) The document, approved by the President, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility.
for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. Also called UCP. See also combatant command; combatant commander. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

unit designation list (DOD) A list of actual units by unit identification code designated to fulfill requirements of a force list. (JP 1-02)

unit identification code (DOD) A six-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each Active, Reserve, and National Guard unit of the Armed Forces. Also called UIC. (JP 1-02)

unit line number (DOD) A seven-character, alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a unit entry (line) in a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System time-phased force and deployment data. Also called ULN. (JP 1-02)

unit type code (DOD) A five-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each type unit of the Armed Forces. Also called UTC. (JP 1-02)

unit-related equipment and supplies All equipment and supplies that are assigned to a specific unit or that are designated as accompanying supplies. The logistics dimensions of these items are contained in the TUCHA standard reference file. (JOPES User’s Manual)

US Country Team (DOD) The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission. (Approved by JMTGM# 076-2864-94)

US Transportation Command coordinating instructions (DOD) Instructions of the US Transportation Command that establish suspense dates for selected members of the joint planning and execution community to complete updates to the operation plan data base. Instructions will ensure the target date movement requirements will be validated and available for scheduling. (JP 1-02)

validate (DOD) Execution procedure used by combatant command components, supporting combatant commanders, and providing organizations to confirm to the supported commander and US Transportation Command that all the information records in a time-phased force and deployment data not only are error-free for automation purposes, but also accurately reflect the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements. Unit readiness, movement dates, passengers, and cargo details should be confirmed with the unit before validation occurs. (JP 1-02)
visual information projection terminal. A remote work station that allows a user to communicate through a keyboard and a cathode-ray tube (CRT) with a computer. (JOPES User’s Manual)

war. A state of undeclared or declared armed hostile action characterized by the sustained use of armed force between nations or organized groups within a nation involving regular and irregular forces in a series of connected military operations or campaigns to achieve vital national objectives. (Joint Pub 5-00.1)

warning order. (DOD, NATO) 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. (DOD) 2. A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by supported commander and requests that a commander’s estimate be submitted. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. (Approved by JMTGM# 094-0556-94)

WARNING ORDER (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)(DOD) A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander’s estimate be submitted. See also warning order. (JP 1-02)
The following lists acronyms frequently used in joint/combined operation planning. Acronyms and abbreviations should be avoided if practical. However, if a long title or term must be used repeatedly, the acronym or abbreviation may be employed provided the first time it is used the long title is spelled out fully along with its related acronym or abbreviation.

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>information warfare</td>
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<td>JAARS</td>
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JAQ  joint area of operations
JCC  Joint Coordination Center
JCGRO Joint Central Graves Registration Office
JCLL Joint Center for Lessons Learned
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JDA  Joint Duty Assignment
JDAL Joint Duty Assignment List
JDISS Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JDS  Joint Deployment System
JEL  Joint Electronic Library
JEPES Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFAST Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation
JFC  joint force commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JINTACCS Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems
JMCIS Joint Maritime Command Information System
JMNA Joint Military Net Assessment
JMPAB Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocations Board
JMRR Joint Monthly Readiness Review
JMRO Joint Medical Regulating Office
JNOCC JOPES Network Operations Control Center
JOPEs Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPESREP JOPES Reporting System
JOPS Joint Operation Planning System
JOPSREP JOPS Reporting System
JPAA Joint Public Affairs Office
JPD  Joint Planning Document
JPEC Joint Planning and Execution Community
JPME Joint Professional Military Education
POC Joint Psychological Operations Center
JPTTF Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
JRC  Joint Reconnaissance Center
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JRS  Joint Reporting Structure
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSEAD joint suppression of enemy air defense
JSO  Joint Specialty Officer
JSO NOM Joint Specialty Officer Nominee
JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSPS Joint Strategic Planning System
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<td>Joint Strategy Review</td>
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<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures</td>
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<td>military assistance advisory group</td>
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<td>Marine Air-Ground Task Force</td>
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<td>POM</td>
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<td>POMCUS</td>
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or pre-positioned overseas materiel, configured to unit sets (DOD), or pre-positioned organizational materiel, configured to unit sets (USA)

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<td>Scheduling and Movement</td>
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<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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