

**BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 71-101 VOLUME 2

1 AUGUST 1997



Special Investigations

PROTECTIVE SERVICE MATTERS

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

NOTICE: This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: <http://afpubs.hq.af.mil>. If you lack access, contact your Publishing Distribution Office (PDO).

OPR: SAF/IGX (Maj Russell W. Merritt)
Supersedes AFI 71-101, Volume 2, 11 May 1994.

Certified by: SAF/IGX (Col Charles P. Azukas)
Pages: 13
Distribution: F

This volume implements AFD 71-1, *Criminal Investigations and Counterintelligence*. It requires the collection and maintenance of information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974. The authority is in Title 10, United States Code, Chapters 47 and 8013. System of records notice F124 AF D, *Investigative Support Records*, applies. This instruction does not confer upon an individual any rights or privileges that applicable law does not require. See attachment 1 for references and terms used in this instruction.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This revision more clearly states the need for a mental health evaluation of persons who threaten high level officials (para 1.1.4), specifies who may drive a heavy armored vehicle (para 3.1.3), and in attachment 1 deletes the term "security escort," changes the term "protective service assessment" to "protective threat assessment," and adds the term "negligible threat." A | indicates revision from previous edition.

Chapter 1

PROTECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND OTHERS

1.1. Reporting Requirements. The Department of the Air Force will report information required by Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 5030.34, *Agreement Between the United States Secret Service and the Department of Defense Concerning Protection of the President and Other Officials*, September 17, 1986, to the United States Secret Service (USSS).

1.1.1. All Air Force personnel will immediately report information affecting the security or safety of persons or facilities set forth in attachment 2 to the local Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) unit. When personnel possessing the information are not able to immediately establish contact with AFOSI, they must use one of the following methods to directly contact the USSS without delay:

- Commercial telephone: (202) 435-5731.
- Secure Telephone (STU III): (202) 435-9251.
- Electrical message address: RUEHSE US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC//DC//ID//.
- Follow up telephonic notification with an IMMEDIATE precedence electrical message within 24 hours. Include the local AFOSI unit as an IMMEDIATE precedence information addressee on all such messages.

1.1.2. All Air Force personnel will notify their supervisors as soon as feasible when they have reported required information to AFOSI or USSS. If the individual has not already reported the information to AFOSI or USSS, supervisors will immediately report it using guidance in paragraph 1.1.1.

1.1.3. Commanders responsible for processing separation, retirement, or discharge of Air Force members (military, civilian, or foreign national) must ensure information required by attachment 3, paragraph A3.1.4. is immediately furnished to USSS.

1.1.4. Directors of Base Medical Services will immediately:

- Report information required by attachment 3, paragraph A3.1.5 to USSS concerning persons being processed through medical channels for discharge.
- Ensure persons are given a mental health evaluation prior to being administratively discharged if they have threatened one of the officials described in attachment 3. See AFI 44-109, Mental Health and Military Law.

1.2. Briefing Requirements. Supervisors will brief all Air Force personnel (military, civilian, and foreign national) on the reporting requirements, as detailed in this chapter and attachment 3, upon their initial entry onto active duty or employment.

- Commanders or supervisors will brief military personnel during basic training or pre-commissioning programs.
- Commanders will ensure that military personnel receive a briefing during the Intro Program after arriving at a permanent change of station (PCS) duty assignment.

- Supervisors will brief civilian and foreign national employees when they report to their initial assignments. Supervisors will ensure their civilian and foreign national employees receive a briefing every 3 years.
- Supervisors and commanders must document briefings.
- AFOSI units will provide guidance on preparing the briefings for commanders and supervisors upon request.

Chapter 2

PROTECTIVE SERVICE PROCEDURES

2.1. Protective Services. AFOSI will provide protective services, including long-term protective service operations (PSO), when the requester and AFOSI jointly determine such protection is needed. (See attachment 4 for PSO considerations.)

2.1.1. The Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG) will resolve all disputes that cannot be resolved between AFOSI and requesters.

2.2. Responsibilities:

2.2.1. Air Force installation commanders will ensure the safety and security of all assigned and visiting personnel.

2.2.2. AFOSI is the only agency within the Air Force authorized to provide specialized protective services.

2.2.3. AFOSI will:

- Investigate threats against Air Force or DoD officials made by Air Force members.
- Refer information about similar threats by civilians to the USSS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
- Monitor any resulting investigations affecting the Air Force.
- Train security police on protective support functions.

2.2.4. The AFOSI detail leader, through the AFOSI detachment, will request the assistance of the Installation Chief of Security Police to obtain the following on-base support for PSOs:

- Traffic control.
- Installation perimeter security and entry and exit control.
- Checkpoints, crowd control, and surveillance security posts.
- Security for principal's aircraft.
- Perimeter security for principal's on-base residence.
- Other support which the AFOSI detail leader and the installation Chief of Security Police agree upon.

2.3. Protection of Senior Air Force Officials. AFOSI will provide a Security Advisor to coordinate protective services and other protective assistance for the Secretary and Undersecretary of the Air Force and the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

- Installation commanders will not independently request protective services for these officials from their servicing AFOSI office.
- AFOSI will conduct a Protective Threat Assessment (PTA) for each stop on the itinerary to determine if these officials require protection.

- Local commanders will not initiate protective measures for these officials without the prior approval of the AFOSI Security Advisor or a designated member of the official's office.

2.4. Protective Services for Foreign Guests of HQ USAF and the DoD:

2.4.1. Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, International Affairs Division (HQ USAF/CVAI), will notify AFOSI of pending visits by foreign guests of HQ USAF and those foreign guests of DoD for which HQ USAF is executive agent. AFOSI will conduct a PTA for all such visits.

2.4.2. Based upon the results of the PTA, AFOSI and HQ USAF/CVAI will jointly determine if a PSO is in the best interest of the Air Force. If so, HQ USAF/CVAI will submit a written request to Antiterrorism Branch, Counterintelligence Division, AFOSI Directorate of Operations, (AFOSI/XOQT) identifying the HQ USAF/CVAI project officer.

2.5. Protective Assistance to Other DoD Agencies:

2.5.1. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Personal Security) determines the level of protection afforded to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Deputy SECDEF, and may task military departments for necessary assistance in providing this protection.

2.5.2. The Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) determines which military department will provide protection for the CJCS.

- Air Force personnel who learn of a specific threat against the CJCS will immediately notify the local AFOSI unit.
- AFOSI will notify the Executive Assistant to the CJCS.

2.5.3. AFOSI will maintain liaison with the other DoD protective service organizations and, when resources permit, provide assistance to them when their principals visit US Air Force bases or areas where AFOSI has primary jurisdiction.

2.6. Support to State and Local Agencies. When necessary, and when resources permit, AFOSI will assist state and local agencies in protecting officials or dignitaries visiting a US Air Force installation or activity.

2.7. Protection of Victims and Witnesses:

2.7.1. AFOSI will refer to AFI 51-201, Administration of Military Justice, concerning their responsibility for the protection of victims and witnesses.

2.7.2. Commanders will request an AFOSI PSO for victims and witnesses only in extraordinary cases where specialized protective measures are required, and when there are specific threats against those individuals.

Chapter 3

ARMORED VEHICLE PROGRAM

3.1. Responsibilities:

3.1.1. Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG) will:

- Submit a nontactical armored vehicle (AV) report via the Directorate of Special Investigations (SAF/IGX) to the Assistant SECDEF (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) (Counter-terrorism) (ASD(SO/LIC) (CT)) and Defense Intelligence Agency/Counterintelligence Division (DIA/OS-ID) not later than 1 March each year.
- Exercise oversight responsibility for all special vehicle acquisitions needed to combat the terrorist threat via SAF/IGX.
- Review and approve command supplements to this instruction via SAF/IGX.

3.1.2. Major commands (MAJCOM) and field operating agencies (FOA) will:

- Establish a focal point for command-assigned AVs.
- Submit an annual report (RCS: DD-POL[A]1719) to SAF/IGX to arrive not later than 15 February each year detailing any procurement, costs, and deployments of command nontactical light armored vehicles (LAV) during the previous calendar year in accordance with DIA/OS-ID format.
- Submit special vehicle requests in response to terrorist threats to SAF/IGX for validation before being sent to the Directorate of Transportation (HQ USAF/LGT).
- Fund transportation costs incurred as a result of command-initiated transfers, reallocations, or deployments of AVs.
- Fund maintenance and repair of AVs.

3.1.3. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) will:

- Manage the Air Force heavy armored vehicle (HAV) fleet to obtain the greatest flexibility in protecting all high-risk personnel.
- Allocate Air Force HAVs subject to the concurrence of the regional unified commanders or their designated security elements.
- Submit an annual report (RCS: DD-POL[A]1719) to SAF/IGX to arrive not later than 15 February each year detailing any procurement, costs, and deployments of AFOSI-managed HAVs during the previous calendar year according to DIA/OS-ID format.
- Coordinate tactical deployments of AVs with supported commands.
- Determine when to use an AV to protect high-risk personnel by considering the factors in attachment 4, paragraph A4.3 and the possibility of using an LAV instead of an HAV.
- Establish agreements with the supported commands to ensure continuity of support.
- Evaluate AVs and protective systems.

- Provide or certify specialized antiterrorism defensive and evasive driver courses (e.g. the Senior Officer Security Seminar, the Security Escort Course, or AFOSI PSO Course). NOTE: Driving of HAVs is restricted to military members occupying high-risk billets (does not include any dependents), specially trained security police personnel assigned as drivers, and AFOSI special agents. All drivers must have successfully completed a specialized antiterrorism defensive and evasive driver course.
- Prepare current threat assessments to accompany installation commanders' requests for vehicle requirements resulting from terrorist threats.
- Provide hands-on orientation to drivers and maintenance personnel on the operation and special care required for AVs.
- Establish a focal point for command-assigned AVs.

3.2. AV Logistics and Alternate Considerations:

3.2.1. Procurement of HAVs will be handled according to DoD Directive C-4500.51, *DoD Nontactical Armored Vehicle Policy*, May 4, 1987.

3.2.2. When warranted by the local threat, achieve transportation security objectives through selective use of LAVs, unarmored indigenous vehicles, vehicle painting and marking exemptions, and domicile-to-duty transportation. Refer to AFI 24-301, *Vehicle Operations*.

3.2.3. HAV drivers will not exceed the armoring firm's recommended top speed, as armoring adds significantly to a vehicle's weight and required stopping distance.

3.2.4. Due to the sensitivity of nontactical AV transparent armor to interior heat build-up, direct sunlight, and ultraviolet light, garage AVs whenever practical. As a minimum, place them under cover, such as a carport, to prevent long-term damage. Prolonged exposure causes delamination and loss of the rated ballistic defeat capabilities of the transparent armor.

3.2.5. Upon determining an AV is unserviceable, Air Force elements will:

- Send a message to Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC ROBINS AFB GA//LVDV//) with information copies to SAF/IGX and HQ AFOSI/Logistics and Engineering (HQ AFOSI/LG) requesting vehicle disposition instructions.
- Salvage subject vehicle according to AFMAN 23-110, USAF Supply Manual.
- Remove all transparent armor and opaque armoring materials from LAVs prior to turning them in for disposal.

RICHARD T. SWOPE, Lt General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND TERMS

References

DoD Directive C-4500.51, *DoD Non-Tactical Armored Vehicle Policy*, May 4, 1987

DoD Instruction 5030.34, *Agreement Between the United States Secret Service and the Department of Defense Concerning Protection of the President and Other Services*, September 17, 1986

Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056

Title 3, United States Code, Section 202

Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "*DoD Armored Car Policy (U)*", April 25, 1984

Public Law 87-195, "*Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*", September 4, 1961

AFMAN 23-110, *USAF Supply Manual*

AFI 24-301, *Vehicle Operations*

AFI 44-109, *Mental Health and Military Law*

AFI 51-201, *Military Justice Guide, Administration of Military Justice*

Terms

Detail Leader—A special agent, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), assigned overall responsibility for the personal safety and security of a principal during a protective service operation (PSO). The detail leader is authorized to make decisions on all matters concerning the immediate personal safety and security of the principal.

Distinguished Visitor (DV)—A guest of the US Air Force or DoD who, by virtue of rank or position, receives honors or protocol.

Fully Armored Vehicles—These vehicles are referred to as nontactical heavy armored vehicles (HAV). HAVs are commercially-designed and manufactured, fully armored configured, motor vehicles procured especially to provide security protection to certain key DoD officials or visiting dignitaries.

High-Risk DoD Personnel—US personnel and their family members whose grade, assignment, travel itinerary, or symbolic value may make them an especially attractive or accessible terrorist target.

Partially Armored Vehicles—These motor vehicles are referred to as nontactical light armored vehicles (LAV). MAJCOMs obtain standard vehicles through normal procurement channels to fulfill valid transportation requirements and later alter them by affixing armoring materials to the windows and body areas.

Primary Agency—A law enforcement, security, or investigative agency with overall responsibility (as established by law or directive) for providing protective services for a principal.

Principal—Another name for the protectee of a protective service operation. A principal may or may not be a distinguished visitor (DV).

Protective Service—A specialized activity which increases the personal safety and security of a

distinguished visitor or other principal. The activity may be limited to a protective threat assessment or may extend to a major PSO involving considerable manpower and resources.

Protective Service Operation (PSO)—The use of specialized techniques and procedures by trained personnel to ensure a principal's personal safety and security during a specific event, while traveling, or over an extended period of time. When required, a PSO can be tailored to provide 24-hour protection. In such cases, the security detail establishes defensive overt or clandestine perimeters around the principal for the term of the PSO at the residence, during travel, and at all sites on the principal's daily itinerary.

PSO-Long Term—Any PSO which lasts longer than 30 days and does not have a known termination date. Usually, AFOSI conducts such operations on a specific threat or vulnerability when the principal cannot be removed from that threat.

Protective Threat Assessment (PTA)—Collecting and analyzing information to identify direct and potential threats to harm, seize, interfere with, or embarrass a specific principal, as well as to determine the existing and anticipated security environment. A PTA is always the initial phase of a PSO.

Terrorist Threat Levels—Terrorist threat levels are derived as a result of analyzing various factors: Existence of a possible threat, capability to carry out an attack, historical threat "picture," intentions of a terrorist group or individual, and specific targeting information.

- **Critical Threat**--Factors of existence, capability, and targeting must be present. History and intentions may or may not be present. Analysts declare the threat level as **CRITICAL** when, based on their assessment of available information, they:
 - Detect the presence of terrorist groups in a region or country.
 - Identify the level of capability (including specific means) by which terrorist groups can carry out an attack.
 - Identify the existence of current, credible targeting of US interests, DoD personnel, or DoD facilities or material.
- **High Threat**-- Factors of existence, capability, history, and intentions must be present. A threat level is considered **HIGH** when the analyst finds:
 - Evidence of terrorist individual or group existence.
 - Evidence of the capability to attack.
 - History of terrorist attacks that may or may not involve American interests, DoD personnel, facilities, or materials.
 - Credible indications providing evidence of intent to engage in acts harmful to American interests or DoD personnel, facilities, or material.
- **Medium Threat**--Factors of existence, capability, and history must be present. Intentions may or may not be present. A **MEDIUM** threat is differentiated from a **HIGH** threat based on the content of the information in the factors of existence, capability, and history. The presence or absence of information on terrorist group intentions may also permit analysts to differentiate **MEDIUM** from **HIGH** terrorist threats.
- **Low Threat**--Existence and capability must be present. History may or may not be present. A threat is assessed as **LOW** when there is evidence of terrorist group existence and capability in a

country but no evidence of intentions or targeting. Historical information of terrorist group activity may or may not be present.

- **Negligible Threat**--Existence and/or capability may or may not be present. A threat is assessed as **NEGLIGIBLE** when there is little or no credible evidence of terrorist group existence or capability, and no credible evidence of history, intention, or targeting.

Attachment 2

PERSONNEL AND PLACES THE USSS PROTECTS

A2.1. Subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, the United States Secret Service (USSS) has authority to protect:

- The President, the Vice President (or other officer next in the order of succession to the Office of President), the President-elect, and the Vice President-elect.
- The immediate families of those individuals listed above.
- Former Presidents and their spouses for their lifetimes. The protection of a spouse will terminate in the event of remarriage.
- Children of a former President who are under 16 years of age.
- Visiting heads of foreign states or foreign governments.
- Other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad when the President directs such protection be provided.
- Major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates and, within 120 days of the general Presidential election, the spouses of such candidates.
- Other persons who the USSS identifies to the DoD.
- The White House.
- Any building housing Presidential offices.
- The Vice President's official residence.
- Foreign diplomatic missions in any area of the United States, its territories, or possessions as directed by the USSS.

Attachment 3

INFORMATION REPORTABLE TO THE USSS

A3.1. Reportable Information. Reportable information exchanged between the Air Force and the USSS includes all information, no matter how innocent, about immediate and present dangers or past incidents affecting the security of any person or facility under the protection of the USSS. This information can be a threat, plan, or attempt to physically harm or kidnap the President, Vice President, their family members, or other high government officials such as foreign heads of state, governors, mayors, members of the Congress, Supreme Court justices, or ambassadors.

A3.1.1. Identification data. To the extent available, the name or names of an individual or group, including former legal names, aliases, and pseudonyms; address; photograph; physical description; date and place of birth; employment; marital status; and identifying military service numbers; as applicable.

A3.1.2. Record data. Files, summaries, or excerpts from DoD files of information concerning an individual or group reportable under provisions of DoD Instruction 5030.34.

A3.1.3. Information pertaining to:

- Threats, incidents, or demonstrations against foreign diplomatic missions (embassies, chanceries, consulates) in the United States or its territories.
- The use or attempted use of bodily harm, assassination, or kidnapping as a political weapon (including training and techniques used to carry out the act).
- Persons who insist upon personally contacting high government officials for redress of grievances and whose actions demonstrate a mental and emotional instability.
- Terrorists and their individual and group activities.
- The ownership or concealment, by individuals or groups, of caches of firearms, explosives, or other paramilitary or military equipment when it is believed the intended use is for other than legal purposes.
- Civil disturbances which may require the use of federalized National Guard or US military personnel to maintain or restore public order.

A3.1.4. DoDI 5030.34 requires reporting of information pertaining to US citizens or residents who have renounced or indicated a desire to renounce the US Government and who are characterized by:

- Violent, irrational, or suicidal behavior or other emotional instability.
- Violent anti-United States sentiment.
- A propensity toward violence.

A3.1.5. Persons within the DoD or those who are being separated, discharged, or retired from the Armed Forces or from civilian employment in the DoD, and who competent authority (installation or hospital commanders) deems to constitute a threat to the safety of the President or the Vice President of the United States, or other persons protected by the USSS.

Attachment 4

PSO CONSIDERATIONS

A4.1. Responsibilities. The Air Force will protect its leaders and official guests from acts which jeopardize their safety and security or impede their mission.

A4.1.1. The US Government holds host foreign governments responsible for the safety of US citizens overseas. The US Air Force may provide protective services off base in overseas areas only under circumstances that conform to local Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), treaties, agreements, or laws.

A4.1.2. AFOSI is the focal point for all liaison activity with the USSS, the Department of State Office of Security (DOS/SY), and all other federal, state, and local agencies regarding protective service missions.

A4.2. Protecting Others:

A4.2.1. AFOSI will protect family members of an AFOSI protective services principal when accompanied by the principal. AFOSI will protect family members who are not accompanied by the principal only when AFOSI and the requester jointly determine that such protection is necessary.

A4.2.2. AFOSI will not provide support or services for non-Air Force or DoD-related principals in an off-base environment without specific approval from the Executive Secretary of the DoD or the Deputy Executive Secretary of the DoD.

A4.3. Requesting Protective Services. Request AFOSI protective services only in the following situations:

- There is a clear and direct threat to a specific individual.
- An Air Force leader or official guest must perform a mission in an environment which places that person at significant and abnormal risk, in other than a war-time situation.
- In war zones, AFOSI PSOs will be initiated only for noncombatant Air Force officials required to be there temporarily for fact finding or other essential reasons. Other senior military officials will be protected only if specifically requested or directed by the Theater Commander.

A4.4. Advisors. AFOSI and installation Chiefs of Security Police serve as key advisors to commanders in determining reasonable protective measures.

A4.5. Authority. Final authority rests with the AFOSI PSO Detail Leader to make all decisions affecting the safety and security of the principal and AFOSI protective service personnel.