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Brevier Legislative Reports, Volume XIX XX, 1881, 475 pp.
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THE CRIMINAL CODE.

On motion by Mr. RYAN, the consideration of the bill [H. R. 367] concerning criminal proceedings was resumed.

Mr. MOODY moved to amend Section 239 of the bill by striking out of the section all after the word "thereof," being these words: "The single evidence of the cashier of the bank purporting to have issued the same may be received as sufficient." He thought the amendment ought to be adopted for the reason that the single evidence of any person, even though he may be a cashier of a bank, ought not to be conclusive evidence to establish a fact that would deprive a man of his liberty; and for the further reason that this principle is susceptible of great abuse in the hands of designing men, who might avail themselves of this provision not only to prosecute an innocent man, but in many cases to relieve the criminal.

Mr. NEFF was of the opinion that if a party is charged with stealing a bank note or bill, you have got to show the fact that he did steal that property, also that the bill or note was genuine, and, in case of larceny, the Prosecuting Attorney ought not to be required to hunt up three cashiers, as is required in the preceding portion of this section; therefore, he opposed the motion to strike out this proviso.

Mr. BUSKIRK said when a cashier comes in and swears that a bill is genuine, a suspected criminal should never be convicted upon the evidence of a single individual.

Mr. MOODY--It makes no difference about this part of the evidence, beause the evidence required by the cashier is to make a prima facia case and put it to the Jury. The State rests there. That would be the case if this were stricken out. There is nothing to prevent the State's Attorney from introducing all the evidence at their command, but, on the contrary, it is his duty.

Mr. RYAN--This clause does not go to the question involved in case of forgery or crime, but to the question of value of the property alleged to have been stolen. Further, this rule is not obligatory in law, but in the absence of other testimony, in case where there is no other testimony that can be introduced to meet just such cases as would fail for the want of testimony of that kind. I think it is well that the testimony in such cases, that the testimony of one cashier may be taken as sufficient on the value of property.

Mr. MURRAY offered as a substitute for the amendment to Section 239, by adding to the section the words, "when not contradicted."

The substitute and the amendment were rejected.

Mr. STEWART moved to amend Section 259 [manner of procedure in criminal cases] by adding after the word "case" the following: "If the defendent or his counsel refuse to argue the case after the Prosecuting Attorney has made his argument, that shall be the only argument that shall be allowed in the case."

Mr. STEWART said it did not change the law any more than where the Prosecuting Attorney had made the opening argument and the opposing counsel refuses to come forward, that no other attorney shall be permitted to take his place. This amendment can not do any harm to the present text of the bill.

Mr. GIBSON said, under the operation of this amendment, advantage would be taken in cases where, by some mishap, the opposing counsel fails to respond. He moved to lay the amendment on the table.

This motion was rejected.

The amendment was adopted.

Mr. BUSKIRK moved to amend Section 239 by striking out at the close of the section the word "sufficient," (being in the sentence "the single evidence of the cashier of the bank purporting to have issued the same may be received as sufficient"), and insert the following words: "And admit prima facie evidence."

The amendment was adopted.

The reading of the bill [H. R. 367] by sections was finished, and the biil was passed to the third reading by yeas, 81; nays, 0.

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