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Brevier Legislative Reports, Volume XIX XX, 1881, 475 pp.
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AFTERNOON SESSION.

Pursuant to order adopted yesterday morning, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the civil code bill [S. 271], concerning procedure in civil cases, commenceing at Section 586.

Mr. URMSTON moved to amend Section 766 so as to admit women to practice law in all the Courts of Justice in this State. The amendment proposes to add a new feature--one in keeping with the spirit of the times; and much can be said both for and against it. The most serious objection is the cry of unconstitutionality. See Section 21, Article 7. While this provision invests certain rights in voters, it does not say only the voter shall be allowed to practice. Will it admit of any other construction than that it does not limit? Surely no private right can be disturbed by adopting such amendment. If there should be a doubt our Courts of last resort would have to construe it, and, without doubt, would decide in favor of the constituionality of the pending amendment. It is only where laws infringe the constitutional restriction are they declared void. If there is a doubt, the Courts declare such laws operative.

Mr. BELL would be on the same side with the Senator who has just taken his seat but for the Constitutional provision referred to, which is too plain to be misconstrued. This Section does not pretend to exclude anybody, and we have no right to extend beyond its provisions the right to anybody to practice law.

Mr. URMSTON was unable to see anything unconstitutional in the amendment. Thereis already act permitting foreigners to practice in the Courts of this State, and if it be right to pass such a law, then this amendment could as well be incorporated in the statute.

The amendment was agreed to by yea, 28; nays, 16.

Mr. CHAPMAN moved to strike out the clause requiring an examination, upon motion, by the Judges or a Committee of the Bar. This amendment would leave the feature in the action as to moral character standing as it is. The provision he desired to eliminate was squarely in the teeth of the Constitution. The amendment just adopted is also squarely in the face of a Constitutional provision written in terms as simple as ideas can be clothed, limiting the practice of law to none but voters. That is the Constitution--the law paramount in the performance of all our duties. This is an attempt to build up barriers around the legal profession such as were prior to 1852, when no Court would admit a person to practice until after passing a regular examination before a Judge or a Committee appointed by a Judge. Upon examination of the debates it will be seen that members of the Consultation Committee desired to break down all barriers other than what is explicitly expressed.

Mr. VIEHE did not believe the Constitution prohibits any but voters to practice law. But the section under consideration, after the sixth line, contains matter of no importance, and should be stricken out. He offered an amendment so proposing.

Mr. BELL considered it incomprehensible that a lawyer should affirm. The Constitution does not exclude all but voters from practicing law. He desired to put on record his protest against the adoption of the amendment proposed by the Senator from Franklin (Mr. Urmston), being, as it assuredly is, in direct violation of the Constitution. And he opposed the amendment (Mr Viehe's) proposing to strike out so great a portion of the pending section.

Mr. GRAHAM favored the amendment. He regretted the feeling of sentiment--a kind of frivolity in legislation which should not be tolerated or encouraged--that brought about the adoption of the amendment proposed by the Senator from Franklin.

Mr. BROWN moved to reconsider the vote by which the words, "without regard to sex," were inserted in Section 766. It would be in violation of the Constitution, as well as the spirit of the members of the Constitutional Convention, as discovered by reading the debates, to fix any other qualification than is stated in the section referred to. Every Senator has a right to support the Constitution as his mind and conscience teaches him to understand it; but reason, logic, authority, practice and everything else is against the power of conferring the right on women to practice law. It is wrong to pass laws we know are in plain violation of the Constitution in the hope that the Courts will declare them operative.

The motion to reconsider was agreed to by yeas, 28; nays, 17.

The question recurring on the amendment [Mr. Urmaton's] which would permit women to practice law, it was rejected by yeas, 15 nays, 30.

Mr. COFFEY moved to strike out Section 858, requiring pleadings other than a demurrer to be filed in duplicate, and requiring receipts to be given for papers removed from Clerk's office.

Mr. TRAYLOR and Mr. GRAHAM favored the motion because it provided for unnecessary labor.

Messrs. WOOD and BROWN also regarded the section as working a hardship.

Mr. WOOLLEN had been urged by attorneys to favor the provisions in this section. Copying presses are not expensive.

The motion to strike out was rejected.

On motion by Mr. VIEHE, Section 859 was stricken out.

On motion by Mr. COMSTOCK, the clause "that no pleading, record or paper shall be removed page: 214[View Page 214] from the Clerk's office without special leave of the Judge," was stricken out.

Mr. MENZIES moved to reconsider the vote by which the lause was stricken out. Pending which--

The Senate adjourned till to-morrow.

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